No Truck with the Chilean Junta! by Jones, Ann
No Truck with the 
Chilean Junta!  
Trade Union Internationalism, Australia 
and Britain,1973-1980 

No Truck with the 
Chilean Junta!  
Trade Union Internationalism, Australia 
and Britain,1973-1980
Ann Jones
Published by ANU Press 
The Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia 
Email: anupress@anu.edu.au 
This title is also available online at http://press.anu.edu.au
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry  
 
Author:  Jones, Ann, author. 
 
Title:  No truck with the Chilean junta! : trade union 
  internationalism, Australia and Britain, 
  1973-1980 / Ann Jones. 
 
ISBN:  9781925021530 (paperback) 9781925021547 (ebook) 
 
Subjects:  International labor activities--History 
  Labor movement--History. 
  Labor unions--Australia. 
  Labor unions--Great Britain. 
  Labor unions--Chile--Political activity. 
 
Dewey Number 322.2
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system 
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, 
without the prior permission of the publisher.
Cover design by Nic Welbourn and layout by ANU Press
Cover image © Steve Bell 1987 - All Rights Reserved. http://www.belltoons.co.uk/reuse.
Printed by Griffin Press
This edition © 2014 ANU Press
Contents
Acknowledgments  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .vii
List of abbreviations   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . ix
Introduction  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1
Britain 
1 . The ‘principal priority’ of the campaign: The trade union 
movement   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 25
2 . A ‘roll call’ of the labour movement: Harnessing labour 
participation  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 63
3 . ‘Unique solidarity’? The mineworkers’ delegation, 1977  .  .  .  .  . 89
4 . Pinochet’s jets and Rolls Royce East Kilbride  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 117
Australia 
5 . Opening doors for Chile: Strategic individuals and networks   . 155
6 . ‘Chile is not alone’: Actions for resource-sensible  
organisations   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 181
7 . ‘Twelve Days in Chile’, 1974  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 201
8 . ‘Not one pound of wheat will go’: Words and actions   .  .  .  .  . 223
Conclusion  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 255
Appendix  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 265
Bibliography  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 269




This book would not have been possible without the generous thoughts and 
memories of the oral history participants. Those who gave liberally of their time 
are acknowledged in the footnotes as contributors to this history.
I would especially like to thank Mavis Robertson and Mike Gatehouse, whose 
generosity, kindness and consideration surpassed my expectations. 
I acknowledge the goodwill of the Rolls Royce East Kilbride Shop Stewards (2007), 
Mick Wilkinson, Colin Creighton, Barry Carr, Gustavo Martin Montenegro and 
Mike Gonzalez, who gave me access to their records.
The professionals of the archives deserve a special mention for their attentiveness 
and endurance. I would specifically like to thank Darren Treadwell at the 
People’s History Museum (Manchester), Carole McCallum at the Glasgow 
Caledonian University Archive, Penny Pemberton at the Noel Butlin Archives 
Centre (Canberra) and John Callow at the Marx Memorial Library (London). I 
also thank those archives and others acknowledged within which have granted 
permission to re-print images of the time.
I am indebted to Professor Paul Pickering, whose patience was exemplary 
throughout the process. The publication of this work would not have been 
possible without the contribution of The Australian National University’s 
Publication Subsidy Committee. 
The work towards this book has been the product of the curiosity, respect, 
social conscience and work ethic instilled in me by Helene and Garry Powell, 




ABB Australian Barley Board
ABCF Association for British–Chilean Friendship
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics
ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
ACTT Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied 
Technicians (UK)
ACTU Australian Council of Trade Unions
AEU Amalgamated Engineers Union (later AUEW) (UK)
AFL American Federation of Labor 
AFULE Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen
AI Amnesty International
AICD Association for International Cooperation and 
Disarmament (Aust.)
ALP Australian Labor Party
AMIEU Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union
AMWSU Amalgamated Metal Workers’ and Shipwrights 
Union (Aust.)
AMWU Amalgamated Metal Workers’ Union (Aust.)
APEX Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and 
Computer Staff (UK)
ARU Australian Railways Union
ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
ASIS Australian Secret Intelligence Service 
ASLEF Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and 
Firemen (UK)
ASTMS Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial 
Staffs (UK)
ATTI Association of Teachers in Technical Institutes (UK)
AUEW Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (UK)
AUEW TASS Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers Technical, 
Administrative and Supervisory Section (UK)
AWB Australian Wheat Board 
BLF Builders Labourers’ Federation (Aust.)
BLP British Labour Party
BWIU Building Workers’ Industrial Union (Aust.)
No Truck with the Chilean Junta!
x
CAC Chile Action Committee (Sydney, Aust.)
CCCD Canberra Committee for Chilean Democracy (Aust.)
CCHR Chile Committee for Human Rights (UK)
CEPCH Confederación de Empleados Particulares de Chile 
(Chilean Employees’ Confederation)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CICD Campaign for International Cooperation and 
Disarmament (Aust.)
CIO Congress of Industrial Organizations 
CITU Catholic International of Trade Unions
CPA Communist Party of Australia
CPGB Communist Party of Great Britain 
CPSA Civil and Public Services Association (UK)
CSC Chile Solidarity Campaign (UK)
CSCC Chile Solidarity Campaign Commission (UK)
CSC EC Chile Solidarity Campaign Executive Committee (UK)
CSCP Committee for Solidarity with the Chilean People 
(Aust.) 
CUT Central Unica de Trabajadores (Trade unions congress 
of pre-coup Chile)
DINA National Intelligence Directorate (Chile)
EETPU Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing 
Union (UK)
ETUC European Trade Union Council
FCC Free Chile Committee (Aust.)
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FDU Firemen and Deckhands Union (Aust.)
FEDFA Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen’s Association of 
Australia 
FIEMC Federation of Building Workers  
FINM Federación Industrial Nacional Minera (Chilean 
Mineworkers’ Federation) 
FTAT Furniture, Timber and Allied Trades (UK)
GCDC Glasgow Chile Defence Committee 
GDR German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GMWU General and Municipal Workers Union (UK)
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
List of abbreviations
xi
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Metalworkers Federation
IMG International Marxist Group (UK)
IS International Socialists (UK)
ISTC Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (UK)
ITF International Transport Workers’ Federation
ITT International Telephone and Telegraph Company 
JWG Joint Working Group (UK)
LCPC London Co-op Political Committee 
LCS London Co-operative Society
LCS-PC London Co-operative Society Political Committee
LHASC Labour History Archive and Study Centre (Manchester)
LPYS Labour Party Young Socialists (UK)
MAPU Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario (Popular 
Unitary Action Movement) (Chile)
MIF International Federation of Miners
MIR Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement 
of the Revolutionary Left) (Chile)
MWU Miscellaneous Workers’ Union (Aust.)
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NALGO National Association of Local Government Officers (UK)
NATFHE National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher 
Education (UK)
NATSOPA National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants (UK)
NCB National Coal Board (UK)
NGA National Graphical Association (UK)
NOLS National Organisation of Labour Students (UK)
NSWBLF New South Wales Builders’ Labourers Federation
NUDBTW National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers 
(UK)
NUGSAT National Union of Gold, Silver and Allied Trades (UK)
NUJ National Union of Journalists (UK and Ireland)
NUM National Union of Mineworkers (UK)
NUPE National Union of Public Employees (UK)
NUR National Union of Railwaymen (UK)
No Truck with the Chilean Junta!
xii
NUS National Union of Seamen (UK)
NUSMW National Union of Sheet Metal Workers (UK)
NUTGW National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers (UK)
PGEUA Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union of Australia
PLP Parliamentary Labour Party (UK)
POEU Post Office Engineers Union (UK)
PSNC Pacific Steam Navigation Company (UK)
RREK Rolls Royce East Kilbride
RREKSS Rolls Royce East Kilbride Shop Stewards
RREKWC Rolls Royce East Kilbride Works Committee
RRSSEK Rolls Royce Shop Stewards East Kilbride
SLADE Society of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers 
and Process Workers (UK)
SOGAT Society of Graphical and Allied Trades (UK)
SPA Socialist Party of Australia
STUC Scottish Trades Union Congress
SUA Seamen’s Union of Australia
SWL Socialist Workers’ League (Aust.)
SWP Socialist Workers’ Party (UK)
SZOT Hungarian Solidarity Campaign 
TGWU Transport and General Workers’ Union (UK)
TGWU GEC TGWU General Executive Council
TUC Trades Union Congress (UK)
TWU Transport Workers’ Union (Aust.)
UCATT Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians 
(UK)
UDM Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UK)
ULS University of London Students
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council 
UP Unidad Popular (Popular Unity Government)
USDAW Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (UK)
WCL World Confederation of Labour
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions
List of abbreviations
xiii
WUS World University Service (UK)
WWFA Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia




Figure 1 Chile Solidarity Campaign sticker.
Source: No Truck with the Chilean Junta, Chile Solidarity Campaign [hereinafter CSC], Box 1—Collecting 
tins, postcards, stickers, leaflets, People’s History Museum, Manchester. The slogan ‘No Truck’ was used in 
other contexts with other graphics. See, for example: Stop Chilean Copper Entering Britain, CSC CSC/16/1, 
Labour History Archive and Study Centre [hereinafter LHASC], Manchester. 
As a lorry driver in Northampton pulls himself up into the seat of his cab on a 
brisk morning before sunrise, he might not seem like an international political 
actor. But he is. As he reverses and glances through the back window of his 
truck, he looks past stickers. One of them reads: ‘NO TRUCK WITH CHILE!!’
It’s a seemingly inconsequential sticker, but it articulates something very grand 
in concept: that workers on one side of the world could alleviate the suffering 
of workers living under a dictatorship on the other.
On 11 September 1973, an alliance of the Chilean Navy, Air Force, Army 
and police seized power after attacking the Presidential Palace in the capital, 
Santiago. Their supporters legitimised the coup as being a people’s rebellion 
against an oppressive government.2 In reality, they had ousted a democratically 
elected coalition of socialists, communists, other left radicals and some centre-
aligned groups. Together, the coalition was called Unidad Popular (UP, or Popular 
Unity).3 Salvador Allende was the leader of the UP and a member of the Socialist 
Party of Chile; he was a Marxist who promoted socialist reforms. Trade unions 
had formed a strong support base for Allende’s government, and were integrated 
1 Please note: dates of archival titles are entered as written on the original source to aid identification of the 
document. Thus dates as a part of archival identification do not necessarily follow the academic guidelines of 
[day] [month] [year]. The [year] has been deleted in the citation if it is implicit within the title of the document. 
The titles of items in the archives had been italicised in order to aid comprehension.
2 Brian Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 105.
3 Samuel Chavkin, Storm Over Chile: The Junta Under Siege (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Company, 
1985), 45.
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firmly into sections of the administration.4 Popular Unity’s program of reforms 
was referred to as ‘la vía chilena al socialismo’ (the Chilean road to socialism), a 
unique path towards socialism particular to the Chilean situation. This peaceful 
and parliamentary way was part of a wave of alternative ideas that had begun a 
surge of popularity throughout the world, and the eyes of the global political left 
had turned to the slender Latin American country and its experiment.
After coming to power, Allende implemented a platform of reforms including 
the nationalisation of large industries. Consequently, there was an increase 
in hostility towards his government from several sources: the political right 
wing in Chile, multinational companies with interests in Chile, landowners 
and even the Roman Catholic Church. Meanwhile, those more radical than 
Allende criticised him for idealising institutions (such as the armed forces) as 
‘classless’ and ‘professional’.5 Allende believed that both his government and 
those institutions would respect the democratic process that had brought him 
to power. It was a fatal mistake.
The election of Allende in 1970 had been a ‘political and psychological blow’ 
to the United States of America.6 Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the American 
President for National Security Affairs, famously said, ‘I don’t see why we need 
to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its 
own people’.7 American manipulation in Chile followed years of involvement in 
the Vietnam War, which was also opposed by progressives, and to them Chile 
became another example of the evils of imperialist intervention. The actions of 
imperialist forces contributed to Chile’s instability and were embodied (for the 
international political left) by multinational companies such as International 
Telephone and Telegraph. 
The United States invested US$8 million opposing the election of Allende, and 
President Richard Nixon made it clear that there was more money available to 
the opponents of the Allende Government.8 Opposition parties were funded and 
4 Ronaldo Munck, The New International Labour Studies: An Introduction (London: Zed Books, 1988), 172.
5 The political ultra-left viewed the military as a bourgeois institution and potentially harmful to the success 
of the revolution. Salvador Allende, ‘The Role of the Armed Forces’, in Salvador Allende Reader: Chile’s Voice 
of Democracy, ed. James Cockcroft (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2000), 86–8.
6 Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993), 217.
7 Ibid., 103. The United States justified its interference in Chile because of the possible snowball effect that 
would spread socialism throughout the Western Hemisphere. The unstable economic and political nature of 
Chile’s neighbouring countries gave credence to the snowball theory, and President Nixon and his security 
advisor, Henry Kissinger, resolved to get rid of ‘that son-of-a-bitch Allende’. Paul Jensen, The Garotte: The 
United States and Chile, 1970–1973 (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1988), 18–19; Nixon, as quoted in 
Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile, 55.
8 Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile: 1808–1994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 355; see also p. 115.
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the media was manipulated.9 Of course, Chileans did have their own agency, 
and the crisis leading up to the coup was stimulated by a strike that congested 
the country. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported a truck drivers’ 
stoppage in October 1972 and again in July–August 1973, shutting down 
this essential transport system.10 Sympathetic shopkeepers, whole sectors of 
commerce, doctors, engineers, bankers, gas employees and lawyers later joined 
the drivers on strike, thereby worsening the crisis that was enveloping Chile. The 
impact of the boycotts on the Government was compounded by the congressional 
rebellion of the extreme left and right wings of the UP administration. The 
relationship of the Christian Democratic Party and the rest of the UP started to 
disintegrate under the pressure. 
The time was ripe for a coup.11
On the day of the military uprising, the president and a handful of supporters 
fortified themselves in the palace. Allende broadcast a final speech to the citizens 
of Chile before the radio station was bombed.12 He said: ‘Long live Chile! Long 
live the people! Long live the workers! These are my last words.’13 Soon after, it 
was announced that the president had died during a full-scale military assault 
that all but flattened the Presidential Palace. 
As the events recorded in this book were unfolding through the 1970s, the 
repression in Chile persisted. Decree 228 was put in place after the first wave 
of arrests, stating that the country was in a state of siege. Disappearances of 
citizens, summary trials and executions started and did not stop. In December 
1973 Decree Law 198, which limited trade union function, was established. 
Within a year of the coup, the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA) was set 
up and the state apparatus for political oppression became permanent. During 
the dictatorship in Chile, 100 000 people were detained in prison and 3000 
people were ‘disappeared’.14
9 See: Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile, 51–2, 64, 71; Chavkin, Storm Over Chile, 45; 
Loveman, Chile, 248; Jensen, The Garotte, 21, 217.
10 Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile, 69–70.
11 The United States had cut off formal support to all sectors of Chile except for the armed forces during 
Allende’s term. Military officers were trained at the School of the Americas where the syllabus included 
‘counterinsurgency’ techniques and pro-United States rhetoric. A military coup was seen as the first chance of 
mobilising the full military detachment of Chile in 100 years. Loveman, Chile, 259; Sigmund, The United States 
and Democracy in Chile, 66; Chavkin, Storm Over Chile, 70–1; Mark Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering 
the Truth (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 27.
12 Patrick Adams, ‘Deadly Politics: Salvaging Memories in Santiago’, Duke Magazine (September–October 2005).
13 James D. Cockcroft, ed., Salvador Allende Reader: Chile’s Voice of Democracy (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 
2000), 241.
14 Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, Vol. I/II (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 1122. Many people estimate this number to be much higher, for 
example: Chavkin, Storm Over Chile, 42.
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The intensity of images of these events initiated a wave of Latin American 
solidarity throughout the world, though radical engagement with Latin America 
was by no means new. Bands of men had left Britain in the 1800s to fight in 
Simón Bolívar’s war, and in the nineteenth century groups of Welsh settlers 
moved to Argentina, where they hoped to maintain their culture away from 
English influence.15 From Australia, William Lane led a socialist utopian group 
to settle in Paraguay, and Western engineers and other workers travelled to the 
southern cone of Latin America to seek their fortune in the railway and mining 
industries.16 These activities, plus their portrayal in popular fiction and media, 
contributed to the consistent idealisation of Latin America in the Anglophone 
world. Latin America was imagined as a continent full of commercial and 
sociopolitical opportunities for both sides of the political spectrum.
The period under study in this book falls between two important dates 
of post-World War II political left history: 1968 and 1989. After 1968 the 
topography of the left changed. New actors on the political stage emerged, 
such as women, gay people and students, and the Prague Spring caused many 
leftists to solidify their opinions against the ‘old’ left and become the ‘new’ left. 
The ‘old’ referred to the statist, Stalinist, Leninist approach as embodied by 
the USSR, which expressed itself in many ways, including through the world 
trade union movement. The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) was an 
institutionalised and hierarchical expression of old left trade unionism. It sat 
opposite the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the 
two organisations represented unions on opposing sides of the Cold War.17 
The political ‘new left’, in contrast, could be simply defined as a movement 
that expressed an alternative to the Marxist-Leninist ideology of Moscow.18 
It was, however, more complex. Peter Shipley explained the term as a ‘flag of 
convenience … a transmutable portmanteau, capable of changing its size and 
shape to accommodate all who fulfil basic qualifications of internationalism, 
anti-Stalinism and anti-capitalism’.19 The new left aimed to challenge, but not 
15 Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Studies in Modern 
History (London: Longman, 1993); Gerald Martin, ‘Britain’s Cultural Relations with Latin America’, in Britain 
and Latin America: A Changing Relationship, ed. Victor Bulmer-Thomas (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
press, 1989); Ross G. Forman, ‘When Britons Brave Brazil: British Imperialism and the Adventure Tale in Latin 
America, 1850–1918’, Victorian Studies 42, no. 3 (1999–2000); see also Kevin Foster, ‘Small Earthquakes and 
Major Eruptions: Anglo–Chilean Cultural Relations in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in Democracy 
in Chile: The Legacy of September 11, 1973, ed. Sylvia Nagy-Zekmi Fernando Leiva (Brighton: Sussex Academic 
Press, 2005), 41–51.
16 Gavin Souter, A Peculiar People: William Lane’s Australian Utopians in Paraguay (St Lucia, Qld: University 
of Queensland Press, 1991).
17 Similarly, there was a division in the world peace movement between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet factions.
18 Willie Thompson, The Left in History: Revolution and Reform in Twentieth-Century Politics (London: Pluto 
Press, 1997), 159.
19 Peter Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain (London: The Bodley Hear, 1976), 207.
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overthrow, the government. Accordingly, the coup in Chile shattered more than 
the broad front of Chilean radicals—it fuelled a firestorm of arguments over left 
strategy around the world.20 
New left activists tried to insert socialist ideas at the base of the new social 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s.21 As a consequence, the new left was 
popularised internationally and became associated with student rebellion, war 
protest and civil rights.22 These causes, and the new left along with them, were 
linked with the growing popularity of socialist humanism—an embodiment 
of romantic moralism. Phrases like these are what point towards the intense 
emotion of the political movements of the time, including Chile solidarity.23 
As a part of Antonio Gramsci’s ‘hegemonic project’, the new left sought to create 
a lens through which reality could be perceived, and so turned towards culture 
as a way of establishing a socialist mentality in the populace.24 This emphasis 
was prevalent in sections of the left in both Australia and Britain.25 So while 
the new left may have been politically weak in the traditional sense, it had an 
immense cultural vitality.26 In both Britain and Australia there were attempts to 
establish broad fronts, which included activists, independents, political parties, 
students and other groups during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
The new left was, however, on the wain by the end of Allende’s government. 
Willie Thompson has noted that the ‘revolutionary potential’ of the political new 
left had dissipated by 1974; similarly Chun lists 1978 as its final year of strength.27 
The political movement may have passed, but the concept of the broad front and 
the cultural legacy of the new left continued. Even though the boundaries of its 
influence will never be clear, it certainly affected Chile solidarity. 
In Britain, the new left’s legacy was embodied in the growth of the student 
movement and the increased appearance of single-issue campaigns.28 In 
Australia the ideas of the new left were incorporated into a long history of 
militant behaviour, a history that should not be (according to Richard Gordon) 
20 See, for example: Ralph Miliband, ‘The Coup in Chile’, The Socialist Register 1973 (London: Merlin Press, 
1974), 451–74.
21 Ibid., 190.
22 Lin Chun, The British New Left (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993), 193.
23 Ibid., 118.
24 Thompson, The Left in History, 184.
25 Chun, The British New Left, 113.
26 The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and the Socialist Party of Australia were not classified as 
new left, though both used some new left strategies. Michael Rustin, ‘The New Left as a Social Movement’, 
in Out of Apathy: Voices of the New Left Thirty Years On, eds Robin Archer, Diemut Bubeck and Hanjo Glock 
(London: Verso, 1989), 119.
27 Thompson, The Left in History, 197; Chun, The British New Left, 194; see also p. 118.
28 Chun, The British New Left, 108.
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mistaken for true radicalism.29 Since the split of 1968, Australia’s Communist 
Party had been rather independent of the Soviet line; yet, it was born of the 
Cominform-aligned communist party, and as such, the ideas of the new left it 
chose to adopt were built on a continuation of the old.30 
How did trade unions fit into this political split between the new and the old?
Lin Chun has noted that the ideas that flowed in the 1970s are hard to catalogue 
as new left or non-new left, and I would argue union actions are similarly 
difficult to classify.31 Trade unions behaved like they always had: they were the 
product of a long history of international and extra industrial activity. In the 
constitutions of most unions international brotherhood and concern for society 
are explicit even when overt socialist rhetoric is not present and regardless of the 
status of union leaders of the ‘old’ or ‘new’ left. Trade unions had participated 
in the Spanish Civil War, the peace and disarmament movements and in actions 
for Indonesian independence and against the Sino–Japanese conflict.
It can be said that the solidarity movement was, in its initial stages, reactionary.
The images of the first days after the coup appeared on television screens and in 
newspapers around the world, burning images of the detentions and bombings 
into the minds of the public.32 The descriptions of the repression provoked 
an outcry from people and groups with an interest in democracy as well as 
socialism and justice. They mourned Allende and the fracture of the Chilean 
experiment and declared solidarity with the ‘Chilean people’, though often this 
declaration was not as inclusive as its phrasing indicated. The movement was 
just as much about the perception of Chile prior to the coup (the Allende years 
as well as a general idealisation of Latin American workers and peasants), as it 
was about the fate of the Chilean people during the dictatorship. 
In short, the solidarity movement was as much about the perceived Chilean 
past as it was about its present and future. In fact, sometimes it was not about 
Chile at all. Peter Shipley has also noted that solidarity campaigns were ‘more 
pertinent to revolutionary activism at home’ than to events in other countries.33 
Ideological conflict in the labour movement is not often presented in ‘crude 
29 Richard Gordon and Warren Osmond Gordon, ‘An Overview of the Australian New Left’, in The 
Australian New Left: Critical Essays and Strategy, ed. Richard Gordon (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1970), 10.
30 Phillip Deery and Neil Redfern, ‘No Lasting Peace? Labor, Communism and the Cominform: Australia and 
Great Britain, 1945–50’, Labour History 88 (2005).
31 Chun, The British New Left, 153.
32 Alan Angell, ‘The Chilean Coup of 1973—A Perspective Thirty Years Later’, El Mercurio, 24 August 2003.
33 Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 114.
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self-interested terms’, but in reality unionists frequently used external issues 
to contest ideological themes via existing union structures.34 Chile’s past and 
present were used to aid political strategy in local internecine battles. 
The coup in Chile did not cause Latin American solidarity, but it did transform 
the political and cultural significance of Latin American solidarity organising. 
The solidification of the dictatorship added a moral tone that spread the Chile 
issue beyond the overtly political pre-coup relationship.35 Soon there were 
blatant human rights violations to campaign against, along with a shattered 
socialist dream to mourn and democracy to fight for. 
The Chile solidarity movement provides a window into labour movement 
interaction with social movements in the 1970s. It aids understanding of how 
networks, ideas and key individuals affect political trade union action. It 
supplies examples of a single-issue movement’s efforts to popularise protests 
around their own aims. For these reasons, and in their own right, the Chile 
campaigns deserve more detailed study than the casual mentions in trade 
union and radical histories that they have received to date, and more serious 
contemplation than the glorified or nostalgic memories of participants.36 While 
there are some limited works on Chile solidarity, this is the most substantial 
work on these campaigns thus far. In this book the trade unionists of the Chile 
solidarity movement take centre stage.
There have previously been three works with a focus on Chile solidarity, only 
two of which (both masters theses) concentrate on the British Commonwealth.37 
Michael Wilkinson focused on British Chile and Nicaragua solidarity campaigns.38 
He traced their achievements as lobby groups in positive and negative lobbying 
environments. Gustavo Martin Montenegro, a Chilean immigrant to Australia, 
wrote the second study in Spanish. He amassed an impressive amount of 
material, but does not explain or unpack the detailed workings of Australian 
solidarity in the text. Both of these works recognise that trade unions played a 
part in solidarity but do not seek to understand the actions of organisations in 
more depth than a general notion of left alliance. 
This is a grave oversight. Trade unions were essential to the Chilean solidarity 
movement: throughout the dictatorship one union or another provided the 
34 David Plowman, ‘The Victorian Trades Hall Split’, in Australian Unions: An Industrial Relations 
Perspective, eds Bill Ford and David Plowman (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1983), 304.
35 Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Oakland, NC: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2006), 456.
36 See, for example: Stephen Deery, ‘Union Aims and Methods’, in Australian Unions: An Industrial 
Relations Perspective, eds Bill Ford and David Plowman (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1983), 75.
37 The other is: Herbert Berger, ‘The Austro–Chilean Solidarity Front, 1973–1990’, in Transatlantic 
Relations: Austria and Latin America in the 19th and 20th Centuries, eds Gunter Bischof and Klaus Eisterer 
(Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2006).
38 Wilkinson was formerly involved in Latin American solidarity movements.
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base of support for solidarity activities. Trade unionists were among the most 
committed individuals to the solidarity movements, and were openly courted 
by the Chile campaigns as likely recruits for a good cause.
This publication does not attempt to provide the reader with the history of 
the Chilean military regime, which eventually came to be known outside Chile 
as the Pinochet dictatorship.39 Where events in Chile are referred to, it is to 
accomplish a more detailed understanding of the transnational nature of the 
solidarity movements in question, or because the event affected decision-
making or strategy within the solidarity movements in some way. Furthermore, 
this book does not attempt to include a detailed study of the Chilean diaspora, 
or a comprehensive reconstruction of political or social identities in exile. Nor 
does it focus on the activities of personalities in exile, such as Joan Jara and 
Luis Figueroa, though their movements are partially tracked. This project does 
not claim to uncover memory of the dictatorship, or accuse governments or 
businesses of mismanagement or conspiracy. Finally, it is not an attempt to 
understand Chilean unionism, or the pressure of the dictatorship on it.40
What this work does do is bring together previously ignored and forgotten 
sources with newly collected testimonies to record a partial history of the Chile 
solidarity movement in Britain and Australia. A series of previously unrecorded 
or under-recorded case studies of trade union political action is provided. To 
do this, a mass of archival sources, newspapers, ephemera, artwork, music and 
oral history interviews has been employed. By describing trade union action 
in the movements under study, which previous scholarship has neglected, 
these activists, actions and organisations are rescued from the ‘enormous 
condescension of posterity’, as E. P. Thompson so succinctly put it in 1963. 
In addition to incorporating neglected information into the historical record, 
this work responds to the criticism of the academic treatment of internationalism 
levelled by Peter Waterman and Jill Timms in 2005. ‘Case studies of international 
solidarity actions are so rare’, they wrote, ‘that they tend to be repeatedly 
reproduced, as if the references or cases speak for themselves and do not require 
critical examination or reinterpretation. There are few comparative, interpretive 
and movement-oriented studies.’41
On another occasion Waterman has also noted that work on labour 
internationalism has been narrow, concerned with single cases and not theoretical 
39 Most Chileans do not call it a dictatorship (dictadura), but ‘the junta’ (junta) or, with a slight sense of 
irony, the ‘little junta’ (juntita).
40 See: Guillermo Campero, Trade Union Responses to Globalization: Chile, report for Labour and Society 
Programme (Geneva: ILO, 2001).
41 Peter Waterman and Jill Timms, ‘Trade Union Internationalism and a Global Civil Society in the Making’, 
in Global Civil Society 2004–5, eds Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Marty Kaldor (London: Sage, 2005), 198.
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in approach.42 John Logue is similarly disparaging of academics’ explanations 
of international trade union activity, which, he writes, are ad-hoc collections 
of leaders’ rationales, descriptions of events and casual linking to economic 
factors.43 In this publication, I have attempted to deploy and extend the work 
of theoreticians such as Waterman through historical reconstructions. The 
layered international and intra-national comparative aspects as well as the 
exhaustive archival research contained in these pages also go some of the way 
to meeting these critiques. 
The field of comparative labour studies continues to grow and this publication 
contributes an illustrative comparison by assessing many units in relation to 
theory.44 Despite the fact that the labour movements of Britain and Australia 
vary substantially in terms of their size and depth of bureaucracy, age and 
geographical area, they still lend themselves to evaluation.45 The first unions 
in Australia were in fact branches of their British relatives, and the definition 
of ‘trade unions’ in Australian legislation is based on the British Trade Union 
Act of 1871.46 British radicals have looked to Australia as a new world where 
compulsory arbitration and the possibilities of the federal system came together 
in a workingman’s paradise.47 By the end of World War II, the labour movement 
in Australia had long outgrown any childlike need, yet it was not until 1968 
that the Amalgamated Metal Workers’ Union officially separated from its British 
parent union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union.48 It is obvious, therefore, 
that growing from the strong tradition of the Tolpuddle Martyrs, the roots of 
Australian unionism are firmly lodged within the rich soil of British traditions. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s both movements were mature and blossoming, yet 
the substantial divergence in the trends and styles of unionism in both countries 
gives life to this comparative project. The inclusion of two nations in the study 
also tempers the exceptionalist tendency that often plagues labour historians 
and trade union histories.49 Furthermore, laying the two movements side by 
42 Peter Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms (London: Continuum, 2001), 5.
43 John Logue, Toward a Theory of Trade Union Internationalism (Kent: Kent Popular Press, 1980), 16.
44 Stefan Berger and Greg Patmore, ‘Comparative Labour History in Britain and Australia’, Labour History, 
no. 88 (2005), 10. 
45 See, for example: ibid., 18; Leighton James and Raymond Markey, ‘Class and Labour: The British Labour 
Party and the Australian Labor Party Compared’, Labour History, no. 90 (2006), 222–9; Mark Bray, ‘Democracy 
from the Inside: The British AUEW(ES) and the Australian AMWSU’, Industrial Relations Journal 13, no. 4 
(2007), 84–93; Andrew Scott, ‘Modernising Labour: A Study of the ALP with Comparative Reference to the 
British Labour Party’ (PhD diss., Monash University, 1999); Neville Kirk, Labour and the Politics of Empire: 
Britain and Australia 1900 to Present (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011). 
46 Donald William Rawson, A Handbook of Australian Trade Unions and Employees’ Associations (Canberra: 
Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, 1973), 3; Greg Patmore and David 
Coates, ‘Labour Parties and State in Australia and the UK’, Labour History 88 (May 2005), 121–40.
47 Neville Kirk, ‘Why Compare Labour in Australia and Britain?’, Labour History, no. 88 (2005), 1–7.
48 Bray, ‘Democracy from the Inside’, 85.
49 Berger and Patmore, ‘Comparative Labour History in Britain and Australia’, 20.
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side, including various levels of unions from workplace to peak body, enables 
a multilayered comparison both intra and inter national, which is very unusual 
and undertaken implicitly and explicitly throughout the book. 
Perhaps the most well-known comparative study of Britain and Australia is 
Neville Kirk’s Comrades and Cousins.50 In it, Kirk focuses on the differences and 
similarities between national labour movements. The comparison contained in 
this publication differs substantially from that undertaken by Kirk. This work is 
bi-national, and it does compare the two nations broadly speaking, but is more 
intensely comparative in the cross-union and cross-activity spheres. This is due 
to a focus that includes low and mid-level decision-making and action in unions 
rather than solely those of the upper echelons. 
The restricted period of the work, from 1973 to 1980, is not representative of the 
whole Chile movement in either country. There were two main phases of both 
movements and the transition between them occurred around 1980. In broad 
terms, the second half of the Chile solidarity movement moved towards a human 
rights campaign with an entirely different set of actors, and in Britain it had a 
feminist focus. In Australia, the second half of the movement was dominated by 
Chilean exiles. Consequently, trade union and labour involvement in the Chile 
movements changed substantially in the 1980s. It would be impossible to give 
adequate attention to the campaigns’ duration in one book, and for this reason 
I present a partial history of the movements.51 
It is important to note, also, that Chile actions were not just responsive 
activities driven by ideology, they were also influenced by the mobilising effect 
of rhetoric;52 the power play between unions, unionists and political groups; 
pressure or inaction from the union hierarchy; opportunities for action created 
by social movements; genuine concern for Chilean citizens; publicity campaigns; 
internationalist identity; the expectation of radical engagement; and tension 
between ‘bread and butter’ issues and activism. These factors will be elucidated 
at length through the body of this work.
I attempt to avoid a confined political narrative by illustrating these pressures 
in depth. Chile solidarity was more than a narrow expression of brotherhood 
between two groups of the working class: it was an expression of the idealism 
of those who wished to change their world. Chile solidarity was not isolated 
from other ideological movements or historical occurrences of the time. Rather, 
it formed part of the cluster of radical and progressive thinking of the 1970s. 
50 Kirk also recently published Labour and the Politics of Empire. The next largest publication is probably 
the special issue of Labour History, volume 88, published in 2005.
51 Due to the same restrictions on space, this work does not include every action undertaken in solidarity 
with Chile.
52 John Kane, The Politics of Moral Capital (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 8.
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As Robert Saunders observed about Chartism in the previous century, the Chile 
cause was similarly bundled together with other issues and ideology in the 
popular consciousness, and its identity could not be separated from those issues 
(imperialism, multinational companies, local political party machinations and 
human rights, for example).53
The pages of this book are separated by geography into two sections. Within 
the sections is a series of case studies, vignettes and biographical sketches. The 
first chapter of each half maps the organisational space in which the solidarity 
movement existed, populating it with its actors: trade unionists, politicians, 
activists, immigrants and organisations. This helps provide a prosopographic 
view of those involved in the movements. It is in these two chapters that the 
landscapes of the Chile solidarity movements are articulated. The next three 
chapters provide case studies of internationalist action and synthesise a repertoire 
of action the labour movement would undertake for remote political gain.
These six chapters are divided by type of trade union action: indirect actions 
organised from without, indirect actions organised from within and the final 
chapter of each section attends to direct industrial action. It is, of course, 
immediately necessary to elaborate those categories. 
Trade union politics: direct and indirect action
If we consider trade unions to be a type of sectional, interest or representative 
pressure group, it is reasonable to assume they would have a permanent structure 
established to service their organisational aims.54 Professor of human resource 
management Stephen Deery notes that there are four general union objectives, 
the fourth of which is political. The first three are ‘provision of direct services to 
members; improved conditions of employment; [and] organisational security’.55 
‘Political or non-industrial objectives’, he writes, ‘have always been regarded 
as a legitimate item of trade union business although few organisations have 
actually resorted to the use of industrial action in the pursuit of such matters’.56
Deery puts it very clearly: the aims of Australian unions are ‘largely restricted 
to the negotiation of limited improvements within the framework of capitalist 
work relations’.57 Bob Hawke, president of the Australian Council of Trade 
53 Robert Saunders, ‘Chartism from Above: British Elites and the Interpretation of Chartism’, Historical 
Research 81, no. 213 (2008), 467.
54 Timothy May, Trade Unions and Pressure Group Politics (Westmead, UK: Saxon House, 1975), 3; Denis 
Barnes and Eileen Reid, Governments and Trade Unions: The British Experience, 1964–79 (London: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1980), 190.
55 Deery, ‘Union Aims and Methods’, 63.
56 Ibid., 89.
57 Ibid., 62.
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Unions (ACTU) for much of the period of the Chile solidarity movement, said 
‘maximisation of gains for its members’ social as well as material gains—is the 
prime objective of the union movement’.58 A few years later, however, Hawke 
said: 
We have a responsibility to in fact use our own strength, our accumulated 
and cohesive strength in a way which will not only assist those who 
are directly in our ranks but also to assist those who are less fortunate 
and less privileged than ourselves and less able to look after their own 
interests.59 
This humanitarian sentiment underpins the international actions of trade unions 
and works in conjunction with the socialist ideology and romantic moralism 
already described.
Trade union actions with extra-industrial aims fall into two main categories: 
‘direct’ (industrial) tactics and ‘indirect’ (party-political) tactics. 
Direct tactics include boycotts, walk-offs, sit-ins, black bans, refusals to service 
or go-slows. Those strategies may be aimed at goods representative of the issue 
(in this case, from Chile), or a general stoppage will be signalled as having a 
political aim through posters, press releases, meeting attendances and leafleting 
(indirect actions when used alone). 
Indirect tactics include political lobbying, sponsorship of parliamentarians, 
affiliation to political parties and forwarding of resolutions.60 Particularly 
pertinent to the Chile campaign is the indirect action of trade union involvement 
in social movements. Their attendance at meetings, demonstrations and 
speaking engagements, for example, contributed to political goals in an indirect 
manner.61 Union (direct and indirect) action for non-industrial issues, where 
those actions attempted to change trade union or government policy from 
outside the electoral framework, could be interpreted by opposition forces as 
a constitutional challenge.62 Yet the potential for disruption of internal union 
harmony did not stop action occurring.
58 Bob Hawke, in D. W. Rawson, Unions and Unionists in Australia (Hornsby, NSW: George Allen & Unwin, 
1978), 99.
59 Bob Hawke, in Deery, ‘Union Aims and Methods’, 75.
60 It is hard to quantify the exact effects of sponsorship of parliamentarians due to the doctrine of 
parliamentary privacy. May, Trade Unions and Pressure Group Politics, 4, 28, 33; Deery, ‘Union Aims and 
Methods’, 87.
61 Timothy May divides indirect actions into two: constitutional actions and symbolic actions. May, Trade 
Unions and Pressure Group Politics, 99.
62 Deery, ‘Union Aims and Methods’, 75–6.
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In order to locate union action for Chile within academic discourse it is necessary 
to outline the relevant abstract theoretical definitions as they have developed 
over time. These definitions also help to elucidate nuance in the union actions 
and interactions as they are revealed through the book. 
I’m not going to lie: the definitions are confusing. 
Over many years, historians, social scientists and theorists have laboured their 
points and created their own phrases. I have attempted to synthesise that below. 
Internationalism: international unionism and 
union internationalism
The labour movement itself was conceived as internationalist in aim and 
construction and the concept of labour ‘internationalism’ first emerged from the 
Marxist-Leninist Internationals.63 Internationalism, writes Waterman, a leading 
scholar in the area, ‘is generally understood as a left-wing or democratic project 
for creating relations of solidarity between social classes, popular interests, 
and progressive identities, independently of, or in opposition to, the state or 
capital’.64 As a term, it has almost universally positive connotations even though 
it inherently places the conception of ‘nation’ above any other political unit.65
Despite the supposed opposition to the state, the international labour movement 
was born out of socialist thought and socialist language and often supported an 
ideal type of state.66 Peak union bodies, such as the ACTU or the Trade Union 
Congress (Britain), could express their internationalism through their affiliation 
with international organisations such as the ICFTU or WFTU, which were 
still divided along Cold War lines in the 1970s. These organisations, literally 
international unions, provided national organisations with the chance to 
communicate, meet and organise.67 Such institutionalised union internationalism 
was easily undertaken by unions and rarely required industrial action. As 
already implied, it forms a part of ‘trade union internationalism’; however, it is 
not its only expression. 
63 Waterman and Timms, ‘Trade Union Internationalism and a Global Civil Society in the Making’, 
179; Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 17. Logue also asserts 
that internationalism in trade unions predates Marxist ideology. Logue, Toward a Theory of Trade Union 
Internationalism, 9.
64 Waterman and Timms, ‘Trade Union Internationalism and a Global Civil Society in the Making’, 179.
65 Perry Anderson, ‘Internationalism: A Breviary’, New Left Review 14 (March–April 2002), 1.
66 Ian Schmutte, ‘International Union Activity: Politics of Scale in the Australian Labour Movement’ 
(Master of Philosophy diss., University of Sydney, 2004), 43–4.
67 Mike Press, ‘The People’s Movement’, in Solidarity for Survival: The Don Thompson Reader on Trade Union 
Internationalism, eds Mike Press and Don Thompson (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1989), 28.
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Trade union internationalism, as a term, covers an array of activities across all 
levels of unionism.68 First, there is international unionism as already discussed. 
Second, bilateral union relations, where unions develop direct links with 
their equivalent in other countries, also express internationalist sentiment.69 
Frequently, though not exclusively, bilateral relations centre on industrial 
issues and strategy sharing and are most often clustered around an industry 
similarity (such as garment makers) or a singular business (such as all employees 
of Toyota). Still, the relationship is based on a Marxist ideal of a brotherhood 
of class, and the terms ‘trade union internationalism’ and ‘internationalist’ 
continue to carry that connection.
The third and final, at least for our purposes, expression of trade union 
internationalism is the engagement in local action for non-local political gain 
(for example, happening in Melbourne to influence Syria). This action does not 
necessarily require a specific union or unionist to be the object of internationalist 
sentiment nor does it need an industrial aim. It may be with the aim of ‘peace’, 
for example, or ‘the Chilean people’. When international action has political 
motives (that is: non-industrial aims), Marcel van der Linden writes, it is in 
general ‘aimed at promoting or opposing a particular political model’.70 Local 
trade union action and interaction with a social movement for non-local political 
gain mean this final category of internationalist expression is the most referred 
to in this publication.
Transnationalism
It must be said that there are more definitions in circulation, including 
proletarian/contemporary/labour/trade union/new labour internationalism, 
however, arguments towards their characterisation do not benefit this study.71 
68 Ibid., 179; Jeffrey Harrod and Robert O’Brien, ‘Organized Labour and the Global Political Economy’, in 
Global Unions? Theory and Strategies of Organized Labour in the Global Political Economy, eds Jeffry Harrod and 
Robert O’Brien (London: Routledge, 2002). Van der Linden acknowledged that ‘proletarian internationalism is 
a more multiform and less consistent phenomenon than is often supposed’. Marcel van der Linden, ‘Proletarian 
Internationalism: A Long View and Some Speculations’, in The Modern World-System in the Longue Duree, ed. 
Marcel van der Linden (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2005), 107–31.
69 Mark Anner, ‘Local and Transnational Campaigns to End Sweatshop Practices’, in Transnational 
Cooperation among Labor Unions, eds Michael E. Gordon and Lowell Turner (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2000).
70 van der Linden, ‘Proletarian Internationalism’, 111; Peter Waterman, ‘The New Social Unionism: A New 
Union Model for a New World Order’, in Labour Worldwide in the Era of Globalization: Alternative Union Models 
in the New World Order, eds Ronaldo Munck and Peter Waterman (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1999), 255.
71 Trade unions did and do engage in a significant amount of international politics and political actions for 
the benefit of people in other nations. The actions are not restricted to workers (proletarian internationalism), 
are not necessarily ‘new’ or ‘contemporary’ (Waterman’s version) and are not automatically moving anything 
but moral support or a projection of identity across borders (transnationalism). Proletarian internationalism: 
van der Linden, ‘Proletarian Internationalism’, 107. Contemporary internationalism and new labour 
internationalism: Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 50, 52, 134; 
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It is necessary to mention, however, a currently fashionable term in academic 
history: transnationalism.72 Transnationalism was actually formed as the 
academic reaction to the traditional manner of approaching international 
relations called ‘realism’. Realism supposes that domestic and international 
politics are completely separate. Transnationalism argues the opposite. This idea 
is supported through the case studies still to come, but the term ‘transnational’ 
implies the carriage of something or someone across a border, and this restriction 
is one of the reasons it is not used exclusively in this book: actions may be 
international in intent only.73 
Many actions discussed within these pages could be classified as transnational 
and many of the actors most certainly were, but ‘internationalism’ was the 
term used by those who undertook the actions and ‘transnationalism’ is a 
term imposed upon the past by academics.74 In ideological terms, the word 
‘internationalism’ meant something to them, just as it has a political connotation 
for us. For this reason, internationalism is employed in the main.
Just as you come to grips with internationalisms, I must add another layer 
of complexity, because international interactions involving trade unions are 
products and partners of models of union function, which are defined below.
Industrial national unionism
The structures of ‘traditional’ or ‘old’ international interaction are linked to what 
is called ‘industrial national unionism’, and adhere to a hierarchical and largely 
bureaucratic system focused on traditional industrial issues.75 The industrial 
national framework is the national expression from which ‘international 
unionism’ springs. Where it strays outside the industrial sphere, this type of 
internationalism tended to follow a more paternalistic aid model, promoting a 
structured hierarchy in unionism and politics.76 In general, the self-perpetuating 
Schmutte, ‘International Union Activity’, 9, 53, 54; Chun, The British New Left, 94–5. Labour internationalism: 
Barry Carr, Labor Internationalism in the Era of NAFTA: Past and Present (Miami: Latin American Labor 
Studies Publications, 1995), 4.
72 Peter Willets, Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-
Governmental Organizations (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), xiv.
73 Anner, ‘Local and Transnational Campaigns to End Sweatshop Practices’, 245.
74 Michael Hanagan, ‘An Agenda for Transnational Labour History’, International Review of Social History 
49 (2004), 456. 
75 Waterman and Timms, ‘Trade Union Internationalism and a Global Civil Society in the Making’; Kim 
Moody, ‘Towards an International Social-Movement Unionism’, New Left Review i, no. 225 (1997). Or 
‘National/Industrial/Colonial Unionism’ in Peter Waterman, ‘Trade Union Internationalism in the Age of 
Seattle’, in Place, Space and the New Labour Internationalisms, eds Peter Waterman and Jane Wills (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001), 9.
76 Peter Waterman, ‘Trade Union Internationalism in the Age of Seattle’, 11, 14; Press, ‘The People’s 
Movement’, 39.
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bureaucracy of these organisations tended to ensure they support activities that 
reflect their own forms of unionism, and their internationalism has been called 
‘fraternal tourism’ or ‘banquet internationalism’.77 It has been prone, to use the 
words of Waterman’s succinct chapter subtitle, to being confined to paternal 
‘North–South internationalism’ and in the process reproduces the imagery of 
‘noble savages and promised lands’.78 
In 1980, John Logue described a particular idiosyncrasy of industrial national 
unionism, which is perceived to be absent in the international interaction of 
other forms of unionism: ‘international working class solidarity becomes an 
independent force for continued international activity … It comes, in a way, 
to represent a good in itself. Born of international action, it becomes a reason 
for international action.’79 This is reminiscent of the well-known ‘iron law of 
bureaucracy’ outlined by the sociologist Robert Michels: the international 
tendency is self-replicating and self-supporting. 
By the period of this study, however, industrial national unionism’s self-
perpetuating tendency had been placed under organisational pressure due to 
changes in the international nature of capital. To paraphrase van der Linden, 
it was challenged by the formation of trading blocs (such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA), the proliferation and dominance of 
multinational (or transnational) companies and the increasing number of non-
governmental organisations that took on causes that were previously on the 
agenda of the labour movement.80 Industrial national unionism was aligned with 
the old left and was not traditionally active in seeking a broad front, yet in the 
new conditions and with the new left, unions began to act outside the industrial 
national framework, as the model does not allow for the partnership of labour 
with social movements or other groups. This led to the theoretical development 
of another model of unionism.
Social movements and new social movements
The model put forward by scholars is ‘social movement unionism’, but before 
attempting to define the paradigm, a question arises that is outside the scope of 
this publication but nevertheless integral to it and the types of unionism to be 
described: was the Chile solidarity movement a social movement at all?81
77 Ronaldo Munck, ‘Labour in the Global’, in Global Social Movements, eds Robin Cohen and Shirin Rai 
(London: The Athlone Press, 2000), 98. 
78 Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, xiii.
79 Logue, Toward a Theory of Trade Union Internationalism, 35.
80 van der Linden, ‘Proletarian Internationalism’, 122–4.
81 Wilkinson characterises the Chile Solidarity Campaign (CSC) as a ‘lobby group’. While some aspects 
of the CSC functioned as a political lobby group, defining it as such overlooks some rhetoric, functions and 
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The definition of social movements is no easy task because, again, no consensus 
is present in the literature. Theorist Sidney Tarrow has argued that social 
movements are collective challenges with common purpose, social solidarity 
and sustained interaction.82 Consensus—that is, unanimity in relation to the 
core values of the movement—has also been noted by Frank Parkin as important 
to social movements,83 though such broad statements could easily describe trade 
union organisation or even a football club.
Writing in 1974, John Wilson constructed a typology of social movements that 
included four types (transformative, reformative, redemptive and alternative). 
For Wilson, a social movement was a mindful, organised attempt to encourage 
or prevent change in society from outside its institutions.84 He continued to 
thicken his description and wrote that social movements
function to move people beyond their mundane selves to acts of bravery, 
savagery, and selfless charity. Animated by the injustices, sufferings, and 
anxieties they see around them, men and women in social movements 
reach beyond the customary resources of the social order to launch their 
own crusade against the evils of society.85
Wilson’s model is usefully expanded if we consider the work of Jan Pakulski. 
Pakulski argues that social movements are ‘recurrent patterns of collective 
activities which are partially institutionalised, value oriented and anti-systemic 
in their form and symbolism’.86 The Chile movement seems to fit into these 
definitions, even though it did not only lobby for change to occur within its 
host countries.87 Having said that, many commentators have acknowledged that 
strategies of the CSC such as liaison with rank-and-file unionists and the use and creation of culture. Michael 
Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby on British Government Policy towards Latin America: 
1973–1990’ (Master of Politics diss., University of Hull, 1990).
82 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 3–4; Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 6.
83 Frank Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1968).
84 John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 8.
85 Ibid., 5.
86 Jan Pakulski, Social Movements: The Politics of Moral Protest (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991), xiv. 
87 The beneficiaries of the ‘lobbying’ were meant to be Chileans within Chile. Further, another question 
is raised about scale: how large does an organised campaign need to be in order to be called a movement—
though this question is beyond the scope of this short literature review.
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the phrase ‘social movement’ has been used and abused by many academics, 
social theoreticians, activists and the general public.88 Pakulski argues that the 
flexibility of its use and meaning is what makes the term attractive.89 
As the Chile campaigns specified their aims as political solidarity and change of 
government in Chile, it seems they fit into the paradigm of a social movement. 
The question then arises: were the interactions between the Chile solidarity 
campaigns and trade unions a form of social movement unionism? In order to 
answer this question in the body of the book, it is necessary to define ‘social 
movement unionism’.
Social movement unionism
The term social movement unionism was originally coined by Peter Waterman 
and later used by Kim Moody and others.90 This ‘new’ unionism highlighted 
the social responsibility of labour and allowed trade unions to create practical 
relationships with community groups in order to achieve their extra-industrial 
goals. Social movement unions do not function in an exclusively hierarchical 
or vertical manner, as in industrial national unionism, but also horizontally, 
facilitating shopfloor alliances across borders or participating in direct contact 
88 For example, Verity Burgmann has stated that a social movement makes demands on the state from 
within society rather than from within the structures of the state. While this at first seems to be a term 
that could fit the Chile solidarity movement, Burgmann continues that social movements are made up of 
imagined communities of the ‘oppressed, disadvantaged or threatened’. Many of those involved in the Chile 
movement in the period under study were not personally oppressed. In terms of the creation of culture, I 
believe Burgmann fell into a trap of connecting union function paradigms (social movement unionism) and 
political strategies (new left cultural extension), which are not necessarily as intimately associated as could be 
assumed. Verity Burgmann, Power, Profit and Protest: Australian Social Movements and Globalisation (Crows 
Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003), 4. There are also competing ideas on social movements: Byrne has noted 
that social movements are unpredictable (do not always arise where there is the greatest need), irrational (not 
motivated by self-interest), unreasonable (feel justified in their protest) and disorganised (deliberately refrain 
from organisation). As a definition, this is the least likely to let the Chile solidarity movement fit into its scope 
for reasons that are apparent through the body of this work. Paul Byrne, Social Movements in Britain (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 10–11. Cohen and Rai propose that ‘human rights social movement’ is an umbrella term 
that would take in indigenous rights, antiracism, anti-dictatorship and freedom campaigns. Robin Cohen 
and Shirin Rai, ‘Global Social Movements: Towards a Cosmopolitan Politics’, in Global Social Movements, 
eds Robin Cohen and Shirin Rai (London: The Athlone Press, 2000), 1–17; John Keane, Global Civil Society? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Pakulski, Social Movements, xiv.
89 Its flexibility also leads to opacity and subsequently attempts to specify meaning with more and still 
more variations of the term, like new social movements. ‘New social movements’ were founded in the 1960s 
culture of revolution, of anger and a sense of change being possible. New social movements were thought to 
be those that did not pitch their arguments for or against the state, but around the state. Thompson, The Left 
in History, 193.
90 I maintain its use here, despite Waterman’s change to new social unionism of 1999. He implemented 
this change to free the term of the Third World-ist connotations. Waterman, ‘The New Social Unionism’, 
247–64; Kim Moody, Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy (London: Verso, 1997); 




and liaison with new left or social movement groups. Social movement unions 
undertake lobbying of government and regulatory agencies and also the provision 
of practical aid, grassroots action, delegations and campaigns to raise awareness.91 
The accepted definition of social movement unionism is ‘an alliance within the 
class (waged/nonwaged), and/or between the class and the popular/community 
(workers/people, labour/nationalist)’.92 This straightforward explanation 
requires, however, more detail. The theory was developed, according to 
Waterman, from his experiences as an activist in the 1980s and 1990s.93 What 
is more, Waterman constructed the concept of social movement unionism as 
an interaction between theories, not as a direct explanation of the relationship 
between social movements and labour, as it has been popularly employed. 
Waterman came to construct social movement unionism by combining socialist 
trade union theory and new social movement theory of the late 1980s.94 It is not 
my intention to take part in ‘depriving’ the theorem of its ‘critical function’, 
but some practicality must be considered, as this work is an attempt to actually 
apply the abstract theories to real case studies.95 
Despite commonsense pointing towards social movement unionism as an 
adequate paradigm to explain union action in this study, it is actually interlaced 
with problems. First, as already mentioned, the original intent of the framework 
was not its application to historical events. Second, the theories and experiences 
from which it was constructed are from a different time period. Third, the 
definition Waterman used in his combination to construct social movement 
unionism was not ‘social movements’ (which, as already established, include 
the Chile solidarity movement), but ‘new social movements’.96
The confusing abstract underpinning these terms weakens their possible 
usefulness for the application to a study of labour history. 
Waterman and Timms have written that despite the proliferation of theories, 
the intertwined and interdependent relationship between unions and social 
movements does not find a theoretical expression.97 They state that ‘the growing 
91 Carr, Labor Internationalism in the Era of NAFTA, 6.
92 Peter Waterman, ‘Adventures of Emancipatory Labour Strategy as the New Global Movement Challenges 
International Unionism’, Journal of World-Systems Research x, no. 1 (2004), 221. Further, the term social 
movement unionism has been consistently applied in a Third-World context, where international unions 
aided communities in the Third World. Waterman, ‘The New Social Unionism’; Waterman, ‘Adventures of 
Emancipatory Labour Strategy as the New Global Movement Challenges International Unionism’, 247.




96 Ibid., 220–1. 
97 Waterman and Timms, ‘Trade Union Internationalism and a Global Civil Society in the Making’, 194.
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presence of international unions within the global justice and solidarity 
movement in general … might suggest a development in the direction of some 
kind of “international social movement unionism”’.98 
But note: they specify ‘international unions’, not unions acting internationally 
and not unions expressing internationalism.
There exists much material around social movement unionism, new social 
movement unionism, international social movement unionism, global unionism, 
political unionism and various other permutations.99 I do not intend to add 
to the pool of confusing acronyms. For the purposes of this study, the term 
social movement unionism will be used to designate an organisational form 
that simply allowed trade unions to create practical relationships with other 
community groups in order to achieve their extra-industrial goals.100 It is 
popularly considered to be diametrically opposite to and mutually exclusive 
of the ‘old’ industrial national unionism. The manner in which unions moved 
between the two styles is an inherent focus of this research and one that is left 
to simple explanations of ‘organic’ transformation by theorists.101 One of the 
principal findings of the research undertaken for this book is that the forms 
were not in fact discrete. 
98 Ibid., 198.
99 Waterman asserts that old social movements were about religion and nation. ‘New social unionism’ 
implies an alliance between labour and new alternative social movements (one further theoretical and temporal 
step away from ‘new social movements’ and two away from ‘social movements’). Waterman, ‘The New Social 
Unionism’, 247. ‘Social unionism’ (an opposition to traditional unionism) attempts to secure standards for 
workers from within the capitalist system through a three-way partnership with state and business; social 
unions aim for equality and justice and socially mobilise in that direction. George de Martino, ‘The Future 
of the US Labour Movement in an Era of Global Economic Integration’, in Labour Worldwide in the Era of 
Globalization: Alternative Union Models in the New World Order, eds Ronaldo Munck and Peter Waterman 
(Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1999), 85. Political unionism is where a union allies itself with a party of the left 
and works to support their platforms. This, in effect, would make the union and the worker passive, and does 
not explain the integration into a social movement. It also offers a one-dimensional political agenda that is rare 
in reality. Mike Press, ‘International Trade Unionism’, in Press and Thompson, Solidarity for Survival: The 
Don Thompson Reader on Trade Union Internationalism, eds Mike Press and Don Thompson (Nottingham: 
Spokesman, 1989), 24; Moody, ‘Towards an International Social-Movement Unionism’, 4.
100 Waterman noted that unions had taken on their forms based on the organisation of capital, and had 
retained those forms, long after capital itself had changed (here Waterman is referring to the structures of 
industrial national unionism). Unions, he argued, were thus unable to effectively protect their constituents. 
New global social movements had moved away from an organisation to a network model, which more accurately 
matched current trends of capital and power flow. ‘The old socialist and thirdworldist internationalisms are 
today little more than so many empty shells—a series of ideologically-defined, institutionalized and competing 
internationalisms of politicians and officials having little contact with workers or peoples.’ Waterman, ‘The 
New Social Unionism’, 250; see also p. 55; Waterman, ‘Trade Union Internationalism in the Age of Seattle’. 
101 Perhaps there is a stepping-stone. The Chile campaigns began just as the new left was in fashion 
throughout the world. As elucidated in this volume, the strategies of the new left locked trade unions and 
social movement groups into a reinforcing cycle of support. The Chile movement was part of the ‘new wave 
of non-sectarian and democratic international solidarity activities’ of the 1970s that does not receive the 
academic attention it deserves in terms of its relationship with unions. The movements in both Australia 
and the United Kingdom roughly fit the ideology of the ‘new left social movements’ outlined in passing by 
Verity Burgmann. She noted that social movements harnessed the industrial language of the labour movement 
to succeed in changing the existing regime: it was the only language capitalists would understand and it 
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Having explored the abstract categories necessary for this study, it is important 
to recognise what has already been hinted at: the history that follows does 
not have an adequate explanation in the current theoretical literature. This 
book will record expressions of internationalism and I will attempt to place 
them within abstract paradigms, but theories or theoretical arguments over 
international social movement unions, new international unionism, social 
movement unionism or industrial national unionism will not obscure the actual 
history of the Chile campaigns. This work infers the usefulness of these theories 
is not in categorising union action but in helping to elucidate the politics of real 
people in often difficult situations. 
The biggest point of confusion around the models previously defined arises 
when the attempt is made to align a union model with a type of internationalism, 
a definition of a social movement, an incarnation of left ideology and a type of 
trade union political action. The terms do not split neatly down the middle, 
aligning with ‘old’ and ‘new’, ‘rigid’ and ‘flexible’, ‘industrial national’ and 
‘social movement’ or ‘hierarchical’ and ‘grassroots’. Where the social movement 
unionism and industrial national paradigms serve this publication is in providing 
end points between which an assumed progression occurred: bookends between 
which I can locate historical actions.
Trade union internationalist action borrows elements of the ideology and 
strategy of various models without excluding others, and unions regularly 
slid backwards and forwards across the progressive scale. Exploring the 
Chile campaigns in detail dissolves the boundaries between what have been 
considered finite and discrete models. This book, starting with Chapter One, 
brings political science models to the history, but more importantly, brings this 
history to light. 
was considered their only chance at success. This comment prompts an important question: was the Chile 
movement a new left social movement and, by default, were the unions involved new left unions? Chile 
solidarity was about democracy and socialism, human rights, peace, justice and solidarity and was a broad-
front movement in both Britain and Australia. The title alone, however, would imply support of new left 
politics, not just strategies, and in this way the term loses validity for this study of Chile solidarity. Many 
unions, unionists and union leaders who were involved in Chile solidarity were determinedly not new left. 
While unions were incorporated into social movement function during the campaign, the Chile solidarity 
movement may have been more ‘old’ than ‘new’, simply because its aim was to capture nation-state power (in 





1. The ‘principal priority’ of the 
campaign: The trade union  
movement
On 11 September 1973 Mike Gatehouse slept through his alarm. 
The twenty-seven-year-old was meant to be at work at a computer centre at 
the Forestry Institute in Santiago, Chile. Instead he dozed in his small flat on 
Ezaguirre Street. When he woke he went to the balcony at the front of the flat 
and looked down the street. From there he could see that the military putsch 
had finally come. 
The Chilean Communist Party had previously issued a general instruction to its 
supporters to proceed to their place of work at the first sign of the imminent 
civil war. So Gatehouse set off. Crossing the city to the Forestry Institute in La 
Reina took much longer than usual as he avoided main roads. He couldn’t see 
any fighting, but he could hear gunshots. 
He arrived at the institute to find that the reality of the first hours of the perceived 
civil war were actually ‘domestic and mundane’.1 Those who had children and 
families left the institute to retrieve them from school or to check on their safety. 
Hours passed. A military curfew was put in place and Gatehouse found himself 
stuck in the institute. Later still, he recalled his escape: cleaners smuggled him 
out of the institute and took him to a home in a nearby shantytown.2 Meanwhile 
helicopters hovered above the town, sweeping the area with random bursts of 
machine-gun fire.3
Slowly all radio stations were taken over and it became obvious that the coup 
had been successful. Shock descended on Santiago.4 ‘I will never forget’, recalled 
Gatehouse, ‘the press, radio and television images of the new dictatorship: 
1 Interview with Mike Gatehouse (Chile activist, UK), 3 August 2007 [hereinafter Gatehouse Interview, 
2007], copy in possession of author. For ease of reading, disfluencies such as ‘um’ have been removed from all 
oral history quotations. 
2 The director of the institute, Federico Quilodrán, and other colleagues did not escape in time. They were 
arrested and taken to the National Stadium. The National Stadium is a sporting complex in Santiago. It was 
used as a detention centre in the first years of the dictatorship and has since been renamed the Victor Jara 
Stadium in honour of one of the most famous victims of the regime.
3 Mike Gatehouse, ‘Testimony: Detainee Remembers Chile 1973’, BBC News Online, 23 October 1998, accessed 
28 July 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/10/98/the_pinochet_file/198743.stm>.
4 It had previously been theorised that a coup would not be successful. It was thought that internal divisions 
in the military would allow trade unions and the people to rise up and oppose the coup.
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the harsh robotic voice and the blank face masked by dark glasses of General 
Pinochet, who represents for me everything that is cruel, destructive, bigoted 
and philistine’.5
Pamphlets had been dropped all over Santiago instructing the denunciation of 
foreigners, and Gatehouse was at risk because of his involvement in a progressive 
food-allocation program set up by the Unidad Popular Government.6 Despite 
warnings from friends, Gatehouse returned to his flat. He found it had been 
ransacked. He was there for only a short time, but long enough for a neighbour 
to alert the police. On his way down the stairs, he was confronted by armed 
police and it was claimed there had been an arsenal of weapons in the flat. 
He was now a prisoner of the military government of Chile. 
At the nearest police station, Gatehouse was accused of being a Cuban, despite 
his blonde hair, blue eyes and English accent.7 Hours passed. Then, as part 
of a small group of prisoners, he was ‘taken out at gunpoint and forced to lie 
face-down on the floor of a bus, police with sub-machine guns standing astride’ 
the group.8 The fear was paralysing. They moved him to the National Stadium 
where he became one of thousands of prisoners in the large sporting complex.9 
Armed soldiers guarded the prisoners. More soldiers with machine guns were 
stationed behind sandbag shelters around the stadium. The violence ‘wove into 
a pattern of brutality, part casual and part systematic’, wrote Dick Barbour-
Might, another Briton interned in the stadium.10 Gatehouse remembered that 
‘the “cells” into which we were herded were the team changing rooms. There 
were 130 prisoners in ours, and at night we were so tightly packed that we could 
sleep only by lining up in rows and lying down “by numbers”, dovetailing 
heads and feet.’11
He recalled the food they were given. Previously, the UP Government had set 
up a pilot program of restaurants in one of the main parks in Santiago. There, 
workers could take their families and enjoy high-quality, subsidised restaurant 
meals. With thousands of prisoners in the stadium, the military rounded up the 
chefs and forced them to cook for the prisoners. The incarcerated knew the food 
was from the little pilot UP village in the park, and occasionally someone would 
5 Gatehouse, ‘Testimony’.
6 Ibid.; Chile Solidarity Campaign CSC, El Arte para el Pueblo (London: Chile Solidarity Campaign, 1974).
7 Carabineros are the police force of Chile. They are regarded as the fourth armed force and their leader was 
included in the original junta that took power from Allende. 
8 Gatehouse, ‘Testimony’.
9 Gatehouse to Basnett, December 30 1976 Re: Scottish Football Team to play Chile, CSC, CSC/1/12, LHASC, 
Manchester.
10 ‘Detained in Chile’, Dick Barbour-Might, New Statesman, September 28, 1973, Scottish Trades Union 
Congress [hereinafter STUC], Scottish Trades Union Congress Archive [hereinafter STUCA], 507/2, Glasgow 
Caledonian University Archive [hereinafter GCUA], Glasgow.
11 Gatehouse, ‘Testimony’.
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come across a hunk of meat that a sympathetic chef had risked putting into the 
food for the prisoners. The origin of the sustenance gave them hope and buoyed 
their spirits, though the amount of food was pitiful.12
Most of Gatehouse’s memories of the stadium are of a much more traumatic nature:
The man next to me in my cell was … a Brazilian engineer, named Sergio 
Moraes, he had worked in a factory called Madeco … 
When he returned [from interrogation] he could hardly hear or speak: 
he had been hooded and beaten about the head and ears with a flat 
wooden bat. He told us that among his interrogators were Brazilian 
intelligence officers. 
I never knew what happened to him, but an Amnesty International 
researcher who went to Santiago some weeks later was told by a military 
official: ‘I hope to god we killed him’.13
The British Embassy finally discovered Gatehouse’s location in the National 
Stadium and negotiated with the military for his freedom. He would be released 
on the condition he leave the country. He had been interned for seven days.14 
The coup in Chile changed Mike Gatehouse. He left the country reluctantly, 
having established a life and invested ideological and emotional energy in the 
UP project. The destruction of his Chilean life, his imprisonment and the death 
of his friends disoriented him. It was a dramatic and traumatic return to Britain. 
He arrived on 2 October 1973 full of pain and anger and eager to share the story 
of his last moments in Chile. He threw himself into the work of Chile solidarity, 
speaking, typing and duplicating. It was the beginning of an activist’s lifestyle 
from which he has never fully emerged. 
Writing about nineteenth-century radicals in Britain, historian David Hamer 
described the attributes of those he called ‘faddists’: ‘faddists were people who 
were possessed of a vision and also filled with indignation and the fundamental 
wrongness, indeed the evil, of the existing state of affairs.’15
Hamer goes on to suggest that for many faddists their cause became an 
obsession—‘the object to which their lives were consecrated’.16 Hamer’s tense is 
important: he clearly believes faddism was a thing of the past. In fact, he insists 
that ‘faddism is most emphatically not a twentieth century subject’ and that it 
12 Gatehouse, in conversation with author, 2007.
13 Gatehouse, ‘Testimony’.
14 Gatehouse to Basnett, December 30 1976 Re: Scottish Football Team to play Chile.
15 David Hamer, The Politics of Electoral Pressure: A Study in the History of Victorian Reform Agitations 
(Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1977), 1.
16 Ibid., 1.
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had disappeared from political discourse by 1900.17 He was wrong. Though the 
word itself had accumulated other connotations, the research in these pages is 
constructed from the historical record left by twentieth-century faddists (in the 
original sense). Discard the negative connotations of modern popular culture, 
and this word describes the people upon whose dedication the Chile cause and 
the Chile campaigns were built and sustained. 
One of them was Mike Gatehouse. Despite his self-effacing and low-key manner, 
Gatehouse had a major impact on the campaign. He would become one of the 
most important and dedicated figures in the Chile solidarity movement in Britain.
Gatehouse’s role was based firmly in the political arm of the solidarity movement 
embodied by the Chile Solidarity Campaign (CSC). This chapter outlines the 
formation and function of that organisation, arguing that CSC operation, despite 
its formal hierarchy and institutionalised labelling, remained the product of 
the idiosyncrasies of those involved.18 The CSC is placed in the context of the 
British labour movement, and the interaction of political parties and trade 
unions with the campaign is discussed in detail. The peculiarities of British 
trade union politics and the interstices in the structure of the labour movement 
made it possible for individuals to have disproportionate influence in the left. 
These individuals would become the most important tactical acquisitions of 
single-issue campaigns such as the CSC. 
Strategic individuals—only some of them modern faddists—formed webs 
of contacts that John Baxter termed an ‘interlocking directorate’.19 Select 
individuals could be more important strategically due to their bundled 
affiliations and acquaintances, and they might be called an interconnected node. 
As the political left expanded in the 1960s and 1970s to include solidarity and 
liberation movements, these new causes came to rely on the individuals with 
accumulated connections for success. 
Individuals could also bring moral capital to the campaign. ‘Moral capital’, writes 
John Kane, ‘is credited to political agents on the basis of the perceived merits of 
the values and ends they serve and of their practical fidelity in pursuing them’.20 
17 Ibid., 2.
18 Other groups encompassed by the Chile solidarity movement which will be dealt with in footnotes are: 
CSC Cultural Committee and Chile Lucha, the Chile Committee for Human Rights (CCHR), Academics for Chile, 
World University Service (WUS) and the Joint Working Group (JWG) for Refugees from Chile. The arrival 
of more substantial numbers of immigrants caused the Centro Unica de Trabajadores (CUT, the trade unions 
congress of pre-coup Chile) to nominate representatives and take an office in London. The group of individuals 
‘Chile Lucha’ was in charge of the magazine Chile Lucha (literally, ‘Chile Fights’). In this publication, the group 
will be referred to as Chile Lucha and the publication as Chile Fights.
19 John L. Baxter, ‘Early Chartism and Labour Class Struggle: South Yorkshire 1837–1840’, in Essays in 
the Economic and Social History of South Yorkshire, eds Sidney Pollard and Colin Holmes (Barnsley: South 
Yorkshire County Council, Recreation Culture and Health Department, 1976), 139.
20 Kane, The Politics of Moral Capital, 20.
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The need for moral capital in an organisation such as a solidarity campaign 
stems from the fact that rationality alone cannot be relied upon to mobilise.21 
Moral capital has a ‘crucial supportive role’ in public and political life that is not 
apparent until that capital disappears, as it legitimises persons, positions, offices 
and campaigns.22 While it was imperative for solidarity organisations to attract 
moral capital through individuals and affiliations, the campaigns themselves 
could also bestow capital on participants, as will be demonstrated in the pages 
that follow.
This detailed description of the Chile solidarity movement provides an 
opportunity for preliminary assessment of the critical reasons for and against 
trade union political action. Ian Schmutte has argued that ‘[u]nions make 
purposive decisions about the deployment of scarce resources to achieve their 
goals’.23 This is called rational choice—that is, maximum benefit for minimal 
loss—in internationalist actions. The unions in these pages could be called 
‘rational maximisers’. Regardless of ideology, the likelihood of union action 
for an external cause was inversely related to its potential impact on the 
membership. 
Trade unions formed part of a web of organisations in the Chile solidarity 
movement, and mapping the web is no easy task: the network of organisations 
and individuals is daunting. Prior to the coup there had already been solidarity 
organisations and, naturally, these were the first to express disapproval of the coup. 
Mike Gatehouse arrived from Chile to find a flurry of activity as the CSC was 
emerging from pre-existing organisations such as the Association for British–
Chilean Friendship (ABCF) and Liberation. The association was formed during 
the Allende administration, and in February 1973 the group boasted 168 
members including artists, academics and intellectuals such as Dick Barbour-
Might, Betty Tate, Celia Bower, George Hutchinson and Pat Stocker. As a group, 
they professed solidarity with the UP administration and published a bulletin 
called New Chile. The group had strong rhetoric against multinational companies 
and published booklets on the International Telephone and Telegraph Company 
and information on Kennecott and their dealings in Chile. 
Despite their strong international focus, they were aware of the importance 
of attracting the support of British trade unions. Even before the coup, at the 
annual general meeting in 1973, it was resolved ‘[t]hat the A.B.C.F. should, 
during the coming year, develop political support for Chile, particularly 
amongst British trade unionists, in order to expose the machinations of 
21 ‘Reliance on moral persuasion declines in proportion as political order succeeds in accruing power and 
has, consequently, more and different means available for consolidating itself.’ Ibid., 16.
22 Ibid., 11.
23 Schmutte, ‘International Union Activity’, 3.
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multinational corporations’. Immediately before the coup, as the situation in 
Chile deteriorated, they issued a leaflet that stated in upper case: ‘WE IN THE 
BRITISH LABOUR MOVEMENT URGENTLY CALL UPON BRITISH WORKERS 
TO EXPRESS THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH CHILEAN WORKERS IN THEIR 
STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM.’24
The focus on trade unions would be inherited by the Chile Solidarity Campaign, 
as the main post-coup solidarity group became known, but the political emphasis 
would shift. The Chile campaign was a broad alliance of left groups, centralised 
in a small office in London. It was, as with any broad front, subject to tension 
within its organisation, and furthermore, the CSC was often victim of the 
external tensions between its affiliates, whose relationships extended beyond 
solidarity into the industrial sphere.25 There were also substantial committees 
in both Liverpool and Scotland and the latter ran almost completely separately 
from the London-based committee.26 
The first meetings of the CSC were held at the House of Commons, but soon the 
meetings moved to the ‘wonderfully chaotic’ office of Liberation in Caledonian 
Road, London.27 The first letters sent from the Chile Solidarity Campaign 
Committee were on the Liberation letterhead. Steve Hart, secretary of Liberation 
24 The leaflet was signed by the following labour movement leaders and organisations: Bill Simpson; Ron 
Hayward; Judith Hart; Ian Mikardo; Alec Kitson; Jack Jones; Hugh Scanlon; George Smith; Alf Allen; Richard 
Briginshaw; Dan McGarvey; Terry Parry; Cyril Plant; Joe Craworf; Leslie Buck; Lawrence Daly; Alan Fisher; 
George Doughty; Charles Grieve; Alan Sapper; John Slater; Roy Grantham; Harry Urwin; BLP; TGWU; AUEW; 
Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT); Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied 
Workers (USDAW); National Society of Operative Printers, Graphical and Media Personnel; Amalgamated 
Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and Structural Workers; Inland Revenue Staff Federation; 
National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers; National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, 
Coppersmiths, Heating and Domestic Engineers; National Union of Miners; AUEW TASS; Tobacco Workers’ 
Union; Association of Cinematograph Television and Allied Technicians; Merchant Navy and Air Line Officers 
Association; Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff; National Union of Public 
Employees. This is a prime example of an interlocking directorate. When the coup occurred, they mobilised 
support for the Chilean Embassy, the ambassador, Alvaro Bunster, in particular, and more generally supported 
the formation of a representative national solidarity committee to be formed. Association for British Chilean 
Friendship, 1975, CSC, CSC/28/2, LHASC, Manchester; Association for British–Chilean Friendship: AGM Feb 
16th. Secretary’s Report, 1973, Etheridge Papers: Longbridge Shop Stewards, MSS.202/S/J/3/2/184, MRC 
[hereinafter Modern Records Centre], UW [hereinafter University of Warwick], Coventry; Hutchinson and 
Tate (ABCF) to TUC, 18th September 1973, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/1, MRC, UW, Coventry.
25 Interview with Barry Fitzpatrick (journalist, National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants 
representative to the CSC), 28 July 2007 [hereinafter Fitzpatrick Interview, 2007], copy in possession of author.
26 The Merseyside committee was extremely active and boasted a very high level of union involvement. Due 
to restriction of length rather than interest or importance, the focus of this chapter is the London committee. 
For a short history of the Merseyside CSC, please refer to: Angie Thew et al., Commemorative Programme for 
the Premiere Screening of Cruel Separation (Liverpool: Merseyside Chile Solidarity Committee, 2008). Some 
Scottish history is included in Chapter Four.
27 Liberation was a small organisation that was started in the 1940s as the Movement for Colonial Freedom. 
At the time of the coup in 1973, it boasted prominent BLP member Stan Newens and Robert Hughes MP as its 
joint chairmen. Liberation served as a springboard for more specific single-issue campaigns such as the CSC. 
Mike Gatehouse, in Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby on British Government Policy towards 
Latin America’; Gatehouse Interview, 2007; CSC Executive Committee: Minutes of the meeting held at Liberation 
on February 5, 1974, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
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and its only full-time staff member, worked with the CSC for the first year. 
Hart had been a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) at 
Cambridge University in the early 1970s, after which he moved to work for 
Liberation.28 Hart was the youngest son of Dame Judith Hart MP, who was at the 
time regarded as the foremost expert on Latin America within the Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP).29 
Soon after he arrived back from Chile, Gatehouse put his distress and culture 
shock aside, and contacted Amnesty International, impatient to give his 
testimony on the occurrences in the National Stadium.30 He also connected with 
the CPGB and spoke to their branches.31 He remembered that in December he 
started to attend campaign committee meetings: ‘and I suppose people starting 
to get to know me and I was wanting to, by what ever means, to work on Chile 
with the whole of my consciousness. And so, in some way or another it was 
suggested that I become Joint Secretary’ of the CSC.32
Working at first from the Liberation offices and soon after moving into the 
London Co-operative Society (LCS) building on Seven Sisters Road, Gatehouse 
and the twenty-two-year-old Steve Hart were joint secretaries of the CSC for the 
first year of its existence.33 
Waterman has defined solidarity committees as ‘voluntary organizations set 
up with the purpose of providing publicity, political support and financial 
28 He later went on to work at a Ford factory and become an officer in the Transport and General Workers’ 
Union. Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
29 She was a keen supporter of the Chile campaign and a member of BLP and labour movement delegations to 
Chile both before and after the coup. Judith Hart, ‘Chile: Not the End of the Road for Socialism’, Tribune [UK], 
14 September 1973; Chile Now: Initial Report of the Labour Movement Delegation (London: Chile Solidarity 
Committee, 1984); Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby’. 
30 Amnesty International went on to work closely with the ‘non-political’ Chile Committee for Human 
Rights (CCHR). The CCHR aimed to relieve substandard human rights within Chile. It remained as non-
political as possible to enable alliance with church and other groups such as Amnesty International. It 
employed the energy and fame of people such as Joan Jara and Sheila Cassidy as well as testimony of refugees 
in order to garner support. Joan Jara was the English wife of the famous Chilean new song artist Victor 
Jara, who was brutally killed by the Chilean military in the first days after the coup. Sheila Cassidy was a 
British medical doctor detained and tortured by the military in Chile. After her release, the revelations of 
her treatment caused the British ambassador to be withdrawn from Chile. Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the 
Solidarity Lobby’.
31 Gatehouse was, while in Chile, very close to the Chilean Communist Party. He joined the CPGB on his 
return. In 1974, the CPGB had just less than 30 000 members; it was a sizeable and powerful organisation. 
Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 219.
32 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
33 The ‘committee’ was only tacked onto the name for the first period of the dictatorship, but was soon 
dropped in common conversation to simply become CSC. The LCS Education Committee let the small front 
office to the CSC for a minimal price. The LCS Political Committee worked with the campaign quite often and 
at its helm was Alf Lomas, who would go on to represent the United Kingdom in the European Parliament. 
The CSC office at Seven Sisters Road was happily situated close to a pub called ‘The Rainbow’, where the 
secretaries used to eat a counter meal with a pint in the evenings before returning to work in the office. Tony 
Gilbert, Only One Died (London: Kay Beauchamp, 1974), 49; Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
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assistance to foreign peoples, organizations and even states’.34 The 1970s and 
1980s saw a wave of these groups, which could be semi or fully institutionalised, 
but even taking this into account, Waterman believes the groups were closer 
to social movements than to semi-state bodies.35 They were not a part of the 
institutionalised labour movement and had flexibility and freedom to innovate 
because of that.36 Yet their position outside the traditional hierarchy necessitated 
the energies of various leading personalities of the left to pull together the 
substantial resources and ideological impetus needed to establish a broad 
left campaign. It could not have been achieved by the two joint secretaries 
alone, despite Hart’s family connections. International secretary of the CPGB, 
Jack Woddis, was strongly in favour of the campaign remaining a broad left 
conglomerate. ‘And that was very important’, said Gatehouse, ‘because 
elsewhere, right across Europe, solidarity campaigns differentiated and split 
quite early on, because the various Trotskyist groups took the general view that 
Chile was the prime example of the failure of communism’.37
The International Marxist Group (IMG) and Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP) were 
the two main Trotskyite groupings in Britain at the time of the coup. Ensuring 
the CSC was an inclusive, broad front would appease some of their criticism of 
both it and the UP Government with the aim of keeping the focus on solidarity. 
The CPGB’s support for the broad front sustains the notion put forward by 
Shipley that the CPGB acted as a progenitor of other left enterprises, although he 
prefixes that with ‘reluctant’, which does not match Woddis’s attitude towards 
the CSC.38 Though the party was not known as a new left organisation, by actively 
encouraging a broad front, the CPGB utilised one of the new left’s defining 
strategies. It then had a relationship with others through the united front, like 
Raul Sol, an expatriate Chilean journalist who was well known in British left 
circles.39 The British left had learnt important lessons from a disastrous split in 
34 Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 132.
35 Ibid., 139.
36 They were, however, a ‘traditional part of the democratic and socialist movement’ from the early 
nineteenth century. Ibid., 132, 35.
37 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
38 Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 24.
39 Raul Sol ‘was, in some senses, [a] charismatic, highly intelligent very intellectual person’, who held the 
respect of many of the Chilean and British left. Sol had established himself by taking an offer to go to the 
Falklands to get the ‘scoop’ on the invasion. According to Gatehouse, Sol ‘clearly formulated the idea that we 
should be a unified Campaign and however much there might be disagreement among the segments within 
the Campaign, that there was much more to be gained for everyone by hanging together than by hanging 
separately’. This idea was supported by a move towards a broad left front within the National Union of 
Students in the 1970s. Gatehouse Interview, 2007; Interview with Mike Gatehouse (Chile activist, UK), 13 
August 2008 [hereinafter Gatehouse Interview, 2008], copy in possession of author; Shipley, Revolutionaries 
in Modern Britain, 46.
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the Vietnam solidarity movement, as well as from watching the splits within the 
French Chile solidarity movement. There was thus a predisposition to keep the 
movement united.40 
Consequently, the CSC functioned as a broad left representative organisation 
that gathered members through an affiliation and local committee system. Trade 
unions were encouraged to affiliate at different levels, from national to branch, 
as were other groups such as political parties, student movement organisations 
and trades councils. Individuals were able to join too. Affiliations were sought 
through circulars, direct letters and speeches at demonstrations, fringe meetings 
and conferences.41 For their fees, affiliates received copies of the CSC magazine, 
Chile Fights, and the bulletin Chile Monitor. These were both important assets of 
the movement, as it has been noted that communication is the nervous system of 
international solidarity movements.42 Only affiliation by unions at the regional 
committee or national level resulted in a representative on the CSC Executive 
Committee.43 
Affiliation brought both inertia and stability to the CSC. The bureaucratised 
nature of the relationship meant that once a union affiliated it was very likely 
they would remain so in the future and continue to pay affiliation fees.44 The 
future was almost certain for the committee, at least in terms of funding.45 Trade 
unionist Brian Nicholson said at a conference in 1982 that the CSC’s strength 
came ‘from the hundreds of party branches, trade union district committees 
and branches, trades councils and individual Labour Movement activists who 
are affiliated to the Campaign. It is they who ensure that there is real solidarity 
action with the Chilean People’46 (my emphasis).
40 Having said that, it was not without its problems, especially in the early years. See, for example: Minutes 
of the National Action Conference on Chile, 1974, CSC, CSC/11/1, LHASC, Manchester; Cal to Pat, Wednesday 
10 April, 1974, CSC, CSC/14/2, LHASC, Manchester. 
41 Gatehouse to Colleagues, July 10 1974, CSC, CSC/4/1, LHASC, Manchester. Kitson often chaired the fringe 
meetings. CSC-EC 16.10.79 Minutes, CSC, CSC/1/5, LHASC, Manchester.
42 Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 257.
43 Affiliation to the CSC, 1974, CSC, CSC/4/1, LHASC, Manchester.
44 Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby’, 81. Gatehouse used the same words in my interviews 
with him: an inertia effect of trade union affiliation. Gatehouse Interview, 2007. I found only one case where 
this did not occur. The Sheffield Trades Council de-affiliated in 1978, then re-affiliated within six months 
after a visit from Gatehouse. This was the home branch of Martin Flannery (BLP MP). Thornes (Sheffield 
District Trades Council) to TUC, 21st. April, 1978, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/8, MRC, UW, Coventry; Report 
of Meeting held on 23rd May 1978 in the House of Commons, 1978, TUC [BLP International Department], 
MSS.292D/936.1/6, MRC, UW, Coventry; CSC EC 1.8.78 Minutes, CSC, CSC/1/5, LHASC, Manchester.
45 Other activities the CSCP undertook to raise money included merchandising, ‘benefit bops’, sponsored 
bike rides and parachute jumps. Trade unionist Barry Fitzpatrick remembered that ‘it was a very enjoyable 
campaign, apart from the topic’. Fitzpatrick Interview, 2007.
46 Bristol Conference, January 30 1982, Notes for Brian Nicholson, CSC, CSC/11/15, LHASC, Manchester.
No Truck with the Chilean Junta!
34
‘Real solidarity’ came through the implied consensus of affiliation and the 
funds the affiliation provided.47 By 1976, 19 unions were affiliated to the CSC 
at the national level, which, estimated Gatehouse in his report to the annual 
general meeting, equalled a total membership of approximately 5.8 million.48 
And the campaign continued to grow. By the end of 1977 there were 30 national 
unions, 85 Constituency Labour Party branches, 54 trades councils, 56 student 
unions, 46 associations of scientific, technical and managerial staff branches, 
18 Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) branches and district 
committees, 18 branches of the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), 
21 National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) branches, eight 
National Graphical Association branches, 50 branches of other unions, 24 other 
political parties and 59 individual affiliates.49 This created a substantial mailing 
list and a reasonable annual income. 
The large list of affiliates yielded a 55-member CSC Executive Committee in 
1977.50 There were 22 unions represented along with seven political groups, 
three other groups and office holders. Average attendance was 20 across the 
monthly CSC Executive Committee meetings of that year.51 Though this 
represents less than half of those entitled to attend, it was still a large committee 
taking in most sections of the labour movement and it gave authority to the CSC 
as a representative front. 
The CSC and unions had a symbiotic relationship. By affiliating, unions could 
fulfil international portfolios, give substance to their solidarity and embody 
the rhetoric of international brotherhood with a minimum of fuss. That is, 
47 In 1975 the CSC’s affiliation rates ranged from £5.50 for individuals to £25 for national bodies. CSC 
Affiliation Form, 1975, STUC, STUCA 507/3, Glasgow Caledonian University Archives [hereinafter GCUA], 
Glasgow. Administrative leniency was employed, however, on various occasions to ensure that all groups 
who so desired could affiliate regardless of their financial status. See, for example: Edmunds (Yeovil & District 
Trades Council) to CSC 1974, CSC, CSC/4/1, LHASC, Manchester.
48 Annual General Meeting London. February 7 1976. Secretary’s Report, CSC, CSC/1/11, LHASC, Manchester.
49 CSC Annual Report, 1977, CSC, CSC/1/13, LHASC, Manchester.
50 Ibid. The MPs were Andrew Bennet, Martin Flannery, John Ivenden, Jo Richardson, Judith Hart, Neil 
Kinnock, Eddy Loyden and Stan Newens. The political groupings were: BLP, CPGB, Youth Communist League 
(YCL), Liberation, IMG, SWP, Labour Party Young Socialists (LPYS). Other groups were: National Organisation 
of Labour Students (NOLS), London Co-operative Society Political Committee (LCS-PC), University of London 
Students (ULS). Trade unions: Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (ACTT), 
Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), AUEW, AUEW TASS, Civil and Public 
Services Association (CPSA), Furniture, Timber and Allied Trades (FTAT), NALGO, National Association of 
Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE), National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants 
(NATSOPA), National Graphical Association (NGA), NUM, NUPE, National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), 
National Union of Sheet Metal Workers (NUSMW), National Union of Seamen (NUS), National Union of Gold, 
Silver and Allied Trades (NUGSAT), National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers (NUTGW), SLADE, 
Society of Graphical and Allied Trades (SOGAT), TGWU, USDAW. Chile Solidarity Campaign officers and 
convenors and representatives of the seven CSC local committee regions also sat on the Executive Committee.
51 Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile Solidarity Campaign: Annual Report (London: Chile Solidarity 
Campaign, 1977).
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they rationally maximised their gain for use of resources.52 As the incentive for 
solidarity with Chile was remote (apart from bragging rights and fulfilment of 
identity), action for Chile needed almost no impediment for it to occur.
The ability of the campaign to be flexible and innovative due to its lack of 
institutional base was attractive to some unions. Ken Coates and Tony Topham 
have written that contrary to what opponents believe, unions are ‘ill-adapted 
organs for the refinement of detailed political strategies, [thus] they tend to 
find themselves reacting to the initiatives of others, rather than assuming any 
overall innovative tone’.53 Unions were both reactive to and exploitative of the 
campaign: they were opportunists when it came to internationalism. 
The establishment of local committees of the CSC was not as vigorously pursued 
as trade union links. The local committees formed in a largely organic and 
haphazard manner, dependent on the efforts of local activists to set up and 
maintain them.54 They were encouraged to integrate into the national campaign 
(which occurred to varying degrees) as well as to coordinate trade unionists at 
the local level and elicit the cooperation of trades councils. The functioning of 
local committees varied: some had complex structures complete with their own 
cultural committees while others were more ad hoc or seasonal.55
Local committees and trade union affiliations provided the main routes through 
which information flowed to and from the regions of the United Kingdom 
and Ireland.56 There was an early attempt to divide the local committees into 
seven regions, each with one representative on the Executive Committee;57 
however, this model did not function well due to the differing nature of the 
local committees, extended travel time, lack of funding and the deficiency of 
resources for coordination at the national office.58 The central office in London 
52 Schmutte, ‘International Union Activity’, 61.
53 Ken Coates and Tony Topham, Trade Unions in Britain (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 358.
54 The only case of the central CSC trying to stimulate the formation of a local committee that was found in 
the archives is a letter prompting Lyn Murray to organise a committee in Manchester in 1974. Gatehouse to 
Murray, November 19 1974, CSC, CSC/13/5, LHASC, Manchester.
55 Local committees included: Aberdeen, Bath, Bradford, Brighton, Birmingham, Bristol, Bury St Edmunds, 
Cambridge, Cardiff, Chelmsford, Colchester, Coleg Harlek, Coventry, Crawley, Cumbria, Darlington, Dundee, 
Dublin, Durham, East Anglia, East London, Exeter, Falkirk, Fife, Galway, Glasgow, Gloucester, Greenwich, 
Harlow, Hemel Hempsted, Hull, Humberside, Ilford, Kent, Lancaster, Leicester, Leigh, Lewisham, London 
School of Economics, Luton, Leeds, London, Manchester and Stockport, Merseyside, Mansfield, Newport, 
North Gloucestershire, North London, Northants, Northampton, Norwich, Nottingham, Oldham, Oxford, 
Portsmouth, Portsmouth Polytechnic College, Redditch, Rochdale, Sheffield, Skelmersdale, Southampton, St 
Albans, Strathkelvin, Sterling, Swansea, Swindon, Tyneside, West London, West Middlesex, York.
56 Affiliates and local committees received separate communications from the CSC with different tones, but 
largely similar information. 
57 The regions were Scotland, North-East, North-West, South-West, East-Central, South-East and London. 
CSC: Regional Structure, 1974, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester; List of Local Chile Solidarity Committees, By 
Regions, As of May 15 1974, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
58 National meetings of local committees were held in an attempt to reflect the democratic nature of the 
CSC’s structure.
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did its best to keep up with regional matters, but the CSC was at best a loose 
federation and at worst an anarchistic and individualist alliance.59 That’s not to 
say that all were happy with the status quo. As early as the 1974 annual general 
meeting, joint secretary Gatehouse warned that the ‘over-emphasis on the 
administrative efficiency of the Campaign, advance distribution of documents, 
etc, would lead to a diminution of the real solidarity work, unless substantial 
funding could be found for expanding the Campaign office’.60
From the outset the issue of internal democracy bedevilled the campaign and, 
by 1977, a Chile Solidarity Campaign Commission was formed to investigate the 
democratic processes of the CSC with a focus on the relationship between the 
executive and the local committees. The importance of trade union participation 
for the CSC (which impacted on funding and legitimacy) was evident in the 
commission’s report. It recommended that the vexed question of the timing of 
the executive meetings (midweek to suit MPs and trade unionists; weekends to 
suit local committees) should be settled in favour of the trade union affiliates.61 
This decision was ironic, because local committees were almost always more 
ideologically sympathetic to the UP and Chilean politics than the trade unions, 
and the CSC had positioned itself as the political arm of the solidarity movement. 
Nevertheless, trade union and labour movement support was more valuable 
than the ideologically pure, but numerically few, local committees. 
Harnessing the power of the labour movement was the most important strategic 
goal of the CSC.62 Trade unionists were elected to public positions in the 
campaign (explained further below) and a concerted effort was made to include 
the actions of all trade unionists at all levels of the movement under the CSC 
banner. The national office reminded CSC local committees in 1976 that trade 
union councils and branches were imperative to action, especially direct action.63 
The campaign instructed its local committees to make an effort to fit in with the 
‘procedural’ nature of trade unions. Trade union liaison had rapidly absorbed 
the majority of time in the CSC, though the campaign noted that ‘boycotts have 
usually been [at] the initiative of the workers concerned, and in few, if any, cases 
has the Campaign had any direct influence’.64
59 A system of minute collection from the regions was not employed. Instead the national office relied on 
a more ad-hoc system of word of mouth and sporadic correspondence. Correspondence with Brian Anglo 
of the Manchester local committee can be found at: Gatehouse to Anglo, December 13, 1975, CSC, CSC/2/2, 
LHASC, Manchester.
60 CSC: Annual General Meeting, December 14 1974, Islington South-East Library, 1974, Coventry Trade 
Union Council, MSS.5/3/6, MRC, UW, Coventry.
61 CSC Commission Final Report, 1977, CSC, CSC/1/12, LHASC, Manchester.
62 This has been identified as an aspect of the archetypical ‘new left movement’. Burgmann, Power, Profit 
and Protest, 22.
63 Suggestions for Local Committees re: Trade Union Work, 1976, CSC, CSC/16/2, LHASC, Manchester.
64 CSC. Executive Committee: Analysis of Campaign Performance to Date. Discussion Document. 23/10/74, 
CSC, CSC/1/4, LHASC, Manchester.
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In the office itself, Mike Gatehouse and Steve Hart assiduously worked the long 
days of a modern faddist for a lean wage. 
Sacrifice did not bring reward for Hart. 
At the first annual general meeting of the CSC, Hart was pushed out of the 
position by groups of the ‘ultra-left’ who were uncomfortable with two 
communists in the powerful organising positions in the CSC.65 ‘But it wasn’t a 
bad thing’, said Gatehouse in 2007, ‘I think Steve was pissed off at the time, but 
I think he was ready to move on anyway’.66 
The departure of Hart from the campaign weakened its ties to Liberation and 
helped the CSC stand on its own. This was the first major administrative change 
but it was by no means the last. The influential position of general secretary of 
the campaign moved through various activists’ hands over the 17 years of the 
CSC’s existence. Each of these professional activists brought to the CSC their 
own political ideas and their own organising style, not to mention their own set 
of contacts.67
The work of the CSC organiser was hugely varied. They were expected to be the 
‘renaissance’ activist: able to speak at meetings, write letters, make telephone 
calls, write apologies, incite emotion, paint pictures, design posters, look after 
public figures, cope with the secret service, counsel Chileans, organise tours, 
photostat, type with a minimum of mistakes (paper was especially scarce in the 
first years of the campaign) and, above all, raise their own salary. 
The role evolved slightly over the years. As the CSC became more and more 
organised and entrenched in its functions and hierarchies, as well as more 
stable financially, the work of the secretary became less a jack-of-all-trades and 
more a master of the social movement. Artists could be employed to design and 
complete posters and companies could be enlisted to distribute them. Over the 
years of the campaign, the title used for this position varied—general secretary, 
organiser, joint secretary—but essentially the role stayed the same: these 
dedicated people were the organising workhorses of the CSC. They were the 
faddists, whose commitment to the cause superseded almost any other factor. 
65 The vote for the unpaid post was between Steve Hart and Colin Henfrey. Henfrey won 57 votes to 29. 
Colin Henfrey was a Liverpool academic and a CPGB member. CSC Annual General Meeting. December 14 1974.
66 Gatehouse Interview, 2007. Hart returned to Liberation, where he had continued to perform duties in 
conjunction with his involvement in the CSC.
67 Mike Gatehouse (joint secretary), 1973–79; Steve Hart (joint secretary), 1973–75; Ken Hulme (trade 
union organiser), 1975–79; Colin Henfrey (joint secretary), 1977; Jerry Hughes (national organiser), 1979–81; 
Bill McClellan (CSC officer/national organiser), 1979–85; Quentin Given (national organiser), 1982–89; Helen 
Garner (CSC organiser), 1986; Carole Billinghurst (CSC organiser), 1987–89. Others who occasionally took on 
organising roles include Jane McKay (Glasgow), Sue Carstairs (1975), Anne Brown, Carl Blackburn (Secretary, 
1991), Angela Thew (Liverpool, late 1980s), Graham Jones (1975), Gordon Hutchinson (local committees 
organisation), Duncan MacIntosh (distribution), Imogen Mark (publications) and Celia Bower (finance). Dates 
in this table are estimated from the appearance of their names in the CSC archive and other sources.
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In the CSC office, during the early period, Gatehouse divided his time among 
three types of activities. The first was collecting and publicising information 
from grassroots groups and trade unions on solidarity actions occurring around 
the country. The second was organising and implementing endorsable (by trade 
unions, political parties or key individuals) actions such as tours, demonstrations 
or the national consumer boycott campaign. Third, the central office maintained 
the structure of the movement by preparing newsletters, organising meetings, 
writing letters and other administrative tasks. Gatehouse remembered that his 
hours in the office were ‘frantic’. The nature of a very small office with a very 
large number of affiliates meant that many hours a week were spent stuffing 
envelopes, leaving little time for other tasks.68 As in other organisations of the 
labour movement, however, the secretaries were generally more powerful than 
their title suggests, as every communication passed through their hands. 
After Hart’s departure in 1974, Gatehouse first worked beside Graham Jones. 
‘But’, said Gatehouse, ‘he couldn’t cope with the ultra-left and they gradually 
put the squeeze on him to get him out’.69   So, in March 1975, the CSC created a 
new position specifically to channel trade union support. The man who got the 
job of trade union organiser was Ken Hulme.70 
Hulme was a young man of twenty-five years when he entered the CSC office. 
He had graduated from Warwick University where he had been active in the 
Trotskyite International Socialists (IS). After finishing university, he went to 
work on a shop floor in the motor industry in Coventry. ‘I was a bit of a student 
revolutionary’, he remembered.71 He had been secretary of the Coventry Trades 
Council, a member of the district committee of the TGWU and had helped to 
establish the CSC local committee in that city. 
In early 1975 Hulme departed Coventry and the ultra-left for some time off 
before beginning a masters degree at the London School of Economics. Peter 
Binns, one of the leaders of the IS, called Hulme to ask him to apply for the 
organising position on the CSC. Hulme recalled that there was an ongoing ‘battle’ 
in the broad-front CSC executive between political factions. The IS was looking 
for a capable organiser to contest the CPGB candidate. Hulme continued: ‘I don’t 
think they expected me to get appointed, and they tried to get me to take a tape 
recorder into my interview so everything could be taped.’72
68 This sort of ‘mechanical’ lobbying (pamphlets, newsletters and effective administration) led to many of 
the political ultra-left considering that the CSC was overly bureaucratised. Gatehouse insists that this criticism 
was mainly because they were not controlling the committee themselves. Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
69 Ibid.
70 Both Gatehouse and Hulme were paid £23 a week plus £4 travel expenses. Annual General Meeting 
London. February 7 1976. Secretary’s Report. 
71 Interview with Ken Hulme (Chile activist, UK), 1 September 2007 [hereinafter Hulme Interview, 2007], 
notes in possession of author.
72 Ibid. The panel at the interview was Brian Nicholson, George Anthony (at the time called Trade Union 
Convenor), Gatehouse and Colin Henfrey (Merseyside CSC). They would make a recommendation to the 
executive, who would ultimately decide. CSC: Annual General Meeting, December 14 1974. 
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Hulme was successful because of his trade union experience, which the CPGB 
candidate could not equal;73 but as Gatehouse explained in 2007, the tactics 
of the IS backfired because ‘unbeknownst to them [Hulme] was already in 
conversation with the Communist Party to become a Communist Party member, 
which he did very shortly after joining the Campaign, which really pissed [the 
IS] off big time’.74
When asked about the amount of pressure that was put on Hulme by his 
defection from the IS to the Communist Party, Gatehouse remembered that 
Hulme was a ‘very hale hearty strong character … [who] enjoyed provoking and 
taunting the ultra left’.75 Hulme admits he had uneasy relations with the ultra-
left, remembering with clarity the underlying tension between himself and co-
activist Gordon Hutchinson.76 Hulme devoted himself to organising, and his 
presence in the CSC ironically appeared to calm the storm of factional politics on 
the executive for a short time. His ‘defection’ also meant the CPGB had members 
in almost all positions in the CSC at the national level.77 With his youth and zeal, 
Hulme brought organisational skills and experience. Gatehouse thought Hulme 
was ‘splendid’, a ‘wonderful organiser’ who ‘easily spoke the trade unionists’ 
language and was easily accepted by them’.78 
In spite of this, the title of trade union organiser was perhaps misleading. 
Hulme was young, Gatehouse was considered an ‘intellectual sort’, and as both 
were relatively inexperienced neither was in a position to tell weathered trade 
unionists where and when to act.79 Rather, the office tried to support actions 
that were occurring at all levels of complicated trade union organisation.80 
They publicised and encouraged activities and held campaigns that created an 
atmosphere of moral authority in which trade unionists could be confident to 
act.81 They also pulled trade unionists into the CSC hierarchy.
73 The CPGB candidate was Graham Jones.
74 Gatehouse Interview, 2007. Hulme left the CSC in 1979 for a position as district organiser for South Essex 
CPGB. Affiliates’ Newsletter No. 32, January 6 1978, CSC, CSC/1/23, LHASC, Manchester.
75 Ibid.
76 Local committees and refugees portfolios within the CSC. Hutchinson worked in the JWG and became 
very close with and involved in Chilean factional politics through the refugees. Hulme Interview, 2007. 
O’Brien to Hutchinson (JWG), 30 April, 1976, Sandy Hobbs Papers, Box untitled, GCUA, Glasgow.
77 The CPGB’s influence in some trade unions, its pre-existing network of sympathisers across the United 
Kingdom and ability to represent the more radical sections of the BLP were positive attributes for the CSC. 
Non-CPGB members consistently raised concerns about CPGB domination in the campaign. 
78 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
79 Hulme Interview, 2007.
80 Ibid.
81 Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby on British Government Policy towards Latin America’, 28.
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The unionists at the helm of the CSC national organisation were Alex Kitson, 
Brian Nicholson and George Anthony. Their names dominated letterheads, their 
public personas were called on at rallies and they were the voice of the cause 
in the press. Nevertheless, the responsibility of the everyday liaison between 
the campaign and the labour movement fell back on campaign workers and it 
required an intricate web of interactions both official and personal. Many union 
actions were decentralised, but the records of the period were—frustratingly 
for a historian—created by the centre. Therefore despite trade union figurehead 
involvement, despite grassroots action, the story of British solidarity is funnelled 
through a small, underfunded office at the centre. The centre and periphery of 
the movement were further confused by the split structure of the British trade 
union movement, which was divided into two separate streams: the unions 
themselves and trades councils.
While all unions had different sets of rules, each union generally had district 
and national-level representation and one national-level office. The executive 
committee of a union did not generally possess policymaking power. Policy 
was decided by a national committee or at a national conference attended by 
working trade unionists as well as officials. This structure enabled delegates 
from all regions to resolve and vote on policies. At the national level unions 
could affiliate to the Trades Union Congress (TUC). National unions could 
also affiliate to international bodies such as the International Steel Trades 
Confederation.82 The many layers of hierarchy led to an administrative distance 
between the rank and file and the national offices, creating internal interstices 
in the structure and numerous idiosyncratic relationships. This is an inherent 
problem in the industrial national structure of unions. Further complication 
ensues when parallel to union structure at the shop-floor level, (joint) shop 
stewards’ committees existed. They comprised elected individuals who were 
members of distinct unions.83 Furthermore, towns or small regions also had 
trades councils. 
No two unions had an identical structure or ideology in the trade union movement 
and the confusion this creates is actually the point: the official hierarchy of 
parallel and different systems allowed for the politically strategic placement of 
individuals. For example, one local-level union member could sit on its regional 
and national councils at the same time as being a shop steward leader and on 
the local trades council (not to mention involvement in other labour movement 
organisations such as political parties or single-issue campaigns). By the same 
token, a unionist higher in the hierarchy could be a member of a TUC committee, 
82 See, for example: AUEW: Structure and Function of the Union, 1976, Amalgamated Union of Engineering 
Workers [hereinafter AUEW], MSS.259/AEUW/6/AC/11/13, Modern Records Centre [hereinafter MRC], 
University of Warwick [hereinafter UW], Coventry.
83 For more information on shop stewards, refer to: Chris Wrigley, British Trade Unions Since 1933 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 37.
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his own union’s executive council, as well as having political party affiliation. 
The people who had sufficient individual experience to have varied connections 
through organisations and knowledge of each organisation’s idiosyncrasies and 
complexities gained disproportionate influence in the political left. By courting 
strategic individuals, the CSC could effectively punch above its weight in 
political arenas. 
An example of this was Alexander H. Kitson, whose strategic importance to the 
CSC was perhaps unparalleled. Kitson was the treasurer of the campaign from 
its inception. Born and raised in Edinburgh, he was president of the Scottish 
Commercial Motormen’s Union at the time of its amalgamation into the TGWU.84 
In the 1970s Kitson was both an executive officer of the TGWU and a member 
of the British Labour Party (BLP) National Executive Committee and thus had 
a substantial amount of influence in the most powerful groups in the labour 
movement in Britain. 
As an executive officer of the TGWU, Kitson had a close working relationship 
with general secretary, Jack Jones.85 If the CSC organisers had to meet Kitson 
at Transport House, he almost always organised a visit with Jones as well.86 As 
well as being leader of the TGWU, Jones was president of the TUC International 
Committee, a fortunate link for the Chile campaign, as it was the third most 
powerful TUC committee behind the general and finance committees.87 Jones’s 
own heavy involvement in the BLP led to the understanding that Kitson had 
freedom in his TGWU position to participate in activities of the Socialist 
International, which were largely concerned with BLP activities rather than 
TGWU business.88 
Kitson in fact chaired the Socialist International’s Chile Committee.89 It 
was also widely rumoured he was linked romantically to Jenny Little of the 
BLP International Department and was active in the BLP’s Latin American 
84 Jack Jones, Jack Jones: Union Man. An Autobiography (London: William Collins & Sons, 1986), 242; 
Transport and General Workers Union National Executive Council, The Story of the T.G.W.U. (London: 
Transport & General Workers Union, 1977), 46.
85 Both Kitson and Jones were high-profile trade unionists in the Trade Union Section of the BLP National 
Executive Committee. Their closeness as political allies ebbed and flowed. Kitson’s subordinate role to Jones 
in the TGWU meant that he gave Jones ‘blind loyalty’ in 1975, according to Barbara Castle. By 1976, however, 
Moss Evans (national organiser, TGWU) and Kitson were united against Jones over the election of Joan 
Maynard or Margaret Jackson to the BLP National Executive Committee. Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 
1974–1976 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980), 412; Tony Benn, Tony Benn: Against the Tide (London: 
Arrow Books, 1989), 615.
86 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
87 Coates and Topham, Trade Unions in Britain, 134.
88 Gatehouse Interview, 2007. Socialist International affiliates included the Australian Labor Party, BLP and 
the Chilean Radical Party.
89 Trades Union Congress (TUC), ‘Notes of Proceedings at a Conference on Chile held at Congress House, 
Great Russell Street London, on Thursday, 24th April, 1975’ (England: TUC, 1975).
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Subcommittees.90 More specifically, he attended the short-lived BLP International 
Department’s Chile Coordinating Committee, which was set up in May 1974 to 
ensure BLP action on Chile was coherent and coordinated. In his capacity as 
a member of the BLP International Committee, Kitson was expected to liaise 
directly with the CSC in lieu of an official BLP representation on its executive.91 
Furthermore, he chaired the BLP Executive’s Latin America Study Group from 
its inception in 1975 until 1978 and sat on the Liaison Committee of the Central 
Unica de Trabajadores (CUT, the trades union congress of Chile) and the BLP.92 
This confusing array of involvements serves to demonstrate both Kitson’s 
commitment to the Chile cause and his use of the Chile issue to establish moral 
authority and dominate the party and union discussion around the topic.93
Ken Hulme, trade union organiser for the CSC, confirmed that ‘Alex more than 
anybody was our “in” into the more senior positions in the labour movement’.94 
Liverpool unionists Jimmy Nolan and Antony Burke concurred that Kitson was 
a ‘lifeline’ into the upper hierarchy of the labour movement.95 Kitson’s name 
on the top of the CSC letterhead, his public profile and personal endorsement 
(almost always with the qualification ‘Executive Officer TGWU’ after his name) 
gave the CSC political credibility and the respect of the labour movement. 
Moreover, with such a high-profile treasurer (he was also treasurer of the 
Scottish Trades Union Council, STUC),96 the CSC was above being accused of 
financial mismanagement.97 
90 Gatehouse Interview, 2007; Hulme Interview, 2007. Alan Angell, a leading Latin Americanist scholar, 
was also active on occasion in these committees. At the time of the coup he was at St Antony’s College Oxford 
and he spent much of the next two years working for Academics for Chile. Academics for Chile was an 
organisation that helped academics in Chile gain contracts in Britain so they could escape persecution. The 
immense amount of work involved in organising such activities led Angell to go to the World University 
Service to ask for organising aid. That organisation then took over most of the running of Academics for 
Chile. Academics for Chile, 1975, Papers of Barry Carr, Melbourne; Angell (St Antony’s College Oxford) to Hart, 
16 October 1973, CSC, CSC/13/3, LHASC, Manchester; Academics for Chile, 1975, CSC, CSC/41/1, LHASC, 
Manchester; Interview with Alan Angell (Chile activist, academic, UK), 30 August 2007 [hereinafter Angell 
Interview, 2007], notes and recording in possession of author. 
91 Having an official representative on the CSC committee would imply the BLP’s unequivocal support of 
the CSC’s actions. This way the BLP had pre-warning of the CSC’s activities in exchange for the CSC’s use of 
Kitson’s reputation. Report to meeting of Chile Co-Ordinating Committee—May 1974, TUC [BLP International 
Department], MSS.292D/936.1/2, MRC, UW, Coventry.
92 Minutes of Meeting of the Latin America Study Group (27/1/75), TUC [BLP International Department], 
MSS.292D/936.1/3, MRC, UW, Coventry; NEC Latin American Sub Committee: Minutes of the Last Meeting held 
on July 25th 1978 in the House of Commons, TUC [BLP International Department], MSS.292D/936.1/6, MRC, 
UW, Coventry; Programme of Work, 1976, TUC [BLP International Department], MSS.292D/936.1/3, MRC, 
UW, Coventry; Coates and Topham, Trade Unions in Britain, 118.
93 Kitson had in fact met Allende in Chile before the coup. TUC, ‘Notes of Proceedings at a Conference on 
Chile held at Congress House’, 15.
94 Hulme Interview, 2007.
95 Nolan Jimmy, Antony Burke, Hugo Santillar, Angela Thew and Anthony Santamera in discussion with 
Ann Jones, Recorded 9 August 2008.
96 Solidarity with the People of Chile—A trade union conference organised by the CSC, 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, 
LHASC, Manchester.
97 This was not a new strategy. See: Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 47–8. 
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The advantages of his connections came, however, with a certain mystery. 
According to Mike Gatehouse, ‘there was more than met the eye’ to Alex Kitson. 
He continued: 
I went there once or twice to meet him with Chilean Trade Unionists … 
and he could be very probing, prying, intrusive and sometimes on the 
verge of being downright rude. And you didn’t [pause] it came out of 
the blue. You didn’t understand where it was coming from, or exactly 
what it related to.98
Kitson was definitely a strong character, who pushed repeatedly for Chile 
resolutions and support at the BLP National Executive Committee and 
conferences.99 For some, politics was thirsty work and, according to Gatehouse, 
Kitson ‘had a big drink problem, but didn’t they all?’100 He did share this trait 
with many trade unionists at the time, and when Bill McClellan was in Chile 
preparing for the arrival of the labour movement delegation of 1984 he sent a 
pamphlet of the hotel where the delegation was to stay with an arrow to the 
mini bar and the statement ‘this is for Brian [Nicholson] and Alex [Kitson]’.101
Nevertheless, Kitson undoubtedly felt strongly about the cause and consistently 
delivered good speeches and relentlessly fought for Chile. At the 1975 Trade 
Union Conference on Chile, he said: ‘We in Britain can be proud of our role in 
this international solidarity movement … We are involved in this because we 
know that the forces of fascism in Chile are the same ones that threaten us.’102
By involving strategic figures such as Kitson who could use their knowledge 
of labour movement quirks, the CSC had a direct liaison with some of the more 
powerful committees in the labour movement. The deliberate and considered 
choice of Kitson as treasurer illustrates a canny political selection by the CSC 
on two levels. First, the campaign gained respectability and true trade union 
connections from the outset. Second, his involvement in organisations across 
the left strengthened the image of the CSC as a united left campaign. His was a 
moderating presence in what could have been perceived as a CPGB-dominated 
organisation. 
Alex Kitson was one among many trade unionists who figured heavily in the 
structure of the CSC. Labour Party MPs Ian Mikardo, Neil Kinnock, Judith Hart 
and Jo Richardson were all strong supporters of the Chile campaign, but despite 
their high public profiles, none of them was chosen as the chair. In a distinctive 
98 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
99 Castle, The Castle Diaries, 506.
100 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
101 Hotel Santa Lucia, 1984, CSC, CSC/5/3, LHASC, Manchester.
102 Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile and the British Labour Movement: Trade Union Conference Report 
(London: London Caledonian Press, 1975).
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and unique move, the CSC placed two rank-and-file trade unionists in the 
positions of joint chairs: Brian Nicholson of the TGWU and George Anthony of 
the AUEW. These were the two largest unions in Britain, and as a consequence 
had the biggest vote in the BLP. They were also two of the best placed in terms 
of possible blacking or boycotting of Chilean goods. 
Both men had mottled reputations; it was said you were not a fully fledged 
member of the CPGB until you had punched George Anthony at least once. 
According to Gatehouse, they were both ‘notoriously and scandalously rough as 
chairmen and had no compunction in telling people to sod off or whatever. They 
were quite macho and … it gave a very distinctive flavour to the Campaign.’103 
‘George and Brian’, continued Gatehouse:
[T]he ‘terrible twins’ we used to call them, they were quite good 
at puncturing any … complacency and so on, though they were not 
without it themselves, but they punctured ours. And Executive 
Committee meetings were very ‘boom boom’: functional, decisive, not a 
lot of waffling went on, and certainly very little ideological discussion.104
Brian Nicholson was a member of TGWU Region One, which took in North 
London and the docks. He was a CPGB member who sat on the National Executive 
Committee of the TGWU, which was ‘bankrolling’ the Chile campaign.105 This 
was a kind of guarantee for Nicholson’s actions, and he ran campaign meetings 
as if they were trade union meetings. Nicholson took a slightly more prominent 
role in the CSC than George Anthony.106 He visited the small CSC office regularly, 
according to Gatehouse, and chaired meetings and conferences for many years; 
but, despite his commitment of time to the collective movement, Nicholson was 
a ‘supreme individualist’: ‘Brian did what Brian wanted.’107 
Nicholson brought some extracurricular activities to the campaign office, such 
as coopting Gatehouse to type the Cherry Blossom. Cherry Blossom was a famous 
brand of boot polish, predominantly black in colour: the Cherry Blossom was a 
blacking list for the unofficial pickets of the docks. After Gatehouse typed and 
photocopied the list, Nicholson would take it down to the docks and the lorry 
firms listed would not be allowed through the lines on that day.108 
103 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
104 Ibid. Evidence of Anthony and Nicholson attempting to stifle an ideological discussion on the lessons of 
the Chilean coup for the National Action Conference can be seen at: Minutes of the Meeting of the CSC Executive 
Committee—held at Cooperative centre, Sunday March 2, 11am, 1974, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
105 Referring to the support of Jack Jones and Alex Kitson. Interview with George Anthony (activist, 
unionist, UK), 22 August 2007 [hereinafter Anthony Interview, 2007], notes in possession of author. 
106 The record shows that Anthony attended more Executive Committee meetings between 21 December 
1973 and 16 October 1975.
107 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
108 Ibid.
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Many solidarity activists believed that both Nicholson and Anthony were 
involved in the CSC to further their political careers. On the other hand, they 
may have been ‘gifted’ representation on the CSC by their unions to keep them 
busy and away from more politically important or local issues. Yet, Gatehouse 
remembered that their time commitment alone would seem to refute these 
accusations. They were ‘very key to the Campaign’, according to Gatehouse: 
‘they were neither Labour Party officials and although they officially represented 
their unions, they were not high up in the union, they were not full time trade 
union officials. They were working trade unionists.’109
Accompanying Nicholson as joint chair was George Anthony, who worked in 
ship repairs at the Royal Albert Dock in London. He joined the Amalgamated 
Engineers’ Union (later the AUEW) at seventeen and rejoined after his national 
service at twenty-one years of age. He was president of the North London 
District of the AUEW in 1974.110 A member of the CPGB, Anthony was a part 
of the London Trades Council in 1973 from which Dr Amicia Young nominated 
Anthony as the delegate to the CSC.111 Gatehouse remarked that Anthony was a 
‘a complex character. I mean, very difficult and he quarrelled in a big way with 
some of the … younger women in the Campaign’.112 Anthony in fact blames ‘the 
women’ for eventually forcing him out of the campaign.113 
His confidence came through from the first. Even though Anthony was not the 
elected representative of the AUEW he took the liberty of representing them. 
‘Well, because Brian Nicholson was from the TGWU’, he remembered in 2007, 
‘I felt it was only right, really, that the [AUEW] should have an equal status’.114 
Because of Anthony’s persistent attendance, he was gradually considered to be 
a representative of the AUEW and managed to manoeuvre himself into a high-
profile position in the solidarity movement.
109 Ibid. Anthony originally represented North London Trades Council at the CSC.
110 Gatehouse to Colleagues, July 10 1974, CSC, CSC/4/1, LHASC, Manchester.
111 Young, of the Association of Scientific Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS), did this perhaps to 
lighten her own load—she attended the first CSC meetings along with Anthony. Her political persuasion 
is unclear though most probably towards the CPGB. Her husband was a commander in the Royal Navy; 
she was a medical doctor. The exact political reasons for Anthony’s nomination for the London Trades 
Council are unclear. When asked about it, Anthony’s response was: ‘Oh yeah, well, she liked me.’ Chile 
Solidarity Committee: Minutes of the meeting held at the House of Commons on 17.12.73, CSC, CSC/1/1, LHASC, 
Manchester; Anthony Interview, 2007. Anthony is also listed as being CSC Trade Union Convenor for a short 
time. CSC Executive Committee, 1974, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
112 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
113 Anthony Interview, 2007.
114 Anthony Interview, 2007.
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Figure 1.2 George Anthony (centre).
Source: Untitled, Morning Star Photograph Collection, Marx Memorial Library, London, courtesy of the 
Marx Memorial Library.
Although the nuances of such stories are hard to corroborate through archival 
sources, it is certain that Anthony and Nicholson took advantage of a niche, or 
an interstice, that appeared in this portion of the labour movement structure. 
Here they could entrench themselves in positions to further exploit the gaps 
and disjunctures that the broad left front threw up. The joint chairs of such 
a broad-front organisation raised their profile and power base to a level much 
higher than their actual union positions. Archival evidence suggests they quite 
often spoke for the largely silent masses of trade unionists affiliated to the CSC, 
and because there was little vocal trade union opposition, they took the liberty 
that they were in fact correct and justified in doing so. 
Other evidence suggests Anthony was detached from the workers’ understanding 
of the Chilean situation or their ability or desire to act. Anthony believes the 
presence of Nicholson and himself at meetings was enough to reassure the trade 
union movement that things were in good hands.115 Considering that almost all 
union organised action was initiated at the periphery and not in the central CSC 
115 ‘I mean, they didn’t come because they didn’t want to … I suppose they felt in a way well, Brian and 
George are handling it, you know, there will be nothing to worry about.’ Ibid.
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office or national-level union offices (as demonstrated in later chapters), this seems 
like quite a presumption. Anthony even admitted that ‘workers never complained’ 
about him calling a boycott, ‘but they never took action on’ the call.116 
Even so, Gatehouse reflected that ‘both George and Brian did really [a] huge 
amount … in their own style. And often that style would be rather prepotente 
as they would say in Chile, and macho and sometimes difficult and sometimes 
quite undemocratic.’117
The leadership style of Anthony and Nicholson was a form of democratic 
centralism, but despite the potential for negative reflections of the two, 
Gatehouse judged that ‘on the whole they were enormously important. And I 
don’t think the Campaign would have got where it did or hung together or been 
what it was without them.’118
Kitson, Nicholson and Anthony’s presence as trade unionists in the campaign, 
however, was not enough to entice the TUC to affiliate. In fact, the CSC and the 
TUC had a tense relationship.119 The Chile campaign was not ‘official enough’ to 
be important to the council, whose political agendas ran far over the heads of 
the Chile activists.120 Gatehouse thinks that
there is a political level in the TUC international work that has absolutely 
bugger all to do with the individual trade unions. Many of the unions, 
particularly unions like the Miners were deeply critical of it, absolutely 
loathed the TUC international committee and regarded them as a bunch 
of spooks.121
The TUC organisation was big enough to run not only its International Committee, 
but also an International Department. The New Statesman described the TUC 
International Committee ‘like most other parts of the TUC structure, [as] oligarchic 
rather than democratic, and has generally been a preserve of the Right’.122
116 Ibid.
117 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
118 Ibid.
119 This caused the CSC to describe its membership in sneaky ways: ‘Over half total membership of TUC 
affiliated through their unions to CSC.’ Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile and the British Labour Movement, 8.
120 Hulme Interview, 2007; Gatehouse Interview, 2007. This did not stop the CSC using every scrap of 
acknowledgment for its own means. In his introduction to the annual general meeting in 1976, Gatehouse 
said ‘the CSC’s presence in the movement was demonstrated by its presence in the TUC for its AGM, and by 
the affiliation through their unions of more than 7 million British workers’. CSC-AGM 19.02.77 Minutes, CSC, 
CSC/1/12, LHASC, Manchester.
121 Gatehouse Interview, 2007. The TUC nevertheless was a very important avenue for small lobby groups 
to get their ideas to government. Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby on British Government 
Policy towards Latin America’, 14.
122 ‘The TUC’s “foreign policy”,’ New Statesman, 1981, CSC, CSC/28/19, LHASC, Manchester.
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The TUC established its own Chile Fund in October 1973.123 They used public 
occasions, such as the speech of Luis Figueroa at the Trade Union Conference for 
Chile in May 1975, to donate large sums to this fund and urge other unionists 
to encourage their own executive committees to donate also.124 The TUC also 
donated £1000 to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
Fund for Chilean Relief when it began in 1974.125 By widely circulating news of 
this generous donation, the TUC encouraged affiliated organisations to donate 
to the ICFTU fund (and away from the CSC).126 Between December 1973 and 
May 1974, £3928.90 was donated to ‘Chile’ through the TUC from 31 unions.127 
Donations varied from £10 from the Rossendale Union of Boot, Shoe and Slipper 
Operatives to the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) and the TGWU, 
which each donated £1000.128 By undertaking this financial administration, 
the TUC could not be accused of ignoring the notion of solidarity. It kept a 
parallel morality with the CSC with little effort and without forgoing control 
of their own affairs, just as the BLP had by declining affiliation to the CSC but 
associating with it through key individuals.
Some unions were careful with their choice of fund. For example, the Society 
of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers and Process Workers (SLADE) 
instructed the General Secretary of the TUC to direct their money only to 
the TUC Chile Fund. They perceived the fund to be in a better position to 
connect directly with Chilean trade unionists than the unwieldy organisation 
of the ICFTU.129 Not all were so trusting and some members of the trade union 
123 TUC to Stanley (POEU), December 22, 1975, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/5, MRC, UW, Coventry.
124 Harry Sterne, ‘Chile and the TUC’, Tribune [UK], 9 May 1975; Record, May 1975, 14: ‘Boycott Chile Junta 
Call,’ Transport and General Workers [hereinafter TGWU], MSS.126/T&G/193/1/55, MRC, UW, Coventry. 
Donations included £25 from Westminster TUC’s Branch of the Association of Professional, Executive, 
Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX). Brown (APEX) to Murray (TUC), 31/10/74, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, 
MRC, UW, Coventry.
125 TUC International Committee Minutes, November 27, 1973, TUC, MSS.292D/901/6, MRC, UW, Coventry. 
The ICFTU also held a workshop of solidarity with Chile in Oslo, 7–8 October 1974, among many other 
activities. T. Jenkins attended, as an employee of the TUC International Department. It was at this conference 
that the recommendation for a coordination committee to direct assistance to the CUT was formed. ICFTU 
Workshop of Solidarity with Chile, OSLO, October 7–8, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
126 TUC Circular no. 59 re: Fund for Chilean Trade Unionists, December 14, 1973, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/2, 
MRC, UW, Coventry.
127 This figure is apart from donations and affiliation fees to the CSC or CCHR. Jenkins to Hargreaves, May 
3, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
128 Whittaker (The Rossendale Union of Boot, Shoe and Slipper Operatives) to TUC, 16th January, 1974, 
TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry; Fisher (NUPE) to Murray (TUC), 21st January, 1974, TUC, 
MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry. The TGWU donation was made under the auspices of Jack Jones, 
who was the general secretary of the TGWU as well as secretary of the TUC International Committee. Jones 
(TGWU) to Murray (TUC), June 14, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry. The TGWU donated 
a further £500 to the TUC Chile Fund. Minutes and Record of the Statutory Meeting of the Finance and General 
Purposes Committee of the General Executive Council, January 10, 1974, TGWU, MSS.126/T&G/1186/A/52, 
MRC, UW, Coventry.
129 SLADE donated £75 on this occasion. Parish (Society of Lithographic Artists Designers Engravers and 
Process Workers) to Murray (TUC) 28th January 1974, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
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movement were still dubious about how the money was being spent.130 These 
fears may have been justified, as the ICFTU and TUC started collecting funds for 
Chile without any clear plan or method to get the money from their European 
offices to trade unionists in need in junta-controlled Chile.131
The ICFTU only acknowledged the first £1000 sent to them from the TUC.132 This, 
along with a pattern of donations from the TUC to the CSC for events and the CUT 
for office equipment, suggests the bulk of the almost £4000 sent to the TUC intended 
for Chile in the early years of the regime stayed in the kitty at the TUC and was 
subsequently used almost exclusively within Britain for British involvement in Chile 
solidarity.133 The amount of money is not surprising. The easiest way of expressing 
solidarity is by donating money. Unions do this in a regular, bureaucratised and 
structured manner.
In terms of policy, an emergency resolution at the TUC Blackpool Congress in 
September 1973 congratulated the trade unions in Chile on supporting the UP 
Government and resisting fascist takeover.134 At subsequent TUC conferences 
the Chile section of the international report spanned several pages. It detailed 
visits by Cyril Plant and Jack Jones to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
delegations received and international (United Nations, International Labour 
Office, ICFTU) Chile resolutions, indicating the high profile of the Chile issue. 
Every year until 1989 there was at least one page of the report dedicated to 
Chile, although it was sometimes in conjunction with other Latin American 
countries. On top of this, resolutions of condemnation of the dictatorship were 
passed, accompanied by long soliloquies by the speakers listing the regime’s 
oppressions and British trade unions’ solidarity efforts.135
The high profile of the Chile issue at congress is not necessarily reflected in the 
general international policy (and certainly many actions of the International 
Department) of the TUC. In fact, many unions did not support the TUC’s 
international activity. The TUC often followed the policy of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (subsequently referred to as the Foreign Office) rather 
than representing the interests of trade unions within Britain. There was an 
130 At the Trade Union Conference on Chile in 1975, Len Willet said: ‘I am a little unhappy in a sense, 
about the support that we have been asked to give to the TUC fund, not unhappy about the support but I am 
unhappy about the progress or lack of it to see where the money is going. To see whether it is being spent 
wisely, and in the proper direction.’ Len Willett, Post Office Engineering Union National Executive Council, 
1976, CSC, CSC/11/4, LHASC, Manchester.
131 Jenkins to Hargreaves, January 4, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
132 Ibid.
133 TUC to Stanley (POEU), December 22, 1975, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/5, MRC, UW, Coventry; Ryder to 
Walsh, November 29, 1982, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/11, MRC, UW, Coventry.
134 Emergency Motion, TUC Blackpool, 1973, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/1, MRC, UW, Coventry.
135 See, for example: George Anthony, TUC Annual Conference Report, 1975 (held at LHASC, Manchester), 
498–9.
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established practice of personnel exchange between the TUC International 
Department, the BLP International Department and the Foreign Office. The New 
Statesmen reported:
The TUC … has stood at the centre of the official structure of international 
unionism ever since the forties. But the official structure—still deeply 
penetrated by the CIA, and by the anti-ideology of the British Foreign 
Office—no longer represents, if it ever did, the aspiration of workers’ 
organisations to escape from national constraints.136
Since 1961 the International Department of the TUC had employed Alan 
Hargreaves.137 Hargreaves was disliked in the trade union movement and was, 
according to Patrick Wintour, ‘one of the least-forthcoming and least-known 
officials in British unionism’.138 He did not carry any sense of being a ‘trade 
unionist’, remembered Gatehouse, who continued: ‘he was extremely hostile, 
difficult to deal with’, and he was on occasion ‘ludicrous, inappropriate, but 
manifestly hostile’.139 He kept the International Department of the TUC on a tight 
rein, instructing his staff to keep all work confidential, even from TUC officials. 
His internal notes to Len Murray, general secretary of the TUC, suggested a 
close relationship that bypassed formal committee communications.
His ‘skilful manoeuvring’ within the TUC ensured he maintained control over 
the correspondence of the International Department with trade unions.140 
Hargreaves even went as far as discouraging trades councils from affiliating to 
the CSC.141 When asked about Hargreaves and his International Department, 
Ken Hulme simply declared: ‘they weren’t nice people.’142 A member of the 
BLP International Department said ‘the trouble with Hargreaves [was] that he 
[did] not like foreigners’.143 As noted, Hargreaves had been recruited from the 
136 ‘The TUC’s “foreign policy”’.
137 The International Department of the TUC was not the same as the International Committee. The 
International Department was staffed by paid workers, not elected representatives of trade union affiliates. 
Alan Hargreaves’ initials (J. A. H.) identify his authorship of documents in the TUC archives.
138 ‘The TUC’s “foreign policy”’. This article was loosely based on the articles presented in Where Were 
You Brother?, published by the War on Want. Murray, the general secretary of the TUC, said this article was 
‘almost certainly libellous’; however, I found it does echo sentiments conveyed in the oral history interviews 
completed for this project. I.C. 5. March 5, 1979, TUC, MMS.292D/901/14, MRC, UW, Coventry.
139 Gatehouse Interview, 2007. Hargreaves represented the TUC at the British Atlantic Committee, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Overseas Labour Consultative Committee and the UK committee for the 
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). General Council Representation on Bodies 
Dealing with International Matters, 1975, TUC, MSS.292D/901/9, MRC, UW, Coventry.
140 Ibid.
141 Hargreaves wrote to Mrs Burgess of the Portsmouth Trades Council: ‘It is the usual practice for Trades 
Councils to avoid becoming involved in political activities not connected with industrial matters of more immediate 
interest. Such activities are best dealt with by the political wing of the Labour Movement, and it would be more 
appropriate for co-operation with the CSC to be carried out through the local BLP branch.’ Hargreaves (TUC) to 
Burgess (Portsmouth Trades Council) July 16, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
142 Hulme Interview, 2007.
143 ‘The TUC’s “foreign policy”’.
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Foreign Office, and he maintained relations with the office well into his term at 
the TUC. For example, Hargreaves learned of the 1974 delegation of Australian 
unionists to Chile from an unsolicited letter from the Foreign Office. This named 
the full delegation, their union affiliations and activities in Chile well before 
communications arrived from unions in Australia.144 Mike Gatehouse’s feelings 
on Hargreaves were clear: ‘this Hargreaves character at the TUC … I felt sick to 
have met this bloke.’145
If only the attitudes of the TUC International Department were taken into 
account, it would seem that the Chile campaign did not have labour movement 
support. Fortunately for the committee, close to the top of the trade union 
movement in Britain was an individual who was strongly sympathetic to the 
cause: Jack Jones. He sat at the head of the TUC International Committee.146 
Jones was a widely known and powerful trade unionist whose international 
credentials stemmed from his participation in the Spanish Civil War. Together 
with Hugh Scanlon of the AUEW, he was known as one of the ‘Tsars of the trade 
union movement’ in Britain.147 Gatehouse said that Jones ‘was a very upright 
man I think, in many ways, I think probably one of the least corrupt … he was 
the most puritanical of the trade unionists’. 
Although Gatehouse recalled that Jones did not have a ‘feeling of real warmth. 
I think he cared a lot, but he didn’t sort of display it.’148 
Generally respected as a man of integrity, Jones was also on the BLP National 
Executive Committee, the Management Committee of the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ITF)149 and was the general secretary of the TGWU. A poll 
commissioned by the BBC in 1977 revealed that the public believed Jack Jones 
wielded more power than the prime minister.150
Apart from Jones, the CSC had few friends in the TUC International Department. 
The relationship between Hargreaves and Jack Jones was imperfect.151 It was said 
that Jones ‘had particular antipathy towards Hargreaves’, but never managed to 
dislodge him from his position at the TUC.152 
144 Hurst (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Hargreaves, 25 April 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, 
UW, Coventry.
145 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
146 Jones, Jack Jones.
147 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
148 Ibid.
149 Sterne, ‘Chile and the TUC’.
150 Tony Greenland, ed. The Campaign Guide 1977 (Westminster: Conservative & Unionist Central Office, 1977).
151 Hargreaves was technically below Jones in hierarchy, but as a full-time employee, he spent much more 
time at the TUC offices. He wielded much more power than his title suggests.
152 ‘The TUC’s “foreign policy”’.
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Despite the power struggle between Hargreaves and Jones and the TUC’s 
general hostility towards the CSC, trade union support for the CSC was actually 
widespread. The attitude of Hargreaves and consequently the International 
Department of the TUC shows the ideological and organisational split between 
sections of the trade union movement that occurred within the industrial 
national model. The disjuncture between union levels allowed Hargreaves to 
establish himself and wield greater power than his position might otherwise 
allow. His actions did keep some TUC and other labour movement support from 
the CSC. It could be argued, however, that his attempts to block official TUC 
action created the space for the committee to expand its official network through 
the affiliation of unions dissatisfied with the representation of the TUC and who 
subsequently sought a more social movement-oriented internationalism. 
A test of strength and organisational obedience occurred when the CSC decided 
to organise a demonstration for 15 September 1974.153 It would take advantage of 
the visit of Salvador Allende’s widow, Madame Hortensia Allende. Mme Allende 
was invited to Britain as a guest of the BLP,154 the London Cooperative Society 
Political Committee, the STUC and the Scottish Chile Solidarity Committee.155 
Gatehouse accompanied and translated for her. He also organised her tour, even 
typing out in Spanish descriptions of people with whom Mme Allende was 
to meet in order to make her feel more comfortable.156 Trade union empathy 
for and generosity towards Allende’s widow was embodied in many acts of 
kindness—for example, Clive Jenkins of the Association of Scientific, Technical 
and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) loaned his car for her exclusive use.157 Mme 
Allende returned to Britain various times during her exile, including a more 
extended tour in 1975. Mike Gatehouse almost always accompanied her.
The Chile campaign invited the BLP, as host of Mme Allende’s 1974 trip, to 
sponsor the demonstration. The Labour Party, in turn, invited the TUC to 
co-sponsor the event.158 At the BLP International Committee in June it was 
informally reported that Jack Jones (strategically placed in the BLP, TUC and 
TGWU, as already described) had said that the TUC International Committee 
would co-sponsor if asked.159 As simply as that, Jack Jones committed the 
153 In February 1974, a national demonstration was held in Liverpool—a separate action to the one 
described here. The demonstration in Liverpool was organised by the London office to recognise the grassroots 
leadership from the docks that was occurring there. Programme of Activity for the Campaign for 1974–5, CSC, 
CSC/2/1, LHASC, Manchester. Nolan Jimmy et al., discussion with Ann Jones.
154 Hayward (BLP) to Murray (TUC), 28 August, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
155 Gira en Gran Bretana. Septiembre 1974, CSC, CSC/20/1, LHASC, Manchester.
156 ‘Mike Gatehouse se alojara en el hotel para asegurar el bienestar de las visitas’ [‘Mike Gatehouse will stay 
in the hotel to ensure the wellbeing of the visitors’]. Ibid. 
157 Ibid.
158 Hayward (BLP) to Murray (TUC), 4th July, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
159 Hargreaves to Murray, July 5, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
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resources of the national trade union body of Britain. Such were the advantages 
of having a sympathetic person in such a strategic position in the interlocking 
directorate of the labour movement. 
Figure 1.4 ‘Mrs Hortensia Allende [centre] met in London yesterday by 
Labour Party International Department Secretary Jenny Little and (right) 
Mike Gatehouse of the Chile Solidarity Campaign.’
Source: ‘Junta is Terrorising the People—Chile Bishops’, Morning Star, 11 September 1975, 1, courtesy of the 
Marx Memorial Library.
According to Jenny Little of the BLP International Department, only the BLP and 
the TUC would be listed as sponsors, despite contributions in money and effort 
towards organising the event from the AUEW, TGWU and other organisations.160 
160 Chile: Demonstration, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry. See, for example, the AUEW 
Executive Council resolving to assist organisation of the 1974 demonstration: Minutes. Meeting of Executive 
Council, held in General Office, on the 4th June, 1974 at 2.45 p.m., Amalgamated Engineering Union, MSS.259/
AEU/1/1/215, MRC, UW, Coventry.
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The speakers were to be Mme Allende, Neil Kinnock, Ken Gill (AUEW Technical 
and Administrative Staffs Section: AUEW TASS), John Gollan (secretary, CPGB), 
Tariq Ali (IMG) and Jack Jones.161 
The inclusion of an IMG speaker at the expense of an IS speaker raised protests 
in that section of the Trotskyite left.162 In a letter, Peter Binns (IS and also member 
of the CSC Executive Committee) pleaded with the CSC to change its decision.163 
Gatehouse, in a conciliatory response, pointed out that trying to construct a 
balanced platform of speakers from the various groupings was a difficult task: 
time was too short to let everyone speak.164 
The inclusion of Ali had more extensive implications than offending the IS. 
The TUC International Department refused the BLP invitation to co-sponsor 
the demonstration because of the IMG speaker on the platform.165 They wrote, 
in a conspiratorial tone, to the BLP that they must refuse due to ‘IMG activities 
elsewhere in the trade union movement’.166 The BLP International Department 
agreed with the peak union body’s views on the IMG speaker, but as Mme 
Allende was a BLP guest, they could not withdraw their support for the 
demonstration without embarrassment.167 In spite of this, Jenny Little talked 
with the CSC about withdrawing Ali from the platform, and threatened to 
remove sponsorship if he was not.168 The BLP was to reconsider the support of 
the demonstration at their national executive committee meeting on Wednesday, 
24 July.169 The paper trail of correspondence on this subject in the archives then 
stops for some months.
The BLP ultimately withdrew its official support for the demonstration, 
‘because of the general election’.170 Factional politics had won over international 
sentiment, and in the process of maintaining its broad united front, the CSC 
had alienated itself (further) from the TUC and the BLP, arguably the two most 
important labour movement groups, certainly within the industrial national 
structure. In practice, however, the withdrawal of support may have been 
an attempt at intimidation only. Gatehouse remembered that ‘the threat was 
161 Gira en Gran Bretana. Others included Inti Illimani and Isabel Parra.
162 This decision was passed by both the CSC Committee (6 July) and the Campaign Executive (19 July) of 
1974. Gatehouse to Binns (IS), July 20 1974, CSC, CSC/45/2, LHASC, Manchester.
163 Binns (IS) to CSC, July 19th 1974, CSC, CSC/45/2, LHASC, Manchester.
164 Gatehouse to Binns (IS), July 20 1974. 
165 Hargreaves to Murray, July 5, 1974. 
166 TUCIC 5.8.74: Chile, CSC, CSC/4/1, LHASC, Manchester.
167 Hayward (BLP) to Murray (TUC), 28 August, 1974. 
168 Chile: Demonstration, 1974.
169 Ibid.
170 Beatrix Campbell, ‘Chile’s Torturers Stand Accused’, Morning Star, 10 September 1974.
1 . The ‘principal priority’ of the campaign: The trade union movement
57
uttered but not carried through’.171 Kitson and MPs such as Judith Hart and 
Martin Flannery would not have been able to continue their vocal support if the 
BLP disapproved so openly of the CSC.
Meanwhile, one level down the trade union hierarchy, the General Executive 
Council of the TGWU (of which Jack Jones was general secretary) wrote that it 
would ‘extend the Union’s fullest support and participation to all expressions 
of solidarity with the Chilean people being sponsored by the Labour Party, 
particularly the nationwide demonstrations to be held on September 15’.172 Jones 
would speak at the rally on the understanding that it would be on behalf of the 
TGWU only.173 The TUC International Committee, of which Jones was head, 
suggested bleakly that he refer to the TUC international policy on Chile before 
giving his speech. On top of this, by June 1974 the AUEW National Executive—
Engineering Section, the Welsh Area National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), 
Scottish Area NUM, London Cooperative Society Political Committee and the 
National Union of Students had also pledged support for the demonstration.174
The protesters would gather at 1 pm at Speakers’ Corner and march via Oxford 
Street, Regent Street and Haymarket to Trafalgar Square. Speeches would start 
there at 4.30 pm, from a platform on the steps of the fountain.175 The protest 
was to be set out for maximum effect: at the head of the march a Chilean flag 
would be carried, then the platform speakers and the CSC banner, pipers and 
10 more Chilean flags. After this would be trades unions and trades councils, 
local CSC committees, constituency Labour parties, CPGB and finally the IMG, 
IS and others.176
On the day of the demonstration, the Morning Star, a newspaper associated 
with the Communist Party,177 reported that ‘exiled Chilean folk singers, their 
fists clenched, pounded out revolutionary songs as nearly 12,000 rain-soaked 
marchers … trooped into Trafalgar Square’.178 The figure is more likely to have 
been 10 000.179 It was the biggest Chile demonstration ever seen, according to 
171 Mike Gatehouse, email to Ann Jones, 26 July 2009.
172 Chile: Passed by the General Executive Council of the Transport and General Workers Union on June 7, 
1974, CSC, CSC/4/1, LHASC, Manchester.
173 JAH re: note attached—CHILE: DEMONSTRATION, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
174 Local Committees Newsletter No. 4, June 25 1974, CSC, CSC/44/1, LHASC, Manchester.
175 Ibid.
176 The division of the march thus indicated the importance of each of these groups to the CSC. It also 
served to keep disputing factions away from each other. Order of March as Agreed for September 15th, 1974, 
CSC, CSC/20/1, LHASC, Manchester.
177 The Morning Star was not the official organ of the CPGB, but functioned as if it was. There were 50–60 
000 copies circulated per day in the 1970s. Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 42.
178 Ibid.
179 On top of 3000 at the Glasgow demonstration the day before. The Times put the total at the Trafalgar 
Square rally at 10 000. Peter Strafford, ‘Two Worlds under Chile’s Junta’, The Times, 16 September 1974.
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the Seamen’s Journal.180 The entire executive of the TGWU spearheaded the 
march, alongside Judith Hart (then Minister for Overseas Development), Martin 
Flannery MP (BLP), Alex Kitson (TGWU, BLP and CSC), John Gollan (CPGB) and 
Dai Francis and Emlyn Williams (South Wales NUM National Executive Council 
members, CPGB and BLP respectively). 
The demonstration was an ‘outstanding success’, wrote Max Engelnick, district 
organiser of the CPGB.181 There were at least 200 union banners present.182 Four 
hundred miners travelled from Wales and 200 from Yorkshire to march. After a 
last-minute shuffle, the speakers included Hortensia Allende, Harald Edelstam 
(former Swedish ambassador to Santiago),183 Tariq Ali (IMG) and Jack Jones.184
Significantly, mass participation triumphed without the official support of the 
two most powerful and all-encompassing groups of the labour movement: the 
TUC and the BLP. The great numbers of trade unionists in the street highlighted 
the lack of connection between the rank and file and the upper echelons in the 
trade union movement. The insistence on a broad front had created space for 
Tariq Ali to step in and purloin more power than his position warranted. 
What was more telling was that one individual could override the structure and 
political idiosyncrasies of the labour movement: Jack Jones, by his presence 
alone, gave the appearance of TUC, BLP as well as TGWU endorsement, despite 
the behind-the-scenes machinations.
By ensuring the participation of strategic trade unionists, the CSC had benefited 
from more than the power of an individual. According to Kane, morally justified 
actions are ‘legitimate’.185 In this way, a person such as Jones with accumulated 
moral capital was used to access opportunities that would otherwise not be 
available.186 Jones was not a faddist. He did not ‘attach an exalted significance’ to 
the Chile campaign;187 but he was a strategic individual: an access point to and 
voice of the trade unions of Britain. Through the industrial national framework, 
180 This is unlikely to be true, as the demonstrations in the German Democratic Republic (GDR: East 
Germany) and Cuba were on a larger scale again. ‘Chilean’s Charge—Appalling Brutality by Esmeralda Crew’, 
Seamen’s Journal 29, no. 6 (July 1974); The GDR’s Fervent Solidarity with the Courageous Chilean People (Berlin: 
Panorama DDR, c. 1973).
181 Engelnick (CPGB London District Committee) to Gatehouse, 16th September, 1974, CSC, CSC/45/2, LHASC, 
Manchester.
182 There were, among this figure, 30 trades councils, 20 AUEW branches and 10 TGWU branches.
183 Edelstam was a fixture on the solidarity circuit in Europe.
184 Other speakers included Jimmy Symes (Liverpool Dockers), Ken Gill (AUEW and TUC), Bob McKluskey, 
(Seamen’s), Alf Lomas (LCS), Neil Kinnock, Steve Parry (Students) and Peter Plouviez (British Actors Equity). 
Steve Parry was quite heavily involved in the CSC in the first two years. He was a CPGB member. Shipley, 
Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 36. Jones is not listed in some reports of the demonstration—for example: 
Chile Fights 8 (London: CSC [Chile Lucha], 1974). Gatehouse remembers that he was present.
185 Kane, The Politics of Moral Capital, 15.
186 Ibid., 11.
187 Hamer, The Politics of Electoral Pressure, 1.
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the CSC had gained the support of the TGWU, AUEW and rank-and-file levels 
of unions. Through horizontal movements, more akin to the relationships 
described in social movement unionism, they had gained Jack Jones. His status 
as an interconnected node gave the blessing of the whole labour movement to 
the Chile campaign. 
The CSC continued to rely on unions. In their program of activity for 1974–75, 
the CSC stated: ‘Our principal support has been in the trade union movement, 
and we must extend this much further, with an extended campaign to increase 
affiliations, and to provide ample stimulus for participation to our affiliates.’188 
The activities the campaign undertook in order to stimulate affiliate participation 
are focused on in the next chapter. In the meantime, trade union work would 
‘remain the principal priority of the Campaign’.189
188 Programme of Activity for the Campaign for 1974–5.
189 Ibid. Trade unions remained the focus of the campaign for the 1970s and into the 1980s. For example, 
the campaign took the side of the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) and National Graphical Association 
(NGA) rather than that of its own (long-term) member Imogen Mark in 1983: ‘While the CSC is not a trade 
union, it is firmly rooted in the labour movement and can scarcely be expected to take a completely neutral 
attitude to serious breaches of elementary trade union discipline.’ Given to Mark, 12th January, 1984, CSC, 
CSC/28/35, LHASC, Manchester.
No Truck with the Chilean Junta!
60
Figure 1.5 Mme Allende addresses the crowd in Trafalgar Square, 
September 1974.
Source: Untitled, Photo box 3, People’s History Museum, Manchester. 
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Figure 1.6 Judith Hart and Hortensia Allende embrace on the platform 
of the first anniversary march. Alf Lomas of the London Co-Operative 
Society Political Committee looks on.
Source: Chris Davies, ‘Remember Allende’, Labour Weekly, 20 September 1974.
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2. A ‘roll call’ of the labour 
movement: Harnessing labour 
participation
The Chile Solidarity Campaign’s strategy at the 1974 May Day rally was simple: 
assemble a strong contingent and move as close to the front as possible. The CSC 
was hoping that Lawrence Daly of the National Union of Mineworkers would 
mention Chile in his address, and they planned to hand out 15 000 copies of a 
special leaflet covering the situation of trade unions in Chile.1 
Like participation in May Day, trade union involvement in the movement 
of solidarity with Chile used a range of strategies familiar to any student of 
democratic politics in Britain, from mass demonstrations to petitions. Union 
involvement in the Chile campaign was not just financial with a representative 
aspect as described in the previous chapter. Union actions for Chile were 
primarily indirect and predominantly led by groups of individuals outside the 
trade unions. Trade unions often relied on this particular type of indirect action 
in order to fulfil their internationalist obligations, and the CSC exploited the 
opportunistic and resource-optimising nature of British trade unions to garner 
support for their cause. As such, the relationship was symbiotic. Interestingly, 
the actions described in this chapter were taken in the style of both industrial 
national and social movement unionism, often at the same time. 
Although the origins and machinations of the first anniversary demonstration 
have already been explained in the previous chapter, its essential features as a 
public ritual are typical of many others and are worth lingering over in detail. 
The establishment of artistic and cultural activities, including banner making, 
mural painting and the use of music are, is explored in this chapter, highlighting 
the blend of labour tradition with social movement and new left strategy. As 
well as these group expressions of solidarity, the chapter will also explore the 
more intimate ‘adopt a prisoner’ program and specially organised conferences as 
methods of mobilising action using existing union structures. 
With the establishment of the CSC came an annual calendar of events that 
revolved around significant Chilean and labour movement dates. Navy Day in 
Chile is marked on 21 May, and is important in the relationship between Britain 
and Chile. Lord Cochrane, a British citizen, was the commander-in-chief of the 
Chilean Navy during the War of Independence in the nineteenth century and 
1 CSC Executive Committee: Minutes of the meeting held on Thursday April 11 1974 at Seven Sisters, CSC, 
CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
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it is traditional for Chilean Navy officers to travel to London to lay a wreath at 
the foot of his tomb in Westminster Abbey each May. This became one focus 
of campaigning.2
The anniversaries of the September coup were, however, what became most 
prominent in the calendar of protest. For the left in general and trade unions 
in particular, demonstrations and marches were a part of the existing repertoire 
of political action. The organisation of demonstrations was a canny move on 
the part of the CSC, as it required little organisational output for the unions to 
participate and lend mass support to the cause.3 The CSC was part of a social 
movement yet it harnessed a traditional strategy of the old left and coopted 
unions through their industrial national structure. It is a supreme example of 
the manner in which abstract models of unionism were blended in practice.
On the night of Saturday, 14 September 1974, at the Trade Union Centre in Carlton 
Place, Glasgow, protestors gathered. At 11.30 pm, they stepped aboard a coach 
that travelled through the night to London. Some hours later, on another side 
of the country, 200 Yorkshire miners started their journey towards the capital, 
and about the same time a train left Liverpool full of demonstrators.4 In Oxford, 
the local CSC filled two coaches of travellers. From South Wales, a train carrying 
400 miners travelled through the morning, led by five members of the Merthyr 
AUEW and five more representatives from the Merthyr Communist Party.5 
At 1 pm on Sunday, 15 September 1974, 10 000 people assembled at Speakers’ 
Corner in Hyde Park.6 This was not a motley mix of citizens churning together, 
but a highly choreographed, large-scale statement.7 The CSC stewards divided 
the march into four sections, demonstrating the broadest support possible from 
the British labour movement for the people of Chile.
The speakers were at the head of the march, including the executive of the TGWU, 
who walked in front of the Chile Solidarity Campaign Committee banner (carried 
2 The year after the coup the authorities at the Abbey would not let the Chilean Navy representatives 
enter. Instead a labour movement delegation placed wreaths at the tomb in memory of the members of the 
Chilean armed forces who were loyal to the constitutional government, and who had died since the coup. The 
delegation comprised BLP MPs Ian Mikardo, Eric Heffer, Frank Allaun, Norman Buchan, Jo Richardson and 
Russell Kerr. Protests continued on 21 May 1974 when the CSC picketed the evening reception held by the 
Chilean Navy. No official British Navy or government representative attended. The Chile Monitor no. 6, 1974, 
CSC, CSC/7/3, LHASC, Manchester; CSC Executive Committee: Minutes of the meeting held on Thursday April 
11 1974 at Seven Sisters; CSC Annual report, 1977, CSC, CSC/1/13, LHASC, Manchester.
3 Further more, they made money. It cost £1577.82 to organise the parade, but the collections at the 
demonstration meant the profit came to £1066.49. CSC Provisional Accounts. October 7 1974, CSC, CSC/1/3, 
LHASC, Manchester.
4 ‘Protest at Chilean Embassy’, Morning Star, 12 September 1974.
5 ‘Trade Unionists fill Demo Train’, Morning Star, 4 September 1974.
6 Despite being in student holidays and on the eve of a general election, there was still a strong turnout. CSC. 
Executive Committee: Analysis of Campaign Performance to Date; Campbell, ‘Chile’s Torturers Stand Accused’.
7 Order of March as Agreed for September 15th, 1974.
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on one side by Mike Gatehouse) and MPs Judith Hart and Martin Flannery.8 
Then there were nine Chilean flags, followed in turn by the Chile Lucha banner9 
and the London Co-Op Political Committee.10 Policemen in overcoats and helmets 
in lines on each side of the protestors restrained the demonstration.11
More impressive than the head of the march was its body, which was made up 
of unionists from all over the country. The TGWU was the first of the union 
section, followed by the NUM contingent. Their traditional banners held aloft, 
the miners marched to ‘the beat of a single bass drum in the prize-winning Llyd 
Coed brass band’.12 Next, the AUEW marched, then the NATSOPA. Actors Equity 
marched with the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing 
Union (EETPU) and then the Post Officers along with AUEW TASS. There were 
then more than 30 trades council contingents with banners. Shop stewards from 
Rolls Royce and Leyland came as well, with their 2 metre-wide banners.13
The last section of the demonstration was reserved for political parties (note that 
this was behind the trade unions). The International Socialists’ delegation held 
their own rally in Hyde Park, then followed on to the national demonstration, 
joining the final section.14 The International Marxist Group also sent a delegation 
but the largest of all was the Communist Party, with more than 100 banners 
from constituencies all over the country. The Labour Party was represented 
by 50 constituency and Labour Party Young Socialists contingents, which flew 
8 Chile Fights 9 (London: CSC [Chile Lucha], 1974).
9 Chile Lucha was a publication group set up by the Chilean immigrant Raul Sol. He was a member of MAPU 
Garreton, which had different politics than MAPU (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario: United Popular 
Action Movement). He was a charismatic, very intelligent man and attracted a small group of loyal followers, of 
diverse backgrounds, while in Britain. He was strongly in favour of a broad front for the campaign. The group 
included Imogen Mark, who was vital to the success of the publication. Chile Lucha ran out of ‘Boardwick 
Street in Soho in London … you went up the fire escape at the back and there was this little flat’. Sol had a 
deep effect on the campaign, because many of the people he mentored through the group became crucial in 
the following years to Chile and other Latin American campaigns. Those people include Sarah Trask, Gordon 
Hutchinson and Imogen Mark. They established the Latin America Archive, which was loosely attached to 
Latin American Newsletters (a commercial newsletter operation). Hugh O’Shaughnessy and Richard Gott both 
worked there, and their influence in newspapers of the time is perceptible (including in those used in this 
thesis). People from within Sol’s small group went on to positions in organisations that attracted funding from 
the Government and other funding agencies. The groups they worked in included Oxfam, Christian Aid and 
War on Want. Gott became a reporter on the junta in Chile; however, he ended up working at the Military 
College in Santiago. Gatehouse Interviews, 2007 and 2008.
10 London Co-Op was a major supporter of the campaign, and the CSC courted it carefully for financial 
support. For these reasons, the London Co-op Political Committee (LCPC) was high in the order of the march.
11 Chile Fights 9.
12 Campbell, ‘Chile’s Torturers Stand Accused’.
13 ‘The exceptionally strong trade-union turn-out suggested that the Campaign’s work with the trade union 
during the year had been well received.’ CSC. Executive Committee: Analysis of Campaign Performance to Date; 
Chile Fights 9.
14 Campbell, ‘Chile’s Torturers Stand Accused’.
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in the face of the BLP Executive’s decision to not sponsor the rally. Added to 
this were the International Brigade and bodies of workers from Spain, Italy, 
Portugal and Ireland.15
Figure 2.1 The yearly anniversary rallies had a loyal following.
Source: This image probably shows the 1983 demonstration—it was a particularly rainy day. Untitled, 
Photo box 3, People’s History Museum, Manchester.
15 Chile Fights 9.
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Martin Gostwick reported in the Morning Star:
Car workers and boilermakers, vehicle builders and railwaymen, 
building workers and construction men, co-operators, miners, Labour 
Party members and Communists filed by in a seemingly endless stream.
Engineers and steelworkers, blast furnacemen, farm workers, journalists 
and print workers—the march from Hyde Park to Trafalgar Square was 
like a roll call of the British labour movement.16
Some walked silently, some chanted. They advanced up Oxford Street, turning at 
Regent Street, through Haymarket before entering Trafalgar Square. The crowd 
streamed into the square to the sounds of Inti Illimani singing Venceremos (We 
Will Triumph).
The first speaker was the widow of Salvador Allende, Madame Hortensia 
Allende. An immaculate and glamorous woman, her crisp clothing, coiffured 
hair, bejewelled fingers, flawless make-up and silk scarf tied to a bow about her 
neck remained seemingly untouched by the rain that fell on the crowd. She 
thanked the trade unionists of East Kilbride, Rosyth and Liverpool.17 Ken Gill 
(AUEW TASS) also spoke, stating that the Chilean experience provided a lesson 
to the British left when confronting fascism: they must stay united.18 Harald 
Edelstam received a ‘mighty ovation’ in thanks for the lives of Chilean refugees 
he had saved in his swift actions as Swedish Ambassador to Chile after the coup.19
The steps on which the speakers stood were full, with the eight members of Inti 
Illimani, the speakers, translators and executive members of unions who felt 
they had the right to be represented on the platform. It was not only unionists’ 
personal ideological commitment that compelled them to be present. It was also 
a manifestation of the alliance between their unions and the social movement: 
the presence of unionists at this rally was a typical example of their involvement 
in indirect political action. The rally was organised externally to the unions, but 
fully embraced by them. Their presence at this traditional-style event was a part 
of their duty as good unionists. Union delegations would continue to attend 
anniversary demonstrations under the obligation of their affiliation until the 
dictatorship fell. 
16 Martin Gostwick, ‘Solidarity with Chile’s Democrats’, Morning Star, 14 September 1974, 2.
17 Davies, ‘Remember Allende’.
18 Bob McLuskey (National Union of Seamen: NUS) and Neil Kinnock (BLP) also spoke.
19 Campbell, ‘Chile’s Torturers Stand Accused’. Edelstam spent lots of time in Britain after the coup, and 
attended many rallies and presentations as well as delegations to the foreign office and so on. I believe this is 
because his children were attending British public schools.
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Figure 2.3 ‘Señora Salvador Allende speaking before a mass rally in 
support of Chilean resistance, Trafalgar Square, London, 15 September 
1974. Organised by the British Joint Labour Movement and the Chile 
Solidarity Campaign. In the foreground are trade union banners and in the 
background Chile Vencera banner by John Dugger of AFD.’
Source: Brian Nicholson can be seen in blue shirt and black jacket immediately below the image of Salvador 
Allende. Arts Festival for Democracy in Chile, CSC, CSC/12/1, LHASC, Manchester.
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As Inti Illimani moved forward to sing for the final time, the crowd huddled 
together for warmth. The musicians sang, in front of them a sea of faces and 
banners, behind them on the steps was a huge strip banner. John Walker 
described the banner: ‘Its vivid expanses of red and blue and its highly 
simplified figures appeared modern in comparison to the more Victorian style of 
the British trade union banners among the crowd.’20
The monumental strip banner, described as ‘an anti-fascist artwork’, was 
specially constructed for the 1974 demonstration.21 It was called ‘Chile Vencera’ 
(sic) (‘Chile will overcome’). The banner was, according to the artist, ‘a blend of 
Californian mural painting and traditional British trade union or Baptist Church 
banner making’.22 The symbolism of its content was important because, unlike 
art hung in a gallery, the practice of displaying banners behind speakers meant 
the audience viewed the piece for a relatively long time, as rallies would often 
last hours.23
It had 10 figures: two copper miners, a fisherman, a foundry worker, two 
campesinos (farm workers), one of whom was an armed woman collecting eggs, 
a metal worker, a medical worker, a ‘cultural worker’ with a gun and a guitar 
modelled on Victor Jara and an education worker with a book from which the 
words ‘Chile lucha!’ (‘Chile fights!’) rise.24 The artist advised that the message 
told of the ‘need to organise collectively to over-throw fascism and includes the 
principle of solidarity to those engaged in a struggle against a military fascism, 
namely—the dual nature of our support, “for food and guns”’.25
This reflects the belief that there was strong resistance in Chile (there was not), 
and quite possibly the radical involvement of the artist or those with whom he 
consulted in the drafting process.26 The artist, John Dugger, was certainly aware 
of liberation struggles as well as conditions in the Third World and he also had 
a keen interest in the British trade union banner traditions.27 Dugger considered 
20 John Walker, Left Shift: Radical Art in 1970s Britain (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 124.
21 Notes on the Big Chile Vencera Banner (Profiles and Analysis), 1976, CSC, CSC/12/1, LHASC, Manchester.
22 Dugger in: Banner Arts Project, Patrick Johnson, 1976, CSC, CSC/12/2, LHASC, Manchester.
23 Walker, Left Shift, 205.
24 Notes on the Big Chile Vencera Banner (Profiles and Analysis). ‘Chile Lucha!’ can also be translated as ‘Chile 
fight!’ (a command).
25 Banner Arts Project, Patrick Johnson, 1976.
26 Dugger visited China in the early 1970s and was heavily influenced by Mao. Walker, Left Shift, 87.
27 In 1971 Dugger and Medalla had formed the Artists Liberation Front, the slogan of which was ‘socialist 
art through socialist revolution’. Their banner consisted of the slogan with the images of Marx, Engels, Lenin, 
Stalin and Mao. Dugger, along with Cecilia Vicuña, Guy Brett and David Medalla, was a founding member 
of Artists for Democracy in Chile, which was established in the Royal College of Art in 1974. Artists for 
Democracy held a two-week exhibition in September 1974 in London and was able to garner high-level 
support such as from Judith Hart, Harold Edelstam and Alvaro Bunster. Dugger and Medalla would go on 
to form a banner studio. Dugger was later employed by the Greater London Council, from 1983 to 1985, as 
a banner maker. Lucy Lippard, ‘Spinning the Common Thread’, A World of Poetry, accessed 3 June 2008, 
<http://www.worldofpoetry.org/cv_t2.htm>; Walker, Left Shift, 86, 204; Chile Fights 9; ‘John Dugger born 
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banners of this type to be a ‘portable-mural-without walls’.28 He believed murals 
were a cheap way to bring art to the people. The Chile Vencera banner was his 
first monumental strip banner, a form in which he would go on to specialise.29 It 
was also a rich symbol of the marriage of the labour movement and trade union 
traditions with new innovations of the social movement.
Making the banner was a long process that started with sketches and moved 
through various prototype phases until finally the templates were cut out of 
canvas and appliquéd onto the strips. The banner was then embroidered. The 
strips allowed for the use of machines and industrial thread, and created a 
sturdy banner. The final version of the banner was ‘laid out and assembled, 
[and] cut into 20 strips’ on the first anniversary of the coup, 11 September 
1974.30 The banner alone weighed 23 kg, but with its trunk, the two 18 m 
rigging ropes and the 42 coloured tassels, it weighed 32 kg. It was roughly 5 m 
high and 7.5 m wide.
The September 1974 rally had 10 000 participants, though in his report 
Dugger estimated that 20 000 people viewed the banner on that day. After the 
1974 demonstration it was used at the Labour Party rally in September 1975. 
Following this, early in 1976, the banner started its transnational journey when 
it was sent to the United States and used for an Inti Illimani concert in San 
Francisco. It then spent May Day in Berkeley at La Peña Cultural Centre.31 The 
banner returned to Britain for the September 1976 rally.32 Dugger estimated 
there were approximately 65 000 viewers of the banner over this time: it was a 
mobile monument to Chile solidarity.33
Pedro Cornejo (CUT) declared a different piece of art to be ‘a magnificent token 
of solidarity with our people’. It was a mural commissioned by the AUEW.34 
Maureen Scott was the chosen artist. According to the AUEW, the mural 
1948’, Tate Gallery, accessed 3 June 2008, <http://www.tate.org.uk/servlet/ViewWork?cgroupid=999999961
&workid=4042&searchid=13877&tabview=text>; John Gorman, Banner Bright: An Illustrated History of the 
Banners of the British Trade Union Movement (London: Allen Lane, 1973).
28 ‘John Dugger born 1948’. Nicholas Mansfield, ‘Radical Banners as Sites of Memory: The National Banner 
Survey’, in Contested Sites: Commemoration, Memorial and Popular Politics in Nineteenth-Century Britain, eds 
Paul Pickering and Alex Tyrell (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 81–99.
29 Dugger (in his ‘Banner Arts’ project phase) was later commissioned by the CSC to produce a 5 m x 3.7 m 
banner based on a patchwork design. It hung at the Albert Hall concert in 1978. CSC Annual Report, 1978, 
CSC, CSC/1/13, LHASC, Manchester. 
30 Banner Arts Project, Patrick Johnson, 1976.
31 Ibid.
32 Mme Allende also spoke. Mme Allende wore a white coat in 1974. At the 1976 rally there is no Salvador 
Allende banner present in the foreground of the photos. 
33 Banner Arts Project, Patrick Johnson, 1976.
34 Cornejo (CUT) to Boyd (AUEW), August 2 1976, CSC, CSC/32/3, LHASC, Manchester.
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portrayed ‘the present plight of the Chilean people and the struggle of the 
workers to restore democracy in their country’.35 Scott had trained at Plymouth 
College of Arts and her practice focused on workers and trade unions.36 
The style of the painting recalled that of Mexican muralists. Its rectangle was 
tightly packed with figures. Pinochet dominated the centre of the picture in his 
sunglasses and, below him, in a river of blood, flowed the bodies of his victims. 
At his shoulders were two figures, a skeleton in the junta uniform and a combat 
soldier. Allende appeared, looking older than when he passed away, bleeding in 
a bottom corner. Above Pinochet, a larger figure looked to the heavens, his face 
obscured both by the angle of this action and by the fact that the painting cut 
half of it off. He appeared to be straining against chains around his wrists. At the 
bottom of the painting, people of various races marched holding ‘the flame of 
resistance’.37 The whole painting seemed to be set in an amphitheatre—perhaps 
a reference to the stadiums that were used as holding pens for prisoners. In the 
background of the painting, sitting starkly against the blue sky, there were red 
banners, which stuck up like rocks. Upon them were union slogans.
When it was unveiled in the council chamber of the AUEW at the Peckham Road 
offices, the former Chilean ambassador Alvaro Bunster spoke at the event, along 
with Luis Pavez of the CUT.38 Ken Hulme, trade union organiser for the CSC, was 
also present, along with John Boyd (who features in Chapter Four) and Hugh 
Scanlon, with Elaine Nicholson interpreting.39 Pedro Cornejo of the CUT wrote to 
Boyd shortly after the mural was unveiled requesting permission to use the image 
of the mural on a postcard to raise money and to advertise solidarity.40 Cornejo 
also requested a number of photos of the mural to use in pamphlets, and ‘it may 
even be possible for us to smuggle a few copies to Chile, so that our comrades 
there can see direct evidence of the solidarity of British working people’.41 
35 Ibid.
36 Walker, Left Shift, 51, 53, 71.
37 Ibid., 218.
38 Luis Pavez was a construction worker who sought exile in the United Kingdom. ‘Chile’s wall of resistance’ 
Labour Weekly, 1976, CSC, CSC/7/9, LHASC, Manchester; Gatehouse to Roberts (AUEW), June 6 1976, CSC, 
CSC/32/6, LHASC, Manchester.
39 The AUEW devoted the back page of the August 1976 edition of its journal to the unveiling of the mural 
(the same month the export of war frigates was granted. See Chapter 4). CSC-Exec 26.8.76 Minutes, CSC, 
CSC/1/10, LHASC, Manchester.
40 Cornejo was announced as the CUT representative in Britain. He was originally adopted when still a 
prisoner by NUPE Hammersmith. Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile and the British Labour Movement, 14.
41 Cornejo (CUT) to Boyd (AUEW), August 2 1976.
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Figure 2.4 The unveiling of the AUEW mural, 1977. From left to right: 
Ken Hulme (CSC trade union organiser), Mrs and Mr Alvaro Bunster 
(ambassador to Britain from the Allende Government), John Boyd, Luis 
Pavez (CUT), Hugh Scanlon, Elaine Nicholson (interpreter) and Maureen 
Scott (artist).
Source: AUEW Journal: ‘Solidarity with people of Chile,’ 1976, Amalgamated Engineering Union, MSS.259/
AEU/4/6/56, MRC, UW, Coventry.
Despite this enthusiasm, art and design historian John Walker said, ‘while there 
is no doubt about the artist’s emotional sincerity, the mural’s pictorial rhetoric was 
antiquated’.42 Walker goes on to say that ‘one of [the mural’s] aims was to foster 
solidarity among trade unionists around the world in the hope that they would 
use their power to mount an international blockade of Chile’s commerce’.43 In this 
respect, the mural was a failure, as shortly after its unveiling it disappeared into 
42 Walker, Left Shift, 218.
43 Ibid.
No Truck with the Chilean Junta!
74
the museum of the AUEW.44 It was a gesture of solidarity, dripping in symbolism 
and of itself very unlikely to change the situation in Chile. It was an indirect 
action and an expression of the internationalism of the AUEW.
Other artistic undertakings of the Chile solidarity movement included 
exhibitions,45 but more prominently, music concerts. All over the world the 
protest music of Chile became an integral part of the Chile solidarity movement 
as it had been for the Allende Government. For many years a cultural committee 
existed within the CSC, functioning as a semi-autonomous body, while still 
being held underneath its rubric.46 The Cultural Committee was unofficially 
affiliated with Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR: Movement 
of the Revolutionary Left), one of the more extremist groupings in Chilean 
politics.47 This occurred in part because the actors and artists who arrived in 
Britain as refugees were mostly miristas.48 Most of the activists involved in 
the Chile campaign were CPGB members and the differing ideologies, along 
with linguistic problems, caused some tension.49 Gatehouse, secretary of the 
CSC, freely admitted the importance of the cultural committee’s activities, but 
noted there were always difficulties with them due to their extreme affiliates. 
‘The differences were never quite explicitly phrased, but they were apparent’, 
he recalled.50 
The biggest and most remembered music concerts were not organised by that 
committee. The group which organised the bigger concerts was formed when 
Joan Jara arrived back in Chile with her daughters.51 At its centre was Peggy 
Kessel. She was a Hampstead intellectual,52 involved in pre-coup solidarity with 
Chile through the Association for British–Chilean Friendship.53 She had organised 
concerts for Vietnam and was, in 1974, working at the National Theatre. Soon 
after the Chile coup broke, she foresaw the need for an anniversary concert 
and booked Queen Elizabeth Hall.54 Members of the high-profile Chilean groups 
44 Minutes. Meeting of Executive Council, held in General Office, on the 13th July, 1976 at 10.00 a.m., 
Amalgamated Engineering Union, MSS.259/AEU/1/1/224, MRC, UW, Coventry.
45 Including exhibitions of posters, photos and patchwork from within Chile, made by exiles or circulated 
by the international solidarity movement.
46 Sometimes called the Agit-Cultural Committee in documents (where ‘agit’ is short for agitation). It 
was established in an ad-hoc manner to organise the Chile Festival of March 1974. Report from the Cultural 
Committee of the CSC to the Campaign Executive. May 9th. 1974, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
47 The adherents of MIR were among the only Chileans to undertake any form of armed resistance to the 
junta.
48 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Joan Jara was the widow of Chilean new song artist Victor Jara, who was murdered in the first days of the 
regime. Roger Burbach, The Pinochet Affair: State Terrorism and Global Justice (London: Zed Books, 2003), 57.
52 Kessel was entrenched in the Hampstead artistic and acting community (CPGB).
53 New Chile, 3 March/April 1973 p. 8, CSC, CSC/7/1, LHASC, Manchester; Association for British–Chilean 
Friendship, 1972, Etheridge Papers: Longbridge Shop Stewards, MSS.202/S/J/3/2/166, MRC, UW, Coventry.
54 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
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which toured, Inti Illimani and Quilapayun, were predominantly Chilean 
Communist Party affiliates and for that reason Kessel was a more appropriate 
organiser than the MIR-aligned cultural committee.55
Gatehouse remembered that Kessel was a ‘formidable woman; she was absolutely 
terrifying to work for’.56 She was so efficient she had a letterhead printed on 
which to write her Chile concert correspondence, and she promised the concert 
would be ‘an evening of moving, but highly professional entertainment, such as 
is rarely found in London’.57 The first large-scale concert was on 16 September 
1974 and neatly coincided with Mme Allende’s tour and the first anniversary 
demonstration.58 Mme Allende was present along with Inti Illimani, Isabel 
Parra, Joan Jara and other British artists.59 The concert was titled ‘Inti Illimani 
Sing for Chile’ and proceeds were to go to the Chile Relief Fund (connected with 
the CCHR).60 Kessel gained the sponsorship of a string of church officials, as well 
as left personalities, such as Dame Peggy Ashcroft and Adrian Mitchell. Eight 
Labour MPs put their names forward as sponsors.61 
The success of the music concerts, which produced empathy and sympathy 
despite the language barrier, led to various performances being held throughout 
the 1970s. One of the biggest was the 7 March 1978 concert, featuring Pete 
Seeger and Quilapayun. It was patronised by 13 Labour MPs and was supported 
by various personalities such as Michael Palin.62 Behind the stage was a banner 
made by John Dugger’s Banner Arts Project, with the words (in Spanish) ‘Never 
give in or stray from the road’.63 The advertising space in the program was sold to 
raise money. Many unions purchased space, but all were outdone by the TGWU 
colour advertisement that took up the whole back cover (see Figure 2.5).64 It 
seems like an inconsequential detail, but by appealing for sponsorship of such 




58 After the concert, Mme Allende, Judith Hart, Steve Hart, Alex Kitson, Alf Lomas and George Anthony 
were invited to dine at the house of the Cuban ambassador. Gira en Gran Bretana. Septiembre 1974.
59 Ibid.
60 Kessel re: A Concert in aid of Chile Relief Fund Inti Illimani Sing For Chile, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, 
MRC, UW, Coventry.
61 Ibid.
62 The concert was organised by Chilean Records for the CSC and the Chile Relief Fund. Chile Solidarity 
Campaign (UK), Pete Seeger and Quilapayun: In Concert for Chile (London: London Caledonian Press, 1978).
63 Nunca te entregues ni te apartes del camino. Ibid.
64 The unions included Society of Graphical and Allied Trades (SOGAT), AUEW, CPSA, NUPE, Union of 
Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW), NATFHE, Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC), NGA, 
National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers (NUDBTW) and TGWU. Other concerts included: 
Inti Illimani and John Williams at the Dominion Theatre; Inti Illimani, Quilapayun, Isabel Parra and Patricio 
Castillo at Royal Albert Hall (30 September 1975; 3800 people attended); and Quilapayun and Bert Jansch, 
Theatre Royal (25 September 1977). CSC, ‘Inti Illimani, John Williams in Concert for Chile,’ (Manchester). Local 
Committees Newsletter No. 14, 24.9.75, CSC, CSC/44/1, LHASC, Manchester; Chile Fights 25 (London: CSC 
[Chile Lucha], 1977); Annual General Meeting London. February 7 1976. Secretary’s Report.
No Truck with the Chilean Junta!
76
with comparatively little work. The symbiotic relationship was manifested as 
the unions also managed to fill internationalist prerogatives and sections of their 
journals with little effort. 
Figure 2.5 The front and back pages of the Pete Seeger and Quilapayun 
concert program. The image on the front page is the Banner Arts banner 
that was suspended behind the singers. The back cover is a full-page 
advertisement from the TGWU.
Source: This copy of the program was signed by Pete Seeger. He wrote as a greeting ‘Mayibuye Africa!’, 
which was one of the rallying cries of the anti-apartheid movement. Chile Solidarity Campaign (UK), Pete 
Seeger and Quilapayun.
The strategic cultural achievements of the Chile campaign then migrated to the 
Nicaragua and El Salvador campaigns, which took cultural integration to new 
levels. Activist Diane Dixon remembered that CSC ‘essentially gave birth to the 
other solidarity movements’.65 Another strategy that found success in many 
solidarity campaigns after accomplishment with the Chile movement was the 
adoption of prisoners, a program that was administered by the CCHR.66
65 Interview with Diane Dixon (Chile activist, Scottish human rights campaigner, CPGB), 4 September 2007 
[hereinafter Dixon Interview, 2007], copy in possession of author.
66 For a time, they also ran an adopt-a-town program, but this was not as successful. This program was 
separate from the ‘town twinning’ program that was encouraged through CSC local committees. CSC Annual 
Report, 1976; Chile: the tide has turned Annual Report, 1983, CSC, CSC/1/13, LHASC, Manchester.
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The CCHR was a registered charity which ran out of 1 Cambridge Terrace, 
London.67 Established from the Chile campaign, the CCHR focused on human 
rights and aimed to work with a broader range of groups than the CSC. They did 
this by remaining ‘non-political’ and attempting to harness church and human 
rights groups as well as labour movement support.68 The CCHR worked (more 
than the CSC) closely with the Committee of Peace, followed by the Vicariate 
of Solidarity in Chile69 and other human rights organisations such as Amnesty 
International (British Section).70 There were times when some groups within the 
solidarity movement pushed for the CCHR and CSC to combine forces for more 
productive use of activist resources, but this was always resisted because the 
political nature of the CSC would have led to the loss of some CCHR supporters 
and vice versa.71
The adopt-a-prisoner program had a high level of labour movement involvement 
and was supported and pushed by the CSC. The Chile campaign admitted that the 
adoption program was ‘perhaps the most important activity we engage upon for 
maintaining and projecting the issue of Chile into the British labour movement’.72 
Participants wrote letters to the prisoners and often to their families, offering 
moral and sometimes financial support, and from time to time a prisoner was 
offered work to help obtain a visa for Britain.73 Chilean and British authorities 
were also contacted and articles were published in union journals and newspapers 
to keep members informed of progress.74 Sometimes, unions were misinformed 
when the snippets of information that made it to Britain were pieced together 
incorrectly. Tom Pilford, however, of the London County Association of Trades 
Councils, when giving advice to unions considering adopting a prisoner, said: 
‘you have to keep on plodding, even if you do make a mistake.’75 
Success in adoption could be a long process drawn out over many months and 
perhaps years, with multiple letters to representatives in Chile and Britain.76 
John Fairley of the Ladbroke House Branch of the National Association of 
Teachers described the process of making contact with a prisoner as taking 
67 Affiliates’ Newsletter No. 21, June 12 1977, CSC, CSC/1/12, LHASC, Manchester; Reg Williams (CPSA) to 
CPSA Branches, 24 November 1978, CSC, CSC/11/7, LHASC, Manchester.
68 The CCHR newsletter distribution list was to 10 000 people. Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity 
Lobby on British Government Policy towards Latin America’. 
69 CSC Annual Report, 1976.
70 CSC Annual Report, 1977.
71 CSC-AGM 19.02.77 Minutes.
72 Suggestions for Local Committees re: Trade Union Work, 1976; CSC Annual Report, 1976.
73 Sample letters in English and Spanish were sent to each adopting organisation by the CCHR as part of a 
guidelines pack drawn up with the help of Amnesty International. Chile Committee for Human Rights: Report 
on Adoption Scheme, April 1976, CSC, CSC/31/1, LHASC, Manchester.
74 CSC Annual Report, 1976.
75 Tom Pilford: Chairman, Greater London Association of Trades Councils, 1976, CSC, CSC/11/4, LHASC, 
Manchester.
76 Contact was not guaranteed and much of the time did not occur; see, for example: ‘Avon’s adopted Chilean 
Freed,’ Public Service, April 1976, CSC, CSC/28/9, LHASC, Manchester.
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about five months. Once established, they kept up a relatively steady stream 
of letters with the prisoner. It was published in the journal of the National 
Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE) that 
‘the first clear result of our Branch work shone through from the tone of our 
prisoner’s letters themselves: our involvement in and concern for his case 
clearly boosting the prisoner’s morale and giving him some hope even in his 
distressing circumstances’.77
Further, the lifting of the individual’s morale had an expansive effect, for, as 
Pilford put it, ‘the grape vine is great and it is going round the prisons that the 
people of England are concerned about them’.78 In November 1976, the CCHR 
received news from Chile that one sole prisoner in the Osorno Penitentiary was 
not adopted when all his prison mates were. A member of the CCHR wrote 
that ‘obviously, he is very sad and this confirms, how important the work of 
adoptions is emotionally’.79 His adoption was quickly confirmed. 
The adoption process sometimes resulted in very direct and personal contact 
with Chilean citizens. Receiving a letter from an incarcerated trade unionist in 
Chile was a moving event in a trade union meeting, and served to mobilise them 
further.80 For example, a letter from Benito Sanchez Muñoz of Lota in southern 
Chile surely provoked such a reaction. He was a miner of only twenty-three 
years of age who had been general secretary of the Young Socialists in his town. 
He wrote to the Scottish Area NUM, which had adopted him, begging for aid: 
‘I fear that this letter won’t reach you, but I’m taking the chance … I beg you 
to see what could be done for my wife and my little girl. I do not dare to tell 
you all the things which has happened to us.’81
Pilford described how the adoption of another young prisoner led to contact 
with his parents, who sent the Electrical Trades Union his thumbprint, his 
identification cards, his photograph, his military service record, a photograph 
of him with Allende and a letter from the local military authorities stating that 
he had good behaviour while incarcerated.82 With such stories and moments, 
it is easy to see how the program effectively ‘personalised the issues’.83 If an 
adoption such as this was ultimately successful and the prisoner made their way 
to Britain, the effect on the trade unionists could not ‘be over-stated’.84
77 ‘“Adopting” a Chilean Prisoner,’ NATFHE Tech Journal 2, March 1978, CSC, CSC/7/14, LHASC, Manchester.
78 Tom Pilford: Chairman, Greater London Association of Trades Councils, 1976.
79 As it turned out, he had already been adopted by the Glasgow 7/194 Branch of the TGWU. The CCHR 
prompted Doug Bain (Chile Human Rights Committee, Glasgow) to chase this up, and soon the prisoner’s 
sentence was commuted. The prisoner accepted an offer to go into exile in Scotland. Magali (CCHR) to Bain, 
2 November 1976, Sandy Hobbs Papers, TGWU, GCUA, Glasgow.
80 Suggestions for Local Committees re: Trade Union Work, 1976.
81 Mellado Torres to Jose, 27th January, 1975, Sandy Hobbs Papers, NUM, GCUA, Glasgow.
82 Tom Pilford: Chairman, Greater London Association of Trades Councils, 1976.
83 Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby on British Government Policy towards Latin America’.
84 Suggestions for Local Committees re: Trade Union Work, 1976.
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Despite the commitment of unionists and the rolling success of the program, 
not all adoptions were successful and in some cases the strategy backfired.85 For 
example, the mother of dual citizen William Beausire, herself an ex-detainee, 
appealed to the CCHR to stop using the incarcerated Beausire as an example, 
because the publicity could be damaging to him.86 Similarly, Sheila Cassidy noted 
that one of her fellow prisoners in Tres Álamos was returned for more torture 
in Villa Grimaldi whenever her name was mentioned in a foreign newspaper. 
Cassidy maintained that ‘these reprisals, however, were a small price to pay for 
the knowledge that her death would not pass unnoticed, and ultimately the 
unflagging efforts of thousands of people in the free world were rewarded, for in 
December 1976 she was released from prison and expelled from Chile’.87
The Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA) was a particularly successful 
adopter, with all three of its adoptees freed by 1978.88 The third of these was 
Jose Gonzalez Salas, who had been imprisoned without trial for three years. 
Salas was in his early twenties. As is the custom in Chile, all young men are 
required to undertake military service after finishing secondary school and 
his started in 1974, only three months after the coup. During this time the 
military intelligence attempted to bribe him to join their ranks, but he refused 
their advances. 
85 The Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) Youth Advisory Committee sent a letter of strong resolution 
on their adoptee to the Chilean Embassy in 1979. The embassy replied that in terms of the disappeared 
persons, ‘your concern is appreciated but it is doubtful that your adopting a missing person can really help 
with the enquiries’. The STUC Youth Committee consistently resolved very strongly for Chile. The STUC 
Women’s Committee only did so in 1974 and 1977. Berguno (Charge d’Affaires of Chile) to Harrison (STUC 
YAC), 17 May 1979, STUC, STUCA 475, GCUA, Glasgow.
86 See, for example: Jonathon Power, Amnesty International: The Human Rights Story (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 2001), 34; David Cross, ‘British Seek Truth on Missing Man’, The Times, 18 November 1981; Clifford 
Longley, ‘Prisoners of Conscience; Chile: William Beausire’, The Times, 28 July 1978; ‘MPs Call on Carter to 
Help Briton in Chile’, Guardian [Manchester], 7 May 1977; Burbach, The Pinochet Affair, 109. Among those 
used to deflect attention for the Beausire case was Excequiel Ponce Vicencio, a unionist on the docks (see 
<http://www.memoriaviva.com> for more information on his detention) and Ricardo Lagos (who would go on 
to become President of Chile in the 1990s). In 1975 Susie Carstairs of the CCHR reported that they were going 
to attempt to move away from ‘VIP’ prisoners and shift the focus to lesser-known prisoners. New guidelines 
had been made, and all letters to Chile would be siphoned through the CCHR due to the ‘risks involved’. 
CCHR, July 30th 1975 circular, Sandy Hobbs Papers, Box untitled, GCUA, Glasgow; CSC Committee Meeting at 
Liverpool. 8.2.75, CSC, CSC/1/5, LHASC, Manchester.
87 Sheila Cassidy, Sheila Cassidy: Audacity to Believe (London: Collins, 1977), 303.
88 ‘Our sponsored Chilean prisoner released,’ CPSA Red Tape 1978, CSC, CSC/7/14, LHASC, Manchester.










































































































































































































































































































































































2 . A ‘roll call’ of the labour movement: Harnessing labour participation
81
One day, 50 women were arrested and taken to the base in northern Chile. 
Among them was Salas’s girlfriend, who ‘was tortured and shot before his 
eyes’.89 Salas was then forced to watch the torture of the other women, but he 
could not. He turned his back and wept. He was taken to the Regiment Prison 
in Calama at gunpoint and given electric shock torture.90 The torments that 
followed included starvation, with his weight falling from 60 to 45 kg, and 
being shot at as he was forced to run. He recalled:
Every night guards would beat me up. Sometimes they would put me in 
blood-stained cells and make me clean them up. They would grab me by 
the hair and rub my face in my comrades blood … My limbs are scarred. 
I almost lost my right leg. They gave me injections of drugs to try and 
brainwash me.91
When Salas was finally released, the CPSA’s journal, Red Tape, relayed Salas’s 
gratitude to the union.92 He was formally greeted by the joyous Executive 
Committee of the CPSA, providing a photo opportunity for the journal, which 
showed Salas relaxing with a drink with the committee.93
Both the adopt-a-prisoner program and the demonstrations made use of an 
efficient strategy of ‘routinising’ Chile into the everyday working of the trade 
union movement.94 Of all the adoptions, the CCHR estimated that half were from 
trade union branches, and the rest by trades councils, students’ and women’s 
groups followed by church and school groups.95 Adoption measures, primarily 
letter writing, were indirect actions easily undertaken within union branch 
structures at little organisational cost;96 but that does not cheapen the feelings 
or intent of many trade unionists in this solidarity action. Adoptions made trade 
unionists feel as if they could alleviate the harsh conditions of those suffering 
in Chile, at least in part.97 
89 CPSA-Sponsored Chilean Prisoner Released, 1978, CSC, CSC/44/4, LHASC, Manchester.
90 Jose Gonzales Salas, in ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 ‘Our sponsored Chilean prisoner released,’ CPSA Red Tape 1978.
93 Ibid. Gonzalez Salas kept some sort of relationship with the union, speaking at their conferences, and so 
on. From Reg Williams (CPSA) to CPSA Branches, 24 November 1978, CSC, CSC/11/7, LHASC, Manchester.
94 By doing so, they perhaps used to their own benefit the tendency described by Max Weber of movements 
to routinise and bureaucratise. Pakulski, Social Movements, xvii.
95 CSC Annual Report, 1976. In 1975, the CSC and CCHR said there were more than 150 Chileans adopted 
by trade unions, trades councils, shop stewards and student unions. ‘At least 4 of these prisoners have been 
released and are now in Britain, partly as a consequence of their adoption.’ In 1976, 500 prisoners were 
adopted in the United Kingdom and 49 of those had been released. In April 1976, the CCHR reported that 
‘currently adopted through us: 521 prisoners, adopted by 354 branches of 40 different labour movement and 
religious organisations’. In 1978 there were 410 prisoners adopted by trade union branches and church groups 
throughout Britain. Report on CSC for LCS Political Committee, 1974, CSC, CSC/1/6, LHASC, Manchester; 
Chile Committee for Human Rights: Report on Adoption Scheme, April 1976; CSC-AGM 19.02.77 Minutes; CSC 
Annual Report, 1978.
96 Suggestions for Local Committees re: Trade Union Work, 1976.
97 Ibid.
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The adoption program appealed to the unionists on a personal level. For Pilford, 
speaking in 1975, it was as if he could see himself:
[L]ike most of you [I] was horrified when the news broke in ’73 when 
Aliendi [sic] had been murdered and thousands of our comrades who 
were in the Trade Union movement were slaughtered and their crime, 
[was] being like us, being politically minded, being involved in the 
Trade Union movement of fighting for rights to give workers decent 
homes and decent living conditions and a right for the things that we 
do every day and fight for.98
Chilean trade unionists were ‘just like us’. This personalisation was a similar 
tactic to the nineteenth-century socialist model of worker-to-worker solidarity, 
which implicitly emphasised the common long-term interests of class.99 If there 
was any self-subordination to the victim, it was apparent in the complete moral 
authority conferred to the prisoners. Their innocence, cooperation and political 
suitability were assumed. The rewards to the victims of the regime were great 
when there was a success: they gained freedom. The reward to trade unions, and 
the solidarity movement, was a boost in moral capital and strengthening of their 
organisational relationship.
Above any organisational gain, the plight of an individual unionist was above 
political difference. Everyone concerned with human rights could agree with the 
adopt-a-prisoner program. Who could not be moved by stories of burnt retinas, 
mutilations and dogs trained to rape?100 In this way the adoption program was 
a means of multiplying and solidifying solidarity.101 The CSC acknowledged 
that while the adopt-a-prisoner program was not vital to the campaign’s human 
rights work, it was ‘important for building the entire campaign, as was evident 
at the trade union conference’.102 
The conference referred to was organised by the CSC in 1975 and was ‘the most 
constructive and important development yet in the trade unions on Chile’.103 
Adoption of prisoners was one focus of discussion, and after the conference 60 
new prisoners were taken on.104 
98 Tom Pilford: Chairman, Greater London Association of Trades Councils, 1976.
99 Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 52.
100 Judy Maloof, Voices of Resistance: Testimonies of Cuban and Chilean Women (Kentucky: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1999), 207, 209; Carol J. Adams, ‘Woman-Battering and Harm to Animals’, in Animals 
and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations, eds Carol Adams and Josephine Donovan (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1999), 68, 78.
101 CSC-AGM 19.02.77 Minutes.
102 CSC Executive Committee: Discussion Document, December 17 1975, CSC, CSC/1/5, LHASC, Manchester.
103 Shonfield (National Rank and File Organising Committee) to Gatehouse (CSC), 27 October 1975, CSC, 
CSC/4/2, LHASC, Manchester. The Rank and File Organising Committee was part of the International 
Socialists. Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 51.
104 Annual General Meeting London. February 7 1976. Secretary’s Report.
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The organisation of the conference stemmed from a resolution at the 1974 
annual general meeting of the CSC and thus even its inception starts in a typical 
procedural trade union manner.105 The conference that resulted was ‘the most 
important activity organised during the past year’ and was ‘a great tribute’ to 
the work of the executive committee.106 Gatehouse started organising in January 
1975. This period coincided with the beginning of Ken Hulme’s time at the CSC, 
and with his enthusiasm the conference quickly moved from being affiliates 
only to a 444-unionist-strong conference in October.107 The TUC also called a 
conference on Chile in 1975, but it did not have anywhere near the attendance 
of the CSC’s Trade Union Conference for Chile.108 
It appeared the CSC had out-unioned the unions.
A set of papers was produced for each delegate of the CSC conference, including 
a draft declaration voted on in the final moments of the conference.109 The sheets 
were packed with information explaining the history and composition of the 
CSC, highlighting its strengths in trade union affiliations and its achievements, 
its current programs and available resources as well as detailed descriptions of 
what was currently occurring in Chile.110 There were also instruction sheets 
on practical things that trade unions could do, including the adopt-a-prisoner 
scheme,111 helping refugees in Britain112 and copper and wine boycotts.113 Harry 
105 Minutes of the CSC Executive Committee, 24/3/75, CSC, CSC/1/6, LHASC, Manchester.
106 Annual General Meeting London. February 7 1976. Secretary’s Report; CSC Executive Cttee: 20th 
November—House of Commons, 1975, CSC, CSC/1/5, LHASC, Manchester.
107 Minutes of the CSC Executive Committee, 10/1/75, at Seven Sisters Road, CSC, CSC/1/6, LHASC, 
Manchester. The TUC also grandstanded their own contributions to the CUT at this conference. TUC, ‘Notes 
of Proceedings at a Conference on Chile held at Congress House’, 36.
108 The only speaker to overlap was Alex Kitson, who was chair at the CSC conference but spoke from 
the floor at the TUC conference. CSC Executive Committee Meeting held on Friday February 28 1975, CSC, 
CSC/1/6, LHASC, Manchester. The TUC conference was held on a weekday, which would limit rank-and-file 
participation. TUC, ‘Notes of Proceedings at a Conference on Chile held at Congress House’. Looking more 
broadly, the CSC conference drafted appeals and letters to Kurt Waldheim of the United Nations, Jim Callaghan 
(British foreign secretary) and the International Conference of Solidarity with Chile (Athens, 1975). CSC Trade 
Union Conference Saturday October 25 1975—SPECIAL APPEALS, 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, Manchester.
109 The declaration called for the British labour movement to get behind trade union boycotts, consumer 
boycotts as well as the adoption of prisoners. CSC Trade Union Conference Saturday October 25 1975—DRAFT 
DECLARATION, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, Manchester.
110 CSC Trade Union Conference Delegate’s Briefing No 1: What is the CSC?, 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, 
Manchester; CSC Trade Union Conference Delegate’s Briefing No 3: What is happening in Chile? 1975, CSC, 
CSC/11/2, LHASC, Manchester.
111 CSC Trade Union Conference Delegate’s Briefing No 4: Adopt a Prisoner Campaign, 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, 
LHASC, Manchester.
112 CSC Trade Union Conference Delegate’s Briefing No 6: Helping Chilean refugees in Britain, 1975, CSC, 
CSC/11/2, LHASC, Manchester.
113 Briefing Document on Copper Boycott August 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, Manchester; Briefing 
Document on Chilean Wine July 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, Manchester; CSC Trade Union Conference 
Delegate’s Briefing No 4.
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Smith, national organiser for AUEW TASS, urged each delegate to return to their 
organisation, talk about Chile and ‘bring life and energy to the commitment of 
the approximately nine million trade unionists represented at the Conference’.114
Kitson and Nicholson chaired the event, and Luis Figueroa (president, CUT) 
also spoke in addition to 24 speakers from the floor.115 There were 11 sponsoring 
unions, and the TGWU was the most notable absentee. Of course, the TGWU 
made it onto the flyer more prominently than the sponsorship list thanks to 
Alex Kitson’s position.116 Delegates were sent from 34 different unions, and 
of those, 17 had executive members present.117 On top of this, there were 
35 trades councils and 19 shop stewards’ committees, making a total of 266 
different organisations.118 The breadth of representation indicates the success 
the CSC had in channelling labour movement power and attention through 
their affiliation system.119 
The day was recorded and the findings published in a pamphlet called Chile 
and the British Labour Movement, and it was cheap to buy and distribute 
through affiliates. The CSC worked hard to gain maximum momentum from 
their organising.120
Luis Figueroa and Pedro Cornejo of the CUT used the conference as an 
opportunity to thank the labour movement for its solidarity, actions and 
adoptions. Cornejo told of his stay in prison and indicated how moved he 
was by the trade union conference: ‘only through the kind of direct contact 
114 CSC Trade Union Conference Report to Delegates no. 2 Report of Proceedings, 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, 
Manchester.
115 Tom Pilford, Alex Ferry (AUEW Glasgow), Brian Anderson (AUEW Liverpool), Jimmy Symes 
(Merseyside Docks Shop Stewards) and Harry Smith all spoke. CSC Trade Union Conference Saturday October 
25—AGENDA, 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, Manchester; Annual General Meeting London. February 7 
1976. Secretary’s Report. For a list of all speakers, see: CSC Trade Union Conference Report to Delegates no. 1 
Attendance, 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, Manchester.
116 The sponsoring unions were Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (ACTT), 
Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), Association of Teachers in Technical 
Institutes (ATTI), AUEW, AUEW TASS, NALGO, National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants 
(NATSOPA), NUPE, NUM, SLADE and SOGAT. Solidarity with the People of Chile—A Trade Union Conference 
[flyer].
117 ACTT, ATTI, AUEW, AUEW TASS, CPSA, Musicians’ Union, NALGO, NATSOPA, NUGSAT, NUM, 
NUPE, NUR, NUS, Post Office Engineers Union (POEU), SLADE, SOGAT and Tobacco Workers’ Union.
118 Annual General Meeting London. February 7 1976. Secretary’s Report. NALGO sent the most delegates, 
with sixty-eight. Kitson said at the time that it was ‘something really new for a white collar union to be 
in the forefront in a cause such as this’. NALGO also made adoption official union policy. AUEW sent 56 
delegates, AUEW TASS 17, TGWU 54, and ASTMS and ATTI sent 28 each. CSC Trade Union Conference Report 
to Delegates no. 1 Attendance; Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile and the British Labour Movement; Tom Pilford: 
Chairman, Greater London Association of Trades Councils, 1976.
119 More than £300 was collected at the conference and each delegate was charged a £1 fee.
120 Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile and the British Labour Movement; From Gatehouse to Editors, Trade 
Union Journals & Labour Movement press re: Chile and the British Labour Movement, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, 
Manchester; Trade Union Conference Report, 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, Manchester. The success of the 
conference led to various others being organised by the CSC, the most prominent of which was ‘Bread, Work, 
Freedom’ (1979).
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afforded by this conference can one get to know a class beyond the boundaries 
of nation, flag and language, and perceive the true nature of the international 
workers’ movement.’121 
The internationalist rhetoric of the speeches temporarily united the attendees 
despite their local political differences. 
The conference encompassed a range of ideological and strategic opinions among 
the trade unions. Some focused on socialism, while others openly admitted 
the reason for their involvement was a commitment to Christian values.122 For 
example, on the one hand Kitson said the job of the British trade unionists 
was limited to pressuring Jim Callaghan, the British Labour Prime Minister, 
to change government policy. On the other hand, some unionists wanted to 
fight fascism directly and bring the junta down.123 The conference was used 
as a way of airing ideological differences and managing that conflict without 
endangering or involving the industrial aims of the unions. The unifying 
internationalist rhetoric provided an umbrella that protected unions against the 
factionalist storm.
The organisation of the conference by the CSC repeated the strategy of routinising 
the Chile issue.124 Support and attendance were easy, resource-sensible actions 
for trades councils and unions to undertake. If international activity of 
unions is contingent on the sum of incentives, capacities and impediments to 
action, as Schmutte has said, the CSC was extremely successful in promoting 
action.125 They provided activities, such as this conference, that negated most 
impediments (lack of finance, lack of organising hours, lack of leadership) and 
made expressions of union internationalism easy. Conferences were a way of 
life for the trade union movement. After the unions agreed to the consensus of 
affiliation by joining the campaign, it was merely good trade unionism to send 
along delegates, just as the TGWU would send delegates to ITF congresses. The 
conference was an indirect action using a strategy of industrial national style, 
yet it was organised by a social movement that mimicked deep traditions. It 
exposes the overlap of the abstract models when applied to real-life examples of 
union–social movement interactions. Nothing is clear-cut. 
121 CSC Trade Union Conference: Concluding speech of Luis Figueroa, President of the Central Unica de 
Trabajadores (CUT), the Chilean TUC, to the conference, 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, Manchester; Hand 
Written notes—Trade Union Conference 1976, CSC, CSC/11/4, LHASC, Manchester.
122 Hand Written notes—Trade Union Conference 1976.
123 Ibid.
124 The campaign also did this with trade union publications. They took a very organised approach to 
ensuring that Chile was covered in trade union journals. See, for evidence: Chile in the Union journals, c1978, 
CSC, CSC/28/15, LHASC, Manchester.
125 Schmutte, ‘International Union Activity’, 65.
2 . A ‘roll call’ of the labour movement: Harnessing labour participation
87
The conference, and the other activities described in this chapter, fits neither 
the industrial national unionism nor the social movement unionism paradigms. 
Almost all Chile solidarity activities were organised, promoted and run 
externally to the trade unions by a social movement group. The CSC exploited 
the hierarchical, official, stratified and ingrained structures, procedures and 
habits of the trade unions in order to achieve its own goals. The actions in this 
chapter demonstrated the flexibility of the internationalist sentiment of trade 
unions. In contrast to the rigidity of the theoretical models of trade union action 
contained in scholarly descriptions, real events were capricious. 
The next chapter discusses another institutionalised trade union action: the 
delegation. The industrial national nature of this delegation’s organisation 
did not mean it was independent of the social movement, but it did not 
mean it dominated the Chile discourse at the time. The rigid organisation of 
the delegation is contrasted with the efforts of one rogue individual. This 
individual had sufficient moral capital to act outside the hierarchy of the 
traditional labour movement.
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Figure 2.8 Jack Jones presents Luis Figueroa (CUT) with a TGWU mini 
banner.
Source: Chile Fights: Chile—Trade Unions and the Resistance 11 (London: CSC [Chile Lucha], 1975), 2.
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3. ‘Unique solidarity’? The 
mineworkers’ delegation, 1977
The delegation had arrived in Chile just in time for May Day.1 Protests on the 
streets were banned and the junta refused permission for official unions to 
celebrate the radical holiday; but they could not ban a mass for the feast of 
St Joseph, the Worker. Three British miners donned their jackets and joined a 
procession of Chilean trade unionists into the cathedral. They ‘witnessed the 
scenes of enthusiasm and defiance as the crowd chanted freedom slogans under 
the eyes of the military’.2
It was the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) which sent the delegation 
to Chile in 1977 and it was unusual in that the idea came from within the 
upper ranks of the union.3 The NUM was not integrated into the Chile 
Solidarity Campaign as much as other unions, yet the delegation represented 
a very significant act of British–Chilean solidarity. By attempting to avoid 
what theorists would retrospectively call social movement unionism and 
sticking with a more stringent (yet not unaltered) industrial national idea of 
internationalism, the miners actually strengthened the social movement from 
which they were trying to remain independent. Ironically, despite loyalty to 
the industrial national structure, the effect of the delegation within the upper 
reaches of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) or International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), for example, was limited. The NUM was unable to 
move the TUC to take substantial action, yet inversely, their action buoyed the 
solidarity campaign.
Another British citizen who travelled to Chile was Jack Jones. His status and 
his knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of all levels of trade unions allowed him to 
use his (very short) time in Chile in a very different manner to the NUM. His 
position at the top of labour movement organisations in Britain and in the world, 
as well as the moral authority gained from his career since the Spanish Civil 
War, enabled him to use the names of organisations within his reach without 
being bogged down by their organisational bureaucracy. This chapter compares 
the two delegations: industrial national versus a strategic individual. 
In 1974 the CSC embarked on a scouting mission for affiliations, but the NUM 
reaction towards the new solidarity organisation was far from confident.4 While 
1 Gatehouse to Bynger, October 25 1977, CSC, CSC/28/12, LHASC, Manchester.
2 CSC Annual Report, 1977.
3 It was not the only type of action undertaken by the NUM, the members of which were also enthusiastic 
adopters of prisoners and hosts to Chilean unionists.
4 CSC Executive Committee: Minutes of the Meeting held on Friday March 15 1974 at Seven Sisters, CSC, 
CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
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preparing for May Day, the CSC was still not sure that NUM president Lawrence 
Daly would even mention Chile in his address at the rally in Trafalgar Square.5 
Months later, in October of the same year, the CSC was still persistently seeking 
NUM affiliations at both the national and the area levels.6 
In strategy akin to peer pressure, a list of prominent unions which had already 
signed up to sponsor the CSC’s Trade Union Conference on Chile was sent to the 
NUM, and the CSC’s coercion led to the NUM’s national-level affiliation in July 
1975.7 This did not, however, herald their loving commitment to the group. In 
fact, further evidence of the NUM detachment from the CSC structure was shown 
in the CSC annual general meeting for the year immediately before the delegation 
in 1976. Only one NUM representative attended the meeting. Other unions had 
sent full delegations;8 however, the NUM did have a permanent representative on 
the executive committee of the campaign. His name was Jack Collins.9
Collins was a ‘lovely man’, according to Mike Gatehouse, and he was a member 
of the Communist Party.10 Collins was the NUM National Executive Committee 
representative from the Kent coalfields.11 
It is not clear why Collins was nominated to attend the CSC, but possible reasons 
may have included his willingness or giving the responsibility for a peripheral 
campaign to a small and less important region. Or it may simply have been due 
to Collins’ communist sympathies. Regardless of the reason, Collins attended the 
CSC regularly, and ‘he kept Chile on the agenda at the Mineworkers all the way 
through’, said Gatehouse.12
And agendas were fairly vigorously argued at the NUM. Their nominal support 
of solidarity did not bring a wave of enthusiasm that overcame their reticence 
to be involved in a social movement. Their desire to remain separate is only 
understood by taking a snapshot of the union’s organisation and the main 
players within it. 
It was essentially an industrial union, representing the majority of manual 
workers in a single industry. The NUM was organised by areas, within which 
5 CSC Executive Committee: Minutes of the meeting held on Thursday April 11 1974 at Seven Sisters.
6 CSC. Executive Committee: Analysis of Campaign Performance to Date. Discussion Document. 23/10/74.
7 In June 1975, Jack Collins attended the CSC Executive Committee as a delegate, indicating that affiliation 
went through. Minutes of the CSC Executive Committee meeting, held on 26th June 1976 at the House of 
Commons, CSC, CSC/1/5, LHASC, Manchester; National Union of Mineworkers (UK), NUM Annual Conference, 
1975 (Scarborough: NUM, 1975).
8 Through 1975–76 the unions with the most visible support at the CSC were NATSOPA, ASTMS, SOGAT, 
NGA, AUEW and TGWU. CSC Annual General meeting for 1976, CSC, CSC/1/12, LHASC, Manchester.
9 Minutes CCS-EC 27.04.76, CSC, CSC/1/5, LHASC, Manchester.
10 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
11 At the time, Collins was one of six communists on the NUM National Executive Committee. Kent was 
a relatively isolated area in the NUM. Joe Gormley, Battered Cherub (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982), 138.
12 Ibid.
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were lodges and branches, which were almost all based on place of work: 
pits or collieries. Each area’s distinct history, their different-sized mines and 
divergent working and economic conditions led to a diverse political make-up 
and some inter-area rivalry. In 1975 there were 20 structural units: 14 regions 
and six industrial groups.13 Areas had considerable political and administrative 
autonomy from the national leadership.14 While the industrial activities of areas 
were the responsibility of the national union, the areas kept most of the union 
fees, and essentially carried out the day-to-day administration of the union.15
Sitting on the NUM National Executive were 20 area officials, all with the same 
formal power. Full-time officials were elected and those posts were permanent. 
The NUM National Executive Committee members elected from the regions 
could in theory be working, rank-and-file miners, but due to reputation and the 
local profile necessary for electoral success, overwhelmingly full-time officials 
were the ones selected.16 While the selection of annual national conference 
delegations and other ballots were conducted at the pithead, ensuring very 
high participation, there was no set method of electing the executive members.17 
This was a relatively undemocratic method of electing what was, in practice, the 
day-to-day controlling body of the union.18 It was also the body from which the 
miners who travelled to Chile were selected.
As with many unions, an annual conference was held, with the idea that it safeguarded 
the democratic nature of the organisation. The annual national conference brought 
together area delegations whose interests and votes were mandated by previously 
held area conferences;19 but the rules were extremely restrictive. 
Emergency resolutions could only be submitted with the consent of 75 per cent 
of delegates present. No more than three resolutions and two amendments per 
area were allowed.20 Submission of resolutions was required at least 14 weeks 
13 The white-collar section (previously Colliery Officials and Staffs Association) had approximately 31 000 
voting members in 1960. That section was in competition with the Association of Professional, Executive, 
Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX). There were also two groups within the union which held joint affiliations 
to other unions (TGWU and General and Municipal Workers Union). David Edelstein and Malcolm Warner, 
Comparative Union Democracy: Organisation and Opposition in British and American Unions (Westmead, UK: 
Gower, 1975), 210, 211–12.
14 The federal structure of the original amalgamation in 1945 still influenced the union into the 1970s. 
Several areas were themselves federations before the 1945 amalgamation. Ibid., 235.
15 Arthur Marsh, Trade Union Handbook: A Guide and Directory to the Structure, Membership, Policy and 
Personnel of the British Trade Unions (Westmead, UK: Gower, 1980), 245.
16 Edelstein and Warner, Comparative Union Democracy, 268; Stephen Milligan, The New Barons: Union 
Power in the 1970s (London: Temple Smith, 1976), 115.
17 Pithead ballots employed small, private voting booths that members had to pass through to enter the 
mine. They would thus turn out between 60 and 80 per cent of members—much higher than postal or branch 
ballots. Milligan, The New Barons, 115.
18 Ibid.
19 Sometimes instructed by the area council rather than the conference.
20 With this in mind, resolutions had to be palatable to the politically diverse union. Academic Martin 
Harrison wrote that ‘militant Areas like Scotland often try to word resolutions so innocently that they will 
command wide, and unsuspecting, support in the coalfields’. Harrison, in Edelstein and Warner, Comparative 
Union Democracy, 234.
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prior to the conference and amendments at least six weeks in advance. These 
rules meant that many issues were decided before the conference. Deceptively, 
the actual control of the proceedings of the conference was not with the caucus 
of area delegations. Resolutions on economic control, or other topics that the 
NUM National Executive believed to be impractical, could be remitted to 
their own meetings. Thus the potential to launch the union into action was 
dependent on the politics and whim of the National Executive. This included 
any international action. The oscillations in the area versus national power 
swing wildly through the structure of union business, not least because often 
the amount of power relied on the character of those in leadership.21 
At the head of the NUM were the president and general secretary, both full-time 
positions and roughly equal in stature and power.22 While the president was 
technically above the general secretary, the power balance could swing due 
to personality.23
The leaders of the union in the 1970s were Lawrence Daly and Joe Gormley. Daly 
had been active in the CPGB until 1956, when he left over the party’s support for 
the Soviet Union. He was then a founding member of the Fife Socialists League, 
a socialist/humanist grouping associated with the New Left Review. Under that 
banner, he was elected Fife County Councillor in 1958. When the organisation 
dissolved, he joined the Labour Party, which he had previously regarded as 
bureaucratic and ‘over orthodox’.24 Concurrently, Daly moved up the ranks of 
the NUM, starting in the Youth Committee of the Scottish Area followed by an 
election to the area’s rank-and-file council. His first full-time NUM post was in 
1964 as a mineworkers’ agent for Fife, Clackmannan and Stirlingshire. To obtain 
that position, he defeated the communist candidate and had the support of the 
anti-communists (individuals and groups) of the area. One year later he was 
secretary of the Scottish Area, the first non-communist to hold the position for 
almost 20 years.
In 1968 Daly ran for NUM General Secretary against Joe Gormley. Daly was 
a man of charisma—so much so that he once recorded a selection of Robert 
Burns’ love songs for television—and this quality was no doubt put to 
effective use to win the election.25 He ran a roughly organised campaign, 
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 214; Milligan, The New Barons, 83.
23 Edelstein and Warner, Comparative Union Democracy, 215; Gormley, Battered Cherub, 78. Both of these 
full-time officials along with the vice-president were ex officio on the executive committee: they held no vote, 
except in the case of a tie, when the president held the casting vote. The president and general secretary were 
elected by pithead ballot, but the vice-president was elected at the annual conference. Milligan, The New 
Barons, 115.
24 Edelstein and Warner, Comparative Union Democracy, 247; David Howell, The Politics of the NUM: A 
Lancashire View (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 20.
25 Milligan, The New Barons, 118.
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utilising various left press outlets, whereas Gormley had almost no coverage 
at all. The largely communist-dominated regions supported Daly against the 
relatively right-wing Gormley, despite the former’s previous relationship with 
anti-communist organisations.26 
Not to be held back by this defeat and in fact learning from it, Gormley ran in the 
1971 presidential election against prominent Scottish communist Mick McGahey. 
His area executive donated £8000 towards canvassing for his election—an 
unheard of tactic in the NUM. And it worked. Gormley was a right-winger or 
‘moderate’ (though he thought of himself as a ‘progressive’) who fought many 
battles, elections and otherwise, against communists at all levels of the NUM 
organisation.27 He sat on the BLP National Executive Committee and was the 
secretary of the NUM North Western Area. He was a self-proclaimed socialist by 
‘gut belief’ and also pronounced himself as a strong internationalist.28 Gormley 
was also a BLP International Sub Committee member for 10 years, and would go 
on to become the vice-president of the Miners’ International Federation.29 One 
commentator said Gormley was ‘a reassuring personality. He lacked panache, 
but [could] be refreshingly blunt.’30 Mike Gatehouse remembered contradictions: 
Ah Joe Gormley! Joe Gormley was a complex man, I mean he was right 
wing in his politics, but he was a genuine miner and it was said of him 
that when he went on delegations abroad, everyone else sort of boozed 
up in the hotels and Joe Gormley went round the mines.31
The leadership of the NUM was split between these two politically disparate 
men. Though Daly was said to have been a much stronger orator than Gormley, 
a prolonged illness in the 1970s kept him at the sidelines of the union. 
According to Stephen Milligan, Daly was eclipsed at conferences by McGahey 
(vice-president from 1972) and later by Arthur Scargill, who was a non-CPGB, 
hardline Marxist.32
26 Edelstein and Warner, Comparative Union Democracy, 249–50.
27 Gormley, Battered Cherub, 161; Milligan, The New Barons, 116–17.
28 Gormley, Battered Cherub, 47, 118. 
29 Ibid., 118, 188.
30 Ibid., 118.
31 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
32 Scargill made a visit to the United States in 1979 to the Rouge plant in Detroit to attend a rally supported 
by the United Auto Workers; at this rally, he urged the US trade union movement to boycott all Chilean trade. 
He was, however, not overly concerned with the CSC or solidarity at all. ‘There were also, I think, sections 
within the trade union movement who regarded the whole stuff about Chile as a bit of a diversion, and a 
digression. I always thought Arthur Scargill was one of those people, because although the miners as a whole 
were sort of supportive, Scargill, who was supposed to be on the left, actually he never said anything against 
but he just wasn’t particularly interested and you would have expected him to be. But maybe he wasn’t 
because Mick McGahey … [was] also the right wing within the miners union, notably, Joe Gormley who was 
a horrible man, God he was horrible, who was General Secretary of the NUM.’ Gatehouse Interview, 2007; 
Scargill (NUM) to Gatehouse (CSC) 16th February, 1979, CSC, CSC/11/10, LHASC, Manchester; Michael Crick, 
Scargill and the Miners (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1985).
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The NUM organisation was large enough that it ran its own International 
Department, in which Vernon Jones was employed.33 Gormley claimed 
responsibility for the establishment of the department.34 Much of the union’s 
own international activity was based on Rule 3(b) of the NUM, which stated that 
an objective of the union was to ‘federate with and assist associations that have 
the same or similar objects in view’. Keeping this in mind, it is useful to note 
that the NUM, in many ways, did not help Chilean miners in a direct manner, 
but tried to prop up the Federación Industrial Nacional Minera (FINM: Chilean 
Mineworkers’ Federation). This approach was obviously welcomed by Chileans 
involved with that organisation. Hernán Cofre told the 1978 NUM conference 
that ‘[t]he situation of our workers is difficult. Even more difficult, perhaps, 
is the situation of the organisations of workers. Our Federation is virtually in 
chaos as far as its finances go.’35
The NUM’s first act of Chile solidarity started well before their affiliation to the 
CSC with a resolution at the NUM National Executive on 13 September 1973, 
just two days after the coup. It was agreed that the NUM support the TUC and 
BLP condemnation of the coup and the Chilean ambassador be contacted.36 
The 1974 NUM Conference in Llandudno, north Wales, voted 280–92 in 
support of a resolution calling on the British Government to sever diplomatic 
relations with Chile, and calling on the TUC to lend all possible support to the 
restoration of democracy.37
In addition to resolutions, by February 1975 a proposal to send a Scottish Area 
NUM delegation to Chile was in circulation, supported by the NUM South 
Wales Area.38 Consistent reports thereafter emerged of NUM plans to send a 
delegation to Chile.39 The Kent, South Wales and Scottish areas of the NUM 
were the most consistent and vocal in their support of the CSC and also the most 
radical politically.40 
The solidarity demonstrated within the NUM and the union’s interaction with 
the CSC were distinct from the AUEW and the TGWU. The latter unions regarded 
their involvement and funding of the CSC to be vital parts of their overall 
33 Gatehouse to Vernon Jones, December 27 1978, CSC, CSC/28/19, LHASC, Manchester.
34 Gormley, Battered Cherub, 188.
35 Hernan Cofre, NUM Annual Conference, 1978 (Torquay: NUM, 1978), 566.
36 National Union of Mineworkers (UK), Annual Report and Proceedings for the Year 1973 (England: NUM, 1973).
37 National Union of Mineworkers (UK), NUM Annual Conference, 1974 (Llandudno: NUM, 1974). The next 
resolution at a NUM conference (though discussions and passing of reports always occurred every year) was 
in 1978, with a long resolution of support for Chile and a call for a boycott of all companies who traded with 
Chile. National Union of Mineworkers (UK), NUM Annual Conference, 1978 (Torquay: NUM, 1978).
38 CSC Executive Committee Meeting held on Friday February 28 1975. NUM South Wales strongly 
supported the CSC.
39 Minutes of the CSC Executive Committee, 24/3/75, CSC, CSC/1/6, LHASC, Manchester.
40 Gatehouse to General Secretaries and CSC Executive delegates of affiliated Unions and Conference co-sponsors. 
September 30 1975, CSC, CSC/1/6, LHASC, Manchester.
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approach to Chile solidarity and to internationalism. NUM solidarity, on the 
other hand, was dominated by independent actions framed as largely unaffected 
(though not uninfluenced) by the CSC or the solidarity movement. The Chile 
campaign encouraged the NUM’s independent action in any way it could.41 
The NUM gained enough momentum from the CUT visit in 1975 to put a proposal 
to the TUC, but, given the attitude of the TUC International Department as 
described in Chapter One, they received a reply that a British representative 
should go as part of an international delegation.42 
The wind seemed to have been expelled from the NUM delegation’s sails. 
In the case of the miners, the CSC had to satisfy itself with riding the waves 
of enthusiasm. Gatehouse wrote in a letter to Dick Barbour-Might, long-term 
friend of, and activist in, the CSC: 
I’m convinced that if we tout the idea [of the delegation] around for long 
enough, we will persuade someone to take it up, and that if a good job of 
preparation and reporting-back is done, a delegation could have as big 
a mobilising effect for solidarity as say the trade union conference last 
year, or the [prisoner] adoption scheme.43
And Gatehouse was confident that despite the relatively right-wing leadership 
of the NUM at the time, ‘there was some real feeling’ towards Chile solidarity.44 
At the 1976 NUM Conference on the Isle of Man, Pedro Cornejo, CUT 
representative in Britain, was given a standing ovation. The CSC was deeply 
intertwined with the London offices of the CUT at that time and in that 
capacity Gatehouse had accompanied Cornejo to the conference. In this way, 
the CSC overcame its exclusion from formal NUM business and was able to 
promote the idea of a delegation. In fact, in his speech, Cornejo asked the 
NUM to send a delegation to investigate mines in Chile, and with this direct 
request, the delegation began to solidify.45 It was the culmination of gentle, 
extra-organisational pressure to massage just the right sort of action. 
The NUM delegation was an initiative taken outside the influence, and without 
the blessing, of the TUC. It was also a ‘risky’ and ‘daring’ thing to do, Mike 
Gatehouse explained:
41 See, for example, the CSC discussion about the NUM delegation: CSC Executive Committee: Minutes of the 
meeting held on Friday May 2 1975 at Seven Sisters Road, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
42 Keeping in mind the conservative forces controlling much of the TUC and the TUC International 
Department in particular makes this reaction unsurprising. CSC Executive Committee: Meeting of October 16 
1975 at the House of Commons, CSC, CSC/1/5, LHASC, Manchester.
43 Gatehouse to Barbour-Might, July 18 1976, CSC, CSC/15/1, LHASC, Manchester.
44 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
45 Delegation from the NUM to Chile and Bolivia 21st April – 7th May 1977[draft?], TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/7, 
MRC, UW, Coventry.
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Delegations are quite high risk … you are going somewhere where you 
don’t know, where you don’t speak the language … there are absolutely 
no guarantees as to who you’ll meet, whether it’s official or not, let alone 
in conditions of dictatorship.
So it wasn’t an un-enterprising thing for the Miners to do.46 
While planning the delegation, the NUM invited a speaker to the executive 
meeting: Julian Filochowski of the Catholic Institute for International Relations. 
Filochowski had recently been to Bolivia and Chile. He reported what he 
saw there and brought a message from the FINM: they would welcome the 
delegation, which would be very important to their program to make contact 
with other mining unions. The federation suggested ‘arrangements should be 
outside official Chilean channels’.47 It was a ‘secret’ delegation, according to 
Wilkinson,48 or, as David Jones called it, a ‘cloak-and-dagger mission’.49
The executive immediately agreed to send a donation to the FINM through a 
trustworthy channel,50 and furthermore that arrangements would go ahead for a 
delegation to Bolivia and Chile.51 No explicit aims were dictated to the delegation 
in the NUM executive meeting minutes. In the Finances and General Purposes 
Committee, the delegation was charged with the responsibility to investigate 
the efficacy of giving the requested larger sums of money to FINM.52 
The delegation left in 1977 and represented a ‘considerable achievement’ 
for the campaign and the culmination of two years’ efforts.53 Four members 
of the National Executive Committee were to go (though three went in the 
end), and it was specified that these members were not to be from the foreign 
delegation rota.54 Journalist David Jones stated that Joe Gormley chose the 
46 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
47 National Union of Mineworkers (UK), Annual Report and Proceedings for the Year 1977 (England: NUM, 
1977), 62.
48 Michael Wilkinson, ‘The Chile Solidarity Campaign and British Government Policy towards Chile, 
1973-1990’, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 52 (June 1992), 58.
49 David Jones, ‘When You Look into the Eyes of a Mother Who has Lost a Son, You Can Tell Who is Telling 
the Truth and Who is Not’, Daily Post, 12 November 1998, 18.
50 The Finances and General Purposes Committee put this into action, donating £1000 each to the Bolivian 
and Chilean miners’ federations. National Union of Mineworkers (UK), Annual Report and Proceedings for the 
Year 1977, 116.
51 It appears that the Catholic Institute for International Relations may have been involved in the 
organisation of the delegation. McKay later said the trip was organised by the Catholic Church. ‘Former Miner 
Tells of Pinochet Horror’, Mail, 21 December 2006.
52 National Union of Mineworkers (UK), Annual Report and Proceedings for the Year 1977, 116.
53 Jones, ‘When You Look into the Eyes of a Mother’; CSCC 14.05.77 Minutes, 1977, CSC, CSC/1/5, LHASC, 
Manchester.
54 Nomination for appropriate members of the delegation from appropriate committees took the form of 
a rota system. This functioned at national and area levels, and it meant delegations were always viewed 
favourably by members. Edelstein and Warner, Comparative Union Democracy, 246–7.
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three delegates.55 Gatehouse confirmed: ‘I think largely through Gormley’s 
agency they hand picked two of the most right wing regional secretaries or 
regional figures to go.’56 
Gatehouse was referring to Ted McKay and Ken Toon.57 Despite the relatively 
conservative tendencies of these two, the Chilean coup had caused genuine 
revulsion through the whole political spectrum of the labour movement: 
Ken Toone [sic] was on the right of the Party and associated with right-
wing trade unionists … Nevertheless he was profoundly affected by 
his visit to Chile and did an enormous amount of work on behalf of the 
Chilean miners on his return to Britain, despite his knowledge that many 
of the Chilean miners he met and their leadership were Communists.58
Jack Collins was not chosen to go to Chile despite his time representing the 
union on the CSC Executive Committee. Gatehouse remembered that he was 
‘pissed off’, but he maintained his commitment to the CSC for years afterwards.59 
Further, it was not Gormley’s ‘style’, said Gatehouse, to allow the CSC to have 
involvement in the organisation of the delegation and perhaps less to allow an 
‘anti’ (someone who consistently voted negatively at NUM National Executive 
Committee meetings) to enjoy a delegation. Incidentally, Gormley’s ‘antis’ were 
always communists; he indicated in his autobiography that Collins clearly fell 
into this category.60 Gormley also wrote: ‘perhaps I’m a bit of a bully.’61 
Despite this setback, the CSC was present in the delegation in another capacity. 
The interpreter and organiser sent to accompany the miners was an Irish woman 
named Ann Browne. Gatehouse said she was ‘one of our people’. She was a 
blessing for the Chile cause, acknowledged Gatehouse, ‘because there is a whole 
art to being the accompanier of a delegation, keeping them together in one 
place, making sure they don’t get pissed, making sure they don’t behave badly, 
making sure they get to the right places on time, all of that’.62
The delegation of 1977 was Browne’s first trip to Chile, but she had extensive 
organising experience and was educated in the Chilean situation through her 
55 Jones, ‘When You Look into the Eyes of a Mother’, 18.
56 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
57 ‘The NUM sort of put forward what the left of the Communist Party said was right wingers for the … 
miners delegation to Chile: they were bloody terrific.’ Hulme Interview, 2007.
58 Gatehouse, in Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby on British Government Policy towards 
Latin America’.
59 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
60 Gormley, Battered Cherub, 150.
61 Ibid., 78.
62 Ibid.
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involvement as secretary of the Joint Working Group for Refugees from Chile in 
Britain, which was run out of Uxbridge Road, London.63 Again, the organised 
Chile solidarity movement played a tangential but influential role.
The conditions under which Browne worked in Chile were very trying. On top 
of chaperoning duties, she also understood in more depth what was occurring 
in Chile. ‘She was extraordinary’, said Gatehouse.64 
The NUM first applied to enter Chile officially as a union delegation, but the 
junta refused permission, just as they had refused entry to the Ad Hoc Working 
Group of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) since 1975.65 
As a CSC report heroically proclaimed: ‘But NUM was not to be put off, and 
determined to send its delegation with or without Pinochet’s permission.’66
While the military government would not authorise the delegation, remarkably, 
visas were not required to enter Chile. So the miners entered ‘“privately” rather 
than secretly and without asking permission from anyone’, wrote Gatehouse 
in 1977.67 There was a possibility they would be turned away at the border or 
deported if the nature of their mission became publicly known. The miners 
were not put off, despite the fact they risked more than their own safety. 
The delegation spent 16 days in Latin America; six of those were in Chile.68 They 
first travelled in Bolivia and met tin miners,69 and then spent a short time in Peru 
63 The Joint Working Group (JWG) was formed in 1974 as a group for refugees from Chile, and was 
less overtly political than the CSC. The JWG later broadened its focus to include refugees from all Latin 
American countries. It attracted government funding for the settlement of refugees. It ran a boarding house 
in London. In 1980–81, its funding was cut by the conservative government. Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile 
and the British Labour Movement; T. Kushner and K. Knox, ‘Refugees from Chile: A Gesture of International 
Solidarity’, in Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth 
Century, eds K. Knox and T. Kushner (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 289–305; Imogen Mark, ‘Ann Browne’, 
Guardian News and Media Limited, 2000, accessed 9 January 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2000/
feb/15/guardianobituaries2>; CSC Trade Union Conference Delegate’s Briefing No 1.
64 After the JWG was disbanded, Browne went on to work for the International Federation of Miners 
(MIF) in 1982 in Brussels, and was instrumental in forming that organisation’s links with Latin American 
mineworkers’ unions. Gatehouse believes she was ‘very beloved by miners from all over the world because 
she was so good and dedicated’. Despite this, in the 1970s, Browne was referred to in NUM documents 
as ‘our interpreter’ rather than identified by her name. See, for example, when Ted McKay paid tribute 
to the interpreter in his address to the NUM 1977 Conference. ICEM, ‘Ann Browne: A Tribute’, in ICEM 
News Release No. 8/2000, 2000, accessed 22 August 2008, <http://www.icem.org/en/5-Mining-DGOJP/437-
Ann-Browne:-A-Tribute>; Gatehouse Interview, 2007; National Union of Mineworkers (UK), NUM Annual 
Conference, 1977 (Tynemouth: NUM, 1977), 467; ‘Saved Chileans to be Allowed Here: Success for Mrs Hart’, 
Morning Star, 16 September 1975, 5.
65 Gatehouse to Bynger, October 25 1977.
66 CSC Annual Report, 1977.
67 Gatehouse to Bynger, October 25 1977.
68 Report of the 109th Annual Trades Union Congress(Enfield: Trades Union Congress, 1977), 510; CSCC 
14.05.77 Minutes, 1977.
69 Bolivia was ruled by dictator General Banzer at the time. His reign included high economic growth and 
human rights abuses.
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in order to gain entry to Chile.70 Throughout the trip they posed as tourists and 
then mining engineers, mining equipment salesmen or industrial archaeologists 
studying the old mining equipment in Chile.71 From Peru, they travelled the 
long road through the Atacama Desert. The Mail reported that ‘at one stage they 
had to be hidden among rocks on a beach next to the Pacific’ Ocean to avoid an 
army patrol.72 
On 30 April 1977, the NUM delegation arrived in Santiago and immediately 
set out to contact the FINM.73 Their first impression of the streets in the capital 
was ‘of apparent calm and order. However … We were never taken directly to 
meet union officials for fear of being followed, and we never arrived until it was 
established that we had not been.’74
Meetings were never held in any public space and people were too scared to hold 
them in their houses. Ken Toon reported that ‘people we spoke to were at great 
personal risk of arrest if they were caught talking to us’.75 Thus, ‘contact was 
difficult and sometimes failed’.76 Meetings and visits to the coalmines were often 
in the middle of the night, described Lawrence Daly, and the men constantly 
had to deal with ‘security forces and all the rest of it’.77 They never stayed in one 
safe house more than a few hours and Ted McKay wrote simply: ‘I often wonder 
what would have happened to us had we been caught.’78 
The delegation passed within 32 km of mines they wanted to see, but turned 
back because it had become too dangerous due to road checks.79 They witnessed 
‘gross violation of trade union and human rights’, according to Ken Toon: ‘A 
physical, social, political and economic repression was being rigidly enforced.’80 
There still existed a curfew on activities.81
70 Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile Solidarity Campaign: Annual Report, 1977. It was ‘frightening’ in 
the mining area in Bolivia, said McKie, as the military had an overt armed presence. National Union of 
Mineworkers (UK), NUM Annual Conference, 1977, 469, 70.
71 ‘“Stop Aid” Demand as NUM Men Visit Bolivia and Chile’, Miner, May–June 1977, 1; Jones, ‘When You 
Look into the Eyes of a Mother’, 18.
72 ‘Former Miner Tells of Pinochet Horror’.
73 They also met representatives of the Federation of Building Workers (FIEMC), textile workers, bakers, 
pensioners, metallurgical workers and peasants. None of the officials they met in these unions was recognised as 
official by the junta. National Union of Mineworkers (UK), ‘Trade Union and Human Rights in Chile & Bolivia’, 
in Report of the National Union of Mineworkers Delegation (England: NUM, 1978); ‘Chile, Bolivia: “Their 
problems should be our problems … their achievements will be our achievements”’, Miner, June–July 1977.
74 ‘Chile, Bolivia: “Their problems should be our problems”’.
75 Toon, in Report of the 109th Annual Trades Union Congress, 511.
76 ‘Chile, Bolivia: “Their problems should be our problems”’.
77 National Union of Mineworkers (UK), NUM Annual Conference, 1977, 467.
78 Jones, ‘When You Look into the Eyes of a Mother’, 18.
79 ‘Former Miner Tells of Pinochet Horror’.
80 Report of the 109th Annual Trades Union Congress, 511.
81 Delegation from the NUM to Chile and Bolivia 21st April – 7th May 1977[draft?]. 
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Toon reported that the only place where Decree 198, which severely limited 
trade union activity, could not be enforced was in a place of worship.82 While 
there was a ban on protest in the street, the junta dared not ban a Catholic 
service. So, Cardinal Silva invited Chilean trade unionists to celebrate a mass 
for the feast of St Joseph, the Worker.83 The main cathedral in the centre of 
Santiago was a cavernous construction, and on 1 May 1977, more than 100 
unionists gathered at one of its side entrances. The NUM members were invited 
to participate, despite the obvious dangers of such a meeting.84 ‘We were so 
moved by the mood of the people that we couldn’t just stand by and watch’, 
they said in their report, so they joined the unionists.85
After a cue, the unionists moved to walk into the cathedral. Inside were well more 
than 2000 people, a crowd so large it overflowed into the square outside. When 
the unionists, with the NUM delegation among them, entered the cathedral, 
the whole crowd burst into ‘loud and continuous’ applause.86 They walked up 
the centre of the cathedral and sat in rows behind the altar. The priests blocked 
their view of the congregation, but also blocked the unionists from view. It was 
reported that they were ‘watched by Chilean secret police, the DINA. Outside, 
the cathedral was surrounded by machine-gun carrying police.’87
The homily of Cardinal Silva was a pertinent and rousing speech on the importance 
of participatory democracy.88 As the Eucharist ended, the cathedral erupted, 
reveals the report, into a mass protest meeting. ‘The Cathedral resounded with 
shouts of “Freedom” as everyone joined in loud protest regardless of the armed 
police who stood at the main entrance.’89 The delegation members recalled 
that it was ‘an experience we won’t easily forget … We felt that we were truly 
hearing the voice of the people of Chile, and there could be no doubt as to whom 
they recognised as their leaders’.90 Toon later said that May Day in the Chilean 
cathedral was the highlight of the trip. Yet, it was not without intense anxiety. 
Ted McKay recalled: ‘When we came out onto the steps, there were troops with 
machine guns and tanks and I felt I could not move. There was a fear I could not 
describe and, at that moment, I thought we were going to get shot.’91
82 Report of the 109th Annual Trades Union Congress, 511.
83 Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile Solidarity Campaign: Annual Report, 1977.
84 CSCC 14.05.77 Minutes, 1977.
85 Delegation from the NUM to Chile and Bolivia 21st April – 7th May 1977[draft?].
86 Ibid.
87 Stephen Kelly, ‘Chile: NUM Sees Repression and Union Solidarity at First Hand’, Tribune [UK], 13 May 
1977, 16.
88 Cardinal Silva Henriquez, in Delegation from the NUM to Chile and Bolivia 21st April – 7th May 1977 [draft?].
89 National Union of Mineworkers (UK), ‘Trade Union and Human Rights in Chile & Bolivia’, 21.
90 Delegation from the NUM to Chile and Bolivia 21st April – 7th May 1977[draft?].
91 Jones, ‘When You Look into the Eyes of a Mother’, 18.
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Later, he wrote in a letter: ‘That experience in the Cathedral on May Day 1977 
will stay with me for the rest of my life.’92
The delegation quickly established that the junta regarded the organised labour 
movement as a major hurdle to the implementation of its economic regime, and 
that it had thus set about cleansing the movement entirely. The Government did 
this in a physical manner and also through laws and decrees. The NUM delegation 
found that workers were banned from holding meetings without a permit issued 
by the military, and even then, there would be a member of the military or 
police present. Unions were not even able to draw up rules, collect dues or 
collectively bargain, let alone strike or undertake more militant activities.93 The 
delegation reported that the ruling military had institutionalised the repression 
to such an extent that mass arrests and executions were no longer necessary.94
The members of the NUM delegation educated themselves about Decree 198, 
which severely limited trade union activity in Chile, monitoring even their 
elections at factory level. But the delegation found:
[D]espite the devastating brutality, mass imprisonment and executions 
perpetrated immediately after the coup, and the subsequent permanent 
intimidation and ‘disappearance’ of prominent trade-unionists, some 
individual unions have been strong enough to survive and some 
union leaders strong enough to maintain their positions, though not 
recognised legally.95
The delegation reported on the clandestine union activity they found. Small 
amounts of money had been collected and the occasional illegal bulletin was 
printed to make its way through the workplaces. Indeed, at some moments, the 
report of the delegation even sounded hopeful: ‘The unions dissolved or not 
recognised by the military are gradually imposing their presence … the fact that 
they were able to receive our delegation and arrange an extensive programme of 
activities was itself a major achievement.’96
The implementation of junta policies had, however, severely altered the 
landscape of the Chilean labour movement. Some unions had Christian 
Democrats (the opposition when Allende was in power) placed at the head 
of their organisations as part of a puppet union structure set up by the junta. 
92 Ted McKay, Letter to Ann Jones, 1 November 2007, copy in possession of author.
93 Toon, in Report of the 109th Annual Trades Union Congress, 511.
94 ‘Chile, Bolivia: “Their problems should be our problems”’.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
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There were 10 of these, unimaginatively called the ‘Group of Ten’. By mid 
1976, the delegation members believed that even the Group of Ten was being 
more openly critical of the junta.97
The report gave an account of general statistics on inflation, wages, 
unemployment and other information gained through churches, rather than any 
in-depth discussion of actual conditions in the pit. The conditions of miners 
were referred to specifically only on one page of the section on Chile. 
The delegation was able to visit two coalmining towns, both of which were 
within the Región del Bío Bío, the eighth administrative region of Chile.98 Arauco 
Province of Bío Bío was an established coalmining area and the British delegates 
visited the towns of Lebu and Lota.99 There they witnessed first hand the people’s 
reluctance to talk to foreigners for fear of persecution.100 The report describes the 
scene of arrival: ‘When we arrived in Lota heavy, torrential rain was falling. The 
following morning mud from the hills was flowing like rivers through the streets. 
Barefoot children ploughed through it on their way to school.’101
Most of the workers lived in wooden shacks, and had no means or money to 
build further rooms or purchase more substantial dwellings. The shacks in Lebu 
consisted of one room for parents and up to 10 children.102 They received what 
Hernán Cofre would later call ‘wages of misery’: enough to barely stay alive. 
The delegation described the extremely high rate of inflation and the unequal 
rise of wages. In their report, they noted that ‘as we walked through the streets 
we were struck by the number of children who went barefoot and the number 
of men and women selling only 2 or 3 articles of very little value’.103
What the delegates spent on a meal, the workers in Chile would not earn in a 
month.104 In their report, they indicated that their informants admitted to never 
97 The report noted that the Chilean Group of Ten was ‘faced with the serious deterioration in the economic 
situation of their membership, they found themselves more and more forced to reflect the demands coming 
from the grass roots’. The state was quick to discipline miscreants. The Copper Miners’ Federation, for 
example, was a ‘tame cat’ union, recognised by the junta. Even so, when the Copper Miners’ Federation 
raised its voice against the junta, its whole executive was dismissed. It was not a member of the Group of Ten, 
and did not have a connection with the FINM (which was completely clandestine and unofficial) with whom 
the NUM expressed their most steadfast solidarity. The FINM claimed to represent approximately 54 000 
members. National Union of Mineworkers (UK), ‘Trade Union and Human Rights in Chile & Bolivia’, 18, 19.
98 Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile Solidarity Campaign: Annual Report, 1977.
99 President of the Lebu Coalminers’ Union, Victor Echevaria, travelled to the United Kingdom in 1978. 
National Union of Mineworkers (UK), NUM Annual Conference, 1978, 564. It was later discovered that British 
company Gullick Dobson was trading mining equipment with the Chilean junta. The NUM subsequently 
protested. Ibid., 563.
100 Toon, in Report of the 109th Annual Trades Union Congress, 511.
101 National Union of Mineworkers (UK), ‘Trade Union and Human Rights in Chile & Bolivia’, 20.
102 Delegation from the NUM to Chile and Bolivia 21st April – 7th May 1977 [draft?].
103 Delegation from the NUM to Chile and Bolivia 21st April – 7th May 1977[draft?].
104 ‘Chile, Bolivia: “Their problems should be our problems”’.
3 . ‘Unique solidarity’? The mineworkers’ delegation, 1977
103
seeing so much poverty. It was noted that ‘they can no longer feed their own 
children’.105 Women started soup kitchens serving one meal a day to children 
whose parents were unemployed, detained or disappeared. It was reported that 
in Santiago 30 000 children were subsisting on this service alone.106 Even with 
family and rent allowances, a miner would use all his income buying two sacks 
of flour and 900 g of sugar.107
Further, it was noted that the education system was ‘user pays’, and most 
people thus could not afford the correct equipment for primary school let alone 
university. But, said the NUM delegation report, the miners were proud that they 
were collectively supporting a workmate at university. In the future, the report 
described, he would say ‘all I have, all I am, I owe to the miners of Lebu’.108
While in Lebu the delegates attended the funeral of a miner who had died in an 
accident two days previously. The number of accidents had risen due to a cut of 
one-third of the workforce with no reduction of production levels.109 
‘Men, women and children walked behind the coffin which was laid in a wooden 
cart. The miner’s workmates pulled it towards the graveyard.’110
The mineworkers collected stories of the oppression on their travels, including 
the murders and the military trials followed by executions. They learned of the 
imprisonment immediately after the coup of the Chilean miners’ leader, who 
told them of his torture while strung up by his thumbs.111 
They spoke to a woman whose miner husband was one of six taken by the 
police to a prison in the next town one month after the coup. The wives of 
the miners travelled to the prison but were refused permission to visit. The 
delegation’s report in the NUM newspaper told its readers how all six miners 
were transferred the next day, with their hands cuffed behind their heads, to 
a prison in Valparaiso.112 The wives travelled to the large port city of Valparaiso 
and spent a day asking after their husbands. They were told eventually that the 
men were in another, smaller town. The women travelled there and approached 
the police, who sent them to the military, who, in turn, told them to go to the 
hospital. Their husbands’ names were registered. A doctor told them their 
husbands had been executed. 
105 National Union of Mineworkers (UK), ‘Trade Union and Human Rights in Chile & Bolivia’, 18; Delegation 
from the NUM to Chile and Bolivia 21st April – 7th May 1977 [draft?].
106 Delegation from the NUM to Chile and Bolivia 21st April – 7th May 1977[draft?].
107 Ibid.
108 National Union of Mineworkers (UK), ‘Trade Union and Human Rights in Chile & Bolivia’, 20.
109 Delegation from the NUM to Chile and Bolivia 21st April – 7th May 1977[draft?].
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The women did not believe the story. 
They thought their husbands were alive and being tortured, so they asked to 
see the bodies: ‘They were taken to the morgue where the bodies lay riddled 
with bullets. There was no explanation.’113
In a sense, these women were lucky: their husbands had not simply been 
disappeared, or buried in a mass grave. They at least knew their husbands’ fates.
The British unionists concluded: ‘For us it has been a great privilege to meet 
with so many people of courage and determination. Their problems should be 
our problems, their achievement will be our achievements.’114 
Additionally, the NUM should be proud of itself, declared the report, because 
it was the first union anywhere in the world to send a delegation independent 
of other organisations.115 Jack Collins, the NUM representative to the CSC, said 
that in his opinion, the visit ‘was probably the most important delegation that 
has ever gone out from this Union of ours to a foreign country’.116 Gatehouse 
was more restrained, but he concurred years later when he said it ‘was a brave 
delegation … they did it and succeeded and did a good job’.117
The men were clearly affected by their time in Chile. Ted McKay more recently 
remembered: ‘I’m now in my mid 70s so time dims the detail but there are some 
feelings and emotions that will stay with me always one was leaving those brave 
men and women behind.’118
The mineworkers’ sprang into action on their return, after first being welcomed 
back at a NUM Executive meeting on 12 May 1977.119 By the June NUM 
Executive meeting, the full report of the delegation was received, and the 
extensive recommendations were adopted in full. They included publicising 
the findings of the delegation, press conferences and interviews. Further, it was 
recommended that the NUM make formal submissions to the TUC, and through 
that organisation, to the appropriate international organisations.120 These 
submissions would deal with the findings of the delegation and also raise the 
113 Ibid.
114 ‘Chile, Bolivia: “Their problems should be our problems”’.
115 This fact is unconfirmed. National Union of Mineworkers (UK), ‘Trade Union and Human Rights in Chile 
& Bolivia’, 14; Kelly, ‘Chile’, 541.
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issue of puppet Chilean representatives at the international trade union level. 
It was recommended that contact be kept and strengthened with the FINM 
by inviting representatives to Britain. Money would be sent to the FINM. At 
length, they passed resolutions on the isolation of the junta and encouraged 
other unions to follow the example of the NUM in making direct contact with 
unions in Chile.121
The NUM considered the publication of the reports as a part of their 
commitment to the Chilean people.122 McKie said the report was compiled from 
the ‘sad material, the horrid material’ that the mineworkers had brought back 
from their journey. At the time, McKie said the editor of the Miner and the 
head of the Miners International Department had written the report, whereas 
Gatehouse remembered that Ann Browne was the author of much of it.123 Ted 
McKay confirmed Gatehouse’s recollections about Ann Browne in 2008: ‘now, 
we took all the praise after we got home, but it was Ann Brown [sic] who was the 
main stay of the delegation. She was also very knowledgeable about everything, 
although we took credit it was Ann who wrote our report.’124
Lawrence Daly sent a letter to Lionel Murray, the general secretary of the TUC, 
requesting that a copy of the booklet-like report be distributed to all affiliated 
unions, with instructions to order in bulk through the NUM headquarters.125 
Orders of 10 or more would carry a 50 per cent discount. The NUM sent 700 
copies of the report to the 1977 TGWU congress, because, said Daly, ‘we want 
everybody to read it’.126 They gave 1000 free copies to the CSC.127 More than 
20 000 were distributed at the heavily subsidised price of 20 pence.128 The Miners 
International sent copies to all its English-speaking affiliates, and it was hoped 
that translations would be made for others. The Miners Parliamentary Group 
(BLP) circulated the report to ministers and the TUC International Committee 
discussed its findings.129 
Lawrence Daly considered it to be ‘beautifully produced’ and ‘one of the most 
excellent reports that has ever been produced by a delegation of the National 
Union of Mineworkers’.130 The report was, of course, part of the educational 
drive of industrial national internationalism. It was an indirect action in an 
121 National Union of Mineworkers (UK), Annual Report and Proceedings for the Year 1977, 168–9.
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attempt to influence the political outcome in Britain, Chile and in other countries 
around the world. Gatehouse concurred with Daly, saying it was a decent and 
influential report. He continued: ‘It wasn’t greatly political but you know, it 
was fine. And in fact, curiously because’ the delegation members ‘were so right 
wing within the [NUM] they could sort of carry the whole union with them, 
although some of the left were very snooty about it’.131
Ken Hulme confirmed this view in his interview: ‘I have the highest regard for 
the commitment and work of the left of the trade unions but frankly it was far 
more effective to see people who were regarded as ordinary non-political trade 
unionists or right-wingers getting really angry about things. And that … was 
very effective.’132
To further harness the momentum, CSC affiliates were encouraged to invite the 
NUM delegation members to speak at their meetings or rallies.133 The delegation 
members received so many invitations to speak around the country that the 
NUM Executive agreed that all requests for them to speak should be handled 
through the head office to relieve the administrative pressure on the individuals 
and branches.134 McKay reported to the 1978 national conference that they had 
told the story of the delegation all over Britain. He said: 
I, for example, have retold my story to meetings of what would be called 
the extreme left, extreme left students that were so far left they made 
Stalin look like Enoch Powell. I have also been across the spectrum of the 
left … when I retold the story from a pulpit in an Anglican church.135
Even further afield, Ken Toon travelled to Geneva to give evidence at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights Ad-Hoc Working Group.136 McKay went to 
Algiers to give testimony to the Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the 
Military Junta in Chile.137 The three men were sent by the NUM to a conference 
131 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
132 Hulme Interview, 2007.
133 CSCC 14.05.77 Minutes; Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
134 National Union of Mineworkers (UK), Annual Report and Proceedings for the Year 1977, 733. See, for 
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from Chile’, Tribune [UK], 17 June 1977, 11.
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in November 1978 in Madrid.138 Ken Toon spoke at the trade union session there, 
calling on unions to ‘imitate NUM and establish relations with their equivalent 
unions in Chile’.139
The participation of these three men in the delegation enabled them to step 
above their actual place in the solidarity movement. They would otherwise have 
played a very peripheral role in Chile or international issues; but genuine belief 
or feeling and even direct experience did not grant them power within the 
labour movement structures. The TUC’s reaction to the NUM delegation, which 
it had barely encouraged in the beginning, was tepid. In 1977, Ken Toon moved 
a resolution on Chile and Bolivia at the TUC Congress, as was recommended by 
the delegation report. He called for an examination of trade, the credentials 
of the Chilean representatives at the International Labour Office (ILO), the 
development of stronger links with Chilean unions and lobbying for aid for 
Bolivian miners.140 A similar resolution was submitted to the BLP conference.141
The correspondence about the delegation that was received by the TUC 
International Committee was summarised down to three sentences in the 
minutes.142 Action on the suspect ILO credentials of Chilean and Bolivian 
representatives would be ‘pursued as opportunity offered’.143 Inquiries were 
made and by the 5 December 1977 International Committee meeting, it was 
reported that the TUC was not ‘able to submit a formal complaint to the ILO 
against the government of an ILO member state other than the UK’.144 Such a 
complaint would have to come from the Chilean delegation. The best thing the 
TUC could come up with as a consolation was the fact that the ICFTU and the 
ILO were considering the information contained with in the NUM’s report for 
use in new or existing complaints against Chile and Bolivia.145 The TUC was 
not willing to push the NUM delegation’s results.146 The NUM’s fidelity to the 
138 Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile Solidarity Campaign: Annual Report (London: Chile Solidarity Campaign, 
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industrial national model, their refusal to let the social movement run their 
internationalist activism, their willing output of resources and efforts were not 
rewarded by the upper hierarchy of the international structures. 
The NUM continued its ‘exemplary work’ in follow-up for many years after 
the delegation returned, which included maintaining contact with the FINM.147 
There commenced a series of reciprocal delegations. In November 1977, Alamiro 
Guzman, president of the FINM, visited Britain as a guest of the NUM.148 
Guzman returned to Chile and became the first Chilean unionist elected before 
the coup to travel abroad and return safely.149 Guzman was followed by Carlos 
Pozo, who was the seventy-one-year-old treasurer of the FINM in 1978. He had 
been imprisoned during the repression of the 1950s in Chile. He was a nitrate 
miner and his wife died on a hunger strike demanding his release while he 
was imprisoned.150 Gatehouse wrote that he was a ‘wizened old comrade with 
an amazing sense of humour’.151 The NUM put money towards Pozo’s medical 
expenses when he travelled to Hungary for treatment.152 After this he described 
himself as ‘a new man’ and continued on to Britain.153 He visited Wrexham as 
a guest of Ted McKay, as they had met when the delegation was in Chile. Pozo 
confided in McKay that he had a sense of foreboding about returning to Chile. 
‘He said we might never meet again. He feared the arrests might happen’, McKay 
told the Evening Leader.154 Pozo was right to be frightened: he disappeared when 
the offices of the FINM were raided on 20 October 1978.155 McKay travelled to 
the Chilean Embassy in London to inquire after Pozo. Soon after, McKay went 
as part of the British delegation to the Conference of Solidarity with the Chilean 
People in Madrid, where he vowed to bring up Pozo’s disappearance.156
Around the same time, the FINM announced that Hector Troncoso was to be 
their representative in Britain. The NUM reported that he was a refugee who 
had ‘lived through the beating that he received at the hands of this regime’.157 
Hernán Cofre flew from Santiago to join Troncoso and visited Nottingham, 
South Derbyshire and Kent. 
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Cofre’s suitcase went missing on the journey and he spent his time in Britain 
wearing the clothes of CSC campaigners and generous miners.158 He spoke at 
the NUM conference with Gatehouse translating: ‘Thank you, comrades, for 
listening to me and for the reception you have given me. It is really emotional 
for me … Thank you for giving two modest Chilean workers the opportunity to 
… join in fraternity with the workers of your country here.’159
Figure 3.1 Ted McKay, Ken Toon, Hernán Cofre, Hector Troncoso and Mike 
Gatehouse at the NUM Annual Conference, 1978.
Source: ‘Standing ovation at Torquay for Chilean miners,’ Miner, July/August 1978, CSC, CSC/7/14, LHASC, 
Manchester.
The NUM produced a pro-solidarity badge and sent thousands of FINM badges 
to Chile.160 It was even rumoured that Joe Gormley would visit Chile.161 In 
1978 Hector Troncoso attended the Scottish Mineworkers’ Gala. ‘As usual’, 
reveals the CSC annual report of the Scottish gala, ‘a float was provided for the 
Chilean refugees to decorate, and a tent set aside for the Scottish Chile Defence 
Committee to mount an exhibition’.162 
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The generosity of the NUM, and their ongoing relationship with Chile, was 
aimed at the FINM and its members, and as such, could be classified as bilateral 
internationalism. The FINM influence in Chile, on politics or working conditions 
was (during the 1970s) very weak, and thus NUM solidarity with them had little 
effect on the dictatorship or positive results for the Chilean people. The NUM 
delegation and their relationship with Chile were restricted by their form of 
organisation—that is, by the old forms of internationalism based on industrial 
national conceptions. They expressed their solidarity with their equivalent 
organisation rather than with the people or with a social movement. Even so, 
the delegation and the ongoing relationship with the FINM were substantial 
symbolic actions.163 The CSC noted the NUM’s ability to establish their own 
contacts with Chile as a ‘gesture of defiance to the dictatorships which want 
them completely isolated’.164
Figure 3.2 Hector Troncoso, Mike Gatehouse and Mick McGahey at the 
head of the Scottish Miners’ Gala March.
Source: ‘Miners on the March’, Miner, July–August, 1978, 11, courtesy of South Wales Area NUM. 
Ted McKay was immensely proud and believed the whole union was behind the 
delegation: ‘When the NUM joined, with one voice, to face the common enemy 
of fascism … we showed the world what the Union stands for.’165 Gormley 
listed the Chile delegation and subsequent interactions with Chilean miners as 
the high points of NUM internationalism in his time with the union.166 Daly 
163 Given the standing ovations, and glowing reports of the NUM in the left press, it would be easy to 
assume that there was no opposition to the delegation. This was not so. See, for example: ‘What Were We 
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articulated similarly: ‘it is another expression of the British Miners Union’s 
belief in international solidarity’.167 And that expression was confined to and 
limited by the industrial national framework.
Of course, the NUM was not the only union which believed in internationalist 
rhetoric. Jack Jones said in 1975: ‘As democrats, we cannot rest while the 
inhuman regime in Chile continues its policy of imprisonment, of maiming, of 
killing those who it perceives as a threat, and while democracy is denied to the 
people of Chile.’168 
Jones travelled to Chile on two occasions, first in 1974 and subsequently in 
1975. Jones’s moral authority stemmed from his long history of fighting fascism, 
including in the Spanish Civil War, and his years of solid leadership of the 
TGWU.169 The first trip was as part of an International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ITF) mission that comprised Jones (then vice-president of the ITF) 
and four other members of the executive board.170 
The men set out from London on a British Caledonian flight, arriving at Santiago 
on 25 November 1974.171 They were escorted off the plane and told they would 
be taken directly to the office of Air Force General Diaz. As they walked across 
the tarmac and into the airport, they walked below the area where the public 
could view arrivals. Someone above shouted ‘Jack Jones!’, and as he looked up 
a note floated down.172 It was the name and address of a British Embassy official. 
The unionists were put into a limousine with air force officers accompanying 
them and escorts in front and behind. 
The general told the delegates the mission would not be allowed to enter Chile 
to make investigations because it would interfere with the ILO Committee for 
Investigation and Conciliation on Matters of Trade Union Freedom which would 
soon arrive.173 The dates proposed and the interference by the ITF mission 
167 Daly, in National Union of Mineworkers (UK), NUM Annual Conference, 1977, 467.
168 TUC, ‘Notes of Proceedings at a Conference on Chile held at Congress House’.
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‘would constitute an obvious undermining of [the Chilean] national dignity’.174 
The ITF mission was invited to return on or after 20 December, after the ILO 
mission was successfully disposed of.175 
Jones only briefly described the meeting in his autobiography, but the reader 
gets the sense of the tension and mood of the general as he flipped between 
anger and placatory behaviour.176 At the end of the meeting, after the general 
had spent time defending the anti-labour movement actions of the junta, he 
was handed a list of disappeared transport workers. He did not react kindly. 
Jones persevered, and mentioned the names of two men he believed had been 
killed. While the general promised to investigate each of the men personally and 
report his findings to the ITF, Jones recalled that ‘the atmosphere became heated 
towards the end and his final words were that we must leave on the next plane’.177 
Jones thought they would be taken back to the airport, but the interpreter 
explained that the next plane would be in two days. They were accompanied to 
a hotel.178 Jones contacted the British Embassy official who had thrown down 
his details at the airport and they went into the centre of Santiago to meet the 
Interdenominational Peace Committee. Jones was moved by the people he met 
there;179 but it seems that this small foray onto the streets of Santiago was enough 
for the Chilean Government to find a plane on which to deport the unionists in 
less than two days. So, barely 24 hours into a five-day visit, the ITF delegation 
was sent on its way. ‘It was frustrating, but not entirely pointless’, Jones was 
reported as saying.180
At the BLP conference just days after his return to Britain, he emphasised 
the need for the labour movement to unite behind the Chilean people; ‘Jack 
received an ovation’.181 The TGWU General Executive Council fully supported 
Jones’s part in the mission and gave him permission to return if another mission 
was organised.182 Jones spoke of his short time in Chile on various platforms, 
including the TUC-organised conference on Chile in April 1975. Pulling at the 
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conscience and provoking the outrage of his audience, Jones listed unionists 
executed in the first days of the coup. He said: ‘they will not regain their 
freedom, but there are hundreds here on this list who with our help and the 
help of the world trade union movement can yet regain their freedom.’183
Jones’s second visit to Chile, in 1975, was as part of an ICFTU delegation, and 
lasted only nine hours. At the conference in Mexico City, Jones insisted that an 
ICFTU delegation visit Chile and demonstrate their solidarity with the oppressed 
labour movement. Though the congress voted for Jones to lead the delegation, 
he was adamant that Otto Kersten, general secretary of the ICFTU, lead the 
party. The delegates left from Mexico City to travel to Chile. After getting off the 
plane, Jones guided the delegation straight to the Peace Committee to renew his 
acquaintances there. This time, he was successfully able to meet with Cardinal 
Silva. Jones remembered in his autobiography: ‘It was a serious yet happy 
occasion, and I was proud to pin the badge of the International on his robe.’184 
Jones continued: 
We were under close observation during the whole of our day in Santiago 
but that did not stop us passing and receiving messages to or from brave 
people who were operating illicitly and who were encouraged by our 
visit … It was at the airport, when we were going to catch our return 
flight, that the secret police showed their hand.185
As they passed through customs, the delegation members were surrounded by 
armed guards. They were manhandled into a room on the side of the customs 
area. They separated off Jones and let the rest of the men go. It was still not clear 
what was going on and Jones’s colleagues started to create a ruckus outside the 
room. A Canadian diplomat who came to farewell the delegation started to make 
representations on his behalf. 
The guards shuffled through Jones’s papers and then confiscated them. Jones 
was absolutely indignant, and as he was led out to the open area to rejoin his 
delegation, he shouted: ‘This is what the Fascists do to a visitor from a friendly 
country. They are thieves. They have taken my property!’186 The police were no 
doubt happy to get rid of the delegation and Jones’s papers were returned three 
months later through the Foreign Office. Jones was reported as saying that the 
ICFTU delegation had ‘helped to identify the international trade union movement 
with the fight of Chilean workers and with the humanitarian efforts being made 
by the peace committee to help the wives and families of detainees’.187
183 TUC, ‘Notes of Proceedings at a Conference on Chile held at Congress House’.
184 Jones, Jack Jones, 293.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid., 239.
187 ‘Fight Chilean Fascism’, Record, November 1975, 6, TGWU, MSS.126/T&G/193/1/55, MRC, UW, Coventry.
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As Jones reported to the Finance and General Purposes Committee of the TGWU 
upon his return: ‘During the Mission’s visit he had been personally subjected to 
the Junta’s fascist activities, including having personal papers (since returned), 
taken from him.’188
Despite Jones’s irritation at the abuse of his freedom, it does seem an exaggerated 
assumption to liken his experience to the oppression suffered by the Chilean 
left. Although his trips to Chile may have been bold international gestures, the 
lack of time and profound contact with the Chilean movement renders them as 
just that: gestures. 
These gestures, however, seemingly simple and bureaucratically loose, had 
consequences that extended beyond Jones as an individual. One outcome of 
Jones’s travels to Chile stems from the confiscation of his papers. The abuse of 
his freedom was used as a reason by the ITF to call on all its affiliates to boost 
the harassment of Chilean transport from 1 January 1976.189 This gave fuel and 
support to boycott actions all over the world, including that which occurred in 
Australia (see Chapter Eight).190 Jones’s personal experiences ensured that the 
TUC was unable to ignore the Chile issue.
While the mineworkers were motivated by feelings against fascism and injustice, 
as well as feelings of working-class and trade union solidarity, Jack Jones sought 
to express his solidarity with the ‘Chilean people’.191 The NUM delegation was 
daring in some ways but exhibited limited flexibility to act outside structural 
and ideological restrictions. ‘It is’, said Jack Collins, ‘our working class duty to 
make sure that the nightmare that is now taking place in Chile and Bolivia, the 
nightmare that these people are living through, is ended forthwith in order that 
we can also share in the victory of that nightmare being brought to an end’ 
(emphasis added).192 
The NUM’s practical solidarity was, however, directed at an organisation rather 
than at miners or a class. They did not target solidarity with the workers or 
the ‘Chilean people’ in general, but with a select group of mostly incapacitated 
unionists. As Waterman suggests, solidarity committees often identify with 
188 Minutes of the Statutory Meeting of the Finance and General Purposes Committee of the General Executive 
Council, November 5, 1975, TGWU, MSS.126/T&G/1186/A/53, MRC, UW, Coventry. Jones always seemed 
to report verbally to his executive committee on Chilean matters. See, for example, The General Secretary’s 
Twenty-First Quarterly Report, 1974, TGWU, MSS.126/TG/385/A/2, MRC, UW, Coventry.
189 ‘Harassment planned for Chile Junta’, Record, January 1976, 6, TGWU, MSS.126/T&G/193/1/56, MRC, 
UW, Coventry.
190 WWFA, Memo Re; ITF – Chile and ITF Circular, December 18 1975, Waterside Workers’ Federation of 
Australia [hereinafter WWFA]: Federal Office, N114/932, Noel Butlin Archive Centre, The Australian National 
University [hereinafter NBAC: ANU], Canberra; International Transport Workers’ Federation Circular no. 
11/S.6/D.1, 76/1/29, 1976, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/942 ITF Circulars 1975 vol. 3, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
191 ‘Standing ovation at Torquay for Chilean miners’.
192 Collins, in National Union of Mineworkers (UK), NUM Annual Conference, 1977, 470–1.
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particular leadership claiming to be representative of workers rather than the 
real workers of the recipient country, and in this case, so did the union.193 The 
problem with this was the fact that the national-level FINM organisation was at 
that point largely redundant. They were persecuted, restricted and impoverished. 
Despite the international aid received, they remained so for some time.
The limitations of the NUM delegation were also in evidence when the TUC, its 
own trade union peak body, did not enthusiastically support it. The lacklustre 
adoption of the recommended courses of action is the case in point, and there 
was an uninspiring carriage through to international-level industrial national 
organisations. Their lack of a strategic individual in the TUC and faithfulness 
to the hierarchy of industrial national unionism hampered the overall influence 
of the delegation.
The CSC, a committee with little of the institutionalised power of the TUC, 
but with links to the most powerful labour movement groups in the country, 
ensured that the small NUM delegation enjoyed flexibility and fame beyond the 
borders of their own union. Travelling to give evidence on the international 
stage, interviewed about their experiences for years after, the three NUM 
members selected by Gormley achieved prominence above and beyond their 
union positions. As Gatehouse wrote: ‘we regard the work of NUM and of 
yourselves in particular as being an example to the whole of the rest of the trade 
union movement.’194
In contrast, the relatively minor forays of Jack Jones to Chile had ramifications 
that outweighed their planning and implementation purely because of Jones’s 
stature. His union and political positions were what allowed him to act in this 
manner. Logue has noted: ‘In general, we can expect that the incidence of 
“parasitic elite activity” will be inversely related to the degree of democracy 
prevailing in the organisation.’195 Jones, who was elected for life, could partake 
in his international delegations with impunity: he was in a position that did not 
require him to account for his actions. His interest in Chile was not only backed 
by the name of the TUC and the ability to circumvent its oppressive committee 
structures and hostile employees, but also drew with it the ITF and the ICFTU. 
Amidst the abstract models of trade union international activity, historians and 
political scientists have often overlooked the role of the individual.
The NUM delegation, perhaps guided by their union’s own rule book, judged that 
the FINM would be the appropriate gateway through which their compassion 
and financial aid might be channelled. They pursued this vigorously and 
attempted to keep it distinct from any action of the CSC. In a different strategy, 
193 Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 135.
194 Gatehouse (CSC) to McKie (NUM), February 4th 1979, CSC, CSC/11/10, LHASC, Manchester.
195 Logue, Toward a Theory of Trade Union Internationalism, 29.
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Jones spent little time in Chile, but went straight to the heart of a Chilean-
run organisation. The Peace Committee, of course, benefited from solidarity and 
funds, but it was not a direct result of them. In judging where aid and publicity 
would be most useful in resistance to the regime, Jack Jones chose the reality 
of a social movement organisation. The NUM members and their union chose to 
prop up a relic of the industrial national structure. 
The real winner, in terms of organisational gain, was the CSC, which benefited 
with little effort from newsworthy events and capable speakers. The CSC did not 
begrudge the separation that the NUM felt necessary from the CSC. In fact, as 
the Glasgow Free Chile Committee had previously done with the East Kilbride 
boycott (Chapter Four), the CSC encouraged the activities of the unionists, who 
could be presented as nonpartisan and morally upright to a politically sensitive 
audience. Though Gormley had attempted to swing control away from the left 
in his choice of delegates, he actually helped the broad front of the CSC more 
than a left-wing delegation could have hoped.
It was very soon after his final trip to Chile that Jack Jones retired. At the 
function that the union held in honour of the occasion, Chilean band Mayapi 
provided the entertainment. Jones wrote to the CSC to thank them. Gatehouse 
replied that it was a ‘unique opportunity’ for the band, as they could play and 
pay tribute to the international work of Jones. It was a ‘very small way of saying 
thankyou for the tremendous contribution you have made to the struggle of the 
people of Chile’. Gatehouse continued that he hoped that during his retirement, 
Jones could return to Chile but under very different circumstances, and where 
there will be no DINA, but a ‘crowd of welcoming trade unionists to meet you 
at the airport’.196
196 Gatehouse to Jones, March 4 1976, CSC, CSC/1/16, LHASC, Manchester.
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4. Pinochet’s jets and Rolls Royce 
East Kilbride
Figure 4.1 Arms sales were a consistent issue throughout the 1970s and 
1980s.
Source: CSC, ‘No arms sales to Chile,’ Box 2 Posters and exhibition graphics, People’s History Museum, 
LHASC, Manchester.
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The helmet looked too big for his head. It sat awkwardly askew, falling 
backwards, and the man beneath looked up and out through thick-rimmed 
glasses. One hand grasped a machine gun, but his jacket still held its pocket 
square and remained buttoned up over his patterned jumper. He looked like 
a grandfatherly academic pulled away from his desk to defend the country. It 
was 11 September 1973 and these were the last hours of President Salvador 
Allende’s life. Planes roared over the Chilean capital. The whine of their engines 
reverberated off the old buildings and cobbled streets in the centre of the city. 
The military coup was in full swing. 
Jets strafed the palace, coming within metres of the edifice. They fired their 
rockets with accuracy. One pilot is said to have aimed for the windows, later 
boasting that he could land a rocket in a tin of condensed milk. With each 
hit an explosion of dust appeared, so thick it looked solid as it hung in the 
air. Deafening blasts filled the atmosphere as the bulky stone of the palace was 
blown apart and windows shattered, reducing sections of its fine facade to 
rubble. Flame, smoke and dust flowed in the wind away from the palace. And 
still the jets came.
These were Hawker Hunter jets, the main offensive aeroplane of the Chilean military. 
Some time later, the ground forces had pushed their way into the palace shielded 
by tanks and President Allende lay dead in his office.
On the other side of the world 3000 men worked in a Rolls Royce factory in 
East Kilbride, just outside Glasgow. For a couple of days after the coup the 
factory routines went on as normal. The working week wore on, and on the 
third morning at 7.45 in the factory canteen, the scheduled shop stewards’ 
meeting opened. Peter Lowe was acting convenor and began proceedings with 
usual union business. Wage claims and finances were discussed and nothing was 
amiss or unusual.1 Towards the end, Bob Somerville raised his hand. He moved a 
resolution against the military takeover of the Chilean Government.2 Somerville 
was a Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) member and he later admitted 
that it was ‘a political move on my part’.3 While there was nothing unusual or 
even unpredictable about that, what was unexpected was that an Amalgamated 
1 The previous convenor, McCulloch, was undergoing a major operation. Lowe would soon be elected to 
the role.
2 Minute of the Shop Stewards’ Meeting held in the main canteen on Friday 14th September 1973, Rolls Royce 
East Kilbride Shop Stewards Papers, Rolls Royce Factory, East Kilbride [hereinafter RREKSS]. Fighting bloody 
hand of Chile’s fascists by Jim Tait, 1974, RREKSS.
3 Interview with Bob Somerville (Chile activist, UK), 27 July 2007 [hereinafter Somerville Interview, 2007], 
notes in possession of author.
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Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) delegate with openly right leanings 
named John Burn seconded the resolution. Bob Somerville remembered that 
this left–right alliance ‘jelled the workforce’.4 
The boycott had started.
It was a small resolution at the time—a gesture of revulsion against fascism—
but it became, to borrow Bob Somerville’s words, ‘one of the greatest episodes 
in the history of Scottish socialism’.5 
The gesture grew legs and a heart and became an action that moved under 
the influence of many masters. It would be wrong to think of it as isolated in 
the factory, or even within Scotland, without external influence. There were 
three main arenas that affected the boycott and each had their own tensions 
and politics: the factory at East Kilbride, the national-level leadership of unions 
and the parliamentary Labour Party. Each interacted to shape the skirmish 
between Chile and the workers at Rolls Royce East Kilbride. This chapter will 
draw together the threads from each arena in an attempt to understand the 
anatomy of such a boycott, and the effect of the different puppetmasters. The 
shipbuilding yards on the Firth of Clyde were under the same pressures, but 
there ideology and action intersected with a very different outcome. 
The British unions with the most strategic industrial locations in terms of trade 
with Chile were the AUEW (due to their involvement in arms and shipbuilding),6 
the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU: docks and road transport) 
and the National Union of Seamen (NUS). The East Kilbride action involved the 
first two of those unions. What follows from here is a detailed reconstruction 
of the inter and intra-union politics of the AUEW and TGWU. It’s a laborious 
task, but one necessary to truly understand how a boycott for remote political 
gain unfolds. 
The Rolls Royce aero-engine factory in East Kilbride was divided into four large 
sheds, labelled Blocks A–D. The factory primarily engaged in ‘servicing’, which 
is the repair and reconstruction of older engines, and Rolls Royce (1971) Limited 
held long-term service contracts with civil airlines and military forces around 
the globe.7 In the early 1970s maintenance on an aero-engine involved stripping 
and cleaning, with each component placed into an engine tray. Inspectors would 
use a pile of cards to check each piece no matter how small for its serial numbers 
and the quality of the work.8 It was tactile labour. Bob Somerville remembered 
4 GCUA, ‘Chile and Scotland: 30 Years On’, Paper presented at the Witness Seminar and Open Forum Series 
(No. 3), Saltire Centre, Glasgow Caledonian University, Saturday, 29 November 2003.
5 Neil MacKay, ‘The Scot Who Humbled Pinochet Tells His Story’, Sunday Herald, 2002, RR East Kilbride 
Witness Seminar and Open Forum, GCUA, Glasgow.
6 The Chile Monitor no. 6, 1974.
7 Rolls Royce Heritage Trust did not respond to any letters I sent about this project. Rolls Royce (1971) 
Limited is hereinafter referred to as Rolls Royce.
8 Somerville Interview, 2007.
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‘you had a hand on every bit of that engine, booking it in’.9 The Avon 207 
engine, which powered jets such as the Hawker Hunter, was a very successful 
industrial engine for Rolls Royce;10 however, the engine could not be ‘taken 
down’ in sections. It had to be totally ‘stripped’, which meant a significant 
amount of skilled work.11 
Somerville was an aero-engine inspector in the subassembly section in B Block. 
He applied for a job at Rolls Royce because his wife’s cousin had alerted him 
to the company’s need for tradesmen.12 He was an active community man and 
a CPGB member, and had joined the AUEW when he was fifteen. He ended up 
serving for 50 years.13 When the Chilean coup occurred he was a senior steward 
and the Rolls Royce factory was particularly well organised.14 In fact, the whole 
factory was unionised. Somerville recalled: ‘You didn’t-a get started at Rolls 
Royce unless you joined a union … So it was always a hundred percent [on] the 
shop floor.’15
There were about 3000 workers in the factory in 1973. These workers were 
divided into sections within the blocks and each section elected shop stewards. 
The Rolls Royce East Kilbride (RREK) Shop Stewards’ Committee comprised 
about 100 men.16 Sitting above the shop stewards was a Rolls Royce East Kilbride 
Works Committee (RREKWC, or the Works Committee) of seven members.17 
Each member of the RREKWC was elected annually from factory level, with a 
high level of re-election.
The AUEW held at least four positions on the Works Committee, in line with 
its predominance within the factory. The rest of the RREKWC consisted of one 
or more TGWU members and at least one allied trades (welders, sheetmetal 
workers, and so on) member.18 Scholars Coates and Topham have noted: ‘At plant 
9 ‘Book in’ refers to the process of writing down the ‘make’ (identification such as serial number) of every 
component of the engine. To ‘work’ an engine refers to the process of working on an engine. Ibid.
10 Commonly called the ‘Hawker Hunter boycott’ because the Avon engines were for Hawker Hunter fighters.
11 The ability to take an engine apart (‘take down’) in sections was a design function to make it easier and 
more cost effective to repair or replace parts. ‘Totally stripped’ means the engine was completely disassembled, 
cleaned, repaired and put back together. Somerville Interview, 2007.
12 Ibid. Somerville did his apprenticeship making mining equipment at Anderson Mavors—another 
militant workplace. Anderson Mavors was also involved in a (separate) Chile boycott.
13 In 2001 he received an MBE for his 16 years on the Motherwell College Board, 25 years on the Community 
Council, 25 years of youth work in judo and at the football club and 50 years as a trade union member and 
activist. Somerville to MacKay (Home Affairs Editor, Sunday Herald), 27.5.02, Robert Somerville, Rolls Royce 
East Kilbride Witness Seminar and Open Forum, GCUA, Glasgow.
14 Somerville Interview, 2007.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. In 1973 the RREKWC comprised Peter Lowe (convenor, AUEW), Dugald ‘Dougie’ Gilles (sub-
convenor, AUEW), John Keenan and Robert ‘Bob/Bobby’ Somerville (both senior shop stewards and AUEW), 
Wally McKluskie (AUEW), Gavin Gordon (Allied Trades) and Jimmy Douglas (TGWU), who was soon after 
replaced with Danny Doorman. 
18 Ibid.
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level, multi-union steward organization is frequently of a more developed and 
hierarchical character than in the single-plant union; union heterogeneity seems 
to encourage stronger steward organization, which in turn makes inter-union co-
operation more manageable.’19
The Rolls Royce East Kilbride organisation supports this assertion. The stewards 
were highly organised, and highly effective.20 The ordered and consistently 
managed structure of the unions in the factory ensured that news of action 
could be relayed among the 3000 workers quickly and effectively. Every action 
was reported from shop steward to section to committee where it was endorsed 
or rejected. 
When interviewed in 2007, Somerville was coy about the political affiliations 
within the Works Committee. He did say that of the seven-man works 
committee, two were members of the BLP (John Keenan was one of them). As a 
CPGB member, Somerville was politically close to Gavin Gordon, who was of the 
left. Somerville remembered that the workforce was particularly militant, and 
estimated that 80 per cent of shop stewards were members of political parties, 
not always of the left, but predominantly so. Within the factory, there was 
an industrial branch of the CPGB and wide distribution of its newspaper, the 
Morning Star.21
Outside the factory in the same period, the town of East Kilbride was home 
to particularly well-organised community and worker groups. East Kilbride’s 
strong Labour/left organisation was a microcosm of the Scottish movement. 
The Scottish sections of national unions were generally regarded as radical and 
extremely well organised, as well as strong-headed and rebellious. All of this 
pointed towards action.
Shortly after the original resolution, Bob Somerville came in to the factory 
to start a shift, when he was called into the convenor’s office. According to 
Somerville, the convenor informed him that one of the stewards in his section 
had refused to work an engine for Chile. That steward was Bob Foulton. 
Somerville was surprised, because Bob was a church elder and not known to be 
a political man. As it turns out, he had refused to work the engine as a Christian 
on humanitarian grounds.22 With this first action, the RREKWC realised there 
19 Coates and Topham, Trade Unions in Britain, 162.
20 Furthermore, the RREK example supports Peetz and Pocock, who note that if confidence, training, 
support and proper delegation of authority occur within a workplace, there will be greater union power. 
David Peetz and Barbara Pocock, ‘An Analysis of Workplace Representatives, Union Power and Democracy in 
Australia’, British Journal of Industrial Relations 47 (2009), 26.
21 ‘I’ve got to pay special thanks to Jimmy Milne, who stood solidly behind us. The Morning Star, who I was 
continuously … I was the sort of liaison between anything that happened in the factory, the Morning Star, Jim 
Tate, Andrew Clark whoever was available “this is happening”—Bang. It’s flashed to the rest of the country. 
Tremendous support, tremendous support.’ Somerville, GCUA, ‘Chile and Scotland: 30 Years On’.
22 Somerville Interview, 2007.
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were Chilean engines in the factory. Somerville went to investigate and then 
reported details of the stoppage back to the convenor. The RREKWC accepted 
the action as legitimate in light of the previous resolution and officially blacked 
the engines. Out of courtesy, the committee contacted management, and also 
the AUEW National Executive Committee, asking them to endorse the action in 
line with the policy and previous resolutions of the union.23 Peter Lowe, RREK 
convenor, also sent a telegram to Tony Benn, Trade and Industry Minister, 
stating: ‘Inform you we are refusing to work on Avon 207 engines used in the 
Hawker Hunter fighter/bomber in for overhaul for the Chilean Air Force.’24
The reaction of management to the boycott was remarkably calm. The good 
relationship that existed between the shop stewards and the company had much 
to do with this. The management persistently asked the stewards to get their 
labourers to work the engines. They did so politely, though with veiled threats. 
Catherine Curruthers of Rolls Royce wrote to the workers:
I must emphasise to you the serious position that would prevail if the 
Company is sued for non-performance of these legal obligations, and the 
further adverse effect which the attendant publicity would have on our 
order book and the future level of employment and prosperity among 
your members.25
Although management tried to persuade the unionists to work on the engines,26 
in hindsight, Somerville felt that it was very awkward for them: ‘some of them 
we knew accepted that what we were doing was the right thing.’27 The workers 
did not lose hours or receive penalties for their stance.
When the boycott at RREK began Somerville ‘took a wee step back’ from its 
public leadership in the factory. He was on the Scottish committee of the CPGB 
at the time and it was important to the success of the boycott, and the Chile 
movement, that the action was not seen as a communist plot.28 The Glasgow 
Chile Defence Committee also kept a distance, respecting the public relations 
value of an ‘un-tampered’ worker-led boycott.29 A Works Committee, rank-and-
file-led boycott held firm moral high ground. 
Convenor Lowe was not politically minded, according to Somerville, but this 
worked in favour of the boycott. Having a nonpartisan public leader meant 
23 Lowe to ‘sir and bro’, 25th March 1974, RREKSS.
24 Telegram from Lowe to the Hon. A. Benn, M.P., 22/3/74, RREKSS.
25 Situation Report, 12 noon: Tuesday 2nd July 1974: Chilean Engines, RREKSS.
26 It was thought the maintenance contract would be taken up by Rolls Royce Motors, a wholly owned 
subsidiary in Brazil. ‘Rolls-Royce Nears Deal on “Blacked” Chile Jets’, Telegraph, 1 September 1974.
27 Somerville Interview, 2007.
28 Ibid.
29 The Glasgow Chile Defence Committee (GCDC) recognised that ‘the working class character of the 
campaign has put it in the forefront of the international solidarity movement from the start’. Chile Defence 
Committee, ‘Resolution to Glasgow Chile Defence Committee A.G.M’ (Glasgow: 1974).
4 . Pinochet’s jets and Rolls Royce East Kilbride
123
it could not be easily attacked as a biased plot. Lowe was invited to speak at 
various conferences and rallies.30 Even after the boycott was lifted, he was 
invited to speak at the trade union conference on Chile, ‘Bread, Work and 
Freedom’, in March 1979, because the Rolls Royce action was regarded by the 
Chile Solidarity Campaign in London as ‘an outstanding example to the whole 
trade union movement’.31 He did so much travel for ‘Chile business’ that the 
shop stewards put money towards a new briefcase for him. 
That briefcase was to be the centre of an event that underlined the seriousness 
of the boycott for the Scottish unionists. Somerville recalled that Lowe travelled 
south ‘to do a TV programme and [when he] went to his hotel he put his briefcase 
down as all Scotsmen do, and went for a wee bevvy just to settle his nerves’.
When he returned, the briefcase was gone. He reported it to the police, but they 
just said he must have misplaced it. Later, when he arrived home, he heard a 
noise outside his house. Somerville continued:
[A]nd he went out, and here was these bundles of paper that had been 
pushed through the door. It was his papers that had been in the briefcase. 
So Peter being Peter [he] quickly ran to the window which looked up 
the main road, and there, lo and behold, was a policeman running out 
and into a car and driving off.32
Despite Lowe’s non-political background, his leadership of the East Kilbride 
boycott had brought him to the attention of some authorities. It also brought him 
prominence within the progressive labour movement. One episode could colour 
a whole career, overshadowing years of leadership on industrial issues.33 On 
Lowe’s retirement from Rolls Royce, the Rolls Royce Hillington Shop Stewards’ 
Committee wrote: 
[Y]our Committee at East Kilbride with Peter at the helm will be remembered 
in working class history for your persistent refusal to release the Avon 
engines intended to power the very Hawker Hunter Aircraft which were 
used by the Fascist Junta in Chile to straff [sic] the Presidential Palace and 
people of that country who were defending democracy.34
30 For example: Dobbie (CSC Tyneside) to RRSSEK [Rolls Royce Shop Stewards East Kilbride], 5th September 
1978, RREKSS. Lowe’s Speech: I would like to take this opportunity and thank the Chile Solidarity Committee, 
1978, RREKSS; Keenan invited to Bristol for trade union conference: Comite Chileno to Keenan (RRSSEK), 1978, 
RREKSS; General request for speaker Manchester CSC Committee, 22nd. July 1974, RREKSS.
31 Gatehouse (CSC) to Lowe (Shop-Stewards Rolls Royce East Kilbride), February 4th 1979, CSC, CSC/11/10, 
LHASC, Manchester.
32 GCUA, ‘Chile and Scotland’.
33 This is also true in part of John Keenan. His concern for workers’ safety and other industrial issues took 
most of his union organising time rather than internationalism. John Keenan, Interview with Ann Jones, 8 
September 2008, copy in possession of author.
34 McCormack (Rolls Royce Ltd, Hillington Shop Stewards Committee) to Rolls Royce East Kilbride Shop 
Stewards Committee 1st June 1983, RREKSS.
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Without meaning to, Lowe and the RREK workers became known for what was 
initially a gut reaction to the coup, a mere resolution passed at a breakfast meeting.35
Despite its eventual prominence, at first, the boycott continued for some months 
without official AUEW support. The majority of RREK workers were members 
of the AUEW, and in order to understand the representative quality of the 
boycott, it is necessary to discuss that union’s democratic practice. The AUEW’s 
structure at the time was complex, overlapping and exceedingly confusing, but 
also very important to understand so that individual actions and reactions can 
be appreciated in their correct context. The AUEW was one of the two largest 
unions in Britain: in 1975 it had 1 204 934 members, of which 133 425 were in 
Scotland.36 In 1976 the membership was broken into four sections: Engineering 
(the largest section by far); Construction Engineering; Foundry Workers; and 
Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Section (TASS).37 Its structure was 
complicated and its constitution based on that of the United States, with an 
elected parliament, an executive and a judiciary. The AUEW’s founding members 
had constructed the voting system to ensure that the rank and file had control 
of union business but, as John Higgins argued, ‘this admirable desire also gives 
rise to a very large rule book and the feeling that procedures are such as to 
prevent anyone from doing anything’.38
The title of the union was also misleading, since there was never a full 
amalgamation.39 Various mergers had strengthened the union’s numbers, but 
also led to its hopelessly fractured structure. Each section enforced its own rules 
and had its own constituent body (the national committees). Representatives 
of the sections came together to form the National Executive.40 The president 
and general secretary of the Engineering Section were always the president and 
general secretary of the AUEW as a whole, reflecting the domination of the union 
structure by the engineers. The 52 representatives of the Engineering Section 
National Committee met once a year with the foundry representatives (seven), 
TASS (seven) and Construction Section (three representatives). Together, this 
35 Somerville’s other community involvement and activist career were also over shadowed by his 
involvement in the Chile boycott.
36 The Engineering Section had 214 members in Gibraltar, USA, Canada and New Zealand in 1975. AUEW: 
Structure and Function of the Union.
37 The sections’ memberships were: Engineering (1.2 million members); Construction Engineering (30 000); 
Foundry Workers (50 000); and Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Section (TASS) (130 000). The 
AUEW Engineering Section is explained in more detail than the other sections here because it is that section 
which is most highly represented in the action at East Kilbride. It is also the biggest and most influential. Jim 
Higgins, ‘Amalgamating the Engineers’, Spectator, 1976; Milligan, The New Barons.
38 Higgins, ‘Amalgamating the Engineers’.
39 Due to an apparent loss of votes that the Engineering Section would suffer.
40 The National Council of seven men governed or administered the Engineering Section in line with the 
policies of the National Committee. If the national councilmen did not agree with the decisions of the National 
Committee they could take it to the appeal court, which also consisted of rank-and-file members. In this 
manner, the union was constructed to ensure that its lay members were theoretically in control of the union. 
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body was the AUEW National Conference.41 The National Conference decided 
on matters of joint policy affecting the union as a whole and was very obviously 
dominated by the Engineering Section. The AUEW structure was cumbersome, 
but democratic in that almost all of its posts were elected, not appointed.42 
Yet still further detail of the structure of the union is needed in order to 
understand the correct organisational context of the interaction between 
national-level leadership and rank-and-file activists at East Kilbride. There 
were 2740 branches. These branches met every two weeks. They were grouped 
into 234 districts, which were grouped into 26 organising divisions, which, 
in turn, were grouped into seven executive council divisions.43 The structure, 
however, had blurry boundaries. For example: ‘Parts of one organising division 
may be in more than one E.C. Division but no district is split in this way. Thus, 
two Districts and their branches may vote for the same Divisional Organiser, 
but, in [s]ome cases, for two different Executive Councilmen.’44
One of the consequences of this complex, confusing structure was to give local 
committees more power. Higgins wrote that ‘the divisions and districts of the 
AUEW operate very much its independent fiefdoms’, and the president, Hugh 
Scanlon, tried to run the union like ‘an oversized shop stewards committee’.45 
Indeed, Scanlon said that a divisional organiser was ‘king’ in his own area and 
held more power there than the regional officer.46
The Executive Council47 (distinct from the National Conference or national 
committees) of the AUEW first discussed the coup in September 1973. There 
41 Each divisional committee elected two delegates for a total of 52 representatives on the National Committee 
of the Engineering Section. The National Committee met once a year and was the primary policymaking body 
of the Engineering Section. The president of the union chaired this meeting, and the general secretary and 
National Council members were present but were not able to vote. AUEW: Structure and Function of the Union.
42 The 186 full-time officials (president, National Executive Committee members, general secretary and 
various levels of organisers) and part-time branch officials were all elected. With the incorporation of TASS 
into the structure, a postal ballot was introduced. The postal vote system was expensive and the varied 
election times across the organisation made elections messy. The change in voting practice led to the right 
wing making a steady comeback against the left wing at a national level. In 1975 John Boyd (right wing) was 
to take the general secretary position from Bob Wright (left wing). Jim Higgins, ‘Trade Unions: Democracy at 
the Top’, Spectator, 1975; Milligan, The New Barons, 127–8; see also p. 23; AUEW: Structure and Function of 
the Union; Jim Higgins, ‘AUEW: Decline of a Union’, Spectator, 1975.
43 AUEW: Structure and Function of the Union.
44 Ibid.
45 Higgins, ‘AUEW’.
46 Edelstein and Warner, Comparative Union Democracy, 310.
47 The AUEW National Executive Committee was constructed of the Engineering Section National Council, 
with two representatives of each of the foundry and TASS and one or two representing the Construction 
Section. The AUEW National Executive Committee was thus made up of 12 or 13 persons, plus the president 
and general secretary, who, as mentioned previously, were always from the Engineering Section.
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was no resolution, but it was decided that the Ambassador of Chile should be 
contacted and the British Government urged not to recognise the junta.48 This 
halfway approach reflected the attitude of the president, Hugh Scanlon. 
Scanlon was a democrat,49 yet his support for Chile action appeared to wax 
and wane. In his capacity as a member of the executive of the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC), Scanlon put his name to various publications and was listed 
as an individual sponsor of the CSC, but he never committed completely to 
the cause.50 Nevertheless Scanlon’s international credentials were significant: 
he was nominated by the European Metal Workers’ Federation to go to Chile to 
secure the release of prisoners.51 Furthermore, in 1977 Scanlon agreed to raise 
the abuses of trade union rights in Chile at an International Metal Workers 
Federation conference in Munich.52 But his approach was scattergun. Scanlon 
did not seem to have anything personally against the CSC, or solidarity with 
Chile in general, but his, and subsequently the AUEW’s, interest in Chile did not 
match that of Jack Jones of the TGWU.53
By 1974 Scanlon and Jones were not as close personally or politically as many 
perceived. In relation to another issue, Scanlon scathingly said at the 1974 
TUC Brighton Conference that ‘I do not care if Jack Jones is Jesus Christ, and 
he thinks he is, but he will not change the AUEW’s decisions’.54 By that time, 
however, Scanlon appeared tired, and at the TUC congress, Ken Gill (communist 
leader of the AUEW TASS) seemed to be doing the talking for the AUEW.55 
The decline of Scanlon in the eyes of the public continued with the right-wing 
swing in the AUEW elections of 1975.56 This fact is important to remember in 
the context of the boycott, along with the confusing structure with its various 
interstices and the personal politics of the leaders.
48 The AUEW also put their name on many publications for the CSC and lent official support to marches. 
Gatehouse to Local Committees, May 15 1974, CSC, CSC/44/1, LHASC, Manchester; AUEW Journal October 
1973: Abstract Report of Council Proceedings, Amalgamated Engineering Union, MSS.259/AEU/4/6/53, MRC, 
UW, Coventry.
49 Higgins, ‘AUEW’.
50 To Callaghan (Secretary of State), October 9, 1974, STUC, STUCA 531/4, GCUA, Glasgow; Press Release 
from the TGWU, October 9, 1974, STUC, STUCA 531/4, GCUA, Glasgow; CSC (pamphlet), 1974, CSC, CSC/7/2, 
LHASC, Manchester.
51 He was president of this organisation. He was also vice-president of the International Metal Workers’ 
Federation (1969–78). Minutes. Meeting of Executive Council, held in General Office, on the 26th February, 1974 
at 10.00 am, Amalgamated Engineering Union, MSS.259/AEU/1/1/214, MRC, UW, Coventry; Terry Pattinson, 
‘Lord Scanlon: Charismatic Trade-Union Leader’, Independent, 28 January 2004.
52 Meneses and Navarro to Scanlon, October 6 1977, CSC, CSC/28/12, LHASC, Manchester. He did, however, 
leave the congress before any resolution on it was passed. Scanlon to Gatehouse, 2nd November, 1977, CSC, 
CSC/28/12, LHASC, Manchester.
53 Moody has argued that passivity is a product of bureaucracy, and perhaps this was so in the case of 
Scanlon. Moody, ‘Towards an International Social-Movement Unionism’, 6.
54 This was the same conference at which the RREKWC representatives were summoned to break the 
boycott. Higgins, ‘AUEW’. 
55 Ibid. TASS always strongly supported the RREK boycott.
56 Scanlon was succeeded by Terrence Duffy as president of the AUEW in 1978 and in 1979 was elevated 
to the House of Lords, becoming Baron Scanlon of Davyhulme. He had sworn previously to never accept a 
peerage and this caused embarrassment and some ill feeling towards him. Pattinson, ‘Lord Scanlon’.
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Born in 1913 in Australia, Scanlon immigrated to Britain with his widowed 
mother at the age of two. He joined the CPGB in 1937, and separately worked 
his way up from the shop floor to become president of the AUEW (1968–78).57 A 
small, wiry, charismatic man, he was known for his scruples and quick-witted 
humour.58 Pattinson wrote in Scanlon’s obituary that his militancy influenced 
both Labour and Tory government relations with unions. His ascendance in 
that field was, in part, due to the nature of the industries in which his workers 
were employed.59 His union was involved in almost all facets of the arms 
industry in Britain. 
On 27 April 1974, the Engineering Section of the union passed a motion to stop 
delivery of warships and submarines and to pressure MPs.60 It did not mention 
other arms or spares. On 1 May 1974, the AUEW TASS released a statement that 
called for the immediate cancellation of all military equipment orders for Chile.61 
TASS was more direct with demands and rhetoric because its members were not 
likely to be involved in trade with Chile, and therefore had little chance to black. 
At East Kilbride the AUEW (mostly the Engineering Section) workers continued 
to boycott the engines without National Executive Committee approval.
After the RREK boycott had begun on 12 May, the AUEW Executive (where 
Scanlon still held a casting vote, making a left majority) sanctioned the terms 
of the boycott. They sent circulars to their 2700 branches instructing members 
to not work any ‘ships, vehicles, aircraft, or any other weapons which could be 
used against our brothers and sisters in Chile’.62 The original resolution of the 
AUEW Engineering Section had focused on ships and submarines, but it was 
challenged by the East Kilbride action. The AUEW Executive had been forced 
to extend the resolution to include aircraft. The rank-and-file action and the 
ideological support from the TASS had forced the hand of the AUEW National 
Executive and the new circular gave strength to the East Kilbride blacking.63
57 He was a CPGB member until 1955. Ibid.; ‘“The Walrus”, Hugh Scanlon: From Awkward to Ermine’, 
Socialist Worker Online, accessed 7 February 2004, <http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=622>.
58 Pattinson, ‘Lord Scanlon’.
59 Ibid.
60 Rolls Royce had already written to the AUEW (W. Aitkin, divisional organiser) asking for clarification on 
the union’s position by 25 March 1974. McCollum (Rolls Royce ltd) to Aitkin (AUEW ES Paisley), 25th March, 
1974, RREKSS. During 1974 Scanlon openly supported the boycott on Chile armaments, specifically frigates 
and submarines. ‘Chile: Scanlon Acts’, Tribune [UK], 10 May 1974.
61 Gill, leader of TASS, was a member of the CPGB. TASS had a CPGB-dominated leadership. The Chile 
Monitor no. 6, 1974. The AUEW TASS Executive Committee sent a letter expressing their support and 
admiration of the East Kilbride Shop Stewards. Gill (AUEW) to Lowe, 21st May, 1974, RREKSS.
62 Scanlon later said that the black ban of jet engines and warships may widen to involve components. 
Raymond Perman, ‘Ban on Work for Chile may be Widened’, The Times, 15 May 1974; The Chile Monitor 
no. 6, 1974.
63 A trade unionist’s guide to the Chile issue: Does your firm trade in Torture?c1974, CSC, CSC/16/2, LHASC, 
Manchester. It was sent to 2700 branches and more than 200 district committees. Perman, ‘Ban on Work for 
Chile may be Widened’.
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The Glasgow Chile Defence Committee succinctly summarised events up to this 
point: ‘ROLLS ROYCE workers’ action inspired the national AUEW to call on its 
members to black all arms going to Chile. The AUEW action, in turn, sparked 
off a debate within the Labour Party on the need for greater solidarity with the 
struggle in Chile.’64
The AUEW blacking at Rolls Royce caused, according to the CSC, the British 
Government to cancel the Rolls Royce service contract with the Chilean Air 
Force.65 The contract was worth £70 000 a year to Rolls Royce—a very small 
portion of their overall business. The Glasgow Herald reported that the engines 
were invaluable because they were among the first Avons ever made. Of course, 
they were also invaluable to the Chilean Armed Forces for a different reason, and 
provided political ammunition for all sides of British politics.66
Britain held 18 per cent of the South American arms market, and the Ministry 
of Defence and the Treasury both considered arms sales economically essential. 
Given an estimated 170 000 people were employed in the arms industry, fears 
of mass unemployment were easily conjured to allay planned boycotts. Private 
manufacturers of arms benefited from taxpayer-funded research, so from their 
point of view movement towards banning arms trade with any country set a 
dangerous precedent. The ministries and private companies unsurprisingly 
pressured the prime minister to maintain trade with Chile.67
The politics of selling arms to Chile was haunting the newly elected Labour 
Government. The BLP conference had passed a resolution immediately after the 
coup calling on the Government to withhold all aid loans and credit;68 however, 
as Barbara Castle noted in her diaries, ‘relations between the Government and 
the National Executive’ of the BLP ‘remained sensitive. Trouble was likely to 
flare up at any time. It did so over the question of Chile.’69
On 28 March 1974, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) decided that no new arms contracts with 
Chile would be entered into. Existing naval and arms contracts posed a problem 
though, and the Labour Government was embarrassed by its previous strong 
moral stand in opposition.70 There were outstanding contracts worth £50 million 
64 Chile Defence Committee…, Glasgow Chile Bulletin Number One (Glasgow: 1974).
65 Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile and the British Labour Movement, 8, 9.
66 Move to End Chile ban, Glasgow Herald, 19/8/76, CSC, CSC/15/1, LHASC, Manchester.
67 Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby on British Government Policy towards Latin America’.
68 ‘Conference Decisions: Chile’, Tribune [UK], 12 October 1973.
69 Castle, The Castle Diaries, 63.
70 On 23 November 1973, the PLP had called on the Conservative Government to prevent arms sales and 
Judith Hart made the mistake of stating that none of the ships should go there and that the trade unions were 
taking ‘effective steps’ in the matter. Ibid., 64.
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for two Leander Class frigates, two Oberon submarines (at Yarrows and Scott’s 
respectively, both situated on the Clyde) and the refitting of a destroyer, as well 
as smaller projects such as the Rolls Royce engines.71 
Cabinet decided that the difficulties of cancellation of the contracts were too 
great and would be deemed illegal.72 They argued that Chile might cut off its 
copper supply to Britain (compromising 30 per cent of the nation’s imported 
copper) if the contracts were not fulfilled, and that future military contracts 
would be lost.73 As Castle confided to her diary, however, this was a vexed moral 
and political question: ‘Even more important than our sales to Latin America 
(which Mason had said would be at risk) was to stick to the view that we took 
in opposition. That was paramount. Otherwise we lost credibility.’74 
On the first day of April 1974, the chancellor, Jim Callaghan, told the House that 
contracts would be fulfilled. The Tribune scathingly made fun of his ‘honour’ 
and his decision to ‘honour’ the contracts.75 Resolutions from constituency 
branches of the party flooded in, calling for the decision to be reconsidered.76 
A week later Cabinet was still in moral turmoil in determining the appropriate 
attitude to take towards Chile.77 In a single meeting it was decided on one 
hand to invite Madame Allende to visit Britain in solidarity with the plight of 
Chileans, but on the other Callaghan stood firm on the fulfilment of armament 
contracts and sending warships to Chile.78
The decision by the Government was taken as an affront by trade unionists.79 
It was easy for the left to construe the Rolls Royce workers as heroes: the men 
gamely standing up to the Chilean and British Governments. There was some truth 
in this. As one commentator put it, ‘it was only the determination of [Rolls Royce] 
71 Ibid., 57; ‘Chile will get Warships’, The Times, 9 April 1974.
72 The BLP, through a letter from Ted Rowlands to the CSC in November 1975, justified its shipment of 
arms to Chile, stating that it was illegal to back out of a contract and citing protection of Britain’s trading 
reputation. It assured the CSC again that no new contracts would be entered into.
73 Castle, The Castle Diaries, 76–7. General Arturo Yovanne proposed to the junta that the copper be 
suspended. Florencia Varas, ‘Chile Threat to Stop Copper Sales to Britain’, The Times, 30 March 1974.
74 Castle, The Castle Diaries, 77.
75 ‘Frigates for Chilean Junta: Why the Government Must Think Again’, Tribune [UK], 19 April 1974.
76 Resolutions Received from Constituency Labour Parties and Trade Unions, 1974, TUC [BLP International 
Department], MSS.292D/936.1/2, MRC, UW, Coventry.
77 This was increased when junior minister Eric Heffer violated the code of collective responsibility and 
spoke out against the decision. Heffer wins for the Left, 1974, Labour Party—Eric Heffer Papers, LP/ESH/10/30, 
LHASC, Manchester; Heffer to Wilson, 12th April, 1974, Labour Party—Eric Heffer Papers, LP/ESH/10/32, 
LHASC, Manchester; Wilson set for a Showdown over Speech, Times, 15 April 1974, Labour Party—Eric Heffer 
Papers, LP/ESH/10/30, LHASC, Manchester; Extract from a speech made by Eric S Heffer MP, Minister of State 
for Industry, at the Pirrie Labour Club, Walton, Liverpool, on Saturday, April 13, 1974, at 8.30PM, Labour 
Party—Eric Heffer Papers, LP/ESH/10/32, LHASC, Manchester; Heffer guns for Harold, Daily Express, 19 April 
1974, Labour Party—Eric Heffer Papers, LP/ESH/10/30, LHASC, Manchester; John Groser, ‘Mr Heffer to Face 
Wilson Rebuke over Chile’, The Times, 15 April 1974; Michael Hatfield, ‘Callaghan Rebuke over Warships’, 
The Times, 2 May 1974.
78 Michael Hatfield, ‘No Policy Reversal on Ships for Chile’, The Times, 25 April 1974.
79 Just after this the AUEW national resolution was extended to include spares. 
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workers which kept the grounded Hawker Hunter engines in Britain’.80 The 
conception of the East Kilbride workers as morally superior to the parliamentarians 
added to the loss of credibility in the BLP, which grew steadily into a maelstrom 
over the next six weeks. On 19 April, Ron Hayward, general secretary of the BLP, 
criticised the decision to fulfil the contracts at the Scottish Trades Union Congress 
(STUC).81 Despite an attempt by Callaghan to calm the Chile storm at the party’s 
National Executive, the radical left thought he was ‘pussyfooting’.82
One commentator observed that ‘the Government and the party have decided to 
go their separate ways’.83 The Cabinet and the Government seemed to separate 
too: more than 100 BLP MPs had signed the motion against delivery of vessels.84 
The Times noted: ‘Some ministers say frankly that differences within the 
Administration, the Parliamentary Labour Party, and the trade union movement 
over supplying Chile with arms are creating the most serious difficulties since 
Mr Wilson formed his Government.’85
By 2 May, the tension within the PLP was taut, Wilson was receiving pressure 
in Parliament from the Tory leader, Edward Heath, and embattled Chancellor 
Callaghan lashed out at various MPs in the left-wing Tribune Group, accusing 
them of muttering and smirking at him while he spoke.86 On 6 May thousands 
of ‘banner waving demonstrators’ walked from Hyde Park to Downing Street 
demanding the cancellation of contracts. Stan Newens MP spoke against the 
Government’s decision at the rally.87 Three days later, Tony Benn, Secretary of 
State for Industry, along with Judith Hart, Ian Mikardo, Michael Foot and Joan 
Lestor, added their voices to the dissent surrounding the Government’s decision 
at an International Committee meeting.88 
80 Chile Defence Committee, Glasgow Chile Bulletin Number One.
81 The feeling at the BLP, which ran out of offices in Transport House (owned by TGWU), was not friendly 
towards the PLP. Hayward said that the BLP ‘would do well to remember whence it came and where a great 
deal of its support lay: namely, in the trade union movement’. Alan Hamilton, ‘Mr Hayward Rebukes Cabinet 
on Chile Ships’, The Times, 19 April 1974.
82 Chile Defence Committee, Glasgow Chile Bulletin Number One. In reply, on 24 April 1974, Callaghan asked 
for leave of the seat of chairman at the BLP National Executive Committee to address the meeting. He was 
‘very mild’ about Chile, but Castle believed he calmed the trade union contingent and the left on the National 
Executive Committee. Castle, The Castle Diaries, 87.
83 This was particularly bad news for the CSC, whose influence on the PLP was much weaker than within 
the BLP. ‘Ministers Accused of Retreat on Chile’, The Times, 23 May 1974.
84 Kinnock and Flannery gathered 160 signatures on their early day motion against the export licences. It 
came to light immediately after the announcement that the engine repairs had still not been paid. CSC Annual 
Report, 1978. Stated as 140 signatures in: Affiliates’ Newsletter no. 29, July 23rd 1978, CSC, CSC/1/21, LHASC, 
Manchester. 
85 ‘Blocking of Arms for Chile Beset by Legal Difficulties’, The Times, 17 May 1974. See also: Castle, The 
Castle Diaries, 86.
86 Heath and Wilson exchanged words in Parliament in May 1974 over the East Kilbride issue. ‘Heath 
Accused Wilson of a “further capitulation to his left wing”, and Wilson retaliated by saying that Heath had 
a “lickspittle attitude” to the Pinochet regime.’ MacKay, ‘The Scot Who Humbled Pinochet Tells His Story’; 
Hatfield, ‘Callaghan Rebuke over Warships’.
87 Staff Reporter, ‘Marchers Protest over Arms Sale to Chile’, The Times, 6 May 1974.
88 Our Political Staff, ‘Mr Benn Joins Attack on Sale of Warships’, The Times, 9 May 1974.
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Despite all of the turmoil, dissent and temper tantrums that further undermined 
the unity of the party, Wilson and Callaghan stuck to the decision: the contracts 
would be fulfilled, but no new contracts entered into. By enforcing the execution 
of the contracts, the Government had opened itself up to attack internally and 
externally. The CSC’s campaign on violence in Chile and the importance of 
cutting arms and aid had created such a climate of moral authority that the BLP’s 
wellbeing was endangered. Work on the frigates and submarines would take 
several years to complete. In one sense, every minute of those years represented 
a failure of the labour movement and a ‘betrayal of the Chilean people’, as well 
as of the BLP.89 Despite this, Barbara Castle was confident of government support 
on the Hawker Hunter boycott as distinct from the frigates and submarines, 
because the RREK was a grassroots action.90 
Figure 4.2 Michael Foot, Joan Lestor and Tony Benn chase down 
Callaghan with the Chile football.
Source: Nicholas Garland, Daily Telegraph, 17 May 1974, © Telegraph Media Group Limited 1974, The 
British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent, <www.cartoons.ac.uk>.
It was not to be so. The Government asked the AUEW leaders to work the engines 
(despite it being directly contrary to the TUC and BLP conference resolutions) 
because the engines were the property of the Chilean Government. Having them 
in the factory apparently delayed the cancellation of the maintenance contract, 
89 Bill Spiers, ‘Frigates Deal a “Betrayal” of Chilean People’, Tribune [UK], 19 April 1974.
90 Castle, The Castle Diaries, 86.
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and the Government wanted to rid itself of further political embarrassment.91 
With this sort of attitude from the Government, Rolls Royce was then able to put 
pressure on the AUEW to lift the ban.92 Scanlon received various well-argued 
letters from Sir William Nield, deputy chairman of Rolls Royce, doing just this. 
Nield also forwarded the letters to John Boyd for his attention. 
Boyd was a right-wing member of the AUEW Executive and pivotal at some 
stages of the boycott.93 He was a prominent teetotaller, a ‘tuba playing’ 
Salvation Army member, who, at that point, was the AUEW National Executive 
Committee member for Scotland.94 Boyd’s involvement at this critical juncture 
of the East Kilbride Chile boycott policy was indicative of both a swing towards 
the right wing of the union (it was immediately before a right-wing swing in the 
1975 AUEW elections when Scanlon was looking ill) and apathy on this issue 
within the hierarchy. Boyd undoubtedly had a large impact on the events that 
followed.95 Boyd himself was not openly against Chile solidarity, but perhaps 
was against direct industrial action for external political causes such as that 
taken at Rolls Royce East Kilbride.
At a meeting in early September 1974, the AUEW Executive decided to consider 
ways to settle the ‘dispute’ only months after agreeing to support the boycott 
(after the Government had asked the AUEW to work the engines).96 Here the 
structure and rules of the unions played a crucial role. ‘The executive may run 
into some trouble’, commented the Telegraph’s industrial correspondent, ‘for 
East Kilbride workers had operated the ban unofficially for two months before 
getting official backing’.97 The backlash from members and solidarity interests 
came quickly.
91 Angela Singer, ‘RAF Denies any Involvement in Removal of Chile Aero-Engines’, Guardian [Manchester], 
29 August 1978, 24.
92 Situation Report, 12 noon: Tuesday 2nd July 1974. The threat by Rolls Royce to the union was that 
reductions in orders would lead to layoffs. MacKay, ‘The Scot Who Humbled Pinochet Tells His Story’.
93 He would go on to become the general secretary in the late 1970s. Marsh, Trade Union Handbook, 168. 
Nield sent the same letter to Jones of the TGWU, but did not provoke a jump to action. Nield had said that 
‘the Company’s goodwill with its customers, and so its capacity to maintain employment, are bound to be 
damaged’. Nield (Rolls Royce Ltd) to Scanlon (AUEW), 5th August, 1975, RREKSS.
94 Boyd had been selected as the right-wing successor to Bill Carron, who retired as president of the AUEW 
in 1968; but Boyd was defeated at election by the left-wing Scanlon. The total poll included only 130 030 of 
1 129 000 members. Scanlon won with 68 022 to Boyd’s 62 008. Scanlon’s re-election in 1970 was by an even 
larger margin. Thus there were deep ideological and personal differences between the two. In lieu of president, 
Boyd turned to the position of general secretary, ousting the pillar of the broad left caucus, Bob Wright, who 
was touted as Scanlon’s successor. Milligan, The New Barons, 123; Edelstein and Warner, Comparative Union 
Democracy, 311; Jim Higgins, ‘AUEW Election’, Spectator, 1975; Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 55.
95 Nield (Rolls Royce Ltd) to Scanlon (AUEW), 22nd August, 1974, RREKSS; Minutes. Meeting of Executive 
Council, held in General Office, on the 31st August, 1974 at 12.45 p.m., Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
MSS.259/AEU/1/1/216, MRC, UW, Coventry.
96 As early as September 1974, Scanlon wrote that the AUEW Executive Council could see no reason why 
the members should not work to facilitate the service of civilian aircraft for Chile: Scanlon to Milligan, 10th 
September, 1974, RREKSS.
97 ‘Rolls-Royce Nears Deal on “Blacked” Chile Jets’.
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The AUEW Executive Committee met on 1 October 1974 to discuss the 
correspondence from branches which were concerned about the expected 
decision to withdraw support for the boycott.98 Significantly, all the branches 
were in support of continuing the boycott. Further, in the interim, Chilean trade 
unionists in exile Luis Figueroa, Humberto Elgueta and Anibal Palma had met 
with the AUEW Executive, which had expressed its sympathy with the Chilean 
cause. But their feelings of sympathy or solidarity did not override the politics 
at play within, and perhaps the economic imperatives of, the executive. Trying 
to fathom interactions in the spartan and opaque executive minutes is difficult, 
but it is obvious that John Boyd stamped his authority on the situation, splitting 
the committee to his favour with a four–two majority. The engines were to be 
worked. The International Marxist Group (IMG) reacted with its usual vigour: 
‘the labour movement, and its’ leaders, allowed John Boyd and his placemen 
in the AUEW to isolate and cut down the Rolls Royce, East Kilbride, black on 
aircraft engines, the most important blacking action in Europe, without raising 
a hand to defend it.’99 
Boyd was the only protagonist in this situation whose influence and personal 
contact spanned all levels of the movement, from national to local. He secured 
the decision to work on the engines by summoning RREK convenors Lowe and 
Gillies, accompanied by Milligan (Mid Lanark district secretary), to Brighton on 
3 September 1974.100 The RREK shop stewards were chastised in retrospect for 
informing the press of the boycott before the AUEW National Executive had the 
chance to communicate with the District Committee and shop stewards. It was 
reiterated that the resolution at the 1974 National Committee was much narrower, 
and the interpretation had to be broadened in concession to the East Kilbride 
action. Boyd told the convenors how the decision to expand the resolution was 
unacceptable to other sections within the union executive as well as members 
such as those working on submarines and warships (whose boycott actions we 
will come to shortly).101 Boyd highlighted the executive’s own ministrations 
with the Government, which led to the prime minister’s statement in Parliament 
on 21 May 1974, as if this ought to be enough of an effort for Chile solidarity.102 
Boyd further emphasised the goodwill of the Rolls Royce company. 
98 The AUEW National Executive Committee’s solidarity did not, however, extend to boycotts, and few, if 
any, of the requests in the letter were taken seriously. Gatehouse to Les Dixon (AUEW), October 19 1975, CSC, 
CSC/4/2, LHASC, Manchester.
99 IMG—Scotland produced this pamphlet. Chile Solidarity—Build and Defend the Blackings, 1974, STUC, 
Tony Southall Collection, GCUA, Glasgow.
100 Probably while at the TUC congress in Blackpool. Ironically, Madame Allende attended that very 
Brighton conference; see Figure 2.3. Fighting bloody hand of Chile’s fascists by Jim Tait, RREKSS; Chile Defence 
Committee, Glasgow Chile Bulletin Number One.
101 Scanlon (AUEW) to Milligan (AUEW District Sec Mid Lanark), 4th September, 1974, RREKSS.
102 This statement included the recommendation to Rolls Royce that it give three months’ notice to the 
Chilean Government of termination of contract. Rolls Royce received written confirmation of this from Tony 
Benn. Statement to East Kilbride Works Committee: Chilean Air Force Engines, 1974, RREKSS; Fighting bloody 
hand of Chile’s fascists by Jim Tait; For Rolls Royce action on the termination see: D McLean, 2 July 1974, RREKSS.
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With that, the AUEW Executive ordered its East Kilbride members to complete 
the overhauls, ‘under the arrangements and conditions as contained in the letter 
received from Sir W. Nield’—the very one forwarded to Boyd.103 
The Glasgow Free Chile Committee said in its newsletter that the ‘Rolls Royce 
shop stewards were not impressed’.104 Lowe and Gillies refused to lift the ban, 
stating that if the AUEW wanted to rescind on their instruction to black the 
engines, they would have to issue another instruction to the whole union.105 
When the unionists returned to the factory, a letter directly instructing them to 
work the engines was waiting.106 As Somerville recalls: ‘The message from the 
executive of the [AUEW was] “Work on them” … It was a directive. If we’d said 
“no”, they [could just take] our shop stewards credentials off us.’107
The disparate attitudes to Chile solidarity between the upper hierarchy of the 
union, or at least one man who spanned the echelons of the union (Boyd), and 
the rank and file reflect the endemic disconnection between the various levels 
of such a large union. Somerville continued:
The work force: oh! We had a battle with the workforce. [But] we said 
OK, we’ll do them, but they’ll never get out of the factory … Although 
a lot of people just refused point blank … And the lad who initiated [it] 
just refused point blank ever to work on an engine [from Chile].108
Somerville said the AUEW directive ‘was a terrible letdown’,109 and even more so 
because of its timing. It was the week of the first anniversary of the coup, when 
workers from the Rolls Royce factories at East Kilbride and Hillington travelled to 
London for the huge demonstration. Solidarity was otherwise at a peak.
The engines were put together with bolts untightened and placed into crates 
(without corrosion protection) then moved into the expansive yard that 
surrounded RREK.110 Workmen painted ‘Chile’ in white on the side of the 
crates so that drivers could make no mistake, and the overseer of the yard kept 
watch.111 Dougal Gillies also kept an eye on them, as he could see the crates from 
103 Scanlon (AUEW) to Milligan (AUEW District Sec Mid Lanark), 4th September, 1974; Fighting bloody hand 
of Chile’s fascists by Jim Tait.
104 Chile Defence Committee, Glasgow Chile Bulletin Number One.
105 Somerville said to him: ‘But you’re a Salvation Army man, you’re a Christian, why are you telling us to 
do something!?’ Somerville Interview, 2007; Fighting bloody hand of Chile’s fascists by Jim Tait. Keenan tells a 
similar tale. Keenan Interview, 2008.
106 Though Scanlon signed this letter, I believe it was probably written by Boyd, who was given Nield’s 
letter to ‘deal with’.
107 Somerville Interview, 2007.
108 Ibid.
109 Somerville, in MacKay, ‘The Scot Who Humbled Pinochet Tells His Story’.
110 Somerville Interview, 2007.
111 Ibid.; Move to End Chile ban, Glasgow Herald, 19/8/76, CSC, CSC/15/1, LHASC, Manchester.
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his house across a field.112 The ‘bitter disappointment and disgust’ experienced 
by the workforce at East Kilbride were felt across the country and many wrote 
to the shop stewards about this.113 A supporter wrote: ‘if General Pinochet does 
get his engines back I hope they are so rusty as to be useless.’114 
The AUEW leadership was happy to wipe its hands of the affair, stating that 
it was now a problem that concerned the TGWU and Rolls Royce.115 In its 
correspondence with affiliates and local committees, the CSC did not mention 
the pressure applied by the AUEW on the rank and file at East Kilbride. They 
dared not interfere with union politics directly, and could not afford to lose the 
support of the AUEW at the national level.116 The CSC had courted the AUEW at 
all its levels: nationally for the political stability and money, and at the grassroots 
level, where direct action could take place. Despite these efforts, the CSC could 
do nothing to control the internal policy and politicking of regime and procedure 
change such as that which occurred in the AUEW in 1975. The CSC never had 
high-level personal support in the AUEW as it did in the TGWU (with Kitson 
and Jones among others). Moreover, the CSC could not rely on broad left/right 
voting groups in the AUEW Executive Committee. Such partisan splits did not 
necessarily always function along the obvious dividing lines. As Higgins said, 
‘like most other spheres of endeavour, our union hierarchs are often motivated 
by personal rivalry and antipathy as much as ideological differences’.117 Even if 
Scanlon had wished to continue the boycott, his power was limited and was, it 
seemed, diminishing.
Paradoxically, despite previously pressuring the AUEW to work the engines, 
the Government withdrew the export licences in 1975 using further atrocities in 
Chile as a justification.118 The inconsistencies within the PLP/BLP decisions were 
symptomatic of a split leadership between its sections and the sheer bulk of its 
organisation. Immediately after the engine export licences were withdrawn, four 
of the engines were secretly moved and taken to a warehouse in Paisley.119 It took 
three weeks for activists to find them despite their proximity to East Kilbride. 
The agents of the Chilean junta were Kuehne & Nagle of Hayes, Middlesex.120 
The TGWU sprang into action, as reported by Alex Kitson in 1975:
112 GCUA, ‘Chile and Scotland’.
113 Chile Fights29 (London: CSC [Chile Lucha], 1978); Howden (AUEW Glasgow) to RRSSEK, 5-2-75, RREKSS. 
114 Francis to RRSSEK, 6th August 1978, RREKSS.
115 Milligan (AUEW ES District Secretary) to Lowe, 13th August, 1975, RREKSS.
116 See, for example, the unspecific language: ‘Eventually such pressure was exerted that the men were 
forced to carry out the repair work for which the engines had been sent.’ Affiliates’ Newsletter no. 29, July 
23rd 1978, CSC, CSC/1/21, LHASC, Manchester. Furthermore, the CPGB, which had representatives in most 
organising positions of the CSC, was very wary of using industrial tactics. Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern 
Britain, 55.
117 Higgins, ‘AUEW Election’.
118 Fighting bloody hand of Chile’s fascists by Jim Tait.
119 Ibid. Beckett says they were taken to a ‘less squeamish plant in Paisley’. Andy Beckett, Pinochet in 
Piccadilly: Britain and Chile’s Hidden History (London: Faber & Faber, 2002), 151–2.
120 Lowe to McIntyre (Rosyth Dockyard Workers), 29.3.76, RREKSS; Nield (Rolls Royce Ltd) to Scanlon 
(AUEW), 5th August, 1975.
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We have told the haulier who had them that if he attempts to move them 
from that warehouse then we will take the necessary action against him 
in other spheres to ensure that it interferes with his business, and these 
engines will lie there until they rot and they will not be worth anything 
by the time they are released.121 
Despite the threat, the ‘four engines got away, and eventually reached Chile’.122 
Four remained in the RREK factory. 
The crates sat in the yard at RREK, exposed to the inclement Scottish weather, 
while in London, Conservative MP Edward Taylor, whose seat was in Glasgow, 
called on the Government to stop its ‘conspiracy of silence’ on the Rolls Royce 
matter. In a sarcastic tone, he endeavoured to embarrass the Foreign Secretary, 
Tony Crosland, into convincing Jack Jones to lift the ban. He said, ‘as Mr 
Jones is always so anxious to tell the Government how to run the country the 
Government ought now to ask him if anything can be done’.123 Before this 
comment, in long and rousing speeches at the TUC-organised conference for 
Chile in 1975, Jones had committed himself and the TUC to Chile solidarity. He 
said, ‘if we all stand together we shall win in this great cause’.124 It was clear 
Jack Jones thought something could be done, even if it was not what Taylor 
had in mind.
All the while, the engines sat in their crates in the yard next to the workers who 
ran past during their informal lunchtime soccer matches. In 1977 management 
asked the workers to take the engines back into the factory to work them after 
the indicators showed severe corrosion.125 The workers refused. They were 
mostly AUEW members.126 For the most part, however, the maintenance of the 
boycott now rested in the hands of the TGWU workers, and their union had 
taken an entirely different tack with Chile solidarity.
The TGWU was the biggest union in the United Kingdom, with more than two 
million members in the mid 1970s.127 The TGWU was similar to the AUEW in that 
its founding principle was to allow lay members to decide policy and elect those 
121 TUC, ‘Notes of Proceedings at a Conference on Chile held at Congress House’, 17.
122 Scottish Chile Defence Committee: Rolls Royce Engines for the Chilean Air-Force, 1978, RREKSS.
123 Statement to East Kilbride Works Committee: Chilean Air Force Engines; Move to End Chile Ban.
124 Jack Jones, in TUC, ‘Notes of Proceedings at a Conference on Chile held at Congress House’.
125 Rolls Royce Engines Snatched for Chilean Junta, Oxford Chile Joint Committee, MSS.21/1279, MRC, UW, 
Coventry.
126 MacKay, ‘The Scot Who Humbled Pinochet Tells His Story’; Fighting bloody hand of Chile’s fascists by 
Jim Tait; Singer, ‘RAF Denies any Involvement in Removal of Chile Aero-Engines’, 24.
127 The TGWU was divided into 11 sections: General Workers; Docks and Waterways; Commercial Services; 
Passenger Services; Public Services and Civil Air Transport; Vehicle Building and Automotive; Power and 
Engineering; Chemical, Rubber and Oil Refining; Food, Drink and Tobacco; Building, Construction and Civil 
Engineering; Administration, Clerical, Technical and Supervisory.
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who implemented it.128 The character of the TGWU was dual: representatives 
on its general executive council were elected partially on a geographic basis and 
partially according to industry group affiliation.129 Branches were the base unit 
of the union and below them shop stewards in each workplace dealt with the 
everyday wellbeing of members.130 
The 35-member TGWU General Executive Council (TGWU GEC) was the 
highest governing body of the union. It reflected the two organisational groups 
of the union in that geographical representatives were elected by ballot of the 
membership of the regions, and there was one representative from each national 
trade group committee.131
The TGWU GEC members were all part-time voluntary officeholders who 
appointed the paid national and local officers.132 The appointment, rather 
than election, of these senior officials meant the TGWU could be conceived 
as being less democratic than the AUEW. What is more, the general secretary 
was elected by ballot of all members of the union. Once elected, however, the 
general secretary held the office for life. The autocratic nature of the union 
was thus played out. Stephen Milligan has emphasised that this tendency was 
exacerbated by low member participation and high turnover of members.133 The 
general secretary was an extremely powerful position, further enhanced by the 
personal connections of Jack Jones to the BLP (see Chapter One), but this did 
not necessarily translate to control over the rank and file.
In some sectors (notably the docks and waterways) the general secretary and the 
Executive Council had very limited influence because of the strong grassroots 
leadership.134 The sheer size and oligarchic tendencies within the branch 
128 The Biennial Delegate Conference decided on policy. Delegates were nominated from branches and 
voted on by regional trade groups. This is a democratic process but very low attendance at branch meetings 
meant that elections (and branches in general) were generally controlled by an inner circle, or oligarchy. Those 
elected were nominated from or by this inner circle. As with most unions, the TGWU claimed its structure 
was ‘designed to give members on the shop floor a voice in policy-making and decision-taking’. Milligan, The 
New Barons, 216–17; Marsh, Trade Union Handbook, 347; Transport and General Workers Union National 
Executive Committee, The Story of the T.G.W.U., 7.
129 Marsh, Trade Union Handbook, 347–8.
130 In the 1970s there was a gradual shift towards more single-workplace branches (rather than multi-shop 
branches). Jack Jones saw the shift to single-shop branches occurring and tried to accelerate the process 
to decision-making at a shop steward level. He met with limited success as branch oligarchs controlled all 
communication and the shift was a threat to the power of some branch officials who had benefited from low 
voting attendance at multi-factory branch meetings. ‘Only a small percentage of union members ever attended 
trade union meetings. This meant that a small number of members, such as communists, could effectively take 
control.’ Keith Laybourn, A History of Trade Unionism c. 1770–1990 (Phoenix Mill, UK: Alan Sutton, 1992), 
177; Milligan, The New Barons, 95.
131 In 1975 ‘roughly half a dozen’ members of the Executive Council (39 members) were communists. 
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structure meant that the TGWU, despite its large staff and (it was generally 
agreed) honest leadership from Jones, was a union with a potential disjuncture 
between its hierarchy and its lay members, its leaders and its led.
Immediately following the coup, the TGWU GEC resolved to support Allende’s 
widow, and, distinct from the AUEW, planned to lobby unions in the United 
States to press their own government on the Chile issue.135 At a meeting on 5 
December, the TGWU GEC noted their commitment to a unilateral boycott (the 
TGWU only) of the Chilean junta if no other sort could be achieved.136 On 7 
June 1974, a lengthier resolution was passed calling on all TGWU members to 
support the boycott campaign on all aircraft, warships and other equipment 
that could be used by the junta against the Chilean workers.137 Early in 1976, 
the TGWU took to using the phrase ‘harassment of Chilean transport’ as was 
employed in the ITF resolutions, and this embodied the degradation of ferocity 
of the official position of the union.138 As the junta in Chile solidified its grasp on 
power, the TGWU progressively softened its stance, though it never completely 
withdrew support for direct action. 
The TGWU GEC minutes show that Chile, and Jones’s activities to do with 
Chile, were constantly discussed over many years. According to the sums listed 
in the minutes, the TGWU effectively bankrolled the CSC and Chile solidarity 
in general. Yet, in those same minutes, the RREK boycott was never specifically 
discussed. It seems that despite the organisational possibility of autocracy, the 
TGWU members at East Kilbride were free to boycott Chile as they saw fit. 
It would soon be out of their hands.
The Hamilton Sherriff Court (Scotland) ruled an injunction on the engines 
in favour of the Chileans in August 1978, stating clearly that the junta was 
the rightful owner of the boycotted engines.139 While this may not have said 
anything new, it did start things moving in favour of the junta. Rolls Royce 
135 An immediate deputation from the TGWU General Executive Committee was sent to the Foreign 
Secretary. Minutes and Record of the two-hundred and fifth statutory meeting of the general executive council 
held at transport house: First day, September 17, 1973, TGWU, MSS.126/T&G/1186/A/51, MRC, UW, Coventry.
136 Minutes and Record of the General Executive Committee, December 5, 1973, TGWU, MSS.126/
T&G/1186/A/51, MRC, UW, Coventry.
137 Minutes and Record of the General Executive Council, Fifth Day, June 7, 1974, TGWU, MSS.126/
T&G/1186/A/52, MRC, UW, Coventry.
138 This seemed to be so that they would avoid legal problems. Minutes of the General Executive Council, 
March 4, 1976, TGWU, MSS.126/T&G/1186/A/54, MRC, UW, Coventry.
139 ‘Rolls-Royce Workers Free Aero-Engines Overhauled for Chile’, The Times, 19 August 1978, 3; Singer, 
‘RAF Denies any Involvement in Removal of Chile Aero-Engines’; Ronald Faux, ‘Docks Watch by Workers for 
Chilean Engines’, The Times, 29 August 1978, 2; Fighting bloody hand of Chile’s fascists by Jim Tait.
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declared its intention to cooperate with the Chileans, who had the legal right to 
their engines.140 They posted notices around the factory stating the company’s 
legal position.141
A general election was looming at the time of the injunction.142 It became 
obvious that the export licences were the last major legal barrier to the junta’s 
repossession of the engines.143 The CSC recorded that the junta and their ‘friends’ 
ran a ‘carefully orchestrated’ campaign ‘designed to modify British Government 
policy with regard to Chile’.144 Robert Adley (a Conservative MP representing 
Christchurch and Lymington)145 suggested the Government was holding the 
engines at the ‘instigation’ of the East Kilbride Shop Stewards, implying that the 
Government was run by rank-and-file trade unionists.146 Adley said the issue 
was not the situation in Chile, but ‘nothing less than international banditry 
by the Government’.147 General Gustavo Leigh of the Chilean Air Force accused 
the Government of obstructing the return of the engines through bureaucratic 
means,148 and the less than progressive (according to the CSC) Scottish press and 
the Daily Telegraph pressured the shop stewards to give up the boycott.149 
At the factory in East Kilbride, the shop stewards received letters that 
melodramatically linked the boycott to the ‘red takeover’ and moral decay of 
the United Kingdom.150 Some were threatening, such as an anonymous and very 
poorly written note to ‘Peter Low’: ‘we are now taking steps to shut) you up ) 
about Chillie also you talk about the (IRA) we will be getting your Black Specks 
off so that you will be able to see to work so a Warning (Shut Up Low).’151
The CSC was slow to respond to the crusade for the release of the engines. They 
were preoccupied with a wave of hunger strikes and a highly choreographed 
demonstration on 9 July 1978.152 The CSC did manage to encourage a letter-writing 
campaign, aiming to stop the engines from leaving the country and halt further 
140 Chilean Air Force Engines, 1982, RREKSS.
141 ‘Rolls-Royce Workers Free Aero-Engines Overhauled for Chile’.
142 MacKay, ‘The Scot Who Humbled Pinochet Tells His Story’.
143 CSC Annual Report, 1978.
144 Ibid.
145 Adley and others were labelled ‘Tory backwoodsmen’ by the CSC. Adley had his suggestion for an 
emergency debate on the export licences rejected by the speaker. To: CSC Local cttee secs Re: March for the 
2,500—Sunday July 9th London, 1978, CSC, CSC/1/20, LHASC, Manchester; Benedict Birnberg, ‘Government 
Accused of International Banditry’, The Times, 14 June 1978, 14.
146 Birnberg, ‘Government Accused of International Banditry’, 14.
147 Ibid.
148 ‘Trade Union Stops Return of Jet Engines to Chile’, The Times, 10 June 1978, 2.
149 To: CSC Local cttee secs Re: March for the 2,500; Affiliates’ Newsletter no. 29, July 23rd 1978.
150 Robert Leckie wrote: ‘It is trade Unions that has brought this Country to its knees.’ Leckie to RRSSEK, 
29-8-78, RREKSS.
151 Peter Lowe. We are now taking steps to shut) you up), 1978, RREKSS.
152 CSC Annual Report, 1978. The march for the 2500 missing people in Chile was silent, accompanied by 
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softening of the British Government’s position on Chile.153 The inaction of the 
CSC during the attack on the boycott could point to overwork of the staff in the 
office. It might also be evidence of their confidence in the unbreakable strength 
of the boycott, which had become a symbol of the worker-based nature of the 
solidarity movement. On the other hand, perhaps the campaign could not afford 
to become embroiled in union business.
In London, facing pressure from the left and the right, Callaghan had turned 
to his legal counsel to solve the problem. Rolls Royce was the only case of 
unfulfilled work since the ban of arms to Chile was first laid down in 1974.154 
Consequently, Edmund Dell, Secretary of State for Trade, adhered to a cabinet 
subcommittee decision and the export licences were granted on 20 July 1978.155 
Rumours circulated that there would be state collusion in the removal of the 
engines, including a mobilisation of the Army.156 The Times speculated that a 
‘lightning raid’ to repossess the engines would occur.157 Callaghan simply said 
he hoped no subterfuge would prevent their removal.158
The fact that the Labour Government which withdrew their ambassador after 
British citizen Sheila Cassidy was incarcerated and tortured had now granted 
export licences for the engines caused disbelief and further disillusionment 
within the left in Britain.159 It was, said Peter Lowe, an ‘immoral act’.160 Support 
from unionists, union branches and individuals flowed to East Kilbride, some 
urging continuation of the boycott, and some supporting the workforce decision, 
whatever it be. Notable by its absence was national-level support from the TUC, 
153 Affiliates’ Newsletter no. 29, July 23rd 1978.
154 ‘R-R Engines Can Go to Chile’, The Times, 21 July 1978, 2.
155 Ibid.; Fighting bloody hand of Chile’s fascists by Jim Tait. The Cabinet had been advised that they were 
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although the STUC was strong in its encouragement.161 The TGWU leadership 
commented through Alex Kitson that the boycott was in line with the TGWU’s 
policy of ‘hostility’ to the Chilean Government and the union supported its 
rank-and-file members.162
Unionists and others offered to guard or sabotage the engines. Scottish Area 
NUM general secretary, Eric Clarke, wrote to the shop stewards saying: ‘You are 
not alone—keep up the resistance and if there is anything we can do, morally or 
physically to help, please do not hesitate to ask.’163 
‘The final hurdle’ in relation to the repossession of the engines was in the hands 
of the rank and file in East Kilbride.164 The pressure caused the RREK Shop 
Stewards to seek legal advice from solicitor Peter T. McCann and the learned 
senior counsel Charles MacArthur QC.165 Any picket, the advice argued, could 
be viewed as criticism of the Hamilton court and therefore could be counted as 
contempt.166 Refusing to obey an order could end in dismissal, but contempt of 
court could mean a jail sentence.167
161 It is very likely the Glasgow Chile Defence Committee’s persistence, along with its connections within 
the communist party, had an affect on STUC attention on Chile. The Scottish unions were led by the Scottish 
Trades Union Council (STUC), which consistently passed strong anti-junta resolutions. Large sections of the 
STUC annual report were dedicated to Chile. Scottish solidarity was perhaps the strongest of all in Britain. 
One of the largest campaigns was over soccer. Chile Defence Committee, ‘Resolution to Glasgow Chile Defence 
Committee A.G.M’; Scottish Trades Union Congress Seventy Eighth Annual Report (1975), STUC Annual 
Reports, GCUA, Glasgow; Milne (STUC) circular, 16 January 1976, STUC, STUCA 507/1, GCUA, Glasgow; 
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In August 1978 a 75-minute meeting of 1500 workers from RREK decided they 
would not impede the removal of the engines.168 They unanimously passed the 
resolution that ‘we refuse to co-operate in the removal of the Chile engines from 
the factory’.169 Dougald Gillies and Peter Lowe, the convenors, said the men 
would not break the law. If they did so they would be ‘reducing [themselves] 
to the level of the thugs in Chile’.170 A handwritten note on the back of the 
solicitor’s advice revealed a two-part contingency plan:
1) Refuse to cooperate in the removal of the Chile engines from the 
factory
2) [In] the event of anyone attempting to remove the Chile engines 
from the factory, we call an immediate stoppage of work and a protest 
demonstration.171
The workers at East Kilbride were never able to put the plan into action.
As was customary at the time, all the factory workers would take their annual 
three-week holiday at one time. The whole place was basically deserted. John 
Keenan, shop steward, along with maintenance staff were the only ones who 
remained on duty during the period. 
But they were at home in bed when at 4 am on Saturday, 26 August 1978, two 
lorries accompanied by the sheriff signed in at the gate of the East Kilbride Rolls 
Royce Factory.172 Management representatives were woken up and called to the 
factory to check the documents. It took two hours to load the engines onto the 
lorries, as together the engines weighed 6 t and required special equipment and 
skills to manoeuvre.173 The lorries had false numberplates and fictitious names 
painted on their sides: ‘Harvey’s Ltd’.174 After they drove off into the early dawn 
of summer, all that remained was a ‘neatly swept’ gap where the Chilean engines 
had stood for years. 
168 The Chilean authorities had been negotiating to get the engines for at least a year before this. They also 
renegotiated the contract with Rolls Royce, releasing the company from obligations to deliver the engines. 
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Figure 4.3 Oxford Joint Chile Committee campaign flyer.
Source: Rolls Royce Engines Snatched for Chilean Junta.
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Union officials were furious.175 Lowe bitterly complained that ‘there is nothing 
we can do now that the engines have already left the factory. We can only hope 
that our fellow trade unionists everywhere else will take up the cudgels on 
behalf of the people of Chile.’176
With the engines off Rolls Royce property, the company (like the national union 
leaders) washed its hands of the whole affair.177 The removal was conducted 
within the law, while any agreement on the use of union labour within the 
factory was suspended in the presence of a sheriff with a court order.178
After the boycott ended, the shop stewards received waves of grateful letters 
and commiserations.179 Cornejo, CUT representative in Britain, wrote to the 
Rolls Royce East Kilbride Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee, on behalf of the 
trade union movement of Chile:
You[r] actions have become one of the most powerful symbols of the 
International Solidarity Movement and all Chilean Trade Unionists both 
inside Chile and in exile, salute you. 
We look forward to the day when we can greet your representatives in 
a free Chile.180
175 Faux, ‘Docks Watch by Workers for Chilean Engines’, 2; Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile Solidarity 
Campaign: Annual Report, 1978; Affiliates’ Newsletter no. 29, July 23rd 1978; Reg. numbers of Lorries … 1978, 
RREKSS.
176 Affiliates’ Newsletter 57, December, 1982, CSC, CSC/44/6, LHASC, Manchester. Also quoted in Singer, 
‘RAF Denies any Involvement in Removal of Chile Aero-Engines’. Martin Flannery, MP for Sheffield 
Hillsborough and Secretary of the PLP Chile Group, said the disappearance of the engines was ‘moonlight 
smuggling’ and he hoped the Government played no part in it. Glasgow Provost, Peter McKennar, aided the 
investigation of where the engines went. One engine was rumoured to have appeared in Hillingdon in the 
south. Empty crates similar to those that housed the engines were found in the Princes Dock in Glasgow. 
Dugald Gillies theorised that they were dropped into the Atlantic Ocean. Accusations that the engines were 
taken to the Brize Norton Base of the RAF were dismissed by RAF representatives. Gatehouse noted that 
if they were taken to a RAF base it would indicate that the Chilean Air Force had been granted landing 
permission to pick them up. McCann, on behalf of the RREKSS, lodged a complaint with Strathclyde Police 
about the use of false numberplates, which would be in breach of the road traffic act. Their first inquiries were 
politely rebuffed by the police, and McCann had to insist on the illegal nature of the false numberplates for 
them to investigate further. His inquiries continued, until finally hitting a wall (despite having Neil Kinnock 
making inquiries as well). The Crown Agent replied that there was no evidence of any offence. Singer, ‘RAF 
Denies any Involvement in Removal of Chile Aero-Engines’, 24; Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile Solidarity 
Campaign: Annual Report, 1978; ‘Chile Engine Crates Found’, Morning Star, 16 August 1974; Somerville 
Interview, 2007; Hamill (Chief Constable Strathclyde Police) to McCann (Solicitor) 13 September 1978, RREKSS; 
O’Donnell (Crown Agent) to McCann (Solicitors) 10 April 1979, RREKSS; Singer, ‘Mystery Clouds Movement of 
Chile Engines’; Sill (Strathclyde Police) to RRSSC, 23 March 1979, RREKSS; To the Chief Constable Strathclyde 
Police, 6th September, 1978, RREKSS.
177 ‘Chileans Reclaim “Blacked” Rolls-Royce Engines’, The Times, 28 August 1978, 2.
178 Faux, ‘Docks Watch by Workers for Chilean Engines’; Affiliates’ Newsletter no. 29, July 23rd 1978.
179 The Chilean Committee of Norwich wrote to the ‘courageous union’: ‘Chilean unionists and workers will 
never forget your solidarity.’ Chilean committee of Norwich to RRSSEK, 6 Sept 78, RREKSS.
180 Cornejo (CUT) to RRSSEK, 18.8.78, RREKSS.
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It was acutely obvious that the engines had become an emblem for the cause. 
Jim Tait expressed it thus:
The length the Chile regime went to has more to do with capturing 
world-wide prestige than four corroded jet engines.
It is an indication of how important these machines are, not as hunks of 
metal but as symbols of the struggle of progress against fascism in Chile 
itself.181
One leaflet stated that ‘by allowing the engines to be moved the Labour 
Government has sold the trades unionists down the river’.182 
It did so in more ways than one. 
As has already been noted, the Labour Government successfully stopped new 
contracts for a time, but it soon fell to trade unions to stop the delivery of the 
warships for Chile. Most of the vessels had been ordered well before Allende was 
elected, but were to be delivered into the arms of the new military government.183 
As already observed, in 1974 the AUEW had resolved to stop frigates and 
submarines for Chile.184 Jimmy McCallum of AUEW TASS185 had argued that 
‘[t]he only time frigates have been used was when they bombarded the port of 
Valparaiso’—the first city to fall in the coup. ‘The ships have been used since 
then as prisons and floating torture chambers for trade unionists.’186
It was noted furthermore by the TUC that ‘a substantial proportion’ of Chile’s 
population lived within range of the guns on these ships; it gave the ‘Chilean 
navy an unusual internal security capability’.187 A CSC brief further confirmed 
the nature of Chile and Britain’s military equipment trading relationship: ‘The 
Chilean Navy and Air Force are seriously dependent upon Britain for their 
continuing capacity to wage both internal and external war.’188
And yet, how the vessels were put to use was not necessarily the strongest 
factor for or against a boycott. 
181 Fighting bloody hand of Chile’s fascists by Jim Tait. ‘Nevertheless, we did our bit. The blacking lit a 
beacon of international solidarity for the people of Chile.’ Somerville, in MacKay, ‘The Scot Who Humbled 
Pinochet Tells His Story’.
182 Rolls Royce Engines Snatched for Chilean Junta.
183 ‘Open File’, Guardian [Manchester], 3 October 1973.
184 AUEW Journal December 1973: Abstract Report of Council Proceedings, Amalgamated Engineering 
Union, MSS.259/AEU/4/6/53, MRC, UW, Coventry.
185 McCallum was the TASS office convenor at John Brown Engineering, Clydebank.
186 A trade unionist’s guide to the Chile issue.
187 Arms for Chile 1974, TUC [BLP International Department], MSS.292D/936.1/2, MRC, UW, Coventry.
188 Brief (29 April 1974) Britain and Chile, CSC, CSC/15/1, LHASC, Manchester.
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Figure 4.5 A CSC poster on the submarines Hyatt and O’Brien.
Source: Poster: The Chilean people ask Stop the Subs, 1976, CSC, CSC/44/1, LHASC, Manchester.
No Truck with the Chilean Junta!
148
Take the example of two submarines called O’Brien and Hyatt that were being 
built at Scott Lithgow on the Clyde.189 These submarines were due to be handed 
over to the Chileans in April and October 1974. On 26 September 1973, the wife of 
the Chilean naval attaché, who had just evicted Ambassador Alvaro Bunster from 
the Embassy in London, travelled to Scott Lithgow’s Cartsburn Yard (Greenock) 
to launch the vessels.190 Inside the yard, trade unionists boycotted the launch 
and outside there was a demonstration organised by local labour councillors.191 
Would their initial reaction translate into sustained action?
The shipbuilding industry has vastly different work practices than the engine 
factory. Workers have one vessel to work on for a very long period (months 
at least, often years). Stopping work on that ship for political reasons would 
mean stopping work indefinitely. The editor of the Guardian commented in 
1973 that ‘union leaders are now faced with the bitter dilemma of not wanting 
to work on ships for the Junta but also not wanting to deprive their lads of the 
needed employment’.192
After the initial, symbolic protest, AUEW members continued to work on the 
submarines.193 In fact, in May 1974 the 500 engineers at Scott Lithgow voted to 
go against the AUEW EC decision to stop work on warships to Chile.194 They 
would work the ships. 
John Teegan, shop steward at the yard, said the decision was reached 
unanimously, partly because of loyalty to the firm, but also because blacking 
the submarines would put ‘hundreds of men out of work’.195 It would directly 
impact the industrial conditions of the unionists.196 The CSC office released a 
statement: ‘The workers obviously thought blacking the two submarines being 
built would lead to redundancies. As a similar decision on Tyneside proved, 
many workers share this fear.’197
189 Also on the Clyde, two Leander Class Frigates called Condell and Lynch were being built at Yarrows. 
These were armed with Seacat missiles and helicopters. The frigates were due to be delivered in December 
1973–January 1974. ‘Open File’.
190 For further information on the submarines: John McKinlay, ‘Chile Pays Debts to Get Clyde Sub’, 
Glasgow Herald, 27 August 1976; John McKinlay, ‘Chile Wants More Ships from Britain’, Glasgow Herald, 
28 August 1976.
191 ‘Chile Winds’, Guardian [Manchester], 15 November 1973.
192 ‘Chile Waves’, Guardian [Manchester], 4 October 1973.
193 ‘Engineers Stop Work on Frigate for Chile’, The Times, 14 May 1974, 1.
194 ‘Engineers Defy Call to Stop Work on Chile Warships’, The Times, 16 May 1974.
195 Ibid.
196 Despite Gavin Laird and Ian McKee (district secretary) talking to the men, they still decided to ignore 
the AUEW Executive Committee’s decision. Gavin Laird, the Scottish regional officer of the AUEW, said there 
was no real chance of the men facing discipline for not following the AUEW Executive Committee order. Ibid. 
The NUS made similar statements about the men who disobeyed the National Executive Committee order.
197 A trade unionist’s guide to the Chile issue.
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On the Tyne at Swan Hunter’s Wallsend dry-dock, a destroyer called Almirante 
Williams was undergoing a refit.198 AUEW workers continued working on her 
also, despite the black-ban directive of their union’s leadership. After she was 
launched, however, she soon appeared at Rosyth to load ammunition and stores. 
While there, she was blacked by TGWU workers, who eventually gave in and 
loaded minimal stores and water. They then warned other TGWU port workers 
that she would surely berth looking to load ammunition. Almirante Williams 
later appeared for trials in Portsmouth, where she was blacked by the AUEW. 
The AUEW Portsmouth district secretary, Rory McCarthy, was reported as 
saying that ‘the feeling among his members was so strong that they had felt like 
sinking the ship, which was, after all, what they had done to the fascists’ ships 
during the Second World War’.199 
So, why do some unionists boycott, and others do not?200
The factor with the strongest influence is economics. Certainly, as Julian 
Amery MP put it, if Britain failed to supply the frigates and submarines the 
Government would be responsible for £50 million and the private firms would 
lose £10 million. More pertinently, he said the naval vessels ordered from Britain 
over the next two years were primarily from the Latin American market, and 
‘there would be serious repercussions from other countries if we failed to fulfil 
the Chilean contract affecting future employment’.201 The prospect of job losses 
in the present and the future was of high importance when deciding whether 
to take action. Where action occurred it stemmed from radical individuals or 
groups in workplaces and almost exclusively where the sustainability of jobs 
and working conditions was not negatively impacted. 
There is an exception to this: the pinnacle of the NUS exhibition of solidarity, 
when 600 unemployed seamen in Liverpool refused to sign on to Pacific Steam 
Navigation Company ships in 1975–76. It was not a perfect seal, stopping trade 
through the port as other NUS members and seamen sailed other ships to Chile 
in this time. Moreover, the men eventually sailed with the company when 
economic pressure became too great;202 but regardless of its faults, this truly is 
an exception to the rule.
198 Another destroyer, Almirante Riveros, was there along with it.
199 The Chile Monitor no. 3, 1974, CSC, CSC/7/3, LHASC, Manchester.
200 Other actions on Chilean vessels include: 18 engineers walking off the frigate Lynch at Yarrows, 13 May 
1974; a TGWU black at Rosyth in February 1974; Weirs Pumps in Glasgow blacked pumps for warships; and 
in 1976 the workers at Yarrow (Clydeside) blacked propeller shafts for Chilean vessels. The management at the 
firm then moved the shafts across Scotland to Rosyth, where TGWU workers promptly blacked them. CSC 
Executive Committee: Minutes of the meeting held at Liberation on February 5, 1974; ‘Engineers Stop Work on 
Frigate for Chile’, The Times, 14 May 1974; Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile and the British Labour Movement; 
CSC-Exec 26.8.76 Minutes, CSC, CSC/1/10, LHASC, Manchester.
201 Minutes of Executive Council. 7th February, 1974, Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Unions, MSS.259/CSEU/1/1/10, MRC, UW, Coventry.
202 To All British Seamen: Support your Executive Council, 1975, CSC, CSC/28/6, LHASC, Manchester.
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The boycott or lack of boycott against Chilean interests in Scotland enables 
various conclusions to be drawn. The implementation of direct action for remote 
political gain is dependent on a number of factors. The first is opportunity. 
Boycotts are opportunistic in the sense that a product must be present for 
the action to occur. While Brian Nicholson may have had influence on the 
London docks, without any Chilean trade passing through, he would only be 
able to spout rhetoric. Second, for some, ideology or morality was an obvious 
motivation: these ideas could bind a multifaceted political workforce in a 
coherent manner, leading to worker action. Third, union democracy and union 
structure could affect the chance of direct action occurring. The attitude of the 
union leadership towards rank-and-file actions and the penalties implicit in 
disobeying the union’s rules influenced the use of direct action. Decisions taken 
at a national level often highlighted the disconnection between the rank and 
file and the national office due to the cumbersome structures of unions. Fourth, 
individuals who had the ability to exploit opportunities, such as John Boyd of 
the AUEW, could affect the course of boycotts. Activists at ground level were 
powerless to stop his political manipulation at the national level.203 
But when all other factors are stripped away, the final and most important 
factor influencing direct action for political gain has already been outlined: the 
economic wellbeing of members. The direct economic impact on those who had 
tools in their hands influenced their action. Ian Schmutte has stated: ‘unions 
choose these activities, and indeed often choose not to act at the international 
scale for their own particular strategic and tactical reasons.’204 That is, 
international action can be contingent on other pressures on union resources 
and risk to other union aims. 
The RREK workers found themselves in a unique situation: they had a 
legitimate material to boycott and, in doing so, they would not cause major 
economic strife for themselves, their company or the nation. The blacking of 
the eight engines posed no threat to jobs at the factory. The loss of the Chilean 
contract alone would not produce substantial economic stress to Rolls Royce 
or the nation or even the loss of hours for the workers. On the other hand, the 
work (or perhaps the failure to stop work) of the engineers on the boats and 
submarines indicated that the economic loss to workers overrode ideology or 
moral commitment to cause. 
203 It has been difficult to reconstruct in any detail what occurred in terms of the submarine and frigate 
boycott. Even Scottish activists at the time do not know the exact details. For example, Diane Dixon said 
‘despite the fact [it was in the] east of Scotland, I couldn’t say I ever knew what the origins of it were … I don’t 
know, and I’d be making it up if I tried to tell you’. Diane Dixon, Interview by Ann Jones, 4 September 2007 
[hereinafter Dixon Interview, 2007]. 
204 Schmutte, ‘International Union Activity’, 10.
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Not surprisingly, for direct action to occur in support of a remote political 
motive, the ‘bread and butter’ of unionists must not be threatened.
Figure 4.6 Thatcher and Pinochet discuss fighter jets.





5. Opening doors for Chile: Strategic 
individuals and networks 
Steve Cooper doesn’t fit the present-day image of a man involved in radical politics. 
He didn’t in 1973 either. 
He was forty-five years old with a gentle disposition and gentlemanly manners. 
A full moustache offset a receding hairline, and conservative clothes didn’t give 
away his passionate interest in workers’ democracy. 
It was that interest which led him to Chile in 1973.1 Chilean political parties, 
Cooper reasoned, were free and the Allende Government was extending workers’ 
democracy and participation.2 What was going on in Chile was a ‘revolution 
in democracy’, said Cooper, and he thought that if the situation remained 
untampered with, ‘it could possibly lead to a more socialist type of society’.3 
He took a break from work and used money he had recently inherited to travel 
to Chile. While there he attended an international conference on multinational 
companies as an observer for the Amalgamated Metal Workers’ Union (AMWU) 
of Australia as well as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) collective 
of unions of Sydney. He stayed in Chile for three months, moving around 
Santiago and getting to know workers and the situation on the ground.4 
Steve Cooper was concerned about imperialism, which was one of the dominant 
themes at the time in the Australian left—a concern that was part of a tradition 
of conspiracy theories in the Australian labour movement.5 In a report on the 
conference published in the Tribune, Cooper wrote that ‘three of the most 
formidable forces in the world, the sovereign national state, the trade union 
movement, and the international socialist movement’, were the natural enemies of 
imperialism and multinationals.6 The way to combat multinationals, he continued, 
1 Interview with Steve Cooper (Chile activist, Australia), 12 October 2005 [hereinafter Cooper Interview, 
2005], copy in possession of author.
2 Cooper had researched a sort of ‘anatomy’ of transnational companies in Australia (1972). An excerpt of 
this work is: Communist Party of Australia, ‘Fighting Multinationals’, Tribune [Australia], 4–10 September 
1973. This was a popular theme in the left at the time. See, for example: Tom O’Lincoln, Into the Mainstream: 
The Decline of Australian Communism (Sydney: Stained Wattle Press, 1985), 141–2.
3 The nationalisation of copper mines also contributed to his interest.
4 ‘International Report (Meeting C.C. 4.5.73)’, (AMWU), photocopied in the notes attached to Julius Roe, 
‘Notes for Speech: 30th Anniversary’, 2003, unpublished ms, copy in possession of author; Jim Baird, ‘After 
the Coup: The Trade Union Delegation to Chile’, 2004, unpublished ms.
5 Tom Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia: A History from Flood to Ebb Tide (Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 86.
6 Steve Cooper, ‘Fighting the Transnational Companies’, Tribune [Australia], 24–30 July 1973.
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was through workers’ control. International workers of the world should 
control international organisations; Cooper called them ‘transnational socialist 
enterprises’, which would challenge multinationals.7 
Also attending the conference on multinationals in Chile was Glen Moorhead, 
federal secretary of the Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen 
(AFULE).8 Moorhead came from within the Socialist Party’s sphere of influence 
and spoke with the confidence of someone who believed he was the true 
representative of the Australian working class. On one occasion he told delegates: 
‘Although Australia is in the same hemisphere as Chile and together with New 
Zealand, Chile is our nearest eastern neighbour, there is no contact between the 
trade unions of our two countries. That situation is rectified from this moment.’9
The rhetoric of solidarity among workers, united across borders, against 
multinationals and imperialism, dominated the discussion at the conference in 
1973. This sort of rhetoric was the most common of the expressions of leftist 
internationalist sentiment in Australia. It appears, however, Moorhead did not 
know about, or didn’t want to acknowledge, the contact that had occurred 
with unionists aligned with the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) over the 
previous years. 
The two Australian participants were from different camps: Moorhead was 
aligned with the Socialist Party of Australia (SPA); Cooper was an Australian 
Labor Party (ALP) member, though his sympathies lay further to the left. The 
Cold War lingered and the conference suffered the usual problems of tension 
between the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the 
WFTU. The ICFTU did not send delegates, because they refused to be on the 
same platform as anyone from the WFTU.10 Similarly, politics got in the way of a 
British delegation as the only invitation sent was to the (relatively conservative) 
TUC, which of course declined, resulting in no participation from that country. 
The summit was like a microcosm of the problems of the solidarity movement 
that it preceded: it was grand on rhetoric, rife with factional tensions and, often 
as not, peopled by faddists. 
Despite the conference’s shortcomings, when Steve Cooper returned to Australia, 
he immediately started agitating for Chile solidarity.11
More than the liberation movements elsewhere, the Chilean case was particularly 
pertinent to Australians due to the similarities between the countries. Chile 
7 Ibid.
8 ‘Australian Speaks at Santiago’, SPA, June 1973.
9 Ibid.
10 They did, however, send representatives from their trade sections. Cooper, ‘Fighting the Transnational 
Companies’.
11 He continued agitating for many years: AMWU St George Branch to CSCP, 26-5-1975, Papers of GMM; 
Hamer, The Politics of Electoral Pressure.
5 . Opening doors for Chile: Strategic individuals and networks
157
and Australia both had long parliamentary and democratic traditions, were 
not recently colonised and their economies were dominated by mining and 
primary production. Most importantly, Allende and his UP Government had 
been democratically elected.12
When the coup occurred in September 1973, the reaction of the left in Australia 
was immediate and incredulous. Even though, as Mavis Robertson remembered, 
the Australian Government ‘never really, even at the worst of times, felt 
comfortable with the Junta’,13 in October 1973, the Whitlam Government 
recognised the new Government of Chile.14 Senator Arthur Gietzelt (a member of 
the ALP with a close relationship to the CPA) publicly declared on the television 
program This Day Tonight that he would use a petition through the Labor caucus 
to reverse the recognition of Chile.15 Whitlam ordered that no minister put his 
name to it. Steve Cooper remembered that Whitlam’s attitude was unhelpfully 
blunt: ‘the Chinese have recognised it Comrade.’16 
Politicians responded to their conscience, or as a result of their support for 
socialist internationalism, or both. Well-known MP Tom Uren was one of the 
ministers who contravened Whitlam’s order and wrote to the prime minister 
to explain: ‘There are times when I must act as an individual and this is one of 
those occasions.’17 Fifty-seven members of the ALP caucus signed the petition.18 
The Deputy Prime Minister, Lance Barnard, said the Australian Government’s 
recognition of the military government of Chile did not imply approval of their 
policies. On this flimsy premise, the Australian Government did not withdraw its 
12 Interview with Andrew Hewett (Chile, peace and student activist, Australia), 23 September 2005 
[hereinafter Hewett Interview, 2005], Notes in possession of author.
13 Interview with Mavis Robertson (feminist, peace, anti-Vietnam War, Chile and CPA activist, Australia), 6 
February 2009 [hereinafter Robertson Interview, 2009], copy in possession of author.
14 This occurred in spite of the ALP’s affiliation to the Socialist International, of which the Chilean Radical 
Party was also a member. In hindsight the recognition was ironic, as in 1975 the Whitlam Government was 
ousted by a constitutional coup. Even before that, many people were comparing Allende and Whitlam. ‘Libs 
Look to Junta: The Chilean Connection’, Tribune [Australia], 3 December 1975.
15 Forty-four members of the Labor caucus, including eight cabinet ministers, sent a telegram to the Chilean 
Ambassador in Australia, revealing their commitment to help the Chilean people regain their freedom from 
the illegal new government. Other ministers, such as Tom Uren, were also very public in their condemnation 
of the military coup. Tom Uren, Straight Left (Milsons Point, NSW: Random House Australia, 1994), 230; 
Rt Hon. Billy Snedden, ‘Whitlam Government: Want of Confidence Motion: 23 October 1973’, in Hansard 
Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), vol. 86 (1973), 2482–8; Bramble, Trade Unionism in 
Australia, 21.
16 Steve Cooper, Notes from a conversation with Ann Jones, Billy Martin (AMWU organiser, Chile activist 
1980s) and Pat Johnson (AMWU organiser of the present), 21 May 2007 [hereinafter Cooper et al. Conversation, 
2007], notes in possession of author.
17 Uren, Straight Left, 230. The ALP NSW State Council also denounced the decision. This was possibly 
Mulvihill’s influence. ‘Govt. Told: “Don’t Recognise Chile”’, Tribune [Australia], 9–15 October 1973.
18 ‘Action Against Chile is Urged’, The Australian, 11 October 1973, 10; Hon. William Charles Wentworth 
et al., ‘Adjournment: National Anthem—Health Insurance Scheme—Decentralisation—Land Transactions—
Political Parties, 25 October 1973’, in Hansard Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), vol. 86 
(1973), 2767; Prime Minister’s press conference, 16 October 1973, 000010358, Whitlam Institute, University of 
Western Sydney, Sydney.
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acknowledgment of the junta despite Whitlam’s condemnation of the coup in the 
House of Representatives.19 The ALP leader in the Senate, Lionel Murphy, said 
soon after the coup, ‘all we can do is hope that democracy is speedily restored’.20
Prime Minister Whitlam was ‘saddened’ as a democrat and a socialist by the 
coup, but in government it was business as usual.21 The ‘que sera, sera’ attitude 
was not shared by the workers of Australia. The Australian Railways Union 
(ARU), Miners Federation, Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia (WWFA), 
AMWU and Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees’ Union all condemned the 
‘bloody-handed military Junta’,22 and the Australian Government’s recognition 
of it, via telegrams sent directly to Whitlam. This is the first hint of the reservoir 
of goodwill, informed partially through ideological and humanitarian concerns, 
that could be and was accessed by the Chile solidarity cause.
In the early 1970s the left in Australia was coming to terms with a freshly split 
communist party. Those more faithful to the line of the Soviet Union had split 
off to form the Socialist Party of Australia (SPA) in 1971. Those left behind 
retained the title ‘CPA’ and found themselves able to express and explore a new, 
self-determinist ideology. The alternative ideology that emerged was labelled 
‘eurocommunism’ and it was closely intertwined with the idea of extending 
political action to support social movements (such as that opposed to the 
Vietnam War). Political pluralism and the renunciation of the Leninist party 
state were central characteristics of eurocommunism but it was the adherence 
of eurocommunists to the democratic process of the bourgeois state that was 
an obvious departure from other socialist strategies.23 Eurocommunists in 
particular believed in a broad-front approach and were attentive to the UP 
experience in Chile for that reason, as well as its attempt to travel the peaceful 
or parliamentary road.24 
19 The decision, he went on to say, was based on whether the Government was in full control of the country’s 
territories. ‘Chile Recognised but not Approved’, The Australian, 12 October 1973, 10.
20 Gustavo Martin Montenegro, ‘La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–1990: Un estudio 
histórico sobre el movimiento de solidaridad australiano durante la dictadura militar en Chile’ (Masters diss., 
University of New South Wales, 1994), 107.
21 Minister of Foreign Affairs to Scott (AMWU South Australian Branch Secretary), 21 November 1973, 
AMWU: South Australian State Council, N131/211, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Recent events in Chile, 000010659, 
Whitlam Institute, University of Western Sydney, Sydney.
22 ‘Govt. Told: “Don’t Recognise Chile”’.
23 Eurocommunism did spring, of course, from a Leninist tradition. Thompson, The Left in History, 159.
24 Ibid., 182; Chun, The British New Left, 114. It has been observed by Peter Shipley that revolutionaries are 
routinely guided by examples in other countries as well as by historical traditions, and this in part explains 
the fascination with Chile. Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 17.
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The tactic of broad alliance meant that eurocommunists moved their focus outward 
from the organised labour movement, though as we shall see, never forgot them.25 
The communist split meant the CPA was able to push to the forefront in many 
trade unions and concurrently express its ideology of the new left.26 
The 1960s and 1970s saw radical left trade unions in Australia starting to defy 
what the Burgmanns called the ‘caricatures of trade unions as bastions of 
homophobia, machismo, racism, ethnocentrism and ecological irresponsibility’ 
as the new left ideas permeated their ranks.27 Steve Cooper’s journey to 
Chile and subsequent actions are perhaps a case in point. The radical unions 
embraced new left concerns and became centres of activism on social issues from 
Aboriginal rights to the environmental impact of development.28 The growth 
in social activism outside the industrial sphere of the unions, and outside the 
orthodox objectives of a Marxist party by the CPA, locked radical unions and 
the party into a mutually reinforcing relationship.29 Union support of the Chile 
movement in the 1970s came from all sectors of the left, but consistent support 
for the Chile solidarity committees, for much of the early 1970s at least, came 
from the self-determinist sector of the left including the unions. The solidarity 
committees formed the core of the movement. 
That is not to say, however, that the SPA and Socialist Workers’ Party or others 
ignored the plight of Chileans. While many felt that the downfall of Allende 
justified their positions on non-cooperation with social democrats and their 
commitment to armed struggle, no-one rejoiced at the brutal military coup 
d’état. Almost all political parties of the left played some part in events over the 
history of the solidarity movement. Andrew Ferguson, an activist involved in the 
movement, remembered that ‘the interests of political parties did on occasions 
create tension. But with good will and focus on the incredible task of building 
solidarity, we would just overcome the tensions (that some personalities were 
probably more focused on than others).’30
In reality, this happened to differing degrees. The incompatible ideological 
positions of the CPA and SPA provided competition for ownership of issues and 
25 Chun, The British New Left, 108. This occurred in the first wave of the new left in Britain, according to 
Chun, as they believed trade unions were not revolutionary. Ibid., 73.
26 Ibid., 26.
27 Meredith Burgmann and Verity Burgmann, Green Bans, Red Union: Environmental Activism and the New 
South Wales Builders Labourers’ Federation (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1994), 121–2.
28 It is important to remember, however, that most Australians joined trade unions not because of this, 
but for the protection and improvement of their working and economic conditions. Deery, ‘Union Aims and 
Methods’, 62.
29 Burgmann and Burgmann, Green Bans, Red Union, 26.
30 Interview with Andrew Ferguson (student, Chile activist, unionist, Australia), 27 February 2009 
[hereinafter Ferguson Interview, 2009], copy in possession of author.
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also drove the participation of key activists. The SPA was dismissive of new left 
radicalism at first, which left the door ajar for CPA influence in some unions as 
well as in social movements.31 As we shall see, however, this was rapidly contested.
The Australian political arena was small in the 1970s, and the diminutive size 
of groups caused them to be less cohesive.32 There were less political party and 
union employees than in Britain and there was also a history of less reliance on 
manifestos in political parties. As Albert Metin noted of Australian labour in 
1901: it was le socialisme sans doctrines.33 Furthermore, there was less official 
communication between organisations and sometimes between members of 
separate organisations, instead replaced with friendly networks. Size meant 
that members were more flexible and less likely to stick loyally to their 
particular party line. Rather, they tended to act according to their consciences, 
as demonstrated by the previously described actions of Tom Uren. As Walker 
noted in 1952, Australian socialism was not revolutionary or ruthless, but 
motivated more by the ‘good sense and goodwill of men’, a notion supported 
in this research: political parties engaged in more political squabbling than 
in planning for a transition to socialism, but individuals found ways to work 
together notwithstanding.34 Stephen Deery concurred with these observations, 
stating that Australian socialists, especially those within the trade union 
movement, represented ‘more a moral dynamic and a set of ideals rather than 
a blueprint for a new economic and social order’.35 Prominent activist in the 
Chilean movement Mavis Robertson remembered that Australians ‘did things 
because they knew they were right, they didn’t do things because they were 
told to do them’.36 It could be said the collectivist convictions of the left fuelled 
actions based on goodwill.
The steadfast support from select trade unions formed the base of the Australian 
solidarity movement. The beginning of the Chilean dictatorship coincided with 
growth in participatory democracy and mass meetings as well as rank-and-file 
political activity in Australian unions.37 For many unions, the Chile movement 
was not their first or their only involvement with international causes at the 
time, and in this regard Chile solidarity followed precedents set by previous 
31 Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia, 53.
32 Observation of Mavis Robertson.
33 As quoted in Kenneth Walker, ‘Australia’, in Comparative Labor Movements, ed. Walter Galenson (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 1952), 232.
34 Ibid., 235. E. V. Elliot of the SUA confirmed this view when he wrote ‘sometimes we have as many 
quarrels among the left-wing as we do with the right-wing’. Political parties also fought for dominance in 
unions through the union elections, yet ironically in doing so they were actually fighting the apolitical nature 
of the majority of Australian workers rather than taking steps towards revolution. E. V. Elliott, ‘Chile: No 
Trade with Junta: Support the Resistance’, Seamen’s Journal (July–August 1977).
35 Deery, ‘Union Aims and Methods’, 62. This is supported by Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia, 86, 87.
36 Robertson Interview, 2009.
37 Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia, 38, 47, 49. 
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international campaigns.38 Unions had previously been involved in the 
solidarity drive for the Indonesian War of Independence, the Spanish Civil 
War, and against apartheid, the Greek military junta and the Vietnam War. The 
involvement in these campaigns was manifested in a manner similar to some 
actions for Chile: demonstrations, resolutions, boycotts and donations. The 
Chile solidarity movement was, however, the first sustained Australian union 
involvement in a Latin American campaign, and would go on to be one of the 
longest union commitments to an international solidarity movement. 
Despite the small number of activists on the Australian left, there was no 
shortage of solidarity groups with official-sounding names that formed in the 
years following the coup.39 The movement across Australia was constructed 
of overlapping and sometimes conflicting groups. The acronym list quickly 
becomes unmanageable, and the visual map an immense organogram or an 
‘alphabet soup’, as activist Barry Carr put it.40 The multiplication of groups in the 
movement was partly due to the scattered cities across the Australian continent, 
each tending to function independently of the others, and the distance between 
them meant there was no national united front as in Britain.
It is perhaps easy to envisage the movement as movements at a State level, 
because the States functioned differently and worked separately for much of the 
time. In some ways, this mirrors the political structure of Australia: the States 
function separately, but within a federation. It was also true more generally of 
left political parties, whose regional factions and internal coups were legendary. 
One further layer of complication of the Chile solidarity committees in Australia 
was their transient nature. Many committees and groupings did not survive 
the duration of the dictatorship, and most committees went through squalls 
and lulls in activity. Moreover, many changed their name, or were not clear 
at any one time exactly what their name was let alone its correct translation. 
The written record that was left in the wake of the multiple committees can 
be misleading. Some committees may have had a membership of fewer than 
10, with little political influence and less mobilising power. If, however, they 
had access to a photocopier or a connection to the media, their influence may 
be overestimated. It is also important to keep in mind that while the map of 
38 For example, the maritime boycott of goods to and from Chile was preceded by a boycott of the export 
of pig iron to Japan. Margo Beasley, Wharfies: A History of the WWFA (Sydney: Hallstead Press, 1996); Brian 
Fitzpatrick and Rowan Cahill, Seamen’s Union of Australia, 1872–1972: A History (Sydney: Seamen’s Union of 
Australia, 1981); Rupert Lockwood, Black Armada (Sydney: Australasian Book Society, 1975). 
39 There was also no shortage of union members. In 1975, 58 per cent of the Australian workforce was 
unionised. Jim Hagan, ‘The Australian Trade Union Movement: Context and Perspective, 1850–1980’, 
in Australian Unions: An Industrial Relations Perspective, eds Bill Ford and David Plowman (Melbourne: 
Macmillan, 1983), 51. In 1980, 63 per cent of unionists were in unions affiliated to the ALP. Deery, ‘Union 
Aims and Methods’, 88.
40 Interview with Barry Carr (Chile activist, academic, Australia), 5 March 2009 [hereinafter Carr Interview, 
2009], copy in possession of author.
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committees is complex, some participants confess to knowing only of their own 
committee. Within each city there were sometimes multiple committees, each 
drawing on their own idiosyncratic support network.41
The archival sources available for the reconstruction of Chile solidarity are 
inconsistent; often the only hints at the existence of committees in some places 
are a couple of publications or mentions of protests in newspapers.42 Tracking 
each group’s complete history would be almost impossible. This chapter, then, 
gives an impression of the character of the Australian Chile solidarity movement, 
by way of a more in-depth description of some of the groups and individuals 
who played an important part in the events of subsequent chapters. These are 
all focused on Sydney.43
This does not suggest a scale of importance, interest or complexity. The choice 
of emphasis on Sydney is due to four factors. First, the committee which was 
established in Sydney was more embedded in trade unions than in other 
Australian cities and thus has yielded more complex relations to be explored. 
Second, the trade union which gave it most support in the period 1973–78, the 
AMWU, kept excellent records that are now available to researchers. Third, the 
location of the AMWU, Seamen’s Union of Australia (SUA) and WWFA national 
offices in Sydney influenced formal union involvement in the Committee for 
Solidarity with the Chilean People (CSCP) (Sydney), which, due to the nature 
of the archived collections, is more quantifiable than in other cities. Finally, 
the green bans of the NSW Builders Labourers’ Federation (NSWBLF) had 
been running for some years by the time of the coup in Chile, which promoted 
an atmosphere of social participation in many Sydney-based unions.44 This 
impetus and ambience contributed to the pool of goodwill and led to strong 
cross-institutional involvement in the Chile movement.
The reservoir of goodwill that existed towards humanitarian and left issues 
was created in part from ideology. It was accessed by the Chile movement in 
Australia not only via organisational links, but by personal networks that 
41 While the State and local structures functioned quite separately, they did not exist in a vacuum: they 
often corresponded with each other, and received news from all over the world via travellers, friends, circulars 
and radical press. They each produced and reproduced pamphlets that made their way around the country 
and they also cooperated on some of the major events (Chapter Six). In the late 1970s there were attempts 
at a more assimilated approach to national solidarity. Notwithstanding efforts and intents, national-level 
integration remained generally cooperative but mostly symbolic. Solidarity with Chile, June/July Newsletter, 
1979, Papers of GMM; Robertson to ‘friends’ re: Inti illimani, Chile Solidarity (1976–1978), Papers of Barry 
Carr; ‘Stepping Up Chile Solidarity’, Socialist, 20 July 1977; Robertson Interview, 2009; Solidarity with Chile, 
Information Bulletin, December, 1978, Papers of GMM.
42 Montenegro reported that a fire at Casa Chile led to lost records. Montenegro, ‘La Campaña de Solidaridad 
con Chile en Australia 1973–1990’, 211. The CSCP records were accidentally disposed of by a family member 
of an activist.
43 A decision almost entirely based on source availability.
44 Burgmann and Burgmann, Green Bans, Red Union, 124, 125.
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crossed ideological lines and party loyalties. Strategic individuals with access 
to multiple organisations and levels of the labour movement were the ones who 
enabled the movement to function as it did. The reservoir of goodwill was not 
bottomless, however, and this chapter demonstrates how the factionalisation of 
the Chilean arrivals contributed negatively to the continuation of the movement.
In Sydney the post-coup Chile solidarity movement started with a stroke of 
luck. By chance, and thanks in part to the work of Steve Cooper, the CPA 
Sydney District Committee had already resolved to sponsor a demonstration in 
solidarity with Chile.45 It happened to be the day the Chilean coup occurred. 
Within hours of the military action in Chile, Sydney activists were on the street. 
After hearing the news while in a meeting, various members of the WWFA 
executive attended.46 Ominously, while there, WWFA organiser Tasnor Bull 
got into a fight with some Maoists who were, he wrote in his autobiography, 
already partaking in the dissection of the failings of the UP Government and 
blaming Allende’s death and the coup on the UP’s inability to arm the people.47 
Hundreds of activists attended the demonstration, and with the workers’ 
delegates present, the Tribune said the crowd was representative of hundreds of 
thousands of Australians. 
The speakers included many prominent union officials and radical activists: 
Laurie Aarons (CPA), Laurie Carmichael (AMWU), Leo Lenane (WWFA), Joe 
Owens (Builders Labourers), Frank O’Sullivan (Building Workers’ Industrial 
Union: BWIU), Brian McGahen (Young Communist Movement), Bill Brown (SPA), 
Malcolm Price (Communist League) and Mike Jones (Socialist Youth Alliance).48 
It was a broad front, and they were united in their shock and anger.
Directly after this protest a group of interested people went to the old boiler 
makers’ building in Castlereagh Street and formed an ad-hoc committee.49 This 
was the first of a string of gatherings that spanned the months after the coup, 
leading to the establishment of the official committee. There was much to discuss 
at these meetings: solidarity, the pros and cons of the peaceful road and possible 
support for the resistance. Accordingly, attendance was high. Soon after the 
initial gathering, 300 people attended a meeting at the Trades Hall in Goulburn 
Street, Sydney.50 The meeting was supported and arranged by members 
of the Association for International Cooperation and Disarmament, whose 
encouragement of Chile solidarity was unwavering and extremely important in 
45 For example: Cooper, ‘Fighting the Transnational Companies’; ‘Solidarity with Chile’, Tribune [Australia], 
4–10 September 1973.
46 Tas Bull, Tas Bull, An Autobiography: Life on the Waterfront (Sydney: Harper Collins, 1998), 147.
47 Ibid.
48 Speakers also included: Denis Freney (CPA), Pierina Pirisi (CPA), Jack Cambourn (Engine Drivers and 
Firemen). ‘Action against U.S. over Chile’, Tribune [Australia], 18–24 September 1973, 3. Maoists persisted in 
being a difficult presence on the movement front. ‘Chile Export Ban Stays’, Socialist, 4 June 1975.
49 Robertson Interview, 2009.
50 ‘Solidarity Meetings with Chilean Workers’, Tribune [Australia], 2–8 October 1973.
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the early stages of post-coup solidarity.51 Professor Ted Wheelwright, a member 
of the faculty at Sydney University, spoke, and joining him was Tas Bull of the 
WWFA and Steve Cooper.52
Two days after the meeting sponsored by the Association for International 
Cooperation and Disarmament (AICD), 60 people attended a meeting at which 
David Holmes of the Socialist Workers’ League (SWL) and Denis Freney of the 
Sydney District Committee CPA debated the lessons of the coup.53 Holmes said 
the failure of the Chilean experiment was due to Stalinist betrayal. He blamed 
Allende and the UP for keeping the working class in the capitalist framework. 
Freney was more delicate, but did note that the only thing that was certain was 
that a neutral military never stayed neutral when workers won control. 
The debate embodied a delineation in the Chile movement, which occurred from 
the very first protest with Tas Bull’s fisticuffs. It is a dangerous simplification to 
divide the Australian left between pro and contra armed struggle, or pro-Soviet 
as opposed to pro-eurocommunism. The division was fuzzy in reality, but the 
difference in analysis of the Chilean situation nevertheless exacerbated tension 
within the committee as it attempted to sustain a broad front. From the very first 
an obvious pattern emerged: many Australian activists used the Chilean situation 
as a pawn in the wider internecine struggle. Activists could selectively adopt 
facts to support their arguments for or against a popular front, for or against a 
revolutionary strategy. Chile could be used to garner local political capital.
Ownership of the Chile issue, and perhaps by proxy the campaign committee, 
certainly influenced the actions of factionalised individuals; but it was not the 
only motivation: much of the time, key individuals just got on with the business 
of solidarity.
The Committee of Solidarity with the Chilean People (CSCP)54 was formed at a 
meeting on 18 October 1973 that had been called to discuss solidarity options.55 
51 The building that the Association for International Cooperation and Disarmament (AICD) was based in 
was actually owned by the AMWU, which had absorbed the building after their recent amalgamation with the 
Boilermakers. It was on Castlereagh Street in Sydney and was a nucleus of solidarity and peace organisations. 
The organisations were all roughly aligned underneath the CPA eurocommunist line. In this way, the AMWU 
provided immediate infrastructure, space and photocopying to the Chile movement, and more specifically to 
one of the committees that emerged out of it.
52 Wheelwright was also involved in the AICD. See: Association for International Co-operation and 
Disarmament (Sydney), The Asian Revolution and Australia (Sydney: Times Press, 1969); Interview with James 
Levy (academic, Chile activist), 12 March 2009 [hereinafter Levy Interview, 2009], copy in possession of 
author; ‘Solidarity with the Chilean People’, Tribune [Australia], 18–24 September 1973, 12; Shane Bentley, 
‘Tas Bull (1932–2003)’, Green Left, 18 June 2003. Professor Wheelwright had been in Chile before the coup as 
well as Steve Cooper. Robertson Interview, 2009.
53 ‘Solidarity Meetings with Chilean Workers’.
54 CSCP refers to the Sydney committee unless otherwise noted. Reported in the Tribune as ‘Sydney 
Committee for Chilean Democracy’. ‘Sydney Committee for Chile’, Tribune [Australia], 23–29 October 1973, 2.
55 Other organisations which aided, or formed around, Chile solidarity included the Latin America Centre 
and Antorcha in Sydney.
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The CSCP philosophy was summed up in the sentence: ‘We will support the 
Chilean people by all means at our disposal, until democracy is once more 
restored and the monstrous Junta has answered for its bloody crimes.’56 
This was a statement that, in theory at least, the whole Australian left could 
embrace. There were 30 unionists present and of the six people elected to the 
steering committee, four had a primary affiliation to a union. The committee 
included Dr James Levy, a Latin American studies specialist from the University 
of New South Wales; Ken McLeod of the AICD; Laurie Steen of the SUA; Jack 
Baker of the Postal Clerks and Telegraphists’ Union; and the AMWU had two 
prominent members on the committee, James Baird and Greg Harrison.57 
A demonstration was proposed for 5 November, which was close to the third 
anniversary of Allende’s inauguration as president; however, the unionists on 
the committee voted against it. They argued that stop-work meetings and other 
union meetings were more productive than a demonstration.58 The domination 
of trade union representatives in the Chile solidarity movement could initially 
be perceived as controlling and powerful. 
This was, however, not necessarily the case as ongoing individual trade unionist 
involvement was mostly of an ad-hoc nature and sometimes in an unofficial 
capacity. The committee elected at that first meeting was intended to appear 
representative, and for that reason included several strategic representatives of 
unions and/or political parties. There was an understanding, however, that a 
working group (mostly different people to those on the official committee in the 
initial months) would undertake the day-to-day decisions and work.59 Those in 
that key group of workers were predominantly CPA sympathisers for the first 
five years of the campaign.
It is possible to divide the main activities of the CSCP into categories: 
publications, protests, government and parliamentary lobbying, aid to refugees, 
music concerts and cultural activities.60 This range of activities was undertaken 
in a fairly impromptu manner (not planned long term), with the aim of keeping 
Chile in the minds of Australians and prolonging the consensus of the moral 
superiority of opposition to the dictatorship that appeared after the coup.
56 ‘Sydney: Slogans in English and Spanish …’, Tribune [Australia], 18–24 December 1973, 3. Though they 
later had much more explicit aims. Montenegro, ‘La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–
1990’, 47–8.
57 NSW Committee for Solidarity with the Chilean People, November 1 1973, WWFA: Federal Office, 
N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; ‘Sydney Committee for Chile’.
58 They also argued that the demonstration would be wasted as media attention would be on the Melbourne 
Cup and the Watergate scandal. It is also possible that the date was offensive to any Maoists or SPA party 
members who may have been on the committee as they thought Allende or his broad front was the cause of 
Chile’s problems. NSW Committee for Solidarity with the Chilean People, November 1 1973. 
59 Robertson Interview, 2009.
60 These activities are explored in more detail in the next chapter.
No Truck with the Chilean Junta!
166
The mobilisation of a united front for Chile was a delicate affair. It involved 
the activation of networks based around political affiliation or acquaintance. 
The CPA/independent left bias of the activists in the working group enabled 
the CSCP to draw on the support of unions/unionists aligned to a similar view. 
But even across factional differences, activists on the CSCP did not have to try 
to motivate unionists, because, as Mavis Robertson said, people knew it was 
right to support solidarity. Letters were sent to trade unions, and most unions 
responded positively to requests for money or notional support. Robertson’s 
network of CPA and peace contacts facilitated more substantial union support 
in the form of attendance at events, speakers or delegates’ support. Unions 
were opportunistic, and would express solidarity when provided with an 
opportunity to do so.
Unions within the SPA sphere of influence, such as sections of the WWFA, SUA, 
BWIU and Firemen and Deckhands, were utilised by the campaign to a lesser 
extent in the first years. Men such as Tas Bull within the WWFA would be 
more naturally sympathetic to approaches from CPA activists. By contrast, Don 
Henderson’s SPA-based network enabled him to mobilise within the Firemen 
and Deckhands, the BWIU or the SUA. The SPA-aligned unions did take actions 
separate from the CSCP, and also sent their own representatives to international 
conferences as a none-too-subtle political gesture. Unions such as the NSWBLF, 
with its predominantly Maoist leadership and tendency to follow the Beijing 
line (anti-Allende), were even less likely to cooperate with the CSCP. 
It is important in the following chapters, then, to make a distinction between 
actions initiated by the committee, actions affiliated loosely to the committee and 
actions completely separate from the committee. As was the case with British 
solidarity, the Sydney committee did not control or have a hand in all solidarity 
activities. Certainly, many activities stemmed from the progressive trade unions. 
What impact the committee did have was due mainly to two factors: first, the 
moral consensus and pool of goodwill based in the ideology of left politics in 
Australia, and second, the mobilising power of strategic individuals from within 
the committee or connected to it.
One of the most important activists in Sydney was Mavis Robertson. Robertson 
was in Moscow at the time of the coup, at a conference of the World Congress 
of Peace Forces. When she returned, she very quickly took stock of what 
was occurring in the CPA regarding Chile and she publicly challenged the 
oversimplification of the situation facing the Chilean left.61 She was immediately 
a leading voice of solidarity.
61 Mavis Robertson, ‘Protest on Chile Claim’, Tribune [Australia], 27 November – 3 December 1973, 10. The 
Chilean Communist Party was ‘orthodox’ and followed the Moscow line faithfully. Alan Angell, Politics and 
the Labour Movement in Chile (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 86, 89.
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Figure 5.1 Mavis Robertson, 1975.
Source: Photograph from: Chile Democrático (organo oficial de la izquierda chilena en el exterior Sydney) 3, 
Marzo de 1977, from the papers of Gustavo Martin Montenegro, Canberra.
Robertson was born in 1930 and her Irish mother was undoubtedly an influence 
on her development.62 She attributed the founding of her desire to support the 
underdog to her mother, who always ‘had her eye on all the little countries’.63 
After joining the Eureka Youth League as a young woman, Robertson soon 
started writing for the CPA. It was through this organisation that she collected 
pencils for Cuba in 1960–61, her first engagement with activism with a Latin 
American theme.64 
62 Her maiden name was Moten.
63 Interview with Mavis Robertson (feminist, peace, CPA and Chile activist, Australia), 31 January 2005 
[hereinafter Robertson Interview, 2005], copy in possession of author.
64 ‘Wanted: A Million Pencils for Cuba’, Tribune [Australia], 12 July 1961.
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Robertson had always been against violence. She believed that any result born of 
violence was negative, as the act of violence itself distorted the outcome. In the 
split of the CPA in 1971, Robertson was firmly within the democratic strand of 
the party, which retained the title CPA.65 An active feminist, Robertson worked 
many hours for that cause and she was also involved in the anti-apartheid 
campaign, Vietnam solidarity and the peace and disarmament movements. She 
was a vocal and prominent member of the CPA until it disbanded.
By the time of her involvement with the Sydney Chile movement, Robertson 
was a mature woman, married with two children. Her husband, Alex Robertson, 
was also a CPA member and was editor of the Tribune for 12 years.66 The long 
involvement of Robertson and her husband with peace and disarmament 
was also shared by many prominent left activists such as Laurie Aarons, Bob 
Gould, Jim Cairns, Denis Freney, Don Hewett and Ken McLeod. The network 
of peace activists which stretched from business owners to parliamentarians 
was an invaluable resource for Robertson’s career in activism and as a strategic 
individual in the Chile movement. Her husband’s early death in 1974 caused the 
only gap in Robertson’s participation in the campaign before she moved on to 
other single-issue campaigns in the 1980s.67 
The peace movement was a common denominator between Steve Cooper 
and Robertson as well as their involvement in the Eureka Youth League as 
youngsters.68 Both were interested in a peaceful transition to socialism, and they 
had undoubtedly crossed paths at many meetings over the years. Robertson 
credits Cooper with the initiative of setting up the pre-coup solidarity 
organisation, which stemmed from his trip to Chile in early 1973. His experience 
in Chile and his absolute commitment to the cause gave him standing as a Chile 
expert in the early years of solidarity. Cooper was an ALP member in the 1970s, 
but his sympathies lay further to the left than the mainstream party.69 He 
published articles in the Tribune and talked at many CPA meetings, including a 
special one-day conference called ‘The Politics of the Chilean Revolution’.70 His 
passion, however, didn’t equal bravado. He was a ‘quiet, self effacing figure’, 
remembered Mavis Robertson.71 
65 She remained a member of the CPA until 1980.
66 Mavis Robertson, ‘Expressing Thanks’, Tribune [Australia], 16–22 April 1974.
67 The published record left in his wake centres on writing on Papua New Guinea, and he was, along with 
his wife, heavily involved in the peace movement. Alec Robertson, ‘A Communist’s New Guinea. “Essentially 
the Same … as Vietnam”’, New Guinea and Australia, The Pacific and South-East Asia 6, no. 2 (1971). Mavis 
Robertson also presented a paper at the conference: ‘The Australian Anti-War Movement and the International 
Movement’, a paper presented to the National Anti-War Conference by Mavis Robertson, 1971, 1988.0048.0128, 
Elsie Gare Collection No. 1, National Museum of Australia, Canberra.
68 The War Lovers, Steve Cooper, 1988.0048.0046, Elsie Gare Collection No. 1, National Museum of Australia, 
Canberra; Robertson Interview, 2005.
69 Cooper Interview, 2005.
70 ‘Australian Communists Look at Chile Events’, Tribune [Australia], 6–12 November 1973.
71 Robertson Interview, 2005.
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While Cooper was writing, organising and agitating behind the scenes and 
Robertson was pulling on her network of contacts, the campaign’s figurehead 
was Senator Anthony Mulvihill.72 Mulvihill was a life member of the Australian 
Railways Union, who had started his career as a shop steward at the Chullora 
railway yards. In the 1960s he was assistant general secretary of the NSW 
branch of the ALP, where he became known for representing the centre-aligned 
Catholics.73 Ron Dyer, in Mulvihill’s obituary in 2001, described his position 
within the ALP: ‘Mulvihill was always regarded as a member of the right 
wing of the ALP, now known as Centre Unity, but he described himself as a 
progressive centre liner.’74 
A keen environmentalist, Mulvihill was involved in conservation campaigns 
and in the green movement that fought for responsible planning in Sydney. 
Moreover, Mulvihill was committed to immigrant workers and immigrant 
issues and his interest and advocacy for Chilean immigrants started immediately 
after the coup.75 He promised to help clear up Chilean issues if he secured the 
chairmanship of the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council.76 
Mulvihill brought this experience and an extensive network as well as the 
resources and legitimacy that came with the title of senator along with him when 
he acted for the CSCP. Using Mulvihill as a figurehead was a similar ploy to that 
used by the British Chile Solidarity Campaign with high-profile unionist Alex 
Kitson. He may not have been a chief organiser, but having a senator’s name on 
the top of the campaign letterhead certainly did no harm. In practical terms, the 
association meant that Mulvihill was automatically receptive and active when 
the CSCP approached him on specific issues. For example, the senator issued 
various requests for explanation to the Government in 1975 about the issue of 
immigration. On top of this, Mulvihill’s centre-right alignment within the ALP 
suggested the Sydney committee was a coalition rather than a cause dominated 
by radicals. It gave authority to the campaign’s assertions of being a broad front. 
This perception made it easier and more acceptable for less politically radical 
people to participate in the movement.77 Senator Mulvihill’s relative alignment 
to the right was not a problem for the working group.78 Robertson had a history 
of working in united fronts on single issues.79 Robertson remembered that she 
72 Solidaridad con Chile: Committee for Solidarity with the Chilean People, September 20, 1979; The Trades 
and Labour Council of the ACT, Z147 box 57, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
73 Nonetheless, he was not always steadfastly centre. Uren, Straight Left, 83, 98.
74 Ron Dyer, ‘Death of Former Senator James Anthony Mulvihill’, NSW Parliament Legislative Council (8 
March 2001), 12449.
75 ‘Govt. Told: “Don’t Recognise Chile”’, 2.
76 Letter from J. A. Mulvihill to C. Fitzgibbon, August 1975, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: 
ANU, Canberra.
77 This was a similar effect as the NUM delegation report from Britain, whose less-radical delegation 
members reinforced the more radical movement.
78 Robertson Interview, 2009.
79 Cooper et al. Conversation, 2007.
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and Mulvihill ‘had worked in the past and we worked again in other things, and 
he knew that I was of the left and I knew that he was of the right, but we were 
interested in an issue and we worked together’.80
Not all political differences resulted in such peaceful working conditions. 
Chileans entering Australia found it hard to understand how such a man could 
lead the campaign.81 They were themselves heavily divided and with their 
arrival the sectarian spectrum in Sydney became confusing and crowded. 
Despite the interest on the part of Australian political parties to ‘secure a presence 
amongst the immigrant community’,82 any dissection of the UP Government or 
‘programmatic debate’ that was raised was hastily put aside, for fear of damaging 
the real aim of the campaign, which was to express unified solidarity.83 In fact, 
the debate ‘would inevitably be brought up again and again’, said Barry Carr, 
‘partly through Chileans, but … that was a particularly sensitive issue’.84
The Chileans did not initially understand that there were two Marxist parties 
in Australia. Describing divergent political views worked against the ethos of 
the unified solidarity movement. This realisation created ‘some awkwardness’, 
remembered Barry Carr.85 The dominant groups within the Chilean community, 
the communists and socialists, could not sit easily with the principal party which 
was active and supportive of the committee, the CPA, whose eurocommunist 
identity was seen as a betrayal of Moscow.86 According to Carr, it was a 
‘permanent source of tension in Melbourne’87 and this awkwardness was 
expressed through creation of the committees whose memberships were closed 
to anyone but Chileans.88
In October 1974 the Comite Chileno de Liberación (Free Chile Committee 
Sydney) was established with two of the three Martin Montenegro brothers on 
its executive. It was a Chilean immigrant committee, which focused, according 
to Gustavo Martin Montenegro, on the needs of the Chilean community;89 but 
not all Chileans joined it. Many overflowed into the CSCP or joined both. In 
80 Robertson Interview, 2009.
81 Ibid.
82 Carr Interview, 2009.
83 Against political exclusionism: For a United Front Against the Repression in Chile—Spartacist League, 
Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union of Australia: Federal Office, N133/158, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.




88 While committees closed to anyone but Chileans were created in Sydney also, they were not as long 
lasting as the Melbourne committees. The Free Chile Committee (Melbourne) and the Support Committee 
for the Chilean Resistance were groups for Chileans only. To the workers, students and people of Australia, 
Papers of GMM.
89 The division between ‘Australian’ and ‘Chilean’, or perhaps ‘local’ and ‘expat’, committees also happened 
in Melbourne. Montenegro, ‘La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–1990’, 88, 89.
5 . Opening doors for Chile: Strategic individuals and networks
171
Sydney the separation between local and expatriate communities definitely 
contributed to the growing complexity of the solidarity situation, possibly to 
the detriment of the campaign. In fact, sectarian behaviour in the political scene 
around the CSCP increased as Chileans continued to arrive.
The separate Chilean committee exemplified an emerging problem within the 
Chile movement: the separate aims of the Australians and the Chileans. Chilean 
arrivals in Australia had a difficult time separating their own internal political 
objectives and ambitions from the Australian Chile solidarity movement. 
They could not imagine that the solidarity movement was a movement for the 
expression of Australian sentiments. The CSCP became property over which 
Chilean political groupings tried to maintain authority. Robertson concluded: 
‘They came as a highly politicised grouping with their own political loyalties, 
expressed in the formation in Australia of party groups.’90 Additionally, the 
collapse of the popular front in Chile made many of them feel they would never 
be able to work together again despite visiting Chilean leaders imploring them to 
do so.91 The expatriate Chilean attitude collided with the push of CPA activists 
for broad-front solidarity.
This disjuncture between the nationalities had a profound long-term effect on 
the movement. Whereas the stated aim of many Australians was to support a 
‘free Chile’ (and later to agitate on human rights issues), Chileans agitated for a 
particular type of free Chile, with a particular type of ruling party or political 
system. Often, in practice, they agitated to gain control of the committee or 
privileged positions in exile to the detriment of the movement.
The establishment of Chilean political groups in exile occurred all over the 
world, and Australia was no exception. An Australia-wide UP network was set 
up, with the national office in Sydney; but the UP itself was made up of separate 
parties and within them came the sectarian politics that were always strong in 
Chile, and perhaps enhanced by the traumatic coup and dictatorship.92
The UP’s constituent units caused trouble due to the lack of clear organisation 
and cooperation between individuals on the ground in Australia. But the lack 
of UP control over the constituent groups in Australia did not mean the Chilean 
90 Carr Interview, 2009.
91 Robertson Interview, 2009; Programme Results—Chilean Trade Union Delegation to Australia, 11–20 
September 1975, Amalgamated Metal Workers’ and Shipwrights Union (Aust.) (AMWSU), E262/137, NBAC: 
ANU, Canberra.
92 For more information on the effect of exile on Chilean politics, see: Alan Angell and Susan Carstairs, 
‘The Exile Question in Chilean Politics’, Third World Quarterly 9, no. 1 (1987), 148–67; Diana Kay, Chileans 
in Exile (Wolfeboro, NH: Longwood Academic, 1987); T. Kushner and K. Knox, ‘Refugees from Chile’; Alan 
Angell, ‘International Support for the Chilean Opposition 1973–1989: Political Parties and the Role of Exiles’, 
in The International Dimensions of Democratization, ed. Lawerence Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 175–201; Patria-Roman Velazquez, ‘Latin Americans in London and the Dynamics of Diasporic 
Identities’, in Comparing Postcolonial Diasporas, eds Michelle Keown, David Murphy and James Procter 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
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population was disorganised. Robertson explains: ‘Amongst that small band of 
disorganised Chileans, if you have a small core that is organised, it is pretty clear 
that they start to get their own way, and that was starting to be reflected in the 
committee.’93
The organised group to which she referred was the Chilean Communist Party. 
Support for the Soviet Union was ingrained in the party and Chilean communists 
could simply not understand the new left’s rejection of the Soviet Union.94 Many 
Chilean Communist Party members were shocked to find the CPA’s eurocommunist 
agenda, and felt a natural alignment with members of the SPA. Some Chilean 
communists accused CPA members of not being ‘true communists’.95 The Chilean 
Communist Party did not suffer as many splits as other Chilean parties in exile. It 
was always an orthodox party, and many of its leaders were exiled to the USSR. 
The party benefited from this consistent relationship.96
Other political groupings had more trouble finding partnerships with Australian 
parties. The Chilean political party Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(MIR: Movement of the Revolutionary Left) also established itself, but had 
trouble finding mass support due to their insistence on armed struggle, which 
ruled out potential support from the CPA, ALP and any moderate groupings.97 
The MIR was always an awkward force in Australia, remembered Barry Carr, 
because it had a small number of the very active Chileans affiliated to it so 
suffered from strong vocal chords in a weak body.98
The Chilean socialists also formed in Australia, despite their international 
organisation moving in and out of alignment with the UP in exile and suffering 
internal splits.99 Factional politics within the Chilean community ran deep and 
were sometimes bitter. As Andrew Ferguson remembered, ‘they replicated the 
divisions and tendencies from Chile in the solidarity movement. So it was a 
polemical, tedious exercise.’100 
Robertson remembered being conscious of the unrelated aims of the Chileans 
and Australians:
93 Robertson Interview, 2009.
94 Angell, Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile; Robertson Interview, 2005.
95 Robertson Interview, 2005.
96 Angell and Carstairs, ‘The Exile Question in Chilean Politics’, 164.
97 This is noted by Montenegro (‘La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–1990’, 42), and 
also in anecdotal conversations with Chilean community members with the author.
98 Carr Interview, 2009.
99 Angell and Carstairs, ‘The Exile Question in Chilean Politics’, 165.
100 Ferguson Interview, 2009.
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Basically, it did not interest me as to the stance that they were going to 
take on various things. What really interested me was that we didn’t get 
so imbedded in what they wanted to do to the detriment of what we 
were capable of doing as Australians in Australia.101
It was hard for Australians to understand the different groups, the differences between 
groups as well as the differences within groups. Robertson remembered trying
to work out where the MIR stood, where the Socialist Party [of Chile] in 
its various computations stood, where [stood] the communists in their 
various computations, never mind the little radicals this that and the 
other and the Christian something or others, the smaller your group 
was, the less likely it was to be cohesive anyway.
She continued: ‘And every one of the Chilean political factions, you could only 
meet in a telephone box. I mean there is not enough time in life, actually, to get 
to the bottom of all these things.’102
Steve Cooper even remembered a group in Chile which believed that life existed 
on other planets, and that a solidarity connection should be made with them. 
‘Intergalactic solidarity’, he called it, laughing.103 
Australians found the strength of Chilean party loyalty very unusual.104 Chileans 
stuck to ‘la linea’ (the party line) so strongly it was cause for tired ridicule among 
Australian activists. Here we strike at the fundamental problem: the political 
sensibilities of Australian and Chilean activists differed. Chileans were often 
found publishing and reciting party manifestos (which were in a constant state 
of flux themselves). The Australian left saw the passive yet passionate party 
discipline of the Chileans as being archaic and a cause for paralysis. 105 The loyalty 
and dependence on la linea were exacerbated by the fact that they adhered quite 
strictly to the formal hierarchy of their chosen political parties, most now re-
formed in exile with leaders in France, Italy, Russia or East Germany.106 
When a Chilean Communist Party member was charged with what was considered 
official party business, they expected the Australian political party they were 
approaching would respect the formal and official nature of their approach and 
101 Robertson Interview, 2009.
102 Ibid.
103 Cooper et al. Conversation, 2007.
104 Carr Interview, 2009.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid. Writing in 1994, Montenegro blamed many of the problems and infighting of the Chilean exiled 
left which arrived in Australia on the Chilean Communist Party, whose adherence to internal party hierarchical 
structure frustrated other groups. Montenegro was of course not a communist party member but a member 
of the Christian left. His brother, Guillermo, was a UP committee member. How much of the adherence was 
due to political culture specifically in the Chilean Communist Party or generally in the Chilean left is unclear. 
Montenegro, ‘La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–1990’, 90.
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their representative legitimacy.107 In such an ‘official’ capacity, Chileans desired 
direct access to the upper hierarchy of the Australian left, despite their lack of 
individual connections or public profile. 
Chileans did not acknowledge that much of the time solidarity functioned 
without any deep action from, or explicit approval of, the Australian political 
elite. As already described, activism in Australia operated through networks of 
friends and acquaintances and political allies at a grassroots level. Those who 
had the amount of time necessary to organise in Chile solidarity were very rarely 
from the upper hierarchy of the labour movement. Chileans did not understand 
the Australian political reality—‘and why should they?’ asked Robertson.108 
She continued: ‘some of them wanted to do things in the political processes 
that were quite inappropriate and, basically, what we tried to do was to find 
solutions.’109
The result of the clashes of political repertoire was a range of mutual 
misunderstandings. For example: meetings were long. At the beginning of 
the 1970s they were conducted in English.110 Even so, Chileans used them 
as opportunities to air political manifestos and engage in combat with other 
factions within the expatriate left. Robertson remembered: ‘We would have 
meetings and they would behave badly, then afterwards they would say “we 
behaved badly and we shouldn’t have done that” and you know. Because they 
knew that people were getting frustrated about these sorts of meetings.’111
Soon, Chilean factions were assembling before solidarity meetings to discuss 
tactics. Australians activists were so uncomfortable with the politicking and 
inability to focus on the ‘big issue’ that, one by one, they gradually ceased 
attending meetings. Andrew Ferguson said: ‘most Anglos wouldn’t put up 
with it.’112
By 1978, meetings were hours long and often conducted in Spanish, which 
indicates that very few Australians were present.113 Ferguson remembered 
meetings of this period went for three or four hours and there were ‘lots of long 
107 Further, Chileans often wanted to speak directly with parliamentary or union secretaries. Australian 
activists only wanted to take the high-profile Chileans to meet figures such as Bob Hawke as a constant stream 
of Chilean refugees was just as likely to erode goodwill as to enhance it. The ACTU was in fact engaged in a 
sort of rearguard action trying to support the Whitlam Government and the ALP in this period and was as 
such distracted. Robertson Interview, 2009.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Levy Interview, 2009.
111 Robertson Interview, 2009.
112 Ferguson Interview, 2009.
113 The meetings were ‘[o]verwhelmingly Chileans, with a few people from the Latin American left, and 
a couple of people from a non Latin American background that were there for political parties on the left in 
Australia’. Ibid.
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winded polemics’.114 He was not fluent in Spanish, and at first at the meetings 
he recalled that he ‘understood virtually nothing in terms of the political 
discussion, except an occasional word, the thumping of the table sort of things 
… and the movement in the room, and then at some point somebody would 
summarise what was going on, and you’d have a feel for it’.115
There were very few Australians who had the patience for this: Chilean politics 
had ‘worn people down’.116 The problem of the meetings demonstrates the 
imperfect fit of the two political repertoires. 
The integration of Chileans into the Australian political left was minimal, and 
very troubled. Many groups could not find an Australian group of similar 
ideology with whom to integrate, and they found it hard to translate their 
political vocabulary to suit the Australian political reality. In short, the Chile 
solidarity movement suffered under the effects of the two sets of disparate 
sectarian tensions (both the Australian and the Chilean), each pulling internally 
and between each other. 
As a result of these tensions, major change came to the CSCP Sydney organisation 
in 1978. 
It had started as a united-front (though CPA-piloted) organisation, and gradually 
Chileans (mostly Chilean Communist Party members) started to direct meetings. 
Soon, those Australians still involved were predominantly aligned with the SPA, 
and friendly to the Soviet-aligned Chileans. 
Steve Cooper, who had worked with the campaign since its inception, recalls that 
it was around 1978 when the SPA started to take renewed interest in the CSCP. 
They wished to oppose the revisionists or eurocommunists (such as Robertson), 
and in turn, support the growing strength of certain Chileans with whom their 
political alliances had matured.117 In doing so they scored morality points; they 
were the ‘owners’ of solidarity against the dictatorship. Though Robertson did 
not think there were any problems within the committee that were made worse 
by the return of SPA interest, their loose alliance with the Communist Party of 
Chile would influence events to come.118
‘Suddenly’, remembered Robertson, ‘there was some woman put on the 
committee whom no one had ever heard of before, and the next thing you know 
she’s going to some overseas conference’.119 
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Robertson Interview, 2009.
117 See, for example: ‘Stepping up Chile Solidarity’, which is the first time the SPA newspaper spoke of the 
CSCP activities in such a manner. 
118 Robertson Interview, 2009.
119 Ibid.
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The activists of the first five years were being pushed out.
Those Australians who left early avoided more personal attacks. Perhaps the 
most scurrilous of the sectarian interactions were those towards the end of 
the 1970s, which surrounded Cooper’s exit from the committee.120 There was 
a rumour circulated that Cooper was in fact an agent of the Australian Secret 
Intelligence Service (ASIS) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).121 This 
rumour almost certainly came from Chileans from within the Chilean Communist 
Party. In 2009, Andrew Ferguson said he could not remember ‘any public 
discussion at any meeting about Steve being associated with ASIO [Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation] or anything like that … I heard suggestions 
and innuendo about that from some individuals, and I can’t remember who they 
are, but [that was] when Steve stopped his involvement’.122
The rumour made it impossible for Cooper to continue to work on the committee. 
He remembered that it was not quite a crude block vote, but he was voted off.123 
Mavis Robertson recalled a slightly different story: that Cooper just left the 
committee with no vote being taken. ‘Because why would you stay with people 
who hate you?’.124
This overt piece of factional warfare was a turning point. Almost all the people 
who had devoted their time to the committee for the first five years left over the 
next few months.125 Robertson was appalled that such an attack would occur 
on a fellow activist. Even though she was perhaps the most prominent CPA 
adherent of all of those involved in the CSCP Sydney, she said she was not 
attacked because ‘I’m tougher. It is perfectly obvious that I am well connected. 
And, no one would believe rumours like that’.126 
Her strategic importance and profile also protected her. Robertson was the 
general secretary of the CPA and had been working for the Federated Engine 
Drivers and Firemen’s Association of Australia, yet she was more powerful 
because of her network of acquaintances.127 Her relationship (through the peace 
movement) with parliamentarians elevated the level of her influence in the 
hierarchy of the left in Australia. Robertson thought that the rumour 
120 Cooper et al. Conversation, 2007.
121 The same thing happened to academic James Levy, who was accused of working for the CIA. He was 
unable to continue to work with those who would make such offensive remarks.
122 Ferguson Interview, 2009.
123 Cooper et al. Conversation, 2007.
124 Robertson Interview, 2009.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Chile Democrático (no. 3 Sydney, Marzo de 1977), Papers of GMM.
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was one of those things that made me realise that I needed to start moving 
on, if that is just what you get for all the things that Steve Cooper did, 
then I don’t want to be involved with all these people. After all, they are 
all safe now, they are in Australia.128
While these Australian activists left the committee (though never stopped 
supporting the movement), another entered, who would be just as influential. 
Andrew Ferguson had been a member of the ALP since he was fifteen years old. 
Ferguson’s political pedigree was impeccable. His father was deputy premier of 
New South Wales and his elder brothers would later become a federal minister 
and national secretary of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) 
respectively. When he went to university he became active in student politics, 
and at a rally in Hyde Park in Sydney in about 1977 he met a man called Tito, 
who handed him a leaflet on the atrocities occurring in Chile. Ferguson already 
had an interest in the revolutionary politics of Latin America, particularly those 
of the more militant left, so the two men had a short conversation. Shortly 
after, Ferguson visited Tito, whose real name was Hector Perez, at his house in 
western Sydney.129 While Tito may have started with the objective of recruiting 
for solidarity work, the two were soon firm friends. It was this friendship that 
was the deciding factor for Ferguson to become involved in the CSCP.130 He 
started to attend solidarity meetings. 
Soon, with the exit of other Australian activists, Ferguson was taking on more 
and more work for the campaign. He took over its administration, typing 
newsletters, making bookings and phone calls and chasing unions for funding. 
‘I spent perhaps ten hours a week doing solidarity work’, Ferguson remembered, 
‘maybe fifteen. And also, it was a part of my social life, friendships, girlfriends 
and so on. So it was all involved in the same thing.’131 At a time when many 
Australian activists were leaving, Ferguson thought he stayed on because his 
‘tolerant and patient personality’ enabled him to deal more effectively with the 
Chileans and their political actions.132 But more than this, the relationships he 
had struck up were what protected and motivated him, at least in part. 
Ferguson’s admiration for and friendship with Tito were coupled with political 
alignment. While Ferguson had been a member of the ALP since he was a 
young man, he admitted he was ‘more a member of the [ALP] out of a tactical 
consideration than a philosophical commitment, and very much from the left’.133 
128 Robertson Interview, 2009.
129 ‘Tito’ was an affectionate name, also used to protect himself and his acquaintances from persecution. 
Perez was involved in the CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores, the trades union congress of Chile) organisation 
in Australia, and was the representative of that organisation in Australia for many years.
130 Ferguson Interview, 2009.
131 Ibid. Ferguson would in fact go on to marry one of the Chilean women.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
No Truck with the Chilean Junta!
178
After finishing his first university degree, he went to work with the BWIU, 
which had a long history of communist leaders and during that period was 
an SPA-aligned union. This meant that Ferguson and Tito (Chilean Communist 
Party) had an ideological alliance. The fact that Chilean communists propagated 
the relationship with the SPA, while most Chilean groupings were unable to 
make such a link with an Australian faction, ‘helped to really give a form to 
the Chilean communists’, and facilitate their dominance of the committee.134 
Solidarity committees, according to theorist Peter Waterman, often identify 
with a particular leadership claiming to be representative of workers rather 
than the real workers of the recipient country, and the adoption of the Chilean 
communists in Sydney in the late 1970s is a case in point.135 
The fact that Ferguson professed to be ‘more motivated by the agenda of the 
radical left, than by humanitarianism’ also suited the aims of the political 
Chileans. Ferguson was not ‘captive to the political tendency in [his] union’,136 
and said that though he was sympathetic to the SPA line, he also understood 
eurocommunism and had a productive relationship with self-determinists such 
as Mavis Robertson.
Ferguson was a strategic individual in more ways than just his political beliefs 
and ability as an interlocutor. Being a Ferguson opened doors. One activist 
remembered that ‘people would have been very mindful that he was a member 
of this famous family’. The political pedigree of this individual gave him access 
to levels within the labour movement higher than his actual standing (when first 
involved with the CSCP, he was in student politics). Ferguson also created what 
he called a ‘new front of solidarity work’ by taking the Chile issue up inside 
the Young Labor Party, where he remembered that few people were interested 
in internationalism.137 Further, his rapidly ascending path within the union 
made him increasingly useful to the campaign. His involvement also pleased the 
union hierarchy as it interfaced neatly with the new social focus of the BWIU. 
Ferguson’s positions in the union and in the CSCP were mutually reinforcing. 
Key individuals, such as Ferguson and Robertson, sustained the Chile movement 
in Sydney. Without their networks the movement would have faded, as Chilean 
exiles were unable to create the opportunities necessary to harness trade union 
support and activity. Ferguson admitted: ‘I could open doors into a union that, 
people who couldn’t speak English could struggle with … they just couldn’t get 
through the bureaucracy. Mavis could, or I could.’138
134 Robertson Interview, 2009.
135 Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 135.
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The local factional activity did affect the path of the CSCP in Sydney, but only 
became explosively destructive when combined with Chilean exile factional 
activity. The reservoir of goodwill for the newly exiled could not be drawn on 
indefinitely. Solidarity committees have been prone to ‘self-subordination to the 
victim’—that is, local activists subordinate their own standards and judgments 
to those of the victims, as their very victimhood bestows moral authority upon 
them.139 Perhaps for this reason, Chilean parties in exile in Australia got away with 
so much. It is difficult to theorise and easy to judge the actions of the exiles in this 
situation. It is important to remember that their disruptiveness may have been an 
expression of their unease. Their efforts and desires may have been to make what 
had occurred in Chile mean something: to not let the terror in and the destruction 
of ‘their Chile’ be forgotten. The Chileans fell into a community of consideration 
in Australia, although it was not inexhaustible. Despite problems within the 
campaign, trade union internationalist sentiment being played out through the 
Chile issue (though often ad hoc and sometimes opportunist) remained quite 
consistent for the duration of the solidarity movement. 
139 Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 134.
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6. ‘Chile is not alone’: Actions for 
resource-sensible organisations
For a grouping formed on the run, the Sydney May Day Committee was 
ambitious: for the first May Day after the Chilean coup, they invited Madame 
Allende to Australia. 
At best the committee was a loose amalgam of interested parties, most of whom 
were members or representatives of the SPA. While their invitation was not 
accepted, they were visited by Aída Insunza and Luis Muñoz.1 Insunza had 
been a professor of labour law at the University of Chile, and the wife of the 
former minister for justice.2 She was a woman of ‘small build but considerable 
presence’, reported the Tribune.3 Muñoz was a CUT member and a journalist.4 
Insunza and Muñoz were representatives of the Chilean Anti-Fascist Solidarity 
Committee, which operated out of Berlin.5 Their visit cost $4000 and that money 
was collected by a wide range of political and trade union organisations including, 
for example, $73.43 from a reception put on by nine unions at the Carlton Bowls 
Club in Melbourne.6 The visitors led the May Day procession in Brisbane as well as 
in Sydney.7 At an associated talk in Sydney, where Insunza spoke in English and 
Muñoz spoke through an interpreter, there were many questions about arming 
the people in Chile and the failings of the UP Government, as would be expected 
from an SPA-dominated audience. Eric Aarons concluded that despite the need 
for analysis, ‘the main thing for the audience there, I sensed, was solidarity and 
warmth with all fighting for Chile’s liberation’.8
While this may have been the case on the surface, beneath the facade, sectarian 
disquiet burbled. But just how much did social movement infighting effect 
1 This visitor should not be confused with Jorge Muñoz, missing person in the later 1970s, or Mario Muñoz, 
over whom there was a considerable campaign and squabbling in 1976. ‘Trotskyists Profit from Munoz 
Campaign’, Socialist, 15 September 1976.
2 Her husband, Sergio Insunza, also spoke at the Stalinist-organised May Day rally in Sydney in 1974. 
He was welcomed on the front page of the SPA organ, the Socialist. ‘Editorial: May Day—Internationalism’, 
Socialist, May 1974, 3; ‘Welcome to Sergio Insunza!’, Socialist, May 1974, 1; From the Chilean Underground, 
April 1974, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; ‘Chile One Year After’, Workers News, 19 September 
1974, 2. Jim Baird followed up with Insunza while he was in Geneva later in 1974. Jim Baird, ‘Chilean Junta 
on Trial before I.L.O.’, Tribune [Australia], 12 November 1974.
3 Eric Aarons, ‘Chile Resistance Fighters’ Visit’, Tribune [Australia], 7–13 May 1974.
4 ‘Chilean Guests’ Appeal! “Keep up the Fight, Venceremos!”’, SPA, June 1974; Aarons, ‘Chile Resistance 
Fighters’ Visit’.
5 WWFA (Syd.), SUA and Firemen and Deckhands union carried most of the cost of their visit. This makes 
sense due to high-level SPA participation in those unions. Sydney May Day Committee, May 2 1974, PGEUA: 
Federal Office, N133/203, ‘International Matters’ 1973–1975, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
6 Ibid.
7 J. Steele, ‘Big Success of Brisbane May Day Commemoration’, Seamen’s Journal (May 1974).
8 Aarons, ‘Chile Resistance Fighters’ Visit’.
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trade union support for the movement as a whole? This chapter accompanies 
the discussion of Britain by focusing on indirect actions organised externally to 
trade unions but completely reliant on them for support. The activities include 
demonstrations, international conferences, tours of Chileans to Australia and 
cultural events. The CSCP’s reliance on trade unions for support in these activities 
was not parasitic. The relationship between the CSCP (and other committees 
around the country) and trade unions was symbiotic. Trade unions’ use of the 
campaign was a ‘resource-light’ method of expressing internationalist sentiment.
The tension between political factions had erupted by the first anniversary 
of the coup.9 Activists from the Communist League and the Spartacist League 
involved in the organisation of the Melbourne rally came to fisticuffs over the 
failure of the Communist League to photocopy a rally pamphlet. In Sydney a 
protest was to be organised by the CSCP along with the Chile Action Committee 
(Socialist Workers League, Communist League, Socialist Youth Alliance and 
Spartacists).10 The Socialist called people to the rally: ‘The bonfires of books in 
Hitler’s Germany 40 years ago have been re-lit in the suffering republic of Chile. 
She needs your help.’11
How much help the 11 September anniversary demonstration would offer the 
Chilean nation was unclear, especially since much energy in the lead-up to the 
event was used in internecine struggles. The separate committees did not have 
different aims: both wanted the junta to end and for repression to cease in Chile. 
Where they differed was in their interpretations of revolutionary strategy: the 
CSCP generally supported Allende’s actions, and the Chile Action Committee 
believed Allende had failed the Chilean people. This situation was complicated 
by a power struggle within the CSCP group, as SPA activists tried to gain control 
of the high-profile first anniversary march, before retreating for some time.
The CSCP would not let any Chile Action Committee members speak on its 
platform. As a consequence, the Spartacists alleged the CSCP was dominated 
by the SPA and that the CSCP only recognised unions, not minority political 
parties.12 In Direct Action (printed by the Socialist Youth Alliance), David 
Holmes wrote that the CSCP was in fact anti-unification and anti-broad front 
as it ignored a cross-partisan meeting that was being organised and just called 
the demonstration ‘on its own and demanded that everyone join the [CSCP] and 
work for it. This set the pattern for the behaviour of the [CSCP] and its Stalinist 
supporters from then on in.’13
9 Open Letter to the Communist League, from Marie Hotschilt, Spartacist League, Plumbers and Gasfitters 
Employees Union of Australia: Federal Office, N133/158, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
10 The Chile Action Committee sometimes called themselves the September 11 Chile Action Committee. 
‘Solidarity with Chile on September 11th’, Socialist, September 1974, 1.
11 Ibid.
12 Against Political Exclusionism.
13 ‘Actions Protest Repression in Chile’,Direct Action: A Socialist Fortnightly, no. 70, (20 September 1974), 6.
6 . ‘Chile is not alone’: Actions for resource-sensible organisations
183
These sort of comments indicate that there were various SPA members active 
within the CSCP at the time, as the CPA was pro-broad front and eurocommunist 
and was implementing new left strategies of engaging with social movements.
By way of compromise, the Chile Action Committee and the CSCP came to an 
informal agreement that the CSCP would hold one rally, and following that, the 
Chile Action Committee would lead on to theirs.14 
The rally was to start outside the Lan Chile offices at 5 Elizabeth Street at 4.30 
pm on 11 September 1974.15 Senator Arthur Gietzelt, Jim Baird of the AMWU, 
Bob Bolger of the WWFA and Chilean refugees would address the gathered 
crowd outside Lan Chile. Nineteen trade unions had their names listed on the 
accompanying pamphlet. At 5.30 pm the demonstrators would march via the 
US Consulate to Martin Place, where the Chile Action Committee’s rally would 
establish what they called an ‘open platform’ (in an implied contrast to the 
CSCP’s platform).16 Only one trade unionist put their name to the Chile Action 
Committee platform: Bob Pringle of the NSW Builders’ Labourers Federation.17 
The CSCP organised the Lan Chile platform under a pro-Allende pamphlet and 
the Chile Action Committee (CAC) advertised for that demonstration as well as 
another in Martin Place under the understanding that there would be joint 
publicity for the rallies. The Chile Action Committee distributed more than 
12 000 leaflets and undertook an ‘energetic paste up drive’ around the city in the 
weeks before the demonstration.18 The CSCP did not feel the need to do similar 
work because their union connections would assure them of a good crowd to 
their section of the march and would undertake the printing on their behalf.19 
Tension was building and then a report aligned with the Chile Action Committee 
noted that the SPA (mentioned specifically, not the CSCP) tried to sabotage the 
agreement and wreck the second rally by speaking over time.20 
The Spartacists weighed into the fight. They published an eight-page 
denouncement of the ‘reformists’ and ‘Stalinists’ in the CSCP. It accused the 
CSCP of favouring the return of a UP government to power in Chile rather 
than returning to democracy.21 The Spartacists argued that the Chile Action 
Committee did not try to push a line like the CSCP did with their pro-Allende 
14 Ibid.
15 ‘Chile Inflation and Repression Hit all Sectors’, Tribune [Australia], 3 September 1974.
16 Ernest Mandel was to speak on that platform. David Homes, ‘CPA, SPA Sectarianism in Chile Defence’, 
Direct Action, 2 September 1974.
17 Though the CAC-organised platform did have a large amount of student support (as demonstrated in the 
Tharkuna). ‘Actions Protest Repression in Chile’.
18 Ibid.
19 ‘Chile: Solidarity Expressed in Aust. Meetings’, Tribune [Australia], 30 July 1974.
20 ‘Actions Protest Repression in Chile’; Against Political Exclusionism.
21 Against Political Exclusionism.
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pamphlets.22 Yet, the Spartacists burnt their bridges by then attacking the 
Chile Action Committee and its Socialist Workers League and Communist 
League constituents. They accused them of capitulating to the CSCP and called 
them ‘pseudo-Trotskyist’. Slashing and burning their way through the labour 
movement, they turned their attention to trade unions, accusing them of 
being weak and conceding to the dominant pro-Allende sentiment of the rally. 
The Spartacists would go to the Lan Chile rally, and support their own open 
platform, separate from the two already organised. Besides the Spartacists, who 
would attend such a platform was unclear. They suspected it would be shut 
down by the CSCP supporters anyway.23 The fact there were three rallies in the 
same place in support of the same cause brings to mind the old adage: the left 
divides, the right rules.
But really, the internecine battle that surrounded the first demonstration 
emphasises the competition that occurred for the political ownership of the 
Chile issue. Demonstrations such as those on the anniversaries were part of 
the regular strategies in the repertoire of trade union political tactics and were 
straightforward to support from the point of view of unions. At the time, one 
commentator said: ‘international protests have a definite impact on the behaviour 
of the Chilean Junta.’24 But like many activities in the repertoire of solidarity 
actions undertaken, they were indirect—that is, non-industrial—and organised 
from outside trade unions yet reliant upon them for success. Political factionalism 
played a role through the whole solidarity movement, both in and out of unions, 
including Australian participation in international solidarity events. 
Australians started travelling almost immediately after the coup and the first 
trip was to Helsinki for a conference under the title of ‘International Conference 
of Solidarity with the Chilean People’.25 Bernie Taft, Mavis Robertson and 
Laurie Aarons were in Moscow for talks with the Soviet Communist Party 
before the World Congress of Peace Forces.26 Taft and Robertson were contacted 
with the request to travel to Helsinki. Robertson remembered that ‘we just left 
the talks, which were not very useful anyway (with the Communist Party it 
was like talking to a brick wall) and we went by train’ to Helsinki.27 Samuel 
Goldbloom from Victoria and Senator George Georges (ALP Queensland) also 
attended the first Helsinki event. Goldbloom was an official of the Campaign 
for International Cooperation and Disarmament in Victoria and Georges was 
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 ‘Actions Protest Repression in Chile’.
25 ‘World Conference on Chilean Fascism: Call to Isolate the Military Junta’, Building Worker, October 1973.
26 The Peace Forces event ran from 25 to 31 October. Mavis Robertson, ‘Moscow World Peace Congress’, 
Tribune [Australia], 13–19 November 1973. Taft had been involved in the anti-Vietnam War movement, and 
he returned to Melbourne to spread his new-found knowledge of Chile solidarity via meetings organised by 
the CPA. ‘Chile Analysed’, Tribune [Australia], 23–29 Octpber 1973, 10.
27 Robertson Interview, 2009.
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one of the vice-presidents of the World Peace Council. Georges actually chaired 
sections of the Solidarity Conference.28 All of the Australian activists were well 
known to Robertson, who remembered that ‘George and I go back a really long 
time, but he was also somebody with strong pro-Soviet tendencies, so he kind 
of sat in the middle between the non-aligned peace movement and the World 
Peace Council’.29 
These prominent peace activists joined representatives from 49 other countries 
for the meeting, which was held on 29–30 September 1973.30 It was organised 
by a Finnish committee set up for the task, headed by that country’s education 
minister.31 Unidad Popular politicians already in exile were given a platform 
and a sympathetic audience to which they proposed a broad-front organisation 
to organise action against the military junta. This was not passed, however, 
as it was ‘too binding’ for ‘Western socialists’.32 Isabel Allende, daughter of 
the deceased Chilean president, also spoke. She said: ‘We now know that the 
violence of reaction must be met with the violence of revolution.’33 As it seemed 
that most who attended were from peace, anti-war and nonviolence movements, 
it was possible her rhetoric missed the mark. 
Despite these tensions, congresses under the title of ‘International Conference 
of Solidarity with the Chilean People’ would go on to be held in Lisbon (1974),34 
Athens (1975, 1982), Helsinki (1973, 1976, 1979), Paris (1976), Madrid (1978) 
and Rome (1980). It was also the start of a pattern of international conference 
participation by Australians. 
The International Labour Organisation ILO provided another international 
forum for Australian representatives. Jim Baird, for example, was invited 
by Chilean unionist Luis Figueroa to appear before the ILO’s Commission of 
Inquiry on Chile Trade Unions in Geneva in October 1974.35 He was one of 19 
witnesses called to present information on the violation of trade union rights 
in Chile. The ILO was assessing whether the Chilean Government was breaking 
ILO directives and whether they should be entitled to ongoing representation 
in the organisation. Baird’s trip was endorsed and paid for by the AMWU 
Commonwealth Committee, the ICFTU and the WFTU and was as a result of his 
28 ‘CHILE: World Campaign of Solidarity Launched’, Tribune [Australia], 9–15 October 1973; Bernie Taft, 
‘Chile and Mass Consciousness’, Tribune [Australia], 16–22 October 1973, 8.
29 Robertson Interview, 2009.
30 ‘World Conference on Chilean Fascism’; ‘Govt. Told: “Don’t Recognise Chile”’; ‘CHILE: World Campaign 
of Solidarity Launched’.
31 ‘World Conference on Chilean Fascism’.
32 Reuters, ‘50 Nations in Movement to Oust Chile Junta’, The Times, 1 October 1973.
33 ‘CHILE: World Campaign of Solidarity Launched’.
34 Henderson attended this conference. ‘Solidarity with Chile on September 11th’.
35 Baird, ‘Chilean Junta on Trial before I.L.O.’; Amalgamated Metal Workers Union, Commonwealth Council 
re: International work of the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union, 1974, AMWSU: National Office, N24/560, 
NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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firsthand experience in Chile as a part of the delegation of 1974 (Chapter Seven). 
Baird was one of only six trade union witnesses at the event, and he spent a 
week waiting to be called to give evidence.36 The documents he supplied were 
cross-examined by the ICFTU, WFTU and CUT as well as junta representatives.37 
Baird’s high-profile ILO visit and the Madrid conference in 1978 were pinnacles 
of internationalist participation. Yet the series of conferences that received the 
most consistent patronage by Australians was the freshly created ‘International 
Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile’ (referred 
to as the commission and not to be confused with the International Conference 
of Solidarity with the Chilean People). The commission held its first session in 
Helsinki from 21 to 24 March 1974, just six months after the coup,38 proclaiming 
that it was ‘one of the most important non-Government bodies dealing with 
continued violations of human rights in Chile’.39 The liaison committee sent 
letters to prominent citizens all over the world, with invitations to join the 
commission. Its body was intended to be populated ‘by international recognized 
political figures, jurists, men of science and culture, particularly from those 
countries not yet represented’.40
The commission essentially heard witnesses and brought material about the 
repression in Chile together. They then took it upon themselves to spread the 
word about the wrongdoings of the junta, and the international interference 
in the affairs of Chile leading up to the coup. The public positions of the 
commission’s members were used to give subsequent activities authority. By 
inviting high-profile, internationally recognised members, the commission 
sought to surround itself with persons of unshakeable moral authority in 
the eyes of the public. They gave press conferences, published proceedings, 
supported documentaries and sent delegations to the United Nations, ILO, the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
and the World Health Organisation. After the first session in Helsinki, the 
commission, or its subcommittees, met in Copenhagen, Lisbon, Mexico City, 
Athens, Berlin, Algiers and finally returned to Helsinki in 1983.
36 Baird, ‘Chilean Junta on Trial before I.L.O.’; Australian Metal Workers’ Union Commonwealth Council, 
to CAC members from Baird re: Visit to Europe, Re: ILO Chile, November 8 1974, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: 
ANU, Canberra; The Commission of Enquiry, 1974, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
37 Baird to Cameron M. Re: I.L.O. Inquiry on Chile Trade Unions, 4th October 1974, AMWSU, E262/137, 
NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
38 ‘Chilean Report’, Harbour News, April 1975. The commission’s headquarters were in Helsinki. ‘Call for 
World Trade Union Action against Chile Junta’, Seamen’s Journal 30, no. 3 (March 1975).
39 It was formed by the same Finnish liaison committee that started the Conference of Solidarity in Helsinki 
a year previously, but was distinct from that and separate to the ICFTU and WFTU conferences. First Session 
of the International Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile, Dipoli, Finland, March 
21–24, 1974, STUC, STUCA 531/2, GCUA, Glasgow; Amalgamated Metalworkers and Shipwrights Union 
(Australia), Chile! A Report from the International Commission into the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile, 
held in Algiers in January, 1978 (Sydney: The Harbour Press, 1978).
40 Concluding Statements, STUC, STUCA 531/2, GCUA, Glasgow.
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Yet as time went on, in the case of Australia, delegates became less and less 
well known and more politically factionalised. Among the 55 members of 
the commission at its first sitting was George Georges, the ALP senator from 
Queensland.41 At the same session from Britain was Arthur Booth, a Quaker 
and vice-president of the International Peace Bureau. By the third sitting, 
little-known unionist Don Henderson was among the Australian delegates, 
and his ascension makes an interesting case study that will reveal itself in the 
coming pages.
The commission’s third session, from 18 to 21 February 1975, in Mexico City 
was opened at the Palace of Arts in Mexico City by Luis Echeverría, the populist 
Mexican president, who had been a supporter and ‘great friend’ of President 
Allende.42 The Chilean regime had recently commuted various life sentences to 
exile in an attempt to change its international reputation, and this contributed 
to the higher number of Chileans present for what was the first meeting of the 
commission in Latin America. Many ex-prisoners who were exiled to countries 
all over the world met up for the first time at this session.43 
Don Henderson of the Firemen and Deckhands of New South Wales attended 
the Mexico session. His union was a very small niche union including those 
who worked on the ferries of Sydney Harbour. He was there representing his 
own union, the SUA and the SPA, and also along from Australia was Henry 
McCarthy of the Amalgamated Metal Workers’ and Shipwrights Union 
(AMWSU). Henderson was elected at the Mexico City meeting to be one of 
the 30 members of the commission. McCarthy had already been elected at the 
Copenhagen session in 1974.44 Interestingly, the only countries which had trade 
unionists as representatives on the commission were Australia and the USSR.45 
The other members were in the main representatives of political parties, lawyers, 
academics and jurists.46 
It was at the Mexico City session that the decision was taken to seek the ‘active 
support’ of the trade union internationals, and the idea was put forward to 
the commission in a letter by Don Henderson. Though this seems very late—a 
full year and a half after the coup—it must be said that it had been assumed 
that the military government would not last long. Furthermore, Henderson’s 
41 Ibid.
42 Rose Styron, ‘Chile: The Spain of Our Generation’, Honi Soit (1975), 12.
43 ‘The affection with which they greeted each other as fellow survivors … gave all of us at the Conference 
an air of hope.’ Ibid., 12.
44 ‘Chilean Report’. McCarthy continued to attend the commission sessions up to at least 1983: Amalgamated 
Metal workers and Shipwrights Union—Memo to the NAC, 22 August 1983, AMWU: National Office, Z109 
Box 19 Package 1, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Amalgamated Metal Workers Union, Commonwealth Council re: 
International work of the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union.
45 ‘Call for World Trade Union Action against Chile Junta’. Trade unionists from Costa Rica, the United 
States, Chile, Mexico, the USSR and Australia were present at the congress. ‘Chilean Report’.
46 There were no trade unionists from Britain represented at the commission. Ibid.
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union outlook, his ‘prolier than thou’47 attitude, gave him a point of difference 
to the rest of the commission members, even to McCarthy, who was much more 
experienced in this form of international non-governmental diplomacy.
When Don Henderson spoke to the conference he first identified the groups 
he was representing and brought greetings from the BWIU, WWFA (Sydney 
Branch), NSW Fire Brigade Employees Union, and the Australian Federated 
Union of Locomotive Enginemen (AFULE).48 These were all unions and branches 
that had substantial SPA member involvement. When he spoke to the conference 
he said there was no doubt that ‘unionism died in Chile on September 11, 
1973’ and that Australians believed the world trade union movement had a 
responsibility to the Chilean working class.49 It was ironic that he was talking 
for Australians, for even counting the backing of the BWIU and WWFA, SUA 
and Firemen and Deckhands Union, he did not represent as many people as 
McCarthy did as a spokesman of the AMWU (let alone with the backing of 
the ICFTU and WFTU unions of Australia and the world). Though his speech 
was admirable in sentiment, it may have been slightly misdirected, given that 
relatively few representatives of the world trade union movement were present. 
Still, he finished off his speech with the rallying cry: ‘Long live International 
Friendship, Solidarity and Peace. Long live the Democratic Forces of Chile.’50
Upon his return to Australia, Henderson wrote of the growing support for 
the conference by comparing the 19 attending countries in Copenhagen with 
the 33 in Mexico City.51 He did not take into account that Copenhagen was an 
extraordinary session and it had been organised on a limited time frame with 
little chance for gathering of funds or forming travel plans.52 Henderson also 
ensured that the readers of Harbour News, the newsletter of the Firemen and 
Deckhands, were not misled as to who the real Australian unionist involved 
was: ‘Whilst Henry [McCarthy] is listed as an Australian Trade Union leader, 
in fact he is, as you know, a journalist responsible for the publishing of the 
A.M.W.U. Trade Union paper.’53 Finishing his union report on the Mexican 
session of the commission in the Harbour News, he wrote: ‘Every victory of the 
47 Burgmann and Burgmann, Green Bans, Red Union, 54.
48 ‘Wider Bans on Chile Junta’, Modern Unionist [Australia] (1975).
49 ‘Call for World Trade Union Action against Chile Junta’.
50 ‘Wider Bans on Chile Junta’, 67.
51 Representatives of 32 countries attended the Mexico City session of the commission. ‘Call for World 
Trade Union Action against Chile Junta’.
52 Still, the 30 members met in Copenhagen in order to draw attention to the military trial of UP leaders 
that was occurring in Chile in March 1975. ‘Commission Calls on Chile to Halt Political Reprisals’, The Times, 
29 June 1974.
53 Concurrently, Henderson appeared to have fallen into the trap of misspelling many of the Chilean names 
and words: ‘Latelier’, ‘Venezuala’, ‘Clodimero’. ‘Chilean Report’.
6 . ‘Chile is not alone’: Actions for resource-sensible organisations
189
working class wherever it may be, is another step towards the sort of society 
that Marx, Engels and Lenin believed in—the sort of society that I believe in 
and continue to strive for.’54
Figure 6.1 Luis Figueroa, Don Henderson and Luis Alberto Corvalan at the 
Mexico Commission of Enquiry.
Source: Photo from ‘Solidarity Call to World Trade Union Movement’, Socialist, April 1975, 3.
Henderson’s platform oratory, however, was not a reliable measure of his influence. 
McCarthy’s connections and experience were actually what led to the visit of 
former Chilean minister of labour Luis Figueroa to Australia, and subsequently 
one of the most substantial gestures of Chile solidarity that the ACTU mustered 
during the dictatorship.55
Figueroa’s relationship with Australian unionists began prior to the coup when 
Tas and Carmen Bull passed through Chile in 1971.56 Post coup, Figueroa had 
spent weeks fighting in the underground;57 but when the military junta put 
out a reward for his capture, it was decided that he would be better off leaving 
Chile and strengthening the anti-dictatorship cause from without.58 The only 
time Henry McCarthy had met Figueroa was when the latter was seeking 
54 Ibid.
55 Press Statement of the AMWU—7/2/74: What is the Chilean Junta Up To?, WWFA: Federal Office, 
N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Julius Roe, ‘Notes for Speech: 30th Anniversary’, unpublished ms, 2003. 
56 Letter to President Salvador Allende from WWF of Australia, 4 August 1972, WWFA: Federal Office, 
N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile, November 3 1971, WWFA: Federal 
Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
57 ‘Aid to Chile Struggle’, Maritime Worker, 14 May 1974.
58 ‘Chilean Thanks for Australian Help’, Maritime Worker, September 1975.
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asylum in an embassy in Santiago, and there were still grave fears for his safety 
at that time (see Chapter 7).59 So, McCarthy was pleased to greet Figueroa at 
the Mexican session of the Enquiry into the Crimes of the Military Junta and 
he extended an invitation to Figueroa to visit Australia as the guest of the 
AMWU Commonwealth Council. As Figueroa was president of the CUT in exile, 
McCarthy suggested he also attend the ACTU congress.60 
In the role of president, Figueroa had travelled all over the world attending 
conferences, sessions and congresses; and in September 1975, he visited 
Australia. He addressed the 1975 anniversary rally in Martin Place, Sydney, 
where more than 600 people had gathered.61 The crowd had shrunk since the 
first anniversary, but even so, Figueroa pronounced that ‘there has been no 
greater concrete example of working class solidarity than that initiated by the 
Australian unions’. It surprised Chileans, he continued, ‘as we did not realise 
how deeply the Australian trade union movement felt about the international 
solidarity of trade unionists and of working people’.62 
He also said he thought the days of military rule were numbered. 
Figueroa’s relatively high-profile position as president of the CUT in exile, and 
as minister of labour in Allende’s cabinet, allowed him to meet high-profile 
Australians such as the secretaries and presidents of unions.63 He also met at the 
AMWU research office with David McKerlie, Brian McGahen and Steve Cooper, 
all three of whom were involved in the CSCP organisation.64 Cooper recalled that 
they took Figueroa and his companion Luis Meneses down to the wharves just 
as the men instigated a half-day strike for Chile.65 The Chileans were pleased to 
see that sort of action occurring.66
59 Steve Cooper, ‘Journey to Chile. 1974’, unpublished ms, 1974. Though it was an important meeting, 
McCarthy still spelt his name ‘Vigueroa’. The Commission of Enquiry, 1974; Steve Cooper and Henry McCarthy, 
‘Chile—Internal Strife—Solidarity’, Tribune [Australia], 16 July 1974.
60 The AMWU paid for Figueroa’s domestic transport and accommodation. Atkins to Figueroa, June 24 1975, 
AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Cable: August 6 1975, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
61 Programme Results—Chilean Trade Union Delegation to Australia, 11–20 September 1975, Amalgamated 
Metal Workers’ and Shipwrights’ Union, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; ‘Chile Venceremos’, Tribune 
[Australia], 16 September 1975.
62 ‘Chile Venceremos’.
63 ‘Support Chilean Workers in their Struggle to Free their Country from Fascism’, Tribune [Australia], 16 
September 1975.
64 The existence of the research office was also imperative to the AMWU’s ability to take part in extra-
industrial activities. Programme Results—Chilean Trade Union Delegation to Australia, 11–20 September 1975; 
Deery, ‘Union Aims and Methods’, 77.
65 Luis Meneses was the CUT secretary, and he visited Australia in 1975 with Figueroa and again in 1977. 
Meneses was to return in May 1977 to impress upon Australian trade unions the importance of maintaining 
boycotts. Baird (AMWU) to Robertson (CSCP), 11th May 1977, Papers of GMM; Central Unica the Trabajadores 
de Chile: Comision Exterior Paris, May 1 1977, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
66 Cooper et al. Conversation, 2007; Programme Results—Chilean Trade Union Delegation to Australia, 11–
20 September 1975.
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Both Meneses and Figueroa travelled to Melbourne for the ACTU congress on 
16-17 September 1975. It was probably their most important action in Australia.67 
In Figueroa’s statement to the ACTU congress, he congratulated and thanked 
Australian unions for their solidarity. He urged the ACTU to protest through the 
ILO and follow the five points of action that were passed at the ILO conference 
in June 1975.68 Bob Hawke, president of the ACTU at that time, declared that the 
ACTU would support the ILO measures. One hundred and fifty trade unionists 
present signed the petition to free Luis Corvalan and all prisoners, which had 
been circulated by Pat Clancy (Building Workers Industrial Union/SPA), Dick 
Scott of the AMWU and Taylor of the ARU.69 
Figueroa spanned the hierarchy as a symbol of solidarity, from grassroots to 
international industrial national organisations. Any investment from social 
movement or unions in him could reap huge internationalist brownie points. 
This sort of tour could also be conducted with minimal resource output from 
trade unions: ideological internationalist obligations were completed without 
imperilling the interests of the members.
Just less than one year after his Australian trip, on 8 September 1976, Figueroa 
died in Stockholm after an illness.70 Don Henderson wrote in the Seamen’s 
Journal that his death far away from his homeland served to remind the world 
that the ‘fight was not over’.71 
67 Programme Results—Chilean Trade Union Delegation to Australia, 11–20 September 1975.
68 These were: 1) stop arms sales to Chile; 2) economic isolation; 3) moral and financial solidarity with 
unionists in Chile; 4) 11 September as an international day of solidarity with Chile; and 5) send a boat with 
food to Chile. Statement by L. Figueroa and L. Meneses to the Delegates of the ACTU Congress, September 17 
1975, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
69 He had met with the Chileans twice as SPA member during their visit. ‘Strengthen Solidarity’, Socialist, 
8 October 1975. Scott was from the AMWU SA and was an ACTU executive member. Baird (AMWU) to 
Robertson (CSCP), 11th May 1977; ‘The ACTU Stands for United Action’, World Trade Union Movement 
(Review of the WFTU), no. 1 (January 1976); ‘Figueroa Speaks’, Socialist, 24 September 1975.
70 ‘Chilean Workers’ Leader Dies in Sweden’, Tribune [Australia], 15 September 1976; ‘Sad Untimely Loss—
Death of Luis Figueroa Reminder Chile Struggle Still to be Won’, Seamen’s Journal 31, no. 11 (November 1976). 
In 1975, Figueroa had toured both Australia and Britain.
71 ‘Sad Untimely Loss’. Previous to Figueroa and Meneses’ visit, an alliance of the left brought another high-
profile Chilean to Australian shores: Anselmo Sule. Rather than being initiated from within trade unions, the 
earlier visit was an indirect action organised from within the ALP as part of their obligation as a member of the 
Socialist International. There is an enormous web of political backwards and forwards and organisation around 
his visit, which was for a meeting of the Socialist International in Adelaide. For more information, see the 
following archival folders: AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; N131/211—Politics—Foreign Affairs, 
NBAC: ANU, Canberra; The AMWU: South Australian State Council, N131/190—General Correspondence, 
NBAC: ANU, Canberra; WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; WWFA: Federal Office, 
N113/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Amalgamated Metal Workers’ and Shipwrights Union (Aust.) [hereinafter 
AMWSU]: National Office, Z26 box 5, NBAC: ANU, Canberra. Also, the following sources provide more 
background on Sule: ‘Chilean MP Tells of Torture after Allende Overthrow’, The Times, 3 September 1975; 
‘Stop Repression in Chile—Sept 11th’, Tharkuna 21, no. 21 (1975); Angell and Carstairs, ‘The Exile Question 
in Chilean Politics’, 165; Memo re: Appeal from ALP for finance to bring ex-Senator Sule to Australia, Waterside 
Workers’ Federation of Australia: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; ‘Chilean Terror’, Maritime 
Worker, 27 May 1975, 6.
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To continue the fight for solidarity, the CSCP used films, tours and other cultural 
activities to widen the understanding of the situation of Chile in the Australian 
community. These activities had the added benefit of raising funds. There were 
always accounts of torture and detention emerging from Chile as well as stories 
such as the banning of music that ‘make people mad’, and music tours reinforced 
and extended the support, but their organisation was a big undertaking given 
Australia’s distance from Europe and also the distance between towns.72 
Two of Chile’s most famous folk groups were outside the country when the coup 
occurred, so they immediately started their exile and found sympathetic homes 
and audiences all over the world. Both groups were part of the Chilean new song 
movement that had emerged, according to a concert program from Britain, ‘out 
of a deep-rooted need to rediscover and revive Chile’s genuine popular music’.73 
New song, wrote Maurice Rosenbaum in 1978, used the ‘basic instruments of 
Latin America’ such as guitars, zamponas, drums, tambourines, woodblocks 
and Andean flutes. It was acknowledged in the Socialist at the time that ‘the 
New Chilean Song has thrived and spread in exile and has become a powerful 
weapon in the Chilean people’s struggle’.74 Notwithstanding, Jill Sykes noted 
in her review of a Sydney new song concert in the Sydney Morning Herald that 
they could sing songs with political points without resorting to polemics.75
The first major tour organised was of the seven musicians of the group Quilapayun, 
who were based in Paris.76 ‘Quilapayun’ literally means ‘three bearded men’, 
as the band had started with three hairy university students.77 Their musical 
director had been Victor Jara, the most famous new song protagonist, who was 
killed in the stadium in Santiago in the days immediately following the coup.78 
In fact, it was because of the friendly relationship between Joan Jara and Mavis 
Robertson that the tour happened at all. The tour was presented by the CSCP in 
conjunction with New Chile Song Productions and with Mavis Robertson as the 
main organiser with the help of David McKerlie in Sydney and Philip Herington 
in Melbourne.79 While the bulk of organisation fell to Mavis Robertson, 
there was also considerable strain placed on the Association for International 
72 Robertson Interview, 2009.
73 Chile Solidarity Campaign (UK), Pete Seeger and Quilapayun.
74 ‘Chilean Folk Artists to Visit’, Socialist, 18 February 1977.
75 Though how Sykes could interpret the intricacies of the lyrics through the language barrier is unknown. 
Jill Sykes, ‘Inti Illimani’s Poetic Message’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1977.
76 They negotiated the terms of their tour to Australia through Juan Carlos Valenzuela at the Discoteca del 
Cantar Popular in Paris. Chile Solidarity Campaign (UK), Pete Seeger and Quilapayun.
77 Ibid.
78 Quilapayun: Ambassadors without a Country, Rob Fruchtman, Chile 1975, Papers of Barry Carr.
79 Quilapayun, Papers of GMM; Final Report of Quilapayun Tour, Papers of GMM; Quilapayun and Jeannie 
Lewis: Party Bookings now open, Papers of GMM. New Chile Song Promotions was the company set up by Joan 
Jara, widow of Victor Jara. Robertson Interview, 2009.
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Cooperation and Disarmament (AICD), as the Chile campaign still used their 
offices.80 Robertson also knew popular folk singer Jeannie Lewis, who was 
tactically selected to ensure an audience for the locally unknown Quilapayun. 
Furthermore, Robertson was acquainted with Kevin Jacobsen, entertainment 
company owner and tour organiser. He was on the left of the ALP, and a very 
experienced promoter. Robertson approached him for advice and he gave her 
a plan and a sheet that would help her organise what would turn out to be a 
very successful music tour. For example, he suggested that activists and groups 
sold tickets, because 10 people selling 10 tickets each was 100 seats sold. This 
strategy meant a reduction in advertising costs and little chance of failure. Each 
trade union connection within the reach of the committee was contacted to sell 
tickets and there was not a progressive union in Sydney without such contact.81
As soon as Quilapayun stepped off the plane, they were put to work at a press 
conference. When Robertson wrote to them before their departure for Australia 
she had requested that they ‘please make sure that the group come off the plane 
wearing their dramatic ponchos’.82 Despite this level of detail in organisation, 
very little appeared in the mainstream press before the concerts in Melbourne and 
Sydney, although there was more success in other cities. This was put down to the 
fact that ‘all too little is known yet about “Quilapayun”’.83 The band’s tour proved 
very popular with radio stations, with various features being played across the 
nation as well as 2JJ recording the Canberra concert to make a radio feature.84 
Joan Jara came to Australia at the same time as the band and spoke at the 
beginning of each concert on the tour, which included Sydney, Melbourne, 
Brisbane, Wollongong, Adelaide and Canberra.85 Jeannie Lewis supported at all 
concerts and Lucia Abarca explained things between songs.86 The concerts had 
a deep effect on those present. When the lights went up on stage, there were 
the seven men and Joan Jara. Jara gave the introduction. She told of the killings 
and the oppression in Chile and called for concrete actions. She said ‘Chile is not 
alone’, and continued: ‘We are not here tonight to weep. We bring you music 
prohibited in Chile today but it is the music of living Chile.’87
The concert in Sydney went very well, despite the poor acoustics at the Town 
Hall.88 While no Quilapayun record was available, interested persons could buy 
80 Final Report of Quilapayun Tour, Papers of GMM.
81 Robertson Interview, 2009.
82 Robertson (CSCP—Syd) to Valenzuela, 13th June, 1975, Papers of GMM.
83 Robertson (CSCP—Syd) to Valenzuela, May 7th, 1975, Papers of GMM.
84 Final Report of Quilapayun Tour, Papers of GMM.
85 Della Elliott, ‘Special Supplement: Quilapayun Singers in Australia—The True Voice of Chile’, Seamen’s 
Journal 30, no. 7 (July 1975), 165–8.
86 Robertson Interview, 2009.
87 Elliott, ‘Special Supplement’.
88 Final Report of Quilapayun Tour, Papers of GMM.
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Victor Jara’s Manifesto from Don Henderson at the Firemen and Deckhands for 
only $5.89 The commercial opportunity was not lost for long, as after the tour 
EMI decided to release two of the band’s records into the Australian market.90 
While in New South Wales, the band played for students and visited workers 
on the South Coast, and in Newcastle and they visited the Chullora workshops 
as the guests of the shop committee and the AMWU.91 Not everything was a 
popular success, and everyday work pulled unionists in the opposite direction. 
On a visit to the Sydney waterfront, it had originally been hoped that Jara 
would speak at a stop-work meeting but the union failed to establish a quorum. 
Instead, Jara and the band visited some ships and were hosted by the WWFA 
for a function.92 One of the members of the band delivered a speech in which 
he said: ‘Our people will win. Our people will defeat the Junta. Our people will 
triumph for Chile and also for all the democratic movement all over the world.’93
Afterwards, the SUA journal proclaimed that Quilapayun were ‘the true voice of 
Chile’. The fact that the band had not lived in or visited junta-controlled Chile 
was ignored in this judgment.94
The Chilean community of Sydney wanted to meet the band members, and 
so did many of the Spanish-speaking community; but it was decided that the 
Chileans would have exclusive time together first. Robertson wrote to the group 
stating that the reason behind the decision of exclusivity was that ‘some Latin 
American[s] are in the “armchair revolutionary class” and were therefore critical 
of the Chilean left’.95 
On top of that, tension was developing among the Chileans resident in Australia 
as to whom, or where, the money from the tour would be going. Some Chileans 
suspected that the Chilean Communist Party controlled the international 
solidarity movement and that all the money was going towards their political 
dominance. While Robertson remembered that at the start of that first tour she 
was ‘singularly unaware’ of the sectarian tensions behind the use of musical 
bands in solidarity, by the end, it was very clear. Despite this and the normal 
difficulties of organising such a large tour, Robertson remembered that ‘[i]n 
general everything went smoothly. In a few places there were minor tensions 
which arise out of cultural differences, e.g. attitudes to women’.96
89 Elliott, ‘Special Supplement’.
90 Final Report of Quilapayun Tour, Papers of GMM.
91 Vines (Australian Union of Students) to Robertson (CSCP), 12/12/74, Papers of GMM; Robertson 
(CSCP—Syd) to Valenzuela 13th June, 1975, Papers of GMM.
92 Final Report of Quilapayun Tour, Papers of GMM.
93 Elliott, ‘Special Supplement’.
94 Ibid.
95 Robertson (CSCP—Syd) to Valenzuela 13th June, 1975, Papers of GMM.
96 Final Report of Quilapayun Tour, Papers of GMM.
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While Robertson politely reflected that Quilapayun were a ‘group of personalities’, 
it is obvious the musicians were very vocal chauvinists. They were often very 
offensive and progressively more unkind the older the woman. Ironically, it was 
the presence of a woman, Joan Jara, with the band that made the whole tour a 
musical and political success rather than just a series of exotic folk concerts. Jara 
had crisscrossed the countryside fulfilling speaking engagements with workers 
and feminists, activists and politicians. In order to fit all of her activities in to 
the 10 days allocated, she must have had little or no time to rest. 
For example, an evening was organised by women involved in the peace 
movement and women’s organisations such as the Women’s International League 
for Peace and Freedom, Women’s Liberation, the Women’s Electoral Lobby and 
the Communist Women’s Collective. The gathering was primarily for women and 
it was hoped that Joan Jara would show a film. Of course, the members of the 
band were welcomed also, though apparently declined the invitation.97
Jara also travelled to Armidale and attended an International Women’s Day lunch 
in Wollongong along with 50 other women,98 met with the Port Kembla WWFA 
branch99 and was called upon to meet with the NSW Trades and Labour Council. 
While the council was ‘not exactly left’, they were nonetheless very important 
for action in New South Wales.100 Jara also met the Victorian Trades Hall Council, 
where the Creative Arts Committee organised a reception with 100 unionists in 
attendance. A later report noted that ‘Joan made an outstanding contribution at 
the [reception]. She was given a standing ovations (which is unusual) by the 150 
delegates except for 5 members, said to be of the Clerks Union, who remained 
seated.’101 Jara spoke at several meetings in houses, gatherings in Adelaide and 
met with representatives of the CPA, SPA and ALP and also with students and 
the church.102 Meanwhile, the band hosted two workshops for musicians, with 
50 attending in both Melbourne and Sydney.103
Jara’s personal presence and easy cultural similarity with Australians smoothed 
other problems and boosted the success of the tour. The one event that defined 
her life, at least publicly, was the loss of her husband.  His martyrdom gave Jara 
97 Though it is unclear if any men took up this offer. Robertson (CSCP—Syd) to Valenzuela 13th June, 1975, 
Papers of GMM.
98 Final Report of Quilapayun Tour, Papers of GMM.
99 Robertson (CSCP—Syd) to Valenzuela 13th June, 1975, Papers of GMM.
100 Ibid.
101 Report on the Tour of Inti Illimani (Melbourne 5.4.77), Papers of GMM. The clerks were a noted right-wing 
union. They had even put forward a proposition to stop the use of political strikes at the 1971 ACTU Congress. 
Schmutte, ‘International Union Activity’, 85.
102 Jara also attended the reception that was given to farewell Jeria Bachelet, who was leaving Australia to 
go to live in Europe. It was a particularly moving meeting, with the two widows in attendance. Final Report 
of Quilapayun Tour, Papers of GMM.
103 Ibid.
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an air of incorruptibility and moral authority.104 Though it seems insensitive 
to discuss and was by no choice of her own, the manner of the death of her 
husband furnished Joan Jara with a huge amount of moral capital. This alone, 
aside from her connections in and out of Chile, obliged and propelled her to use 
this immense legitimacy and strategic ability. 
The concerts and meetings represented the biggest gatherings in solidarity with 
Chile that had occurred up to that point in Australia. Both the Sydney and the 
Melbourne concerts had audiences of 2000 people.105 The tour resulted in a 
burst of support for the campaigns in all the cities visited and the tour report 
declared it to be an ‘enormous success politically and artistically’.106 It also 
spurred on the organisers to continue with a musical theme.
The second tour of a high-profile Chilean band was that of Inti Illimani in 1977.107 
‘Inti Illimani’ means ‘condors of the sun’ in Quechua, and all members had been 
students at the Technical University in Santiago.108 When the coup occurred, 
they had been outside Chile on tour and had since been living in Rome. In the 
four years since the coup, Inti Illimani had toured to Washington, Hanoi, Paris, 
Moscow, Berlin, London, Rome, Caracas, the Hague, Milan, Lisbon, Venice, 
Havana and Mexico City.109 The band earned no money personally from the 
tour, but all their expenses were paid. Any profit was to go to the ‘movement for 
solidarity with Chile’.110 The tour of Inti Illimani benefited from the Quilapayun 
tour before it. Less education of the audience was now needed and many 
Australians now knew of the new song movement.111
The main problem was visas. A change in government since the Quilapayun 
tour in Australia meant it was difficult to obtain entry without extensive travel 
documentation.112 Ever conscious of their support base, the CSCP also sought 
permission from Actors’ Equity to allow the Chilean musicians to perform.113 
Again, Robertson was at the helm of the organisation, but this time she was 
104 ‘I fully trusted Joan Jara and anyone who thinks that she is … on a narrow sectarian side, doesn’t know 
her.’ Robertson Interview, 2009.
105 8, 10 July 1975. Quilapayun, Papers of GMM. The United States had bigger concerts, but did not make 
as much money for the cause. Robertson Interview, 2005.
106 Final Report of Quilapayun Tour, Papers of GMM.
107 Inti Illimani also returned in 1985 and 1987. The Chilean Community in Canberra presents: Inti Illimani 
in Concert, Papers of GMM.
108 Inti Illimani: Chile’s Famous Folk Singers, Australian Concert Tour, March 1977, AMWSU, E262/137, 
NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
109 Chile Democrático3, Sydney, March 1977.
110 Listed elsewhere as the Movement for Restoration of Human Rights in Chile. Agreement/Contrato, 
Papers of GMM; ‘Inti Illimani’, Tribune [Australia], 23 March 1977. The contract was signed mainly to make 
sure that ‘the movement’ avoided excessive taxation. Robertson (CSCP—Syd) to Rivas, 17th January, 1977, 
Papers of GMM.
111 Robertson (CSCP) to Rivas, 10th December, 1976, Papers of GMM.
112 Robertson (CSCP—Syd) to Rivas, 17th January, 1977, Papers of GMM.
113 Evatt (AAEAA) to Robertson (CSCP—Syd), 23/12/76, Papers of GMM; McGahen (CSCP) to Patten 
(Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs), 28th January, 1977, Papers of GMM.
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assisted by a more efficient national organisation. Brian McGahen (Young 
Communist Movement and subsequently AMWU Research Officer)114 helped 
Robertson organise the Inti Illimani tour, as he was unemployed at the time.115 Inti 
Illimani sent extensive requests for sound equipment that exceeded the wattage 
capacity of most Australian venues, and furthermore, 12 microphones were 
needed and these details stretched the resources, and no doubt the patience, of 
the organisers.116 Five hundred posters, and 700 programs were printed.117 The 
Electric Record Company looked after the pressing of an Inti Illimani record. 
They promoted the $6.95 record extensively in Sydney and Melbourne, but the 
concerts in other States did not benefit from the company’s work.118 
The CSCP had to outlay approximately $9000, and so asked affiliated and friendly 
organisations for donations.119 Again, the political and fiscal generosity of trade 
unions was imperative to the campaign. The fact is, despite the large outlay and 
difficult liaison with the musicians and the expatriates the music tours were 
probably the most solid moments of Australia-wide organisation. Support for 
the tour was given by the AMWSU (Vic.), BWIU, Chilean UP Committee of 
Australia, Firemen and Deckhands Union (FDU) (Vic.), WWFA, various student 
groups, Teachers’ Chile Solidarity Group (NSW), Miscellaneous Workers’ Union 
(MWU), Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen’s Association of Australia 
(FEDFA), Clothing and Allied Trade Union and Food Preservers.120 Clearly, little 
would have occurred without the unions. Every little bit counted, even the $25 
donated by the Printing and Kindred Industries Union NSW branch and the 
WWFA’s $100.121 Funds were also boosted by student and workers’ concerts, as 
well as collections at the interval of the main performances.122
In Melbourne, Philip Herington battled to organise the Victorian leg of the tour 
among his suite of other political activities and ‘pestering’ from locally based 
Chileans; but he succeeded above all expectations when the band visited the 
West Gate Bridge site to play at a stop-work meeting and the workers struck 
114 ‘Chile Popular Unity Adopts New Program’, Tribune [Australia], 1 October 1975.
115 Much of the incoming correspondence to the CSCP Sydney on the topic is addressed to him. 
116 Philip [Herington] (CSCP—Melb) to Brian [McGahen], 25.1.77, Papers of GMM; Rod Williams 
(CSCP—Perth) to Brian, Papers of GMM.
117 Philip [Herington] (CSCP—Melb) to Brian [McGahen], 25.1.77, Papers of GMM.
118 McGahen (CSCP—Syd) to friends, 23rd February, 1977, Papers of GMM.
119 McGahen (CSCP—Syd) to [blank], December 1976, Papers of GMM.
120 Report on the Tour of Inti Illimani (Melbourne 5.4.77), Papers of GMM.
121 Kelly (PKIU) to CSCP, 21st March, 1977, Papers of GMM; Fitzgibbon (WWFA) to McGahen (CSCP), 
March 21, 1977, Papers of GMM.
122 It was made clear that only CSCP material was allowed to be distributed and sold at the concerts: 
McGahen (CSCP—Syd) to [all States], Jan 23 [1977?], Papers of GMM.
No Truck with the Chilean Junta!
198
for half an hour to extend the concert. They then passed an excellent resolution 
and promised to work towards action for Chile in the future.123 This was the 
highlight of the trip for the members of the band. 
Meanwhile in Perth, the solidarity committee did its best to find a venue for a 
concert that met the Chilean’s requirements, and to be fair, they struggled even 
to find a typewriter to write their letters on.124 
Inti Illimani was made to work hard from their arrival in Sydney from Japan 
on 24 March 1977.125 They were kept constantly on the move, with press 
engagements, small performances and large concerts as well as solidarity 
meetings with Chileans and trade unionists.126 The tour organised would take in 
Wollongong (Warrawong Hall, 25 March 1977), Sydney (Town Hall, 26 March), 
Brisbane (Teachers’ Union Hall, 27 March), Melbourne (Dallas Brooks Theatre, 
29 March), Adelaide (Norwood Town Hall, 30 March) and Perth (Octagon 
Theatre, 31 March).127 
At the Sydney concert, the two most important organisers, Mavis Robertson and 
Philip Herington, attended, having been saved good seats so they could at last, 
and at least, enjoy the concert.128 Tas Bull, the prominent unionist, had been 
coopted as a compere and did a ‘splendid’ job under the difficult circumstances.129
It was reported in the Tribune that almost 10 000 people attended the concert 
tour.130 Sykes described in the Sydney Morning Herald ‘whether you were stirred 
by their appeal for the return of socialism to Chile, you could not help but be 
moved by the beauty and power of their material, and the quality and strength 
of their performance’.131
In a letter to the organisers all around Australia after the tour, Mavis Robertson 
wrote that there was ‘no doubt that the tour has been a success both financially 
123 Final Report of Quilapayun Tour, Papers of GMM; Philip [Herington] (CSCP—Melb) to Brian [McGahen], 
25.1.77, Papers of GMM; Report on the Tour of Inti Illimani (Melbourne 5.4.77), Papers of GMM; From Philip 
Herington, Papers of GMM.
124 Rod Williams did his best to organise the concert there. Rod Williams (CSCP—Perth) to Brian, Papers 
of GMM; Williams (CSCP—Perth) to Brian, 11-2-77, Papers of GMM; Robertson (CSCP—Syd) to Friends, 13th 
December 1976, Papers of GMM.
125 McGahen (CSCP—Syd) to [blank], December 1976, Papers of GMM.
126 Inti Illimani Itinerary, Papers of GMM.
127 ‘Inti Illimani: Chile’s Famous Folk Singers, Australian Concert Tour, March 1977’; ‘Inti Illimani’, Socialist, 
2 March 1977, 4; ‘Inti Illimani’, Tribune [Australia]. The group did not travel to Tasmania due to travel costs, 
although the Tasmanian State Council of the AMWSU did donate $50 and offer to assist in organising the event 
if it was to go ahead. Ridley (AMWU Tas State Council) to McGahen (CSCP), 4th April 1977, Papers of GMM.
128 He was in Sydney for the SPA anti-war conference in that week. Philip [Herington] (CSCP—Melb) to 
Brian [McGahen], 25.1.77, Papers of GMM.
129 Robertson (CSCP) to Bull (WWFA), 22nd April, 1977, Papers of GMM.
130 ‘El pueblo unido jamas sera vencido’, Tribune [Australia], 20 April 1977.
131 Sykes, ‘Inti Illimani’s Poetic Message’. Similarly in the report in the Tribune, it was written that ‘Inti 
Illimani’s powerful combination of music and politics inspired audiences wherever they played, bringing the 
strength and spirit of the Chilean resistance alive’. ‘El pueblo unido jamas sera vencido’.
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and politically’.132 Philip Herington, however, noted in his report that ticket 
sales in Melbourne were slower than for the Quilapayun tour two years earlier 
because the passing of time had taken ‘the edge off the enthusiasm about Chile’, 
as well as organisational issues and overlapping events (such as the uranium 
moratoriums).133 Despite this, the tour was hailed a success, so much so that 
Chilean music events in the future promised music ‘in the style of Inti Illimani’.134 
Trade unions in Australia were opportunistic just as those in Britain were 
and just as they were around the world. Though Australia’s Chile movement 
lacked the coherence of that in Britain, trade unions were provided with ample 
opportunities to use the movement to express their internationalism at little 
organisational cost. The indirect actions described in this chapter illustrate the 
symbiotic relationship between radical unions and the Chile committee. Each 
was being used by the other.
But actions that were light on the use of resources could be undertaken by 
almost anyone. Did Australian unions have the commitment to put their backs 
into it and really push in the name of internationalist ideology? And was there 
anything that the solidarity movement could do to encourage independent 
union action?
Those within the movement were certainly aware of the challenge. After the 
tour of Inti Illimani, Philip Herington wrote:
Our task now is to develop in the coming period a political program 
of solidarity work which can consolidate the impact that the Inti had 
and to translate it into [concrete] actions that Australians can do. This 
demands careful work to spread our message among trade unions, the 
ALP, Church groups etc.135
The following chapters will assess the campaign’s success in their work of 
encouraging trade unions to take action independently.
132 Robertson to ‘friends’ re: Inti illimani, Papers of Barry Carr.
133 Report on the Tour of Inti Illimani (Melbourne 5.4.77), Papers of GMM.
134 ‘Concert for Chile’, Tribune [Australia], 30 November 1977.
135 Report on the Tour of Inti Illimani (Melbourne 5.4.77), Papers of GMM.
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7. ‘Twelve Days in Chile’, 1974
Steve Cooper sat at a table looking across at a group of Chilean men. They were 
in a factory called Madeco, a metalworking establishment that Cooper had first 
visited a year before. The difference was that now Chile, and its workers, had 
been under military rule for six months. He observed the men closely, and noted 
that there were several newly appointed ‘union representatives’, and only one 
of the old committee.
Cooper asked only one question: ‘When you have an industrial disagreement 
with the boss and you get no satisfaction after exhausting negotiation—what 
practical action can you take?’
It was a loaded question. 
From the tense silence that followed, Cooper surmised:
1. that the position here was the same as they had already been told 
elsewhere: ‘a strike would be suicide’
2. that there was an informer present.
To ease the tension and reduce the potential danger to the workers, they cut the 
conversation short, and toured the factory: ‘On leaving the plant, we took some 
photos. I conveyed to them that we were aware of the true situation and they 
seemed rather pleased, but relieved, when I left.’1
Cooper had returned to Chile as part of a joint trade union delegation. This 
chapter describes the lead-up to the delegation, including the factional jockeying 
between unions and how one resource-rich organisation could exert its political 
will. It describes the activities of the delegates while travelling in Chile, and 
the information they discovered. Delegations such as these fulfilled a unique 
part of the repertoire of action of trade unions in the Chile movement. They 
were created by unionists for unionists. Significantly, of all solidarity activities, 
delegations were the least opportunistic and involved the most organisation and 
commitment. Interestingly, what the delegates did and found in Chile are not 
the most important aspects. It was what they could do previous to and post visit 
that made the delegation significant to the solidarity movement. 
This chapter reveals that the size of the union was imperative to its adoption 
of external political issues: a threshold must be passed for the resources to be 
available for such an undertaking. The organisation of the delegation further 
1 The AMWU Commonwealth Council: Re: Chile Fact-Finding Mission, 7 June 1974, Plumbers and Gasfitters 
Employees Union of Australia [hereinafter PGEUA]: Federal Office, N133/203, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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underlines the importance of strategic individuals in developing external 
political action within labour unions. It provides several more examples of 
such individuals at work, including Henry McCarthy and James Baird. Finally, 
this chapter elucidates the politics of delegate selection and indicates that the 
use of international social movement delegations as a weapon in local factional 
disputes was a dangerous strategy.
The arrangement of the delegation was prompted by a throwaway remark during 
a visit to Australia by the president of the Chilean national airline, Lan Chile. In 
November 1973, General Germán Stuardos, newly appointed president of Lan 
Chile, became the first Chilean Government official to enter Australia after the 
coup. Stuardos was a ‘debonair’ man, who ‘muster[ed] all what urbanity he could 
to defend the regime and its odious doings, already well known’.2 According to 
Derry Hogue in The Australian, Stuardos had been a general in the Chilean Air 
Force during Allende’s Government, but had resigned shortly before the coup 
as a protest against Allende’s policies.3 G. A. Grimshaw, NSW Branch Secretary 
of the Transport Workers Union of Australia, was more straightforward. He said 
Stuardos was ‘a big shot in the Chilean Government’.4 Stuardos was visiting 
Australia acting in the interest of the military junta: petitioning for Lan Chile 
landing rights and justifying the Chilean military’s actions because of the so-
called extreme policies that Allende’s Government had pursued. 
Still, as John Kane has noted in his book Moral Capital: ‘any attempted legitimation 
is always potentially vulnerable to someone else’s delegitimation.’5 The junta’s 
efforts to legitimise their rule in the eyes of the world could be undermined by 
the moral capital of a few if those few were suitably armed. What sort of arms 
would you need to dent the shiny exterior of a new military government?
In 1973 Lan Chile still flew commercially only to Tahiti, forcing passengers to 
connect with other airlines in order to travel on to Australia. They were keen to 
alter this situation.6 A press conference was to be held for Stuardos and it would 
inevitably expose him to questioning about what was occurring in Chile. In the 
days previous to it, AMWU publicity officer Henry McCarthy and Steve Cooper 
had agreed that journalists should be encouraged to question Stuardos about the 
abuse of trade union rights. Stuardos’s offhand response to one such question 
produced the opportunity. He said ‘we will be lucky if union officials from your 
country come to Chile and see what has happened and how much happier the 
2 Derry Hogue, ‘Lan Chile Query’, email to author, 7 March 2005, copies in possession of author.
3 Derry Hogue, ‘Chile Air Line Wants to Land Here’, The Australian, 22 November 1973.
4 ‘Unions Free Plane after Chilean Note’, The Australian, 11 February 1974.
5 Kane, The Politics of Moral Capital, 32.
6 Report re Chile ‘Fact-Finding Mission’, February 1974, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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people are now’.7 Cooper and McCarthy discussed the possibility of a delegation 
and decided it was a viable option.8 McCarthy then drew the attention of his 
union colleague Jim Baird to the opportunity.9
Seizing the opportunity, Steve Cooper, who was working at the Miscellaneous 
Workers’ Union (MWU), McCarthy and Baird, national organiser of the 
AMWU, banded together to become the Committee on the Delegation to Chile.10 
McCarthy rang the regional manager of Lan Chile in Australia. He demanded 
that a delegation of unionists be able to see fellow unionists and jails in Chile in 
order to assess the ‘happiness’ of the Chilean people as stipulated in Stuardos’s 
invitation. The invitation was formally extended to the AMWU and five other 
unions as selected by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). It was 
reported in the Herald that the unionists would be able to ‘go anywhere’ and ‘see 
anyone’ while in Chile.11 Lan Chile agreed to pay for return flights from Tahiti to 
Chile for the unionists and 17 January 1974 was set for their departure.12 Who 
were these men who swiftly forced the hand of the airline and what was their 
union like?
The AMWU consisted of 167 445 members in 1971. It was known as a progressive 
union and was affiliated to the ACTU, State trades councils and to the ALP in 
every State.13 New South Wales had 36 per cent of members.14 Politically, nine 
national-level and 30 NSW State-level full-time officials were ALP left or CPA, 
but there was also an organised opposition within union ranks.15 
The AMWU was the union in which the Sydney Committee of Solidarity with 
the Chilean People was most firmly embedded, even in those first months. The 
involvement did not stem directly from the encouragement or efforts of the 
CSCP, but from a combination of reforms and amalgamations with a mix of new 
ideology. The AMWU had high membership growth in the very early 1970s, 
emerging in 1972 as an even larger organisation due to amalgamations.16 As 
with other unions in Australia, the AMWU benefited from the ACTU Congress’s 
decision to set union fees at 1 per cent of weekly earnings, which meant a 
7 Hogue, ‘Chile Air Line Wants to Land Here’.
8 Cooper et al. Conversation, 2007.
9 The AMWU Commonwealth Council, Re: Lan Chile Airlines, 10 December 1973, PGEUA: Federal Office, 
N133/203, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
10 Montenegro, ‘La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–1990’.
11 Herald, 29 November, 1973 in AMWU Commonwealth Council, Re: Lan Chile Airlines, PGEUA: Federal 
Office, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
12 Ibid.
13 Rawson, A Handbook of Australian Trade Unions and Employees’ Associations, 29.
14 Stephen Frenkel and Alice Coolican, ‘Union Organisation and Decision Making’, in Australian Unions: An 
Industrial Relations Perspective, eds Bill Ford and David Plowman (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1983), 146.
15 Ibid., 146–7.
16 Ibid., 51; Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia, 68.
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substantial windfall for unions with the large wage rises of 1973–74.17 The 
AMWU had only recently shed its ties to the Amalgamated Engineers Union 
in the United Kingdom, and then it amalgamated with the Ship Wrights and 
Ship Constructors Union in 1976 to become the Amalgamated Metalworkers and 
Shipwrights Union (AMWSU).18 This resulted in its status as Australia’s largest 
union in 1978. The union was consequently still in metamorphosis in 1973–74 
at the time of the Chile delegation. 
Jim Baird had cut his teeth in the more militant Menzies years. ‘In the old days’, 
he recalled in the 1970s, a shop steward ‘was often successful by the loudness 
of his voice and the size of his fist. But that’s changed. Now the membership 
want logical arguments.’19 The union and its members may have been becoming 
more sophisticated and the union was definitely becoming more complex. The 
growing awareness of members described by Baird had caused the union to 
become progressively more organised. It emerged from its amalgamation with a 
bulky and rather complicated structure. Its policymaking body was a biannual 
conference, the participants of which were elected by the rank and file. Sitting 
below the policy body was a national committee which was made up of 22 
members and which met three times a year. Underneath that was the nine-man 
executive, which dealt with the day-to-day running of the union. As noted, 
it was dominated by men who were CPA and ALP members, though all CPA 
members on the executive strenuously denied any interference by the party in 
union affairs.20 The AMWU assistant national secretary, Laurie Carmichael was 
the president of the CPA and secretary, John Halfpenny, was also a member. The 
union was affiliated to the ALP in every State, but for the CSCP it was perhaps 
the CPA links that were more operative. The connection and sympathy of the 
AMWU leadership for the CPA created a reservoir of resources and goodwill for 
the Chile campaign.
The large AMWU membership provided a generous budget, which allowed 
for a broad array of committees. These were divided into two types: industrial 
committees (17) and subcommittees (12). One of the latter was an international 
committee convened by a national officer. In the early 1970s George Aitkins 
held this position.21 There was also an established research office at the union, 
which had a coordinator and four full-time research officers.22 It has been noted 
that a union’s research and education capabilities directly affect the type of 
activism the union undertakes. Given that unions at this time in Australia were 
17 Hagan, ‘The Australian Trade Union Movement’, 51.
18 Bray, ‘Democracy from the Inside’, 85.
19 Pat Huntley, Inside Australia’s Largest Union (Northbridge, NSW: Ian Huntley, 1978), 69.
20 Ibid.
21 Aitkins was also a WFTU representative. Roe, ‘Notes for Speech’.
22 Huntley, Inside Australia’s Largest Union, v–viii. Cooper would later take up a paid research position at 
the AMWU (after the delegation returned).
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extending their staff capability it is reasonable to hypothesise that the type, scope 
or method of activism was changing too.23 In 1973 the AMWU was entering a 
period of relative prosperity, with a new building being constructed in Sydney 
and the creation of various new professional administrative positions. These 
positions provided more man-hours for the union, which not only allowed for 
adequate attention to the industrial issues but also an overflow of advocacy into 
social justice issues, such as the Chile movement. 
The multiplication of members, officials, employees and funds for the AMWU 
in the 1970s meant that the representatives of the union attended many more 
international conferences.24 Without the membership growth’s subsequent 
multiplication of structure, time, organising and research hours, the delegation 
would never have gone ahead. The AMWU’s action was, in this case, directly 
related to its size.
If prosperity provided the means, it was the impact of the ideas of the new left 
that encouraged unions such as the AMWU to take on new causes—some of 
them social, others international. The extension of union activity into social 
activism was also driven by key individuals. The AMWU’s involvement in the 
Chile issue, in particular, reflected the influence of several fundamental people 
in the union—notably, James Baird and Henry McCarthy. 
Baird was a boilermaker by trade, whose apprenticeship at Morts Docks in 
Balmain in Sydney exposed him to an education by the radical left. It was the 
international nature of the work at Morts Docks and the high concentration 
of workers with radical left politics that pushed Baird towards the trade union 
movement.25 By the 1970s Baird was immensely respected and later in his 
career became a commissioner of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission.26 In the 1970s, he was also convenor of the AMWU publications 
committee, and before being elected to the national organiser position in 1973 
he had been head of the research centre for nine years.27 Along with Baird’s 
long-term membership of the CPA, this meant he was well aware of the Chilean 
situation before the coup.28 He was present at the first meetings of the CSCP 
23 Deery, ‘Union Aims and Methods’, 77; Hagan, ‘The Australian Trade Union Movement’, 51.
24 Commonwealth secretary J. D. Garland said this came down to the far-sighted policies the union 
undertook in the 1940s and 1950s. Pat Huntley and Ian Huntley, Inside Australia’s Top 100 Trade Unions—Are 
they Wrecking Australia? (Northbridge, NSW: Ian Huntley, 1976), 326.
25 Huntley, Inside Australia’s Largest Union, 65.
26 Rhiannon Lee, ‘Death of the Honourable Roy Frederick Turner, AM, A Former Member of the Legislative 
Council’, in NSW Parliament Legislative Council (29 June 2004), 10438.
27 Huntley, Inside Australia’s Largest Union, vii.
28 Minutes of Meeting of National Council held Professional Musicians Club, Sydney, Wednesday 16 Jan 1974, 
AMWU: South Australian State Council, N131/98 Commonwealth Council Minutes AMWSU and AMWU 
1973–1977, NBAC: ANU, Canberra. Huntley, Inside Australia’s Largest Union, 65.
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and was a member of its executive and steering committees.29 His prominent 
position in the AMWU ensured that Chile received constant coverage in the 
AMWU publications. 
In this he had an ally in Henry McCarthy, the national publicity officer of the 
AMWU in the early 1970s, who was a strategic actor of high importance in the 
early years of the Chile movement. For example, he endorsed the production 
of 15 000 leaflets for the demonstration on the first anniversary of the coup.30 
In 1973 Baird gained strategic importance after his election (a promotion) to 
national organiser, but he lost the ability to dedicate time and make on-the-run 
decisions due to the increase in his union responsibilities. McCarthy could be 
a little more flexible in his role and the position of head of publishing was by 
nature influential. 
The committee organising the delegation to Chile (McCarthy and Baird, together 
with Steve Cooper, who was starting to take on a substantial amount of work 
at the CSCP in Sydney) sought guarantees from the Chilean Government for the 
safety not only of the delegation’s members but also of the Chileans with whom 
they hoped to meet. The official press statement from the AMWU outlined the 
guarantees sought, including access to prison areas and freedom to interview 
people without surveillance from authorities.31 The Miners Federation also 
expressed interest, and ABC Television’s 4 Corners program was to send a crew; 
however, it all soon ground to a halt. 
Although the Chilean Government was willing to give all manner of assurances 
verbally, the Australian office of Lan Chile received a cable from the Chilean 
Government stating that it ‘did not consider it appropriate to give written 
confirmation of the guarantee[s]’.32 It was little wonder. The letter sent seeking 
the assurances had rather cheekily noted that there was a substantial level of 
resentment of the ‘current undemocratic military government in Chile’ among 
trade unions in Australia.33 A lack of written assurance for this group of unionists 
implied that the danger to others was very real indeed. The Australians refused 
to move without the papers and Lan Chile and the Chilean authorities refused 
to accede to the demands. 
As January 1974 came and went, McCarthy, Baird and Cooper began to mobilise 
the support of trade unionists and the wider community. The AMWU distributed 
a press statement (thanks to McCarthy’s strategic role as publicity officer) titled 
29 NSW Committee for Solidarity with the Chilean People.
30 The demonstration was to be organised by the CSCP. Circular. AMWU Commonwealth Council, august 16 
1974, PGEUA: Federal Office, N133/158, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
31 Press Statement of the AMWU—7/2/74: What is the Chilean Junta Up To?
32 Press Statement by Federal Council Waterside Workers’ Fed. of Aust. Re: Chile, Sept 13 1973, WWFA: 
Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
33 Press Statement of the AMWU—7/2/74: What is the Chilean Junta Up To?
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‘What is the Chilean Junta up to?’. It outlined the fight to get to Chile, and some 
of the occurrences within Chile that the delegation proposed to investigate.34 
While it may have been Baird and McCarthy pushing AMWU action on Chile, 
the official AMWU face of international issues was George Aitkins (as head of the 
International Subcommittee).35 Aitkins was not a lightweight in the union; he 
was a WFTU representative and a national organiser with extensive negotiating 
experience.36 His position and knowledge would come into play for the Chile 
cause sooner than anyone expected.
The Chilean Government officially deferred the delegation on 6 February; the 
AMWU press statement explaining the situation was released on 7 February. 
The final sentences of the document called for support of the WFTU solidarity 
with Chile Day on 12 February, and urged the Australian Government to refuse 
Lan Chile’s landing rights. As it turned out, Australian action pre-empted the 
international boycott plans, but despite their efforts until that point, the metal 
workers were not the ones who struck the first blow. 
At 6 am on Saturday, 9 February 1974, a Lan Chile flight was black banned 
at Kingsford Smith Airport in Sydney. ‘When the plane landed in Sydney 
on Saturday morning’, said Grimshaw, secretary of the NSW branch of the 
Transport Workers’ Union of Australia, ‘we decided to take industrial action to 
show them we were fair dinkum’.37 The Transport Workers’ Union, with support 
from the AMWU, WWFA, SUA and other unions, refused to touch the plane. It 
remained unfuelled and unloaded and was parked off to the side of the airport, 
in an area under air force control.38 The passengers, and their families waiting in 
the terminal, resented the union action. George Aitkins noted the irony:
The 138 passengers refused to leave the aircraft for 3 1/2 hours unless their 
baggage was unloaded. Some 300 relatives and friends demonstrated 
outside the Custom Hall by slow clapping and chanting ‘chasalga’ 
(‘let them free’) referring of course to the passengers but ironically the 
protest of the transport workers was to get the Junta to ‘let the Chilean 
trade union and political prisoners free.’39 
The black ban was hailed as ‘possibly the first direct action taken in defence of 
Chileans by workers in another country’.40 Australian workers had sensed an 
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Cooper et al. Conversation, 2007.
37 Ibid. Grimshaw was later listed as a member of the delegation; however, he did not travel. AMWU 
Commonwealth Council re: Chile Fact Finding Mission, February 22 1974, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, 
NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
38 Roe, ‘Notes for Speech’.
39 AMWU Commonwealth Council re: Chile Fact Finding Mission.
40 Chilean Junta Airliner Grounded, 1974, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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opportunity and moved rapidly and conclusively. While the plane lay idle on 
the tarmac, Lan Chile and AMWU representatives Henry McCarthy and George 
Aitkins met to negotiate its servicing. They used the black ban to highlight 
their opposition to the military government of Chile, and also as leverage to get 
the Chilean Government to grant their demands for the delegation. The thickly 
moustached Aitkins was quite deaf and, so the story goes, he just turned off his 
hearing aid so he could not hear what the Lan Chile representatives were saying, 
let alone grant any concessions.41 The unionist’s negotiating experience won 
out, and the two AMWU organisers were successful: the Chileans were forced to 
accede to the demands of the trade union delegation. After a delay of 22 hours, 
the aircraft left Sydney on 10 February 1974.42 
The Transport Workers’ Union action was pivotal in this story. Without it, the 
delegation may never have travelled. Luis Figueroa and Luis Meneses, Chilean 
trade unionists who later visited Australia, phrased it explicitly in a special 
message for the Transport Workers’ members of Mascott Airport: ‘without your 
action which banned the Lan Chile Aircraft in 1974, it is possible that we may 
not be alive.’43 On an earlier occasion, Figueroa had said ‘when that plane was 
grounded in Sydney the news swept through Chile and from that moment, lives 
began to be saved in Chile’.44
What was essentially an opportunistic, symbolic and short-term action had 
deep consequences.
Following the blacking of the plane, flushed with success, 13 unions presented 
a united front against the military junta of Chile. They endorsed a pamphlet that 
focused on the black ban of the aircraft and the abuse of workers’ rights in Chile. 
The flyer’s title was an open declaration of solidarity with ‘oppressed people’, 
but the text was focused on trade union rights. This was a textbook case of the 
manifestation of the socialist ideal of a worldwide working class: ‘Oppressed 
people across the world with a yearning for freedom will take courage from the 
stand of the airport workers.’45 The delegation was hardly mentioned, as it was 
41 I have not been able to find why AMWU went in to negotiate instead of TWU organisers. Cooper et al. 
Conversation, 2007.
42 Chilean Junta Airliner Grounded, 1974. James Baird claimed the plane was boycotted for a month. Baird, 
‘After the Coup’, 7. This copy was given to the author by Steve Cooper, who believes it was written as part 
of Baird’s memoirs before his death. Steve Cooper remembers the boycott as lasting about a week. Cooper 
Interview, 2005. The Australian reported that Australian and Chilean journalists were aboard when it left, 
and if they were, they were not linked to the delegation as implied in the article. ‘Unions Free Plane after 
Chilean Note’.
43 J. Baird to G. Grimshaw, October 1 1975 and attached letter for Transport Workers’ Union Strikers from 
CUT, September 19 1975, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
44 Maritime Worker, 14 May 1977, 7.
45 Chilean Junta Airliner Grounded, 1974.
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too controversial for all unions to agree. The exclusion of the delegation from 
the pamphlet was a concession to the SUA, WWFA and AFULE, who all opposed 
the trip, but supported the boycott of the plane. 
Despite the veneer of unified purpose and ideology, soon the cracks were showing 
in the fragile unity of the plane blacking.46 Those who objected generally did 
so on the grounds that taking up the invitation of the military junta implied 
complicity with fascism, imperialism and capitalism. The AFULE, who had 
sent a delegate to the Chilean multinational conference before the coup, was 
firmly against sending a delegation of unionists as guests of the military junta.47 
The Building Workers’ Industrial Union (BWIU) also felt that the acceptance 
of the invitation might lend respectability to the junta.48 The maritime unions’ 
opposition was based on their belief that the delegation would necessarily have 
to work with the Chilean military in order to express solidarity. They held the 
view that working within the framework set by the capitalist world only added 
to its legitimacy. In the words of CSCP activist Mavis Robertson, members of 
the SPA believed that the delegates would be suborned by the military rulers 
of Chile, or as Cooper phrased it, ‘duchessed’.49 The SPA affiliates also believed 
that the military regime would take the delegation ‘around like circus ponies’, 
showing them only the places where everything was unaffected by the coup.50 
Their objection was not due purely to their doubts about the usefulness of 
the delegation, but also to a nuanced ideological difference. Individuals in 
opposition to the delegation were generally anti-revisionist, pro-Soviet and in 
the SPA, or unions in which this view predominated.51
The SUA’s opposition to the delegation was particularly vehement. The Federal 
Office of the SUA sent a letter to the AMWU stating that ‘any acceptance by 
Australian workers’ representatives of the hospitality of the fascist military 
Junta in Chile is an indictment of our class consciousness’.52 The SUA sent 
representatives to every meeting discussing the delegation, and consistently 
raised their opposition to it. Some members of the AMWU National Council also 
opposed the delegation at first; however, it was agreed that if the international 
labour movement organisations supported it, a consensus for support would 
be reached. According to Baird, ‘Henry McCarthy … got to work and through 
his international contacts was able to secure the support of the’ ICFTU, WFTU 
and the Catholic International of Trade Unions (CITU).53 The international 
46 ‘Seamen Reject Invitation for Fascist Chile General’, Seamen’s Journal 29 (March 1974), 64–5.
47 Ibid.; Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen letter to J Baird, March 18 1974, AMWSU, 
E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
48 AMWU Commonwealth Council re: Chile Fact Finding Mission.
49 Robertson Interview, 2009; Cooper et al. Conversation, 2007.
50 Cooper Interview, 2005.
51 Robertson Interview, 2009.
52 ‘Seamen Reject Invitation for Fascist Chile General’.
53 Baird, ‘After the Coup’.
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organisations telexed their support within an hour of the requests.54 The 
WFTU reportedly said that the delegation would ‘greatly help the international 
solidarity campaign’.55
WFTU approval was not long lasting.56 Believing them to be misled, the SUA sent 
information concerning the organisation and conditions of the delegation to the 
WFTU on 15 February.57 In response, the WFTU did not withdraw support from 
the delegation, but strongly questioned if the delegation would be allowed to 
make independent inquiries when in Chile. Yet, in the same letter to the AMWU, 
they also gave further information on the current union situation in Chile.58 
As both the SUA and the AMWU were affiliates, it appears the WFTU was 
unwilling to take sides. The opposition to the delegation was a manifestation 
of local political divisions and probably not important enough for the WFTU 
to bother with. ‘Chile’ was being used as a tool for political point scoring and 
assertion of identity. Mavis Robertson reflected on this, saying, ‘well, there 
is no doubt in my mind that the split in the [CPA] was being played out in 
international things’.59 But going out against the delegation was a dangerous 
stance. If the delegation succeeded they would return heroic. Furthermore, not 
all the unionists, branches or unions played into the factional disputes.
Despite the federal officers (Elliot, Geraghty, Nolan, Webster and Brennan) all 
unanimously voting against the delegation, the structure of the SUA allowed 
branches to have their say, and it was not as simple as branches following national 
office orders. At a stop-work meeting on 25 February 1974, the Victorian Branch 
of the SUA discussed the proposal. Members were confused. Comrade Wilson 
questioned why the SUA national office at first asked for motions in support 
of the delegation, then in opposition to it. He said: ‘Earlier, quite properly, 
the Federal Office suggests stop work meetings carry resolutions calling for a 
fact finding commission, comprising members of Parliament and Trade union 
representatives. To present this as fundamentally different from a fact finding 
Trade Union group is nonsense.’60  Whatever the status of those who travelled to 
Chile, they would need visas, he argued, and thus would have to make contact 
with the ruling junta. At the Queensland branch stop-work meeting, the motion 
was put to the assembled unionists. There was a speaker against the motion 
(that is, for the delegation), and only five ended up voting to endorse the federal 
54 Ibid.
55 ‘Australian Mission may Visit Chile’, SPA, March 1974.
56 ‘Seamen Reject Invitation for Fascist Chile General’.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.; International Committee AMWU, ‘Commonwealth Conference—May/June, 1974’, in photocopies 
attached to Roe, ‘Notes for Speech’.
59 Robertson Interview, 2009.
60 SUA (Victorian Branch) Minutes of Stop Work Meeting held Unity Hall Tuesday, 25th February, 1974, 5, 
Seamen’s Union of Australia [hereinafter SUA]: Federal Office, N38/639, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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office’s stance.61 The Fremantle branch, however, unanimously carried their 
resolution endorsing the federal office’s position. The West Australian, Port 
Kembla, Sydney, Newcastle and South Australian branches all carried to support 
the national office,62 but internal SUA dissent and even unified opposition to the 
action would be little more than a scratch on the history of the delegation.
Leaving behind the disagreement between the unions and the machinations of 
political factions, the delegation set off for Chile via Tahiti on 23 March 1974. 
They were almost the only passengers aboard.63 The delegates were Jim Baird 
(the official AMWU representative), Steve Cooper (endorsed by the MWA), Ron 
Masterson (Plumbers and Gasfitters Union, Newcastle Branch), Brian McMahon 
(Transport Workers’ Union, Victorian organiser),64 Henry McCarthy (travelling 
as a journalist) and Carmen Bull (translator and Argentinean-born wife of 
prominent CPA member and WWFA organiser Tas Bull).65 Not surprisingly, not 
one delegate was a member of the SPA.66 Many of the delegates were not paid 
their union wages for the period they were away, but the unions invested funds 
in the trip and expected results.67 Their activities in Chile were to include a 
meeting with the Minister for the Interior, a visit to a detention centre and 
multiple factories, and meetings with the ex-minister of labour as well as 
underground and stranded trade unionists.68 
Steve Cooper described their arrival in Chile in his notes:
Night. Santiago patterned with lights as we land, full of forebodings.
The rest of the passengers leave. The plane is well out in the airport. We 
descend the stairs and cluster at the bottom. It is very dark with a thin, 
swirling mist.
He continued:
61 ‘Seamen Reject Invitation for Fascist Chile General’.
62 SUA (WA Branch) minutes of stop work meeting held in Waterside Workers’ Federation Hall—Fremantle—
Tuesday, 26th, February, 1974, SUA: Federal Office, N38/639, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; ‘Seamen Reject Invitation 
for Fascist Chile General’.
63 Roe, ‘Notes for Speech’.
64 McMahon was a lawyer. The Commission of Enquiry, 1974.
65 The AMWU Commonwealth Council: Re: Chile Fact-Finding Mission.
66 Against political exclusionism: For a United Front Against the Repression in Chile—Spartacist League.
67 Henry McCarthy received 10 days’ leave without pay to travel on this delegation. Several unions 
contributed to his airfare. Mission to Chile (minutes of CAC Meeting, 18-2-74), Papers of GMM; AMWU 
Commonwealth Council re: Chile Fact Finding Mission.
68 The delegation also saw General Schneider’s daughters, a bishop who was key to getting interviews with 
workers and students and so on, interviewed between 30 and 40 people, and took a pocket camera to try 
to catch images without being noticed by the military. They possibly visited a women’s prison, found that 
soldiers from the south had been sent to the north and vice versa in order to make soldiers more likely to 
follow orders and Carmen went out after the curfew in attempts to make contacts. They visited the towns of 
Valparaiso, Santiago, Antofagasta, Tocopilla, Maria-Elena and Chuquicamata. They met with representatives of 
the CUT, Metal Workers, Textile workers, CEPCH, Railway workers, Sugar Workers, Dockers, Copper Workers, 
Hospital Employees and Lan Chile’s Union. Roe, ‘Notes for Speech’; The Commission of Enquiry, 1974.
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Out of the mist some soldiers emerge, walking towards us. One is dapper 
with a moustache. Major Figueroa. But he smiles and politely asks about 
our trip, and we can relax. We sense he is ‘O.K.’ given that the city is 
otherwise crawling with psychotic killers in uniform.
So far, so good.69
Relying on gut instinct was a must, as the delegate’s grasp of Spanish was, in 
general, rudimentary. 
The highest-profile meeting with the junta was with Oscar Bonilla Bradanovic, 
an army general and co-conspirator with Pinochet, who later met his death in 
a suspicious helicopter accident in 1975.70 He was minister of the interior and 
he met the Australian unionists dressed in perfect, crisp military uniform. He 
greeted the Australian unionists by saying, ‘you have come from a paradise, and 
I have just left hell’.71 Bonilla’s idea of hell was the three years of government 
under Allende, which had represented such hope for the Australian unionists. 
This poorly disguised, combative mockery must have heightened the tension 
in the room, a hypothesis that was supported by the language of the report 
written by David McIntyre, a South American affairs expert from the Australian 
Embassy in Argentina.72 Led by James Baird, the Australians tried their best to 
extract information about the ‘hell’ they had come to investigate.73
The general followed his confrontational opening with a claim that there was 80 
per cent popular support for the military government. He then made remarks 
emphasising the freedom of Australians to form their own opinion on what was 
happening in Chile. The interview was opened to questions and the Australians 
began to probe intensely. They sought answers regarding the detention 
of unionists, the conditions at the Dawson Island prison camp in Tierra del 
Fuego and confirmation that torture had taken place.74 At this time Bonilla was 
still supporting the general facade of the military government: that it was a 
69 Major Figueroa was not related to the labour leader also named Figueroa. Cooper, ‘Journey to Chile. 
1974’, notes transcribed to one copy on return to Australia, copy in possession of author.
70 Largely believed to be the victim of political cleansing that Pinochet undertook to solidify his own 
position. Arturo Alejandro Munoz, ‘Gral. Bonilla, accidente demasiado sospechoso’, accessed 17 April 2007, 
<http://www.granvalparaiso.cl/columnistas/munoz/bonilla.htm>; Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile, 
Comite Exterior Paris: Un Fraude Escandoloso, September 19, 1980, Australian Teachers’ Federation, Z219 Box 
83, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Burbach, The Pinochet Affair, 53.
71 Conversation with General Oscar Bonilla (Minister of the Interior) and Trade Union Delegation, 25 March 
1974, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
72 The Commission of Enquiry, 1974.
73 Baird acted as the main negotiator with Bonilla. He was chosen possibly because he was the only 
delegate with a national organiser position, and was thus the highest in rank. Baird’s aim was getting people 
back to Australia. Gustavo Martin Montenegro’s family came to Australia because of Baird’s work. Judy 
Lyons, ‘Chilean Refugee “Tortured, Threatened with Death”’, AMWU Monthly Journal (1974); Cooper et al. 
Conversation, 2007.
74 Press Statement of the AMWU—7/2/74: What is the Chilean Junta Up To?
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benevolent dictatorship forced to act because of the serious Marxist threat to 
the people of Chile and the world. Bonilla insisted that ‘the objectives of the 
government [were] to reinstate democracy and normalcy’.75 
Figure 7.1 Australian trade unionists speak with General Oscar Bonilla.
Source: From left: Jim Baird [unconfirmed], Steve Cooper, unknown member of the Australian diplomatic 
core [possibly Jim Lindsay or David Macintyre], General Bonilla. ‘La Patria’, Martes 26 de Marzo de 1974, 
AMWU: National Office, Z112 box 7, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
A photograph of some of the delegation in the interview with General Bonilla 
appeared on the front page of La Patria, a Chilean newspaper in print at the 
time. It was part of the strategy of the military government to appear open 
and transparent to foreign visitors. The caption below the photograph tells the 
75 Conversation with General Oscar Bonilla (Minister of the Interior) and Trade Union Delegation, 25 March 
1974, 3.
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reader that the visit of the Australian trade unionists was not of a ‘political 
character’ and that they did not want to visit Dawson Island Detention Centre. 
In the extensive files of the AMWU, a cut-out of the article appears. It is circled 
various times in ink, with the following words scribbled by an unknown hand: 
‘this is a complete lie. Thats what we went for.’76 
Although the delegates did not visit Dawson Island as they had hoped, they did 
win a small victory when they were granted permission to enter the Chacabuco 
Detention Centre.77 The visit was perhaps the most important aspect of the 
delegation to Chile, however confused the Australians were about the spelling of 
its name. Writing Spanish words and names down as they sounded resulted in 
distinctively Australianised versions of words being used throughout the whole 
Chile solidarity movement. In this case, the Chacabuco centre was ‘Chakabooka’, 
‘Chacabouka’ in a report and ‘Chacavuco’ in a union newspaper, resulting from 
the Chilean accent, which often leads to confusion of the sounds of ‘b’ and ‘v’.78 
Despite some uncertainty over the most basic information, the intense feeling 
of solidarity and the determination of delegates Jim Baird, Carmen Bull and 
Ron Masterson were obvious as they travelled deep into the Atacama Desert to 
the detention centre.79 Chacabuco was a nitrate-mining ghost town, deserted in 
the 1930s. In 1974 it was surrounded by layers of fencing with wooden guard 
towers. The buildings were very old and dusty, but rust and decay-free as a 
result of the dry climate in which they were situated. The freshly painted signs 
on the outside of the area indicated ‘Minas’: mines.
The delegation members procured a taxi to travel the 260 km from Tocopilla in 
the north of Chile. The detention centre guards carried machine guns and peered 
cautiously into the vehicle that had appeared out of the desert. They forced 
the Australians to hand over their passports and then the letter from Minister 
Bonilla, which ‘caused a small stir’.80 A guard, still carrying his gun, squashed 
into the car with the delegates as they drove into the camp. Since their arrival 
in Chile, the list of detained men the delegates hoped to speak to had grown to 
include academics, metal workers and a number of other unionists and non-
unionists; however, only 20 inmates were led out into an enclosed garden area 
where some small plants struggled against the elements. They sat in a rotunda. 
76 Sindicalistas Australianos, 1974, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra. Baird later spoke to an aide 
of the Minister for the Interior, who told him the minister was ‘furious that the delegation was doing what it 
wanted’. Roe, ‘Notes for Speech’.
77 Chacabuco was one of the places pointed out by the WFTU as a potential place to visit. Press Statement 
of the AMWU—7/2/74: What is the Chilean Junta Up To?
78 12 Days in Chile, 1974, AMWSU, E262/137 ‘Chile 1974–1977’, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Chacabooka, 1974, 
AMWU: National Office, Z112 Box 7, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
79 Chacabooka, 1974; The AMWU Commonwealth Council: Re: Chile Fact-Finding Mission.
80 Baird, ‘After the Coup’.
7 . ‘Twelve Days in Chile’, 1974
215
The inmates looked worn out, but clean. They stated that they had received 
relatively good treatment at Chacabuco, where they were allowed to receive 
censored letters and visitors too if they had the means to travel all the way into 
the desert. Although they were all held without charges, the men were relatively 
happy to be at that particular centre. They thought it was the best camp, used 
by the junta purposely to mislead foreigners investigating human rights abuses. 
Jim Baird wrote in a report: ‘It was a moving situation at the end, as we decided 
after 1½ hours to leave. They embraced us and gave us an emotional farewell.’ 
The Australians walked with the men towards their barracks behind a fence. 
Furtively, a metalworker pressed a piece of paper into the hand of a delegation 
member.
They then halted, all trying to talk to Carmen [the only delegate present 
with fluent Spanish]. I think to try and convey some last minute 
thoughts. We bid them farewell and stood and waved as they walked 
back towards the wire enclosure accompanied by the group of armed 
guards who shepherded them through a wire gate about 12 ft. wide 
and 8 ft. high. They stood and continued to wave until at last they were 
moved towards the huts which were in rows behind the wire.81 
Later, when the Australian read the note, it said ‘we expect a lot of you comrade. 
We look to you to tell the Australian workers of what has happened.’82 The 
delegates were anxious to leave the oppressive and intense environment, and 
refused the commanding officers’ invitation to dine.83 They drove back into the 
desert, heading towards the sea and away from ‘what can only be described, 
with all its emotive force, as a concentration camp’.84 
To make the most of their time in Chile, the Australians had split into smaller 
groups. Despite this, the chaperones succeeded in taking up chunks of time by 
insisting on sightseeing and picnics. Still, the delegates succeeded in visiting 
Luis Figueroa, who was under the protection an embassy in Santiago.85 Figueroa 
had been Allende’s minister for labour and the president of the CUT, the peak 
union body in Chile. He spoke at length to the Australian unionists about the 
crimes of the junta and the present trade union conditions in Chile, reporting 
that the CUT had been dissolved and its assets confiscated. Trade unionists who 
remained in office, said Figueroa, were Christian democrats or members of the 
81 Chacabooka.
82 Discussion with Metal Workers and Building Industry Leaders. Tuesday, 2nd April, 1974, PGEUA: Federal 
Office, N133/203, NBAC, ANU, Canberra, 1974, 7.
83 He was an air force officer, trained in the United States. He was eager for company, as he disliked the 
prison and the desert. Roe, ‘Notes for Speech’.
84 12 Days in Chile, 1974.
85 The delegates made their way there accompanied by Australian Embassy officials (possibly including Jim 
Lindsay). Cooper et al. Conversation, 2007; Minutes of CAC meeting, 27-5-74, Papers of GMM.
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right. Despite what was happening in Chile, it was the failure of workers of 
the world to develop international action against multinationals that primarily 
concerned Figueroa. Steve Cooper, hearing this after attending the conference 
on multinationals the year before in Chile, must have been filled with dismay. 
Still, Figueroa said ‘the fact that this Delegation can talk to the unions and to 
the people in gaols has created a great lift in morale among the Chilean trade 
unionist[s]’. He also proposed ‘a toast to the delegation and to international 
trade union unity’.86
Delegates met two members of the Confederación de Empleados Particulares 
de Chile (CEPCH: the Chilean Employees’ Confederation) with the aid of the 
Australian Embassy. Both were Christian democrats and they described the dire 
situation of workers in Chile, including the blacklisting of UP supporters by 
employers. Now the mere accusation of political activity could lead to instant 
dismissal.87 The report of the conversation described the emerging economic 
conditions of the workers and the speculation over numbers of dead and 
missing. It continued: ‘Now, to deal with the main problem. Most of the union 
officials are dead, gaoled or have lost their jobs, therefore cannot be organised.’88
The military government had no respect for the organised labour movement, and 
the military chiefs in each town were given almost unlimited power.89 For unionists 
in Chile, the report related that ‘the objectives to-day are to survive, to defend our 
friends, and to achieve freedom for the unions and end the state of war’.90
As well as the Madeco factory visit detailed at the beginning of this chapter, 
Steve Cooper also visited Indumet, a ‘small but modern’ sawmill equipment 
manufacturer in the suburb of San Miguel, only 6 km from the centre of 
Santiago.91 The factory had been under workers’ control until the day of the 
coup. On that day, a tank and soldiers had broken into the factory and at least 
14 workers had been killed. Another version of the story was that carabineros 
attacked the factory and, following CUT orders, the workers offered armed 
resistance. Three of the policemen died and later the army retaliated. Sixteen 
workers were disappeared.92
86 The AMWU Commonwealth Council: Re: Chile Fact-Finding Mission.
87 Ibid.
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Cooper remembered the workers he had met a year earlier had all ‘seemed to me 
cordial, intelligent and conscientious ordinary trade unionists doing their best 
to implement industrial democracy’.93 Not one of them was left working at the 
factory when Cooper returned in 1974. 
Cooper also met with some surviving members of the Textile Workers’ Union 
of Chile. That union’s membership had been predominantly socialist and 
communist and consequently had suffered heavy losses in the initial repression 
of the regime. The men sitting across from Cooper shared some of the shocking 
and painful stories of the terror of life under the dictatorship. Workers had been 
executed in their workplaces and military personnel killed families and burnt 
houses if their search for arms was resisted. The men said ‘there was a lot of 
torture. At the national stadium some … were shot. They pulled out fingernails. 
They castrated men. They violated and raped women and pushed pisco bottles 
into their vaginas.’94 
The confronting stories together with the constant tension of being under armed 
guard must have put immense strain on the delegates.95 But it also drew them 
together. ‘Saturday night. Shared a room with Ron Masterson’, wrote Cooper in 
his notes. They ‘chatted away until shut up by rifle fire nearby. (Silly Ron tries 
to stick his head out to see what’s going on). If the place was bugged, they got 
our life stories.’96
The room may or may not have been bugged, but there were definitely guards. 
Jim Baird found this out when a cleaner took him aside and gestured towards 
another room. In it were armed guards.97 Baird also recalled that on the way 
to a mine visit, they stopped to admire the scenery and as a result arrived 20 
minutes late. The carabinero at the gate proceeded to beat the driver for this 
transgression. The ‘interpreter’ swiftly pulled out his identification card, and 
the policeman stopped beating the man, and saluted.98 People were not who 
they seemed and not everyone could be trusted. The interpreter was clearly 
more than a clerk.
In their report in the CPA organ Tribune, Baird, McCarthy and Bull wrote that 
‘the delegation worked tirelessly and with an average of four hours sleep a night 
to see as much as possible of life in Chile’.99 They visited the shantytown El 
Carmen, and Cooper articulated the experience of returning to where he had 
93 The AMWU Commonwealth Council: Re: Chile Fact-Finding Mission.
94 2.4.74—Textile workers Union of Chile interview, April 2 1974, AMWU: National Office, z122 Box 7, 
NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
95 Baird, ‘After the Coup’.
96 Cooper, ‘Journey to Chile. 1974’.
97 Roe, ‘Notes for Speech’.
98 Ibid.
99 Carmen Bull, Jim Baird and Henry McCarthy, ‘Chilean Resistance’, Tribune [Australia], 16–22 April 1974.
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been welcomed a year earlier: ‘I walked on into the settlement and asked a 
worker about Sergio, Vincente and the twelve others I knew, and he told me they 
had all been shot. It just felt like the end of everything.’100
The delegates were taken to the river where the bodies had been dumped.101
Almost 10 days in Chile had passed before the delegation was contacted by 
any of the banned, underground unions. On 2 April 1974, a secret meeting 
was set up with representatives of the Chilean underground resistance to the 
dictatorship. A trusted interpreter accompanied Masterson, Cooper and Baird. 
One of these men wrote:
After passing through a number of back streets in Santiago, we came to 
an old two-storey building, part of a row of buildings, we were ushered 
into the front room through a hallway to meet two Chileans in their 30s 
or 40s. A careful exchange of information followed as to our connections 
and they volunteered that they were among the remaining free leaders 
who had been the national leadership of the metal workers.102
The Australians learned that many unionists had been detained and murdered. 
The unionists could still use the building, because the Metal Workers’ Union 
had given it to the Archbishop of Santiago, thus preventing the military from 
confiscating it as they had done with other unions’ property. The men had not 
been home since the coup of 11 September 1973 and were in danger of being 
detained. They believed that if they returned home, they would not only be 
captured, but also their families would be persecuted. The unnamed, nervous 
men proceeded to outline the limited nature of organised opposition to the 
junta; but after some minutes, they were interrupted: ‘we were joined by a 
very impressive man in his 40s who was introduced to us as a leader of the 
Building Trades Workers. From the onset, he commanded the discussion with 
the delegation.’103
The building worker was heavily involved in the resistance to the military 
government. He accused the Chileans who had already left the country of 
‘running away’ and was strongly focused on unifying the forces of the political 
left and the general populace to fight the military government. The Australian 
unionists expressed their desire to help the resistance in Chile, but the 
charismatic man replied that he was looking to political parties for support, not 
100 Cooper, ‘Journey to Chile. 1974’.
101 Roe, ‘Notes for Speech’.
102 Discussion with Metal Workers and Building Industry Leaders. Tuesday, 2nd April, 1974.
103 Ibid.
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trade unionists. The Australians replied: organised resistance could come ‘from 
the militant trade unionists in Australia, who would be able to look for political 
support from the working class parties’.104 
The statement seemed to win the trust of the Chilean men. The interpreter present 
said that the conversation he heard was ‘the most open and frank’ discussion 
since the unions had been forced underground months earlier. The Australians 
wanted to offer the men some form of immediate assistance, so rifled in their 
pockets to produce all the cash they had to give to the underground unionists. 
It totalled $100. The Chileans reciprocated by presenting the Australians with 
three albums of Victor Jara’s recordings as the meeting ended emotionally. 
The final paragraph of the report places the meeting in an international context 
and underlines the responsibility that the Australians felt for the Chilean 
workers and their situation. ‘This meeting, taking place as it did in the back 
streets of Santiago in the bare surroundings of an empty house, for me, was a 
most moving experience’, recalled a delegation member:
It leaves one with a deep appreciation of the dedication and sacrifices 
made by these workers in the struggle against the Chilean fascists and 
the need of those who are free to help them in their life and death 
struggle, cannot be over emphasised as a part of the world movement 
for Freedom and Democracy.105
The Australians felt their efforts had not been wasted as the underground 
unionists
expressed their very deep appreciation of the delegation’s visit. They 
felt that as a result, many trade unionists were alive or free because of 
the fear by the Junta of adverse international publicity about their anti 
union actions. They said that in the few weeks prior to us arriving, 
there had been considerable publicity in the press and progressives 
everywhere were hoping that we would go back and tell the story of 
what was happening in Chile.106
The story was told. 
The delegation returned home from Chile on 4 April 1974 and shortly after 
produced a four-page broadsheet newspaper entitled 12 Days in Chile, which 
was published in seven languages around the world. The paper outlined the 
activities, findings and successes of the Australian trade union representatives, 
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against the military junta.107 The paper showed some photos of the delegation 
in Chile, Chilean children and acts of repression such as book burning. The 
articles described to the reader the tyranny of the military government, giving 
accounts of talks with Luis Figueroa and the underground members and visits 
to shantytowns and factories. They also published a letter to Bob Hawke (at 
the time the president of the ACTU) from Figueroa and called for more protests 
by Australian unions. In a brief description of the delegation’s achievements, 
they included the petitioning for the release of political prisoners Olivares and 
Enriquez (which occurred in the weeks after the return of the delegations). They 
also listed the retrieval of information and discussions with everyday Chileans 
as ‘solid achievements, going beyond what was possible for representatives of 
previous delegations’.108
They also produced a report that went out to WFTU-aligned unions, even those 
which opposed the delegation. In it, the delegates reported the broad range of 
opinions they had encountered, such as one Chilean saying that ‘Chileans who 
have left Chile should not lose touch with those who remain’,109 and another 
who said that Chileans in exile had ‘run away’ and were not of any help.110 
Despite this openness, Robertson recalls:
[W]hen they came back, and the people from the Seamen’s union in 
particular attacked them … [the AMWU] were the biggest union in the 
country at the time and … I think their attitude was to say that ‘I don’t 
think we’re going to have people telling us that we’ve done the wrong 
thing and we didn’t achieve anything, when we have!’111
Luis Figueroa, ex-minister in Allende’s Government, said of the delegation’s visit: 
‘because it reached the Chilean people, [the delegation] is of great international 
importance and gives great support to the Chileans fighting against oppression, 
we recognise that their concern is an expression of international solidarity.’112
Words such as these must have been tough to swallow by those who had 
vehemently opposed the delegation. The action was a significant marker in the 
history of Australian trade union internationalism. It was a product of the size of 
the AMWU and strategic individuals within it. Without the resources inherent 
in the membership boom or the individuals connected through politics and 
common internationalist sentiment, the delegation would not have happened. 
107 Baird, ‘After the Coup’.
108 12 Days in Chile.
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But it wasn’t without social movement links: Steve Cooper, an example of a modern-
day faddist, was involved in the union and deep within the CSCP. It made him a 
unique and driven participant in the delegation and the activities that followed. 
His involvement also exposes a slight flaw in this otherwise seamless classification 
of the delegation as solidarity by unionists for unionists. He was clearly linked to 
the solidarity committee in more than just name. Consequently, the rigidness of 
the theoretical classification is put to the test when trying to file the delegation 
as an action of social movement or industrial national unionism. It is true the 
delegation remained relatively clear of the social movement, but its contribution 
was relied upon in more than one way by trade unions and the movement. 
It is hard to determine the exact depth of reaction or influence of the delegation 
as it formed part of a broad web of solidarity actions that took place across 
the world. It is certain that the authority, rhetoric and symbolism of such an 
indirect action was enhanced by the fact that this delegation was one of the 
only types of action that was created by the trade unions, rather than being an 
opportunistic expression of internationalism. 
Mavis Robertson recalled that the delegation ‘got fantastic results, I mean, they 
got unbelievable results when you think about it’.113 They acted on the ideal of 
an international working class that was drawn from their own political ideals. 
The efforts of these men ‘resulted in a world-wide exposure of the suppression 
and victimisation of the labour movement’.114 Locally, they were able to use 
their experiences in Chile to raise awareness and accumulate support for the 
initial wave of the Chile movement.115 
113 Robertson Interview, 2009.
114 Statement by L. Figueroa and L. Meneses to the Delegates of the ACTU Congress, September 17 1975.
115 Baird, ‘After the Coup’; 12 Days in Chile.
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8. ‘Not one pound of wheat will go’: 
Words and actions
The Holstein Express was crewed by Indonesian seamen, but it sailed under a 
Liberian flag.1 Its Australian agents, Dalgety and Patricks, had been charged with 
the shipment of 600 dairy cows to Chile. In the week of 4 December 1978, the 
ship attempted to dock in Newcastle to load but was black banned by Australian 
workers. Union members would not assist with loading the cargoes. They simply 
refused. After discussion between the workers’ representatives and the agents, it 
was agreed that the ship could anchor outside the harbour in Stockton Bight and 
receive water and stores.2 It remained off Newcastle for two weeks.3
In stop-work meetings on 19 December 1978, the Sydney, Port Kembla, Port 
Adelaide and Victorian branches of the SUA all passed motions of support for 
the actions of their Newcastle branch.4 And shortly thereafter a white flag 
was raised by the owners in the form of a communiqué shown to the maritime 
unions that the ship would depart for New Zealand without cattle if it was able 
to refuel. The maritime unions allowed the ship to dock and refuel and it set 
off on 22 December 1978, apparently without cows and apparently for New 
Zealand. The company was in the middle of a goosestep that spanned the State.
The next day, Don Henderson, secretary of the Firemen and Deckhands’ Union, 
was urgently advised that the ship was in fact at the southern NSW town of 
Eden loading hay and cattle.5 The union delegate at Eden was contacted and 
subsequently the local fishermen who had been hired to load the cattle stopped 
work.6 The ship’s crew and the vendors were forced to load the cattle themselves 
and the vessel departed for New Zealand on Sunday, 24 December 1978. Don 
Henderson immediately sent a telegram to the Morgan Lighthouse in New 
Zealand to ensure that the unions there would boycott the vessel.7 In response 
to the agent’s deceptive attempt to circumvent the black bans, the maritime 
unions of New South Wales placed a blanket ban on all Dalgety and Patricks’ 
1 Extract SWM—Held Tuesday 19th December, 1978—Sydney Branch, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, 
NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
2 Federal Office Report No 16/1978, Period ending December 13, 1978, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, NBAC: 
ANU, Canberra.
3 ‘Blow for Solidarity’, Seamen’s Journal 34, no. 1 (January 1979), 2.
4 Extract SWM—Held 19th Dec 1978—Port Kembla Branch, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, NBAC: ANU, 
Canberra; Extract SWM—Held Tuesday 19th December, 1978—Sydney Branch; Extract SWM—Held 
Tuesday, Dec 19, 1978, Port Adelaide, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Extract SWM—
Held Tuesday, Dec 19, 1978, Victorian Branch, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
5 Montenegro, ‘La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–1990’, 202.
6 Geraghty, ‘Barometer’, Seamen’s Journal (January 1979).
7 Overseas Telegram to Morgan Lighthouse, Wellington, New Zealand from Henderson Firemen & Deckhands 
27-12-78, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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ships. This remained until 4 January 1979 when the agents produced written 
confirmation that they would not act for any ships trading with Chile.8 The 
WWFA chose to believe them.
That year, three classes of livestock worth $570 000 made it to Chile, including 
1348 bovine animals and one horse. As this represents many more animals than 
was reported in the Seamen’s Journal (only 600), it is possible there was another 
ship during that year, the Journal was misinformed or the Journal deliberately 
played down the size of the shipment.9 Regardless, the total live animal export 
to Chile constituted less than 10 per cent of the total $7.6 million exports 
that made it to Chile in that financial year. So why was this short, ultimately 
unsuccessful boycott hailed as ‘Unions’ Chile Solidarity Victory’?10
This chapter reconstructs and explains the intricacies of a trade boycott used 
for political purposes. It delves further into union size, tactical positioning of 
union labour, strategic individuals and internationalist rhetoric. It explains the 
influence of these factors on industrial action for external political purposes. 
While declarations of black ban and boycott action were imperative to some 
unions’ internationalist identity, ultimately jobs were more important than any 
distant political gain. Consequently, the size of the shipment to be boycotted 
played a role in the decision-making of a union, where ultimately industrial 
protection was paramount. Like the engineers in East Kilbride and shipbuilders 
on the Clyde from past chapters, the key issue in the final instance was jobs—jobs 
the unions were constituted to protect.
Australian workers in the SUA and WWFA were employed in internationalist 
professions.11 The products they dealt with were transnational, and the 
conditions on the job exposed workers to people of many cultures. Furthermore, 
in the case of seamen, the cramped conditions on board obliged them to be 
tolerant. On the ship there was the opportunity to read and on land previous 
generations of radicals gave new lads their political education.12 Wharves and 
ships were radical spaces in the 1970s, but more than that, seamen and wharfies 
conceived of themselves as radicals. Seamen Paddy Crumlin said of his union: 
‘The industrial work was complemented by the political work, our identity 
was with social issues.’ 13 The boycott of the Chilean regime was not only a 
political statement, but also an assertion of identity, and for that reason it was 
consistently represented as ‘successful’ by the left press and trade unionists 
both at the time and subsequently. 
8 ‘Unions’ Chile Solidarity Victory’, Socialist, 17 January 1979.
9 ‘Blow for Solidarity’.
10 Ibid.
11 Diane Kirkby, Voices from the Ships: Australia’s Seafarers and their Union (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2009), 14.
12 Ibid., 181.
13 Ibid., 413.
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Boycotting, for both the Seamen’s Union and the Waterside Workers’ in Australia, 
embodied their internationalism: it was a representation of their socialist and 
humanitarian identities. As John Healy (WWFA) said, ‘the fight of the Chilean 
people cannot be viewed as their fight alone’.14 The same rhetoric in support of 
boycotting was also repeated by Chileans in exile who consistently called for the 
action against the junta by trade unions.15 For example, visiting the UP in exile, 
representative Hugo Miranda said, ‘I must say that we think the most important 
way to fight against the military Junta is the way that you have elected; that is 
to say, the trade union bans, the boycott’.16
The seamen and the waterside workers had used boycott action as a political 
statement before. As recently as December 1972 the Sydney Waterside Workers 
had banned US shipping in protest against the bombing of North Vietnam. In the 
same year, the SUA had boycotted the Spanish ship Pedro de Alvarado in protest 
against the antidemocratic policies of the Franco Government.17 Stretching back 
into the 1930s, the waterside workers had black banned shipping for a number 
of causes including anti-Japanese imperialism, anti-Dutch imperialism and anti-
apartheid.18 The anti-Japan actions protested the invasion of China and were 
known as the Pig Iron Bans, after the main export boycotted. The Pig Iron Bans 
led to large-scale layoffs in Port Kembla.19 The name ‘the Black Armada’ refers to 
the actions, including boycotts and mutinies, that maritime workers took in the 
1940s to support Indonesia’s independence from the Netherlands.20 During the 
1960s and early 1970s, there was no shortage of international issues to act upon 
including the Greek military junta, apartheid in South Africa and of course the 
Vietnam War. Historian Rupert Lockwood wrote in 1975 that his colleagues of the 
future would find that during this period, ‘the conscience of the Australian people 
found expression more often on the waterfront than in the nation’s legislatures’.21 
Nevertheless, much of the wharfies’ internationalism in the 1970s was around 
‘bread and butter’ issues, especially after they joined the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ITF) in 1971. The organisers spent a great deal of their time 
sorting out pay disputes and safety issues for foreign seamen.22 
14 Healy, ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
15 For example, see: ‘Aid to Chile Struggle’, 7. The same rhetoric was used by the ILO: ‘ILO Call to Fight 
Chile Torturers’, Maritime Worker, 2 September 1975, 7.
16 ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
17 ‘Maritime Action on Franco Ship’, SPA, September 1972. This is not mentioned in the Sweeney Report, 
which cites a WWFA pay dispute due to arsenic spills on this ship. This could have been a later voyage. This 
possibly indicates that the ban was a one-off. John Bernard Sweeney, Royal Commission into Alleged Payments 
to Maritime Unions (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976), 134.
18 ‘Apartheid Protest’, Socialist, 23 November 1977; Sydney Branch Waterside Workers’ Federation, Branch 
News, 12 January 1973; Kirkby, Voices from the Ships, 37.
19 ‘Pig-Iron Ban—2500 Employes [sic] May Lose Jobs’, The Age, 19 December 1938, 19; ‘Dismissed’, The 
Age, 21 December 1938, 8.
20 Lockwood, Black Armada.
21 Ibid., 253.
22 Les Symes, ‘Bread-and-Butter Internationalism’, Maritime Worker, 5 October 1976, 14.
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For Chile, however, the WWFA policy was internationalism pure and simple: 
‘that no Chilean ships and no cargoes to or from Chile will be handled on the 
Australian waterfront.’23 
Using the boycott as a political tactic against the Chilean dictatorship had the 
potential to be effective in various ways. First, there was economic loss as a 
motivator for change in the junta.24 Second, the boycott could serve to lift the 
morale of leftist forces in Chile or at the very least, individuals imprisoned 
there as well as Chileans in exile.25 Enacting a boycott was a concrete gesture 
of worldwide working-class solidarity. Anner notes that left-wing unions are 
more likely to pursue an internationalist agenda, especially internationalism 
in its more confrontational forms.26 This tendency must have been further 
exacerbated by the fact that the impact of the coup in Chile was first felt in the 
left and therefore was a ‘socialist’ issue. No-one was surprised that the SUA 
and WWFA took action, as they had the reputation of being among the most 
radical unions in Australia. In fact, Stephen Deery wrote in 1983 that political 
stoppages in Australia are very few, and mostly from stevedoring, maritime, 
building and metal industries.27 
In more than one sense, Australian maritime unionists held a ‘unique position 
in the workforce’.28 Not only was their identity internationalist but also their 
physical location was strategic, with a high percentage of primary products and 
manufactured goods passing through their jurisdiction. This was intensified by 
Australia’s geographic isolation and the topographical distance between cities, 
which necessitated reliance on sea transport. The maritime unions expressed 
solidarity through telegrams and letters, as was normal for progressive unions, 
but the difference between them and other unions was that almost all of their 
work was a potential direct action on an international issue. 
Historian Diane Kirkby has proposed that the internationalism of the SUA was 
an identification with other individuals: a person-to-person commitment that 
overcame the difficulties of action.29 Activist Mavis Robertson remembered:
There is a cultural history in Australia, perhaps because it is a continent 
that … is bound by sea … that those kind of bans have been more 
23 ‘Firmer Chile Junta Bans’, Maritime Worker, 9 March 1976, 12.
24 ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
25 Ibid.
26 Mark Anner, ‘Industrial Structure, the State, and Ideology: Shaping Labor Transnationalism in the 
Brazilian Auto Industry’, Social Science History 27, no. 4 (2003), 627.
27 Deery, ‘Union Aims and Methods’, 75.
28 Don Henderson, ‘The military coup in Chile in September 1973 had little effect on the thinking…’ 1993, 
Papers of GMM.
29 Kirkby, Voices from the Ships, 106.
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prevalent in Australia than in some other countries. It doesn’t mean that 
we are more solidarity conscious, it means … that it is a cultural right 
thing to do.30 
Both of these conclusions are true in part, but, in the case of the Chile campaign, 
internationalism was also an assertion of political identity. SUA member John 
King said, ‘because that’s what we are, we endeavour to help the underdog’.31
The SUA, as outlined above, has a proud history of international action. In 
fact, their pride was the cause of an exceptionalist attitude within the union. 
The union’s record of international actions was mentioned almost every time 
their representatives spoke at a function as if they were bastions of true 
internationalist action. That projection of identity was a simplification of the 
SUA’s actions within the broader union movement. For example, members had 
declined the invitation to crew the Boonaroo, which was shipping supplies and 
troops to Vietnam for the war.32 After threats of disciplinary action from the 
ACTU and a compulsory conference at the Arbitration Court, the SUA allowed 
members to crew the ship.33 The choice to lift a ban on the Boonaroo showed that 
however hard-line their leaders were, the SUA was not impervious to pressure 
from the rest of the labour movement.34 
In her history of the SUA, Diane Kirkby notes that the seamen had a reputation 
for being a communist-led union. While many members were politically aware 
and active, very few were actually card carriers of the CPA or SPA.35 Leaders, 
Kirkby asserts, were not elected because of their political affiliation, but because 
they were good unionists. The SUA was a democratic and collectivist union: 
democracy was built into the union’s procedures and organisation.36 It was not 
unusual to have resolutions and letters forwarded from ships, as the SUA was an 
organisation on the move, literally, and no-one was to be left out.
In 1971 the SUA had approximately 4500 members, though given the mobile 
nature of their working life, it was impossible to gather every member into a 
single meeting. The union was affiliated to the ACTU, and State labour councils 
and to the ALP in all States except the Northern Territory and Tasmania.37 
But the SUA was known to be more radical than those affiliations suggest. 
The reputation was due in part to its secretary, Eliot V. Elliott, who, as Don 
30 Robertson Interview, 2009.
31 Kirkby, Voices from the Ships, 86.
32 Schmutte, ‘International Union Activity’, 85.
33 Ibid.
34 Kirkby, Voices from the Ships, 51, 52.
35 Ibid., 26.
36 Officials were elected by ballot; port representatives and seamen were elected at stop-work meetings. 
Ibid., 141.
37 Rawson, A Handbook of Australian Trade Unions and Employees’ Associations, 84.
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Henderson quipped in 1972, had been in the SUA for ‘more years than I even 
want to think about’.38 Elliott had been a founding member of the SPA, and 
before that, a Communist Party member since 1941. He was a Leninist and a 
supporter of socialist countries until his death in 1984.39 Elliott was still a trim 
and fit man in the 1970s, with a carefully tended moustache.40 Elliott was known 
to be a straight talker, straight up and down and sometimes humourless, and 
Don Henderson told Kirkby he was a ‘very dogged fighter for human rights, the 
rights of people everywhere’.41 He was persuasive and intimidating, and believed 
SUA members had the opportunity to spread internationalist ideology around 
the world. Of Chile, Elliott wrote: ‘The struggle of the Chilean people is, in our 
opinion, the struggle of the Australian people, for the struggle of the people 
everywhere in the world under bourgeois democracy is a common struggle.’42
Elliott took a personal interest in the maintenance of the Chile boycott—for 
example, attending the Sydney branch stop-work meeting to explain the 
Holstein Express dispute.43 
Stop-work meetings were in fact essential to the functioning of the SUA and to 
their expression of Chile solidarity. Federal office reports were distributed to 
branches and then discussed at the monthly meetings, resulting in branches that 
were very well informed of official union business at the national level.44 Mick 
Carr, SUA member, said ‘all good trade unionists went to the stop work meetings’.45 
Stop-work meetings were effectively paid for by shipowners, as everyone in 
port at that time received half a day’s paid leave.46 In these circumstances it 
was easy to be good. In theory, a deck boy could propose a motion at a meeting 
that could flow back into union policy, although it was not that often that the 
rank and file went against the union leadership’s recommendations.47 Similarly 
at elections, officials were almost always retained. Even so, the discussion at 
meetings demonstrated consistent strength in anti-Chile dictatorship feeling. 
By comparison, British seamen were also generally compliant with their 
38 ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
39 Rowan Cahill, Sea Change: An Essay in Maritime Labour History (Bowral, NSW: Rowan Cahill, 1998).
40 Kirkby, Voices from the Ships, 17.
41 Ibid., 19, 20.
42 Elliott, ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
43 Extract SWM—Held Tuesday 19th December, 1978—Sydney Branch, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, NBAC: 
ANU, Canberra.
44 For example, the SUA Queensland branch called for the national office to continue discussions with 
the ACTU on the Chile issue so that the ACTU support of the boycott would be reimposed. Extract SWM 
minutes held Queensland Branch Tuesday May 2nd 1978 ref. 1422, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, NBAC: 
ANU, Canberra.
45 Kirkby, Voices from the Ships, 145.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 147–8.
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leadership’s orders; however, they were exposed to much more Chilean trade 
and consequently the prospective loss of more jobs, which influenced decision-
making on the ground.
Members of the SUA were kept informed through the Seamen’s Journal, which 
often reported on Chile. Elliott’s wife, Kondelia, was in charge of the federal 
office and the Seamen’s Journal. Given the control of the administrative hub of 
the union, the true democratic practice in the union was possibly less robust 
than has been previously put forward.48 It was the sort of democracy that Lenin, 
and Elliott, favoured: democratic centralism. One thing is certain, however, 
the Journal and the stop-work meetings were the main expressions of Chile 
solidarity within the SUA. Almeyda, executive secretary of the UP in exile, 
sent a long letter to the SUA that was republished and it served to motivate 
sailors. He wrote that the solidarity of the SUA saved lives and freed people from 
concentration camps. Almeyda put it simply: ‘the boycott holds back Pinochet’s 
plans to arrest the trade union leaders and make them disappear.’49
When the Chilean musical group Inti Illimani attended the Melbourne branch’s 
monthly meeting in April 1977, they spoke about the boycott of wheat and 
sang two songs. In response, the SUA branch produced and passed a strong 
resolution;50 however, the band did not perform for the WWFA Melbourne 
branch, even though it represented a greater number of unionists with perhaps 
more strategic power. That branch was dominated by Maoists at the time, who 
did not like the sound of the Marxist–Leninist singers.51
Of the two main unions which enacted the boycott on Chilean goods, the 
WWFA was far greater in size, industrial power and perhaps also in political 
influence. The WWFA held the most privileged position from which to 
implement a boycott action. Not only was stevedoring an unavoidable part in 
the trade between Australia and Chile, but there was also a law that stated that 
no member of a foreign crew may be engaged in the stevedoring of a ship.52 In 
addition, their membership was larger and more spread out over the continent. 
For these reasons they had more opportunities to put their boycott into action 
than the SUA: where Australian-crewed ships were only a small percentage of 
all that sailed, almost every ship that came into Australia would be touched in 
some way by WWFA members. In contrast with the SUA, the organisation did 
not widely publicise its threatened Chile action in its journal despite, or perhaps 
because of, its actions’ potential greater efficacy.
48 Kirkby, Voices from the Ships, 149, 154.
49 ‘Trade Boycott—Unidad Popular Chile’s Warm Gratitude for S.U.A. Solidarity’, Seamen’s Journal 33, no. 
4 (April 1978), 94.
50 Report on the Tour of Inti Illimani (Melbourne 5.4.77), Papers of GMM.
51 Hewett Interview, 2005.
52 The Navigation Act, s. 45(1), as quoted in Sweeney, Royal Commission into Alleged Payments to Maritime 
Unions, 132.
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In 1976, the WWFA had members in every Australian port working in 
stevedoring.53 The union was affiliated to the ACTU (at State and national levels) 
and the ALP in all States. Between 1965 and 1975, the WWFA membership 
had fallen from 23 000 to just more than 13 000 due to new technologies on the 
wharf.54 Ironically, considering the dramatic loss of members, the 1973 elections 
started a period of organisational stability for the national WWFA. At the next 
four elections, Leo Lenane, Tas Bull, Charlie Fitzgibbon and Neil Docker were all 
re-elected at the national level.55
Though the WWFA was often presented as the epitome of the ‘communist 
menace’ union, this was not necessarily the case.56 Card-carrying communists 
were in fact a minority throughout the WWFA. Margo Beasley noted in her 
history of the union that although the fact that ‘there was a strong ideological 
base to the WWF’s industrial strategy is unquestionably true … it was much 
broader than purely communist in inspiration’.57 Traditional militancy came out 
of bad working conditions rather than any advanced class consciousness. In fact, 
the union was a politically diverse organisation. Mavis Robertson remembered 
that the WWFA at the national level ‘was a mixed group of people, and as long 
as Tas [Bull] was there … you had a rational kind of leadership, not an irrational 
one. (They weren’t vying for positions to go to Moscow, the last thing they 
would want to do probably).’58
There was also diversity at the lower levels. The Port Melbourne branch was 
dominated by Maoists and five of its members travelled on a 1975 delegation 
to China.59 By contrast, the Sydney branch in particular was not completely 
dominated by any one party, though there were many CPA and SPA-influenced 
members. Among the most vocal were probably those affiliated to the SPA. 
Stephen Deery commented that of all Australian unions, the WWFA ‘has 
perhaps shown the most persistent level of industrial activity in socio-political 
issues’,60 and this fact drew criticism from within the union movement. The 
wharfies were seen as possibly challenging the constitutional government by 
using industrial tactics to try to influence parliamentary proceedings or foreign 
policy.61 In actuality, despite the perception of consistent militant political 
53 Ibid.
54 Bull, Tas Bull, An Autobiography, 141. In 1971, the WWFA had 16 113 members spread over every 
State of Australia. Rawson, A Handbook of Australian Trade Unions and Employees’ Associations, 94; Beasley, 
Wharfies, 228.
55 Three-year terms. Bull, Tas Bull, An Autobiography, 144.
56 Beasley, Wharfies, 140.
57 Ibid., 142.
58 Robertson Interview, 2009.
59 WWFA Melbourne Branch, Official Branch News, 28 July 1975.
60 Deery, ‘Union Aims and Methods’, 75.
61 Ibid., 76.
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action by the WWFA, most of the disputes the union was involved in were 
industrial in nature (for example, for safety or wet weather gear) and the union 
did not always take up the call to boycott.62
Even with its strong tradition of internationalist sentiment, the WWFA joined 
the ITF only in 1971. When they did so, Charlie Fitzgibbon, general secretary, 
was immediately appointed to its executive council.63 It was through the ITF that 
the WWFA took up a highly publicised flags-of-convenience shipping campaign, 
which was an economic, industrial and human rights issue. The international 
movement seemed to benefit from Australia’s involvement in general, as 
Australians (especially in the maritime unions) were willing to act. Australia’s 
geographic position also gave credence to the claim of worldwide support. 
About the same time as the union joined the ITF, Tas Bull became federal 
organiser of the WWFA.64 Bull had a strong international bent. You could say 
that internationalism was one of his passions—which was apt considering his 
first name (Tasnor) was a conglomerate of Tasmania and Norway, the birthplaces 
of his parents.65 He was a long-term maritime worker and he spent some of his 
youth abroad as a seaman. Bull had been a member of the CPA until 1956 and 
joined the ALP in 1974.66 He was, at one stage, chair of the Hunters Hill ALP.67 
Bull was a well-known trade union figure in the 1970s and 1980s, and also 
worked himself into prominence in the ACTU. His complex web of political 
connections, strong commitment to internationalism of all types and personal 
affinity with Latin America made him prominent and useful in the Chile 
solidarity movement in Australia.68 The affinity was due, at least in part, to his 
wife, Carmen, who was Argentinean. 
Tas Bull and his wife travelled to Chile in 1971 for the first anniversary of the 
election of Allende. They celebrated alongside Chileans in the National Stadium, 
which later became a concentration camp in the first days of the military regime.69 
At meetings in Sydney in September 1973, Bull drew on those brief experiences. 
Yet despite his personal feelings, he remained aloof from the organisational side 
of the movement. He was not a member of the CSCP and he did not attend 
62 Tom Bramble has noted the conservative industrial practice of some CPA union leaders and furthermore 
lists examples of the WWFA’s non-support of other strikes such as by the Mt Isa Copper Miners in 1964. 
Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia, 21, 34. 
63 Bull, Tas Bull, An Autobiography, 131; Fitzgibbon (WWFA) to McGahen (CSCP), March 21, 1977, Papers 
of GMM.
64 Bull was federal organiser of the WWFA from 1971 to 1983. Rowan Cahill, ‘Obituary: Tas Bull (31.01.1932–
29.05.2003)’, Labour History, no. 85 (2003).
65 Ibid.
66 Bull, Tas Bull, An Autobiography, 148.
67 Shane Bentley, ‘Tribute to Labor Leader Tas Bull’, Maritime Workers Journal, July 2003.
68 Bull was director of the Cuban Children’s Fund until his death, and spent his seventieth birthday in that 
country. Bull, Tas Bull, An Autobiography.
69 Montenegro, ‘La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–1990’, 226.
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committee meetings regularly, if at all. Mavis Robertson remembered that he 
‘felt things with his heart’ about Latin America, but the Chile issue ‘was not 
the centre of his life’.70 He was sensible in terms of deploying his own, and his 
union’s, resources. 
In more than one sense, maritime unions cooperated amongst themselves and 
took initiative in expressing Chile solidarity. They shared some of the public 
relations burden of the boycott. Sometimes, they acted under a unified banner 
called the Water Transport Group of Unions, which also included the Firemen 
and Deckhands Union of New South Wales (FDU).71 For example, the group held 
a buffet lunch in honour of the visit of Chilean Hugo Miranda in July 1977. 
Miranda had been a senator for eight years and a member of the UP Government. 
He survived two years as a political prisoner in Dawson Island and after his 
release resided as an exile in Mexico.72 As a guest of the CSCP Sydney, Miranda 
was treated to lunch and spoke to the group along with Benson (SUA Sydney), 
Elliott, John Healy73 and Henderson.
Don Henderson verbosely welcomed Miranda:
Comrade Hugo Miranda is here to acquaint us, if we need to be acquainted, 
with the problems that are today confronting the progressive forces of 
Chile and have confronted those people since September 11, 1973. 
I remember that day for two reasons: because of the destruction of 
democracy in that country and the brutal murder of Allende and some 
of the other people; and because it happens to be my birthday.74
Henderson was the secretary of the FDU, a small NSW-based union, whose 670 
members (in 1971) mainly worked on the Sydney ferries. While it was affiliated 
to the NSW Labour Council, the union was not an affiliate of the NSW ALP.75 
Henderson did not attend all meetings of the CSCP, but went to many. He was 
most active, it seemed, in the international-level solidarity scene, as described in 
Chapter Six. He was often sent to represent the maritime unions at international 
conferences, and the influence he had within the WWFA and SUA was due to 
his network of SPA contacts. 
70 Robertson Interview, 2009.
71 The FDU was described as a ‘kindred union’ of the WWFA Sydney branch. Waterside Workers’ 
Federation, Branch News, 23 February 1973.
72 ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
73 John Healy, son of Jim Healy, legendary waterside leader and CPA member. ‘Jim Healy’s Cargo Hook’, 
Maritime Worker, 4 November 1975, 5; Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia, 21.
74 ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
75 Rawson, A Handbook of Australian Trade Unions and Employees’ Associations, 55.
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Henderson had joined the SUA as a deck boy in 1940, and prominent SPA 
member Eliot Elliott acted as his political mentor.76 His experiences as a deck 
boy on a hospital ship during World War II influenced his anti-war stance.77 By 
1947, with the birth of his first child, he had started work on tugs and moved 
over to the FDU. Henderson joined his local ALP branch at one stage, trying to 
infiltrate them and spread SPA sympathy, but when the plot was discovered, he 
was expelled along with 16 other branch members.78
Henderson’s commitment to Chile and his SPA membership made him an important 
figure in the first years of the campaign in Sydney. The combination of his political 
affiliation and the relatively small size of his union allowed him the time and 
gave him the drive to devote himself to the Chile cause. Henderson occasionally 
spoke for a more substantial amount of workers and the Australian solidarity 
movement than his union position actually warranted. To those involved in the 
SPA faction of the Australian left, Henderson ‘was a very important player’ in 
Chile solidarity.79 To those in the CPA stream, he ‘strutted around’ on the world 
stage due to the maritime union and SPA support. His union position was not as 
fixed or as broadly representative as, for example, Jim Baird of the AMWU, yet 
he keenly participated in the kind of ‘prolier than thou’ attitude described by 
Burgmann.80 In reality, however, it was the small size of his union that was key in 
the high level of his involvement: he had time on his hands.
Though his political affiliation meant he probably helped more resident Chilean 
Communist Party members than people from other groups, activists reminisced 
that he did try to bridge both the political gap and the gap between union 
and CSCP.81 He was ‘a nice man’, recalled Mavis Robertson, and Ferguson 
remembered his dedication to the cause.82 
Well before the Chilean coup, in August 1972, the Waterside Workers’ Federation 
of Australia sent a letter to Salvador Allende. They expressed their admiration 
for the UP and the Chilean people and their attempts to implement a progressive 
socialist program. They wrote: ‘We are conscious that there are many powerful 
forces throughout the world and particularly in the North American continent 
who will do everything within their power to frustrate your efforts to build a 
new people’s democratic society in Chile.’
More than just anti-imperialist sentiment, the Waterside Workers expressed 
particular sympathy with Chile. The letter continued: ‘Our interest is 
76 Kirkby, Voices from the Ships, 19.
77 Ibid., 40.
78 Ibid., 30.
79 Ferguson Interview, 2009.
80 Burgmann and Burgmann, Green Bans, Red Union, 54.
81 Robertson Interview, 2009.
82 Ibid.; Ferguson Interview, 2009.
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particularly related to the fact that this is the first such effort to build a new 
society in the Southern Hemisphere and in particular in our own region—the 
South Pacific area.’83
With this support of the UP Government and the general hypersensitivity of 
the Australian left to capitalist imperialism, it was no surprise that immediately 
after the coup the WWFA Federal Council released a press statement stating its 
abhorrence to the happenings in Chile. 
But it did not call for a boycott.84 
At the All Ports Conference on 19 September 1973, the motion was carried 
with an addendum initiated by the Sydney WWFA branch: that all branches 
take industrial action against the military government in Chile.85 This bears 
close similarity to the manner in which the rank and file from Rolls Royce East 
Kilbride forced a revision of the original executive’s Chile decision in Britain as 
described in Chapter Four. The WWFA All Ports Conference also declared that 
the coup proved there had been CIA interference in Chile, and called upon the 
Australian Government to raise the matter at the United Nations. 
Similarly, the National Secretariat of the SUA immediately condemned the coup 
publicly by publishing a denunciation in the Seamen’s Journal in September 
1973.86 In the first stop-work meeting after the coup, Sydney seamen urged 
the federal office to place a boycott on Chilean trade and soon the boycott was 
official SUA policy. 87 The Committee of Management decision did not directly 
call for a boycott, but for members to participate in mobilisation against the 
Chilean Government.88
It would be months before any industrial action was taken on ships trading 
with Chile and the main export affected would be wheat.
83 Letter to President Salvador Allende from WWF of Australia, 4 August 1972.
84 Press Statement by Federal Council Waterside Workers’ Fed. of Aust. Re: Chile, Sept 13 1973.
85 Interestingly, the Federal Council passed a resolution that did not call for industrial action, or the 
mention of it was not published in the Sydney Branch Waterside Workers’ Federation Branch News. The All 
Ports Conference is the first official mention of industrial action. All Ports Conference—extract 26, September 
19 1973, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Maritime Worker, 23 October 1973, 4; 
‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
86 Montenegro, ‘La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–1990’, 224.
87 This call for boycott was repeated in the Tribune: ‘Australian union should also urgently consider a 
boycott of all Chilean goods imported into Australia and the cutting of communications and other links, 
with thousands of Chilean workers dead, being tortured and bombed in the factories run previously under 
workers’ control and which they are now so heroically defending, the duty of unions here is clear. Words of 
solidarity are valuable, but become somewhat hollow if not backed with deeds.’ ‘Chile Cargo Ban’, Tribune 
[Australia], 2–8 October 1973.
88 1973, National C.O.M Meeting (SUA), Papers of GMM. In fact, the first published SUA call for the direct 
boycott of Chilean trade was after Don Henderson attended the Mexico City International Commission of 
Enquiry into the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile. T. A Curphey, ‘Need Stressed for More Union Action 
against Chile Junta’, Seamen’s Journal (May 1975).
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The first substantial sale of wheat to Chile in many years occurred in 1966 and 
remained relatively steady until a significant increase in the early 1970s.89 This 
was in part due to an amplification of the area sown to wheat and in the yield per 
acre, which placed pressure on the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) to find extra 
markets for the bumper crops. Transport strikes in Chile had caused many local 
crops to be spoiled and made Chile an ideal customer for Australian wheat.90 
In 1972 Dr Pedro Bosch, representing the Chilean grain-buying authority 
Empresa de Comercio Agrícola, visited Australia and negotiated the third sale of 
wheat to Chile for the 1972 season. He was undoubtedly shown a very good time 
while he was here, as all business the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) undertook 
was ‘highly personalised’.91 A total of 600 000 t of wheat was sold to Chile in 
that year. The contracts secured Chile 7 per cent of the total Australian wheat 
exports and earned it the ranking of Australia’s fourth-largest wheat customer 
for 1972.92 In July 1973 Dr Bosch and the AWB negotiated large sales to Chile 
while the Allende Government was still in power. The wheat was to be shipped 
early in 1974 but the coup occurred before this could take place. 
Wheat was by far the biggest commodity exported to Chile prior to the coup; but 
even with the large wheat contracts, Chile never reached 0.01 (one hundredth 
of 1 per cent) of total Australian exports.93 Other items that consistently exited 
Australia labelled for Chile included grass seeds of various types, agricultural 
products such as canned fruits, machinery parts and safety equipment. There 
were also miscellaneous items such as four breeding sheep in the 1968–69 
financial year and artificial limbs in the 1969–70 financial year. The major 
imports from Chile were marine products both for human consumption (hake 
fillets) and in the form of meal to be fed to animals or used as fertilisers.94 
Wheat is an important product to Australia and Australians, not only because of 
its monetary value, but also because it is an integral part of Australia’s psyche. 
The golden wheatfields, ‘boundless plains’ and ‘nature’s gifts’, as well as the 
salt-of-the-earth farmers who ‘toil with hearts and hands’ were integral to 
Australia’s identity and history (as demonstrated in the national anthem). The 
first wheat in Australia was sown by convicts on the government farm where the 
89 The 1966 season is not included on the graph because the amount is only included in bushels (not tonnes). 
Australian Wheat Board [hereinafter AWB], Wheat Australia Annual Report (Melbourne: AWB, various years).
90 Seasons are measured from 1 December of the previous year to 30 November of the year listed. The area 
sown to wheat was up by 21 per cent in 1974. AWB, Wheat Australia Annual Report (1974).
91 Greg Whitwell, Diane Sydenham and AWB, A Shared Harvest: The Australian Wheat Industry, 1939–
1989 (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1991), 237.
92 ‘Chile Buys Again’, Wheat Australia 5, no. 4 (1972).
93 The highest percentage was 0.006790475 per cent in 1972–73: Australian Bureau of Statistics [hereinafter 
ABS], Australian Exports, Country by Commodity, ABS 5414.0 (Canberra: ABS, 1973–74).
94 Import statistics and descriptions compiled from ABS, Australian Imports, Country by Commodity, ABS 
5414.0 (Canberra: ABS, 1965–84).
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Sydney botanic gardens are now located.95 The iconic image of the great Aussie 
battler was played on by the AWB in its self-congratulatory 1967 publication 
when it said that the wheat industry started from a ‘humble beginning’ and 
from that ‘a great primary industry has developed’.96 In the 1960s wheat made 
up as much as 15 per cent of the total national income from exports and it 
continued to be a vital part of the Australian economy.97 
By the 1970s, Australia was the third-largest wheat exporter in the world. 
Economic historian Greg Whitwell characterised the period 1974–89 as ‘the 
drive for greater efficiency’ in the wheat industry in Australia.98 In 1978, 70 
per cent of all wheat grown in Australia was sold for export, explaining the 
preoccupation of the AWB with external markets.99 Chile, especially after the 
contracts of the Allende years, had become an important wheat customer.100 
The AWB was a government-controlled authority that had a monopoly on the 
acquisition and sale of wheat in domestic and international markets.101 The main 
objective of the AWB was to raise and stabilise the incomes of Australian wheat 
growers. While a single desk, State-run enterprise might not maximise profits 
per se, it does aim to make money secure and regular for its suppliers.102 
The Wheat Board’s composition was shaped by the domestic politics of the era.103 
Four of the board members were selected by the Minister for Primary Industry 
and the federal acts provided that the minister could ‘direct’ the board.104 This 
rarely happened, and it was more often that Canberra reacted to the AWB’s 
decisions rather than ordering a course of action. There were two published 
interventions, one in 1967 and one in the early 1970s. Neither had anything 
to do with Chile.105 Given the Whitlam Government’s insistence that credit be 
offered to Egypt in the 1970s, and the previous use of the AWB in 1967 as a 
95 AWB, Wheat Growing: A Great Australian Primary Industry (Melbourne: AWB, c. 1967).
96 Ibid., 4.
97 E. J. Donath, ‘The Australian Wheat Industry in the 1970s’, Australian Outlook 23, no. 3 (1969), 296.
98 Whitwell, Sydenham and AWB, A Shared Harvest, 191.
99 AWB, Wheat Australia Annual Report (1978), 3.
100 I contacted the AWB various times to ask for information or interviews about the boycotts. The AWB 
did not reply.
101 AWB, Corporate History, accessed 30 April 2009, <http://www.awb.com.au/aboutawb/corporate/
history/>; Steve McCorriston and Donald MacLaren, ‘Single-Desk State Trading Exporters’, European 
Journal of Political Economy 21 (2005), 505; Steve McCorriston and Donald MacLaren, ‘Deregulation as 
(Welfare Reducing) Trade Reform: The Case of the Australian Wheat Board’, American Agricultural Economics 
Association 89, no. 3 (2007), 638.
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‘tool of foreign policy’, it is not a stretch of the imagination to envisage that 
the contracts entered into with the Allende Government may have had some 
political element.106 But it was not necessarily so. 
Rather than the elected and selected board members, it was actually the 
management of the AWB that ran the everyday negotiations of the organisation. 
They applied their substantial weight to decisions within the organisation. The 
general manager until 1977 was L. H. Dorman, who had previous experience in 
international grain companies and had worked at the AWB since 1939, seeing 
the board through many political decisions. He would turn up at an ACTU 
meeting in the near future.107
The board’s attitude to the maritime bans on Chile was that they were ‘pointless 
(as well as being costly and inconvenient)’.108 If there was a hole in the market, 
they argued, someone else would simply fill it. Caroline Overington, writing 
about the AWB scandal in Iraq in 2007, wrote that AWB executives ‘were not 
callous, but, in the course of doing business abroad, Australian executives are 
routinely forced to deal with all manner of dictators, thugs and murderers … 
AWB’s only interest was trade—specifically, trade that would benefit Australia’s 
… wheat farmers’.109 
Though written more than 30 years after the wheat trade with Chile’s dictatorship 
started, the words still ring true.
The first direct action taken to enforce the trade union boycott was in May 1974 
on two vessels owned by Indomar Limited (Bahamas): Jag Shanti and Star Lily. 
This was almost certainly not the first Chilean trade to enter or exit Australia 
since the coup, but perhaps it was the first time when the balance between 
ideology, economics and opportunity was perfect. The ships were contracted to 
load wheat for Chile but were boycotted by the maritime unions in Fremantle.110 
At first the SUA refused to tug the vessels ashore. After prompting by the ACTU, 
the vessels were tugged, but not loaded. 
The Wheat Board organised a meeting with the ACTU, who were significantly 
less politically radical than the maritime unions. The AWB hoped that this would 
make them more receptive to capitalist reasoning and that maritime unions 
would in turn be receptive to the authority of the ACTU. The AWB argued 




109 Caroline Overington, Kickback: Inside the Australian Wheat Board Scandal (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
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110 Hetherington Kingsbury Pty. Ltd to T. Bull (WWFA) re: Proposed Ban Chilean Cargoes, May 20 1974, 
WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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the Allende Government. They informed the ACTU that the vessels were under 
the charter of the AWB, and consequently any delay to them was costing the 
Australian Government. The AWB also argued that Chile could easily acquire 
wheat from the United States at a cheaper price, reducing the effect of any 
boycott as a method of punishing the military government.111 A very similar 
argument was put to the WWFA in the 1960s when the AWB feared the loss 
of the East Indies market due to the action the wharfies were taking to aid 
Indonesian independence.112 
Hetherington Kingsbury, agents for Maritime Chartering Services Incorporated 
of Connecticut, who were, in turn, agents for Indomar Limited, pressured the 
WWFA directly to lift the boycott. The agents said that while they were mindful 
of the union’s aims in holding a boycott, Indomar had ‘no involvement in any 
ideological/political conflict’.113 Though the WWFA was responsible for the 
greater part of the wheat boycott, wheat for Chile only made it into the pages 
of the Maritime Worker once.114 This fits with the general reporting pattern of 
political action against Chile by the WWFA: very minimal.
The WWFA contacted the Wheat Board because they were concerned about the 
contractual obligations the board had with the previous Government of Chile. 
The AWB had, in fact, just signed a new contract with the representative of the 
new military regime in February 1974 and four more shipments of wheat were 
set to sail in June of that year. Two vessels had been chartered for this purpose. 
The WWFA, considerate of the Wheat Board’s contractual obligations and 
the financial consequences that breaking them would have on the Australian 
Government, offered to load the remaining vessels on the condition that no 
further contracts were entered into with the dictatorship. The AWB reluctantly 
agreed to these terms, happy to meet their current contractual obligations, but 
wounded at the loss of their recently engaged fourth-largest customer. 
The maritime boycott was not restricted to ships loading wheat. When the 
Esmeralda, a Chilean naval sailing ship used in the first days of the coup as 
a torture centre, attempted to visit Sydney in 1974 she was blocked by the 
WWFA.115 A year later, in September 1975, Melbourne rank-and-file tug men 
111 Memo re: Shipping—Wheat Shipments to Chile, June 3 1974, WWFA: Federal Office, N144/932, NBAC: 
ANU, Canberra.
112 Lockwood, Black Armada, 228.
113 Hetherington Kingsbury Pty. Ltd to T. Bull (WWFA) re: Proposed Ban Chilean Cargoes. Minter, Simpson 
and Co (Solicitors and Notaries), later contacted the WWFA for information on the boycott of 23–29 May 1974. 
Indomar tried to sue the AWB for losses. Minter, Simpson and Co to Fitzgibbon (WWFA), November 11 1974, 
WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra. Baird recalled that ‘Chilean leaders said that the 
Junta was very anxious to placate Australia, because it desperately needed our wheat’. Baird, ‘Chilean Junta 
on Trial before I.L.O.’.
114 Maritime Worker, 4 March 1975, 2.
115 ‘Block the Esmeralda!’, Tribune [Australia], 4–10 June 1974, 12; Maritime Worker, 10 September 1974, 
6. For information on the Esmeralda, see: Amnesty International, Chile: Torture and the Naval Training Ship 
the ‘Esmeralda’, AMR 22/006/2003 (London: Amnesty International, International Secretariat, 2003).
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(SUA) refused to tug another ship, Austral Entente (USA), in protest of the United 
States’ involvement in the coup in Chile.116 This was an entirely opportunistic 
action on the anniversary of the coup. The Chilean registered Viña del Mar was 
boycotted in Dampier, Western Australia, by the SUA at the end of the 1980s. 
It was attempting to load 100 000 t of iron ore for Western Europe. It sailed 
with no cargo nine days after arriving.117 Conversely, all through the early 1980s 
shipments of rutile (TiO2—found mainly in the Murray Basin of Victoria and 
New South Wales) were successfully sent to Chile. Australia holds 44 per cent of 
the world’s known rutile deposits and thus a substantial portion of the world’s 
market, but this was not a target of union harassment. Boycotting trade with 
Chile was not without risks for the workers. Section 30K of the Commonwealth 
Crimes Act (1914) outlawed interference with overseas or interstate trade, and 
the workers doing so could be arrested and potentially jailed. In 1978, the SUA 
and individuals within the union were summonsed in Western Australia over 
their bans on Indonesian-flagged ships. The person who initiated action under 
the Crimes Act was a representative of West Farmers.118 
Section 45D of the Trades Practices Act 1974 also prohibited secondary 
boycott, ban or strike action that occurred within Australian workplaces.119 
The individual, the union representative and the union could all be held 
responsible if this did occur. Interestingly, Section 45DD allowed for boycotts 
with the purpose of environmental protection, and Section 88(7) stated that 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) could grant 
permission for a secondary boycott—that is, an industrial action with a non-
industrial objective. Without that permission, however, the boycott against 
Chile was illegal. John Garrett of the SUA recalled the danger of refusing to 
tug Chilean ships: the NSW Crimes Act was still in force and the NSW Liberal 
Government (1965–75) was active in oppressing any political activity that was 
not in the national interest.120 Margo Beasley noted that in the 1950s when Jim 
Healy of the WWFA was arrested due to political actions on the wharves, it was 
only due to the fact that those campaigns were ‘major and effective interventions 
116 ‘Chile Venceremos’, Tribune [Australia], 16 September 1975; Carr (Co-Convenor, Australian CSCP) to the 
President (Continuing Liaison Council World Congress of Peace Forces) 27.10.75, Papers of Barry Carr.
117 Montenegro, ‘La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–1990’, 204; ‘Chilean Registered 
Vina del Mar’, Seamen’s Journal 35, no. 3 (April 1980), 55. The agents for the Vina del Mar asked the SUA if 
they would be able to load again in 1981. The SUA refused. ‘Chile Alert’, Seamen’s Journal 36, no. 2 (February 
1981), 43.
118 Extract SWM Minutes Victorian Branch 31/1/78. ref. 628, 31 January 1978, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, 
NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Extract SWM Minutes W.A. Branch 31/1/78 Ref. 676, 31 January 1978, SUA: Federal 
Office, N38/299, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
119 Primary boycotts are actions taken with the purpose of protesting industrial concerns in that place 
of work. Secondary boycotts are with aims that do not fall into that category. Bramble, Trade Unionism in 
Australia, 104.
120 Kirkby, Voices from the Ships, 105.
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in international affairs’.121 She was referring to the Dutch shipping ban, which 
also put substantial pressure on the AWB. If this is true, perhaps the relatively 
small amount of trade with Chile protected the workers to some extent.
The law was not the only negative pressure on maritime unions. There was 
considerable insistence that they drop their black ban on trade with Chile in 
a number of forums, not just with the Wheat Board and shipping agents. Don 
Henderson reported that there were ‘verbal conflicts with farmers’ organisations, 
reactionary politicians and their supporters’ on various occasions.122 Resistance 
to the boycott came with two main arguments: concern about the boycott’s 
humanitarian impact and anxiety about its effect on Australian business. It soon 
became clear that support for the boycott of Chilean trade was not a given even 
among unionists. 
In the first instance, the ACTU’s attitude had been to support the boycott; but by 
22 January 1975, representatives of the Storemen and Packers, Marine Stewards, 
Federated Shipwrights, the WWFA and the SUA, plus Bob Hawke and Harold 
Souter of the ACTU, met with three representatives of the AWB.123 Hawke had 
called the meeting immediately upon receipt of a letter from the then chairman 
of the AWB, Jack Cass, requesting it.124 The ACTU representatives, in a slightly 
ambiguous position, tried to mediate between the unionists and the Wheat Board 
representatives. The AWB maintained that wheat was the only product that 
was exported to Chile in any substantial amount (see Figure 8.1). AWB general 
manager Dorman argued that cutting off the supply of wheat because of the 
boycotts could harm the long-term export market for Australian wheat. Wilson 
of the SUA, Tas Bull of the WWFA and Campbell of the Federated Shipwrights 
(soon to amalgamate with the AMWU) stood firm. There would be no wheat 
shipments to Chile, despite the supposed humanitarian and business concerns.125
The shipments already negotiated were sent, and no wheat was thereafter 
contracted to Chile, as demonstrated in Figure 8.1. With the exclusion of wheat 
from the export list, the total value of exports to Chile dropped to an all time low 
121 Beasley, Wharfies, 152.
122 ‘Wider Union Bans on Chile Junta’, Modern Unionist 3, no. 1 (1975).
123 The AWB representatives were chairman, J. Cass OBE; general manager, L. Dorman OBE; and South 
Australian grower representative, T. M. Saint. Australian Council of Trade Unions RE: Exports of Wheat to 
Chile, Jan 20 1975, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; Australian Wheat Board to 
Hawke RE: Chile, January 20 1975, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
124 Sir John Cass, NSW wheat grower, was selected as chairman by outgoing Minister for Primary Industry 
and Country Party leader, Ian Sinclair, against the previous chairman’s wishes. Cass was the first chairman 
who took an active interest in the day-to-day running of the AWB. Whitwell, Sydenham and AWB, A Shared 
Harvest, 239.
125 Minutes of Meeting of Unions with Representatives of the AWB to Chile held in the ACTU Board Room 
on Wednesday. 22nd January, 1975, commencing at 2.15pm, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, 
Canberra; ‘General Secretary’, February 7 1975, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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of only $157 000 in 1976.126 The reduction was dramatic, but the WWFA was 
aware that a small amount of trade was slipping through, and in the Maritime 
Worker asked all branches to redouble their efforts.127
Figure 8.1 Wheat Percentage of Total Exports to Chile, 1968–69 to 
1977–78.
Source: ABS, Australian Exports, Country by Commodity.
Some of the goods may have been exported by being transhipped—that is, 
labelled for another place before being sent to Chile.128 In 1977 John Healy 
reminded the maritime workers to be on the lookout: ‘At a couple of terminals 
they tried to sneak containers that had been shipped via Europe. Some of our 
boys have been very alert and they noticed Chilean copper and we said, “that 
goes back on the ship and goes back where it came from”.’129
Despite transhipping, the efficiency of the maritime unions’ stranglehold on 
trade led to the intensification of pressure aimed at them. Stewart A. Anderson, 
president of the Bendigo Trades Hall Council, a trade unionist and the ALP 
candidate for Bendigo in the heart of Victoria’s golden triangle, sent a concerned 
letter to the AMWU detailing his apprehension about the moral and political 
126 ABS, Australian Exports, Country by Commodity (1975–76, 1976–77, 1977–78).
127 ‘Firmer Chile Junta Bans’.
128 Henderson, ‘The military coup in Chile in September 1973 had little effect on the thinking…’, 1993.
129 Healy, ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
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implications of a ban on wheat shipments to Chile. Acknowledging that a 
guarantee could not be given that the wheat would reach the needy, he still 
wondered: how could the democratic situation in Chile improve with no bread?130
The accusation that denying wheat to Chile was in fact starving the Chilean 
people was rebutted by the AMWSU Commonwealth Council in a standard letter. 
In it the union argued that the ILO and the UP in exile had requested boycotts 
on basic materials to Chile, and that the military government had not restored 
subsidies for low-income earners to purchase grain, therefore little would get 
through to the workers.131 In information circulated in 1977 by the CSCP, it was 
noted that the wheat sold to Chile was used for fodder. That is, it would be 
eaten by animals, not humans, and ‘it will fatten up meat for the tables of the 
wealthy’.132 The AMWSU, WWFA and SUA stood by the assertion that bans on 
trade to Chile were a valid method of putting pressure on the military government 
and the humanitarian repercussions of the boycotts were non-existent. 
A similar response was given to the Continental Overseas Corporation (USA) 
on 28 October 1974. Buyers in Chile had approached the company to import 
Australian meat. The 1972–73 financial year had seen a substantial amount of 
meat ($5.1 million) exported to Chile.133 Australian exporters therefore backed 
the 1974 proposal of approximately 1000 tonnes of frozen meat (approximately 
one-fifth of the 1972–73 meat export to Chile), and the Australasian Meat 
Industry Employees Union supported the sale, but the WWFA was defiant.134 
The Continental Overseas Corporation telexed the Department of Agriculture 
seeking advice, which wrote to the Department of Labour and Immigration, 
which in turn wrote to the WWFA.135 The Continental Overseas Corporation 
had expressed common concerns over the boycotts: that it was damaging their 
business, Australia’s reputation and her long-term export prospects. 
Putting forward a similar argument in a separate union and business alliance, 
a representative of the Federated Cold Storage and Meat Preserving Employees 
Union of Australia wrote to the ACTU enclosing a letter from the general 
130 Stewart Anderson to Fitzgibbon (WWFA), January 20 1975, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: 
ANU, Canberra.
131 AMWU Commonwealth Council to S. Anderson, Branch Secretary, Bendigo RE: Chilean Grain Boycott, 
February 6 1975, WWFA: Federal Office, N113/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
132 The trade Boycott of Wheat Sales to Chile, March 1977, Papers of GMM. This fact is backed up by the 
statistics that note that only unmilled wheat went to Chile. This is considered unfit for human consumption. 
ABS, Australian Exports, Country by Commodity (1974–75 – 1988–89).
133 ABS, Australian Exports, Country by Commodity (1972–73).
134 This is even though their representatives had signed petitions for the release of political prisoners 
in Chile: Clodimoro Almeida, Anselmo Sule, Pedro Felipe Ramirez and Luis Corvalan. Sule later visited the 
WWFA offices in Sydney. Letter to Cardinal Monsignor Silva Henriquez, May 15 1974, WWFA: Federal Office, 
N113/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; ‘Chilean Terror’, Maritime Worker, 27 May 1975, 6.
135 From Department of Agriculture, Canberra. to M. Ryan, Department of Labour and Immigration, 
Melbourne, RE: Meat to Chile, October 28 1974, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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manager of Murray Goulburn Cooperative Company, about exports to Chile. 
The general manager recalled that before the dictatorship, Australia had been 
exporting dairy products to Chile, and this had all but come to a stop due 
to the WWFA ban (which he specifically mentioned rather than ‘maritime’, 
unwittingly leaving a tantalising hint as to the effective player in this action).136 
This trade had topped $605 805 in 1972–73 from a low of $3000 in 1968–69.137 
In 1980, Chile would import 21 000 tonnes of dairy product from the European 
Economic Community. It was argued that up to 40 per cent of that could be 
replaced with Australian product owing to the decreased transport costs across 
the southern hemisphere. The Cold Storage and Meat Preservers did not see a 
point in denying Chileans’ food or Australian workers’ opportunities.138 It was 
a familiar refrain: external political gain outweighed concerns for employment.
ACTU president, Bob Hawke, told the SUA in 1979 that trade was being diverted 
around the boycott to other countries to our detriment.139 He tried to assure 
the SUA that the international labour movement would act eventually against 
the Pinochet regime.140 He argued that continued pressure from the SUA would 
reduce the influence of the forthcoming two-day international boycott to be 
organised by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). 
Elliott, however, was already on the record as saying that ‘the Chile wheat ban 
is a matter of principle before earning’.141 Similarly, Henderson of the Firemen 
and Deckhands believed government and business put profit before people, and 
‘it is one thing to pay lip service to freedom and democracy, it is another thing 
if you are talking through your pocket’.142 The AMWU published a pamphlet 
that declared: ‘nothing exported to Chile is for [the workers], it is for the elite 
minority who live in luxury while millions are persecuted and starved.’143
Peter Nolan, secretary of the ACTU, was explicit in a circular to the 15 unions 
involved in sea transport in 1978. Not only was the boycott detrimental to 
workers in Australia, but also there had been a threat of legal action from 
farmers’ associations. He questioned why boycotts had not been placed on 
other regimes and attempted to weaken the moral position of the maritime 
unions. For example, why was there a blanket ban on Chile and only a partial 
ban on Indonesia? The final point Nolan made was that although international 
136 Gallagher (Secretary Federated Cold Storage and Meat Preserving Employees Union of Australia Vic/Tas 
Branch) to Nolan (Secretary ACTU), 19 August 1980, ACTU, N147/285 ‘Bans on Chile, 1978–1979’, NBAC: 
ANU, Canberra.
137 ABS, Australian Exports, Country by Commodity (1968–69, 1972–73).
138 Gallagher (Secretary Federated Cold Storage and Meat Preserving Employees Union of Australia Vic/Tas 
Branch) to Nolan (Secretary ACTU), 19 August 1980.
139 Hawke had also had some sort of confrontation with Henderson in early 1978 over the Chile boycott 
issue. Extract SWM Minutes Victorian Branch 31.1.78 Ref. 628, 31 January 1978.
140 ‘Hawke Opens Conference’, Seamen’s Journal 34, no. 3 (March–April 1979), 54.
141 Montenegro, ‘La Campaña de Solidaridad con Chile en Australia 1973–1990’, 206.
142 Henderson, ‘The military coup in Chile in September 1973 had little effect on the thinking…’, 1993.
143 Amalgamated Metalworkers and Shipwrights Union (Australia), Chile!.
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organisations condemned the regime, why were Australia and New Zealand the 
only ones holding a boycott? Even Eastern-bloc countries had continued to 
trade with Chile.144 Despite the increased pressure, the maritime unions refused 
to lift their blanket boycott on trade with Chile and this stance had grassroots 
support within the unions.145 
Defiance in the face of the ACTU, which had gained huge membership in this 
period due to the incorporation of white-collar unions, was not unusual. Despite 
a union membership rate sitting at 58 per cent of Australian workers in 1975, 
the ACTU was ‘a federation without the institutional capacity to direct and 
coordinate a structurally decentralised union movement’.146 For example, in 1966 
the SUA had ignored the ACTU ruling that there was to be no union interference 
with ships carrying goods to Vietnam.147 It was a case of history repeating itself 
as after a brief period of encouragement, the ACTU released a statement that 
it supported ‘the aims and not the methods’ of the boycott.148 The ACTU was 
pressured by its own more right-wing affiliates, as well as business and political 
interests.149 Furthermore, the ACTU was, in general, not willing to go against the 
Government, because losing a Labor government was believed to be detrimental 
to all Australian workers.150 In 1975 the congress heard Chilean trade unionists 
Luis Figueroa and Luis Meneses speak, but it had little effect: it seems the 
confederation stayed neutral from late 1975 to early 1977.151 Soon, however, the 
ACTU’s attitude changed and it began to try to have the boycott lifted.
By the ACTU Executive Meeting of February 1977, the consistent pressure 
finally provoked a debate.152 The delegates from the AMWSU and BWIU voted 
against the lifting of the boycott; importantly, Charlie Fitzgibbon (WWFA) 
was not present at the meeting. Fitzgibbon was the unionist who originally 
proposed the motion to support the boycott in 1973–74. In his absence, the 
144 ‘Ban on Indonesian and Chilean Trade’, Seamen’s Journal 33, no. 1 (January 1978), 14.
145 ‘Committee No. IV’, Seamen’s Journal 34, no. 3 (March–April 1979), 75.
146 Hagan, ‘The Australian Trade Union Movement’, 51; Chris Briggs, ‘The End of a Cycle? The Australian 
Council of Trade Unions in Historical Perspective’, in Peak Unions in Australia: Origins, Purpose, Power, 
Agency, eds Bradon Ellem, Raymond Markey and John Chields (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2004), 242.
147 Beasley, Wharfies, 218.
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149 The ACTU was capable of providing leadership on some political issues, such as the uranium debates 
of the 1970s. See, for example, the WWFA’s decision to ship uranium: ‘Unions’ Policy’, Maritime Worker, 29 
March 1977, 9; Hagan, ‘The Australian Trade Union Movement’, 52–3.
150 It was ‘too big a price to pay’. Hagan, ‘The Australian Trade Union Movement’, 52.
151 Agenda Paper, Australian Congress of Trade Unions, 15 Sept – 19 Sept, 1975, ACTU, S784/2/21, NBAC: 
ANU, Canberra; ‘First Aid to Chile’, Maritime Worker, 4 January 1975, 12.
152 The trade Boycott of Wheat Sales to Chile, March 1977. An example of a letter pressuring the ACTU to 
drop the boycott can be found at: D. Eather (Vice President, Queensland Graingrowers Association) to Hawke 
(ACTU), 29 July 1977, National Farmers Federation: Australian Primary Producers Union, N18/779, NBAC: 
ANU, Canberra; AWB to Hawke RE: Chile, January 20 1975, WWFA: Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, 
Canberra; AMWU Commonwealth Council re: Chile, January 22 1975, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, 
Canberra; Australian Metal Workers’ Union Commonwealth Council, RE: Chile, January 28 1975, WWFA: 
Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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majority supported lifting the ban, adding that the decision would not be put 
to the congress. With that, the boycott was no longer sanctioned by the ACTU. 
The ACTU had decided that the only people who were being harmed by the 
boycott were Australian workers, and the ban was ineffectual because it was 
being carried out only by Australia and New Zealand.153 
The council’s about-face caused waves of defiance throughout the SUA, the BWIU 
and the AMWSU.154 John Healy responded bitterly, arguing that the ACTU had 
tried to ‘smash the ban, to lift the ban, to allow trade with Chile’ even though 
international protests against the Pinochet regime and industrial action around 
the world were on the increase, including those by the ICFTU with which the 
ACTU was affiliated.155 Between February and the next meeting of the ACTU in 
December, the CSCP lobbied trade unionists with detailed arguments about why 
the boycott should remain. Steve Cooper wrote that the boycott was supported 
by the CUT, WFTU, ICFTU, World Confederation of Labour (WCL), ITF and the 
ILO. Further, Bob Hawke, president of the ACTU, was also the federal president 
of the ALP, whose conference supported the ban on trade. 
At stop-work meetings members of the SUA made statements demonstrating the 
high level of idealism and ideology among its members. The Sydney branch, for 
example, said: ‘Australia’s trade with Chile never was important or vital to any 
section of our people, and our continued boycott will enhance the overseas and 
national democratic principles of the Australian people.’156 
For some SUA members international brotherhood took a higher priority than 
the tension between Australian unions, which was exacerbated by their boycott. 
At an SUA Sydney branch stop-work meeting, Pat Sweetensen (SPA) admitted 
that the seamen did not want to be isolated from the Australian trade union 
movement, but ‘we also have international responsibilities to our suppressed 
comrades’.157 The SUA reserved the right to continue it because the repression 
continued in Chile.158
John Healy, leader of the WWFA Sydney branch, echoed SUA sentiments. He 
said, ‘as far as the W.W.F. is concerned, [wheat] will never be handled until 
153 Minutes of the ACTU executive meeting held in the ACTU boardroom, Melbourne, from Monday. 12th 
December, 1977 to Friday, 16th December, 1977 commencing at 2.15pm: Second Session, Fourth Session and 
Resolutions, ACTU, N147/622, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
154 Henry McCarthy returned from Algiers with support messages for the boycott. Henry McCarthy, 
‘Boycott the Junta’, Tribune [Australia], 22 February 1978.
155 Healy, ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
156 Extract SWM Minutes Sydney Branch 31/1/78, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
157 Extract SWM Minutes held Sydney Branch 2nd May 1978, ref. no. 1493, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, 
NBAC: ANU, Canberra. See also Extract SWM Minutes held Port Kembla 2nd May 1978, SUA: Federal Office, 
N38/299, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
158 Federal Office report No 8/1978 Mey [sic] 26, 1978, SUA: Federal Office, N38/299, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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democracy is restored in Chile’.159 Leo Lenane, federal organiser, repeated that 
attitude in July 1977: ‘the way to remove the trade bans in Chile is through 
restoration of democracy in that country.’160 In the Maritime Worker of 27 
September 1977 and the Seamen’s Journal of February 1978, it was reiterated 
that the ban was still in place.161
What seems like a cut-and-dried story is, however, much more complicated: 
inconsistencies exist in this narrative that only appear with very close 
examination of all sources. First, the ACTU Executive Meeting minutes of 20 
March 1978 note that Fitzgibbon of the WWFA voted along with the other 
members to lift the ban.162 Second, late in 1978 the ACTU received notice from 
shipping agents of barley being shipped to Chile.163 The content of the letter 
suggests previous communication. Letters started to flow, seeking confirmation 
of the WWFA’s position.164 Further, Gethin, of the Farmers’ Union of Western 
Australia, wrote to the ACTU stating that his members were worried about the 
WWFA reinstating the ban on Chile.165 The last mention in the Maritime Worker 
of the ban being policy was in mid October 1977, but the mention was one 
sentence only, and relegated to the corner of a page.166
So, was the boycott still in place?
The WWFA was going through a general weakening in the 1970s. The organisers 
had other things on their minds such as containerisation, job layoffs, contracts, 
amalgamations and the stagflation of 1974–75, which led to increased employer 
pressure in all industries.167 Margo Beasley wrote:
The Australian waterfront was widely regarded as a shambles by 1976. 
The cost of surplus labour had reached record levels and no matter how 
159 Healy, ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
160 Lenane (WWFA) to CSCP, 7th July, 1977, Papers of GMM.
161 ‘International Aid’, Maritime Worker, 27 September 1977, 3; ‘Indonesia, Chile Bans’, Maritime Worker, 
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NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
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quickly the stevedoring industry shed employees, there were always 
either too many left for the work available, or those that were left were 
inefficiently used because of the way the industry was structured.168
The Seamen’s Journal does not mention the WWFA lifting the boycott. Neither 
does it mention it holding the boycott in place. The mentions of waterside 
boycott after the wheat incidents are left to non-specific sweeping statements 
except for the case of the Holstein Express. For example, the Sydney Waterside 
Workers reinforced the rhetoric of the ban after Humberto Elgueta spoke to 
their meeting on 10 October 1979, but the promotion of the WWFA boycott 
faded.169 According to trade statistics, so did the WWFA’s stranglehold on trade 
to and from Chile. 
There was a lull in both import and export activity with Chile from the 1975–76 
to the 1977–78 financial years caused by the WWFA boycott, and the ACTU’s 
support of it. These three years, after the existing wheat contracts were filled 
by the AWB, were when the WWFA and ACTU advertised their Chile boycott. 
Interestingly, the small amount of trade that did get through was primarily 
scientific and allied health machinery. These were shipped in relatively equal 
amounts before, during and after the WWFA boycott. The SUA may have 
stopped at least one shipment of iron ore in 1980, but shipments of grass seed 
made it through the ports every year of the dictatorship (except one). Trade 
with Chile never ceased, despite the best efforts of radicals. The total exports 
to Chile dropped from a high of $42 million in 1972–73 to a low of $157 000 in 
1976–77. This reduced the rate of trade to pre-Allende levels.170 Imports also 
hit a low in 1976–77, but the variation in those figures was not as marked (see 
Figure 8.2). 
With the change in stance of the ACTU and the weakening of the WWFA’s 
boycott in practice in 1977 and 1978, exports rose sharply. Major exports to Chile 
now included coking coal, malting barley and, in 1982–83, wheat. In addition, 
imports rose, with the highest being in the 1980–81 financial year, with $6.5 
million worth of goods arriving in Australia.171 The traditional imports of fish, 
fertilisers and fishmeal were entering and also on one occasion parts for arms 
in 1976–77. Despite this, trade with Pinochet’s Chile never again reached the 
zenith of the early 1970s, though it did experience a spike due to a particularly 
good malting barley shipment year in 1979–80.
168 Beasley, Wharfies, 237.
169 It is unlikely, however, any substantial amount of Chile–Australia trade travelled through Sydney. 
‘Chile Bans Stay’, Tribune [Australia], 10 October 1979.
170 In 1963–64 it was $142 000.
171 Import statistics and descriptions compiled from ABS, Australian Imports, Country by Commodity 
(1965–84).
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Figure 8.2 Comparison of Imports from and Exports to Chile, 1966–85.
Source: ABS, Australian Exports, Country by Commodity.
While the Wheat Board agreed not to ship wheat, the Australian Barley Board (ABB) 
had made no such commitment. The ABB was a government statutory authority 
that had been established under the National Security Act of 1939. Similar to the 
Wheat Board, it was a legislative requirement that all growers sell their barley to 
the ABB.172 Barley had been grown in Australia since the first European settlement. 
In the 1960s, bulk handling had become the norm for Australian wheat and barley 
and had contributed to the loss of jobs on the waterfront.
In January 1973 Britain entered the European Common Market and this created 
a problem for the ABB, as it no longer enjoyed the benefits of trading with 
Britain without import taxes.173 This was also coupled with an increase in 
barley production and a bumper crop in the USSR in 1976–77.174 As a result, 
the Barley Board was searching for new markets. The 1978–79 season was a 
172 The first chairman, Herbert Tomlinson, had a long career, working previously with Dalgety & Company, 
the same company which would test the maritime boycott in 1978 attempting to export cattle. Pauline Payne 
and Peter Donovan, The Australian Barley Board: Making the Right Moves, 1939–1999 (Adelaide: Australian 
Barley Board, 1999), 97; also 17.
173 Ibid., 79.
174 Ibid., 94.
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bumper crop in Australia and this was reflected in the largest shipment of barley 
to Chile, in the 1979–80 financial year.175 Due to the bumper season, the ABB 
sold 136 505 t to South American countries, and the export records say that 
in the 1979–80 financial year all of it went to Chile.176 In 1978, barley had the 
highest international selling price of all coarse grains.177 Most of Australia’s 
barley crop was grown in South Australia and Victoria. As the major brewers 
of Melbourne bought most of the barley from their own State, it was likely the 
barley shipments to Chile were exiting via one of the South Australian ports 
where the ABB had facilities.178
Figure 8.3 Specific Exports to Chile, 1968–85.
Source: ABS, Australian Exports, Country by Commodity.
From Figures 8.2 and 8.3 (assembled from trade information collected by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics), it is obvious that the WWFA, not the SUA, had 
real power when it came to boycotts. The rhetoric of internationalism may have 
been stronger, or at least more vocal, in the SUA, but the strategic position of 
the WWFA allowed it to be much more effective. Its larger membership had 
175 ABS, Australian Exports, Country by Commodity (1979–80).
176 Some 142 574 t of barley went to Chile. Payne and Donovan, The Australian Barley Board, 94; ABS, 
Australian Exports, Country by Commodity.
177 Australian Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Coarse Grains Situation and Outlook (Canberra: AGPS, 1978).
178 Port Lincoln, Wallaroo, Port Giles, Port Adelaide or Ardrossan.
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more contact with Chilean trade than Australian-crewed ships ever could. But 
this strategic position also exposed the WWFA to more pressure than the SUA 
experienced. 
Other than the odd burst of rhetoric, such as from the Sydney branch 
president, John Healy—‘[t]here will not be one pound of wheat go, there 
will not be one point of cargo come in’179—the WWFA did not publicise their 
Chile commitment.180 They kept their members informed of events in Chile and 
petitions via the Maritime Worker and circulars, but there was no dramatic call 
to arms as in the Seamen’s Union. 
The WWFA was carrying many campaigns at the time, including anti-apartheid 
and contra the Greek junta. The WWFA was also under constant pressure 
to take up campaigns due to their efficiency in boycotting. Mavis Robertson 
recalled one occasion when Tas Bull said to her: ‘Listen Mavis, if someone else 
comes through this door and asks me to put a ban on something else, whether 
it’s this or that … none of my members will ever get a day’s work, and sometimes 
we just have to do things symbolically.’181
This was a significant admission. The wheat boycott was the main action, 
allowing the WWFA to claim the moral high ground. It was a powerful symbolic 
action. After that, jobs came first.
Despite its limitations, the boycott was, many times over, heralded as the 
cause for freedom of Chilean political prisoners. It was appreciated by many 
throughout the world such as the CUT in exile, which sent thankful telegrams.182 
Luis Corvalan, on his release from Dawson Island, said the maritime workers’ 
boycott was ‘an inspiration to the people of Chile’.183 A world away from Chile, 
in Wollongong, Doreen Borrow of the local Chile Solidarity Committee wrote: 
‘We live with the certainty that the Chilean People will one day live in dignity 
and with full human rights. That day will come because of the united actions 
of the working class throughout the world. Included among these are our 
honoured comrades in the S.U.A.’184
Kirkby called it ‘shared humanity’, and this sentiment is an echo of E. V. Elliott’s 
insistence that the Chilean and Australian workers were ‘brothers in struggle’.185 
179 Published in an SUA publication.
180 Healy, ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
181 Robertson Interview, 2009.
182 Original text reads: ‘agradecemos y felicitamos por beoycot contrat el transitoria debe condisionarse a 
liberación de los prisioneros politicos y sindicales [sic].’ Telegram from CUT to WWFA, January 1975, WWFA: 
Federal Office, N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
183 Relayed via Frida Brown, an SPA member who was in Moscow. ‘Luis Corvalan Thanks SUA for Solidarity 
with Chile Workers’, Seamen’s Journal 32, no. 2 (February 1977).
184 ‘Restore Democracy in Chile’, Seamen’s Journal 38, no. 8 (September 1983), 233.
185 Kirkby, Voices from the Ships, 16; Elliott, ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
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But it was easy for Elliott to say ‘solidarity has no national or geographical 
boundaries’,186 or for Henderson to state that ‘we believe by isolating the Junta 
we will help the people of Chile to restore the democratic freedoms that Comrade 
Allende and many thousands of his countrymen have given their lives for’.187
The FDU and the SUA’s real influence on trade with Chile was negligible, and 
thus their members’ exposure to criticism or potential jail was also far less. The 
SUA could enjoy using Chile as a ‘feather in their internationalist cap’ from the 
relative safety of their position, when it was unlikely that Australian-crewed 
ships would sail to Chile. The most contact they were likely to have was through 
tugboats.188 When trade did pass through, perhaps tug men turned a blind eye, 
just as many other unionists in Australia must have. 
For example, wheat was transported by truck to regional silos. As soon as it 
arrived at the silo the wheat was the property of the AWB. From those regional 
silos it was transported in stages by train to ports. There were 17 wheat export 
ports in Australia.189 Given that hides, coal, meat, wool, dairy products, clothing, 
manufactured goods, minerals, canned foodstuffs and cars were sent to Chile, the 
TWU,190 AFULE,191 ARU,192 AMWSU, Amalgamated Engineering Union, Miners 
Federation, Australasian Coal and Shale Employees Federation, Food Preservers’ 
Union of Australia, Wool Brokers’ Staffs Association, Australasian Meat 
Industries Employees Union, the Federated Cold Storage and Meat Preserving 
Employees and Australian Textile Workers Union, to list just a few, all may have 
had workers who mined, moved or manufactured goods bound for Chile. 
In other words, the majority of Australian workers did not take a stand. 
Given this inconsistency between rhetoric and reality in the activities of the 
Australian labour movement, and the fractured nature of the branch structure 
of the WWFA, the fact that the ‘ban stayed on so long, was a miracle’, to use 
186 E. V. Elliot, ‘On Course!’, Seamen’s Journal (May 1974).
187 ‘Wider Union Bans on Chile Junta’.
188 Tug ‘seamen’ were congratulated as members of the SUA, but were actually in the main members of the 
FDU. For example, John Garrett, who incidentally was also the official SPA representative to the CSC. Kirkby, 
Voices from the Ships, 105.
189 AWB, Wheat Growing, 11, 12, 14.
190 The TWU did boycott at Mascott Airport as described in Chapter Seven. J. Baird to G. Grimshaw, 
October 1 1975 and attached letter for Transport Workers’ Union Strikers from CUT, September 19 1975.
191 AFULE expressed their solidarity through getting Chilean enginemen jobs. They also supported 
Chileans in coming to Australia. Australian Metal Workers’ Union Commonwealth Council, Re: Chile, 30/1/75 
and attachments dates 6/1/75 and 3/1/75, January 30 1975, AMWSU, E262/137, NBAC: ANU, Canberra; 
Mr Sergio Marambio—age 32, 1974, Australian Federated Union of Enginemen, 8/3/38 Box 136, Melbourne 
University Archives: Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen Collection, Melbourne; Memo 
re: Appeal from ALP for finance to bring ex-Senator Sule to Australia, April 9 1975, WWFA: Federal Office, 
N114/932, NBAC: ANU, Canberra.
192 In 1975 the ARU offered ‘practical support’ to the Chile cause. Programme Results—Chilean Trade Union 
Delegation to Australia, 11–20 September 1975.
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the words of Mavis Robertson.193 It was a ban chiefly in name, but the symbolic 
nature of the boycott does not imply it was useless. Rhetoric, especially from 
the WWFA and ACTU, scared shipping companies from attempting to trade 
Chilean goods.
The so-called miracle continued in 1978, when the live-cattle shipment on the 
Holstein Express was boycotted by determined maritime unionists. Was this 
really a ‘union victory’, as hailed by the SPA organ? 
The 1978–79 financial year was the start of the upward swing of trade with 
Chile. The SUA’s harassment of this one vessel in a wave of trade may seem 
relatively futile or a gesture and little else. Yet, the Holstein Express incident was 
symbolic of so much more for the SUA: it was support for the Chilean people, but 
more than anything, it was a self-affirming action by the seamen whose identity 
rested on their radical internationalist ideology. Henderson argued, speaking of 
the SUA: ‘In fact, we see ourselves—quite rightly, I believe—as among the most 
progressive sections of the trade union movement of this country. We also see 
ourselves as internationalists and we involve ourselves in all issues of economic 
and industrial matters.’194 
For the waterside workers, it was slightly different: 1978 had been a hard year. 
The negotiations for the contract of 1978–80 had stalled. In April of that year 
there had been a nationwide stoppage on the waterfront over the use of non-
union labour to load ships.195 ‘Scabs’ had crossed a picket line set up by the 
Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union (AMIEU), who had supported the 
sale of frozen meat to Chile in 1974. They were protesting live export of animals 
from Australia, as it resulted in the loss of their members’ jobs. The WWFA 
respected their picket lines, even though the AMIEU had questioned the Chile 
ban in 1974, even supposing it meant less work.
Tensions were high in the WWFA, and anti-solidarity scabs were on the top of 
the blacklist. The WWFA official organ framed the Holstein Express incident as 
typifying the deception of the companies and the non-union labour involved. 
The article noted that $1000 in compensation had been received by the 
watersiders of Port Kembla for the work to load the cattle that should have been 
undertaken by union labour.196 Should the workers have accepted the money in 
light of their boycott on Chile? For the WWFA, it wasn’t about Chile anymore.
The WWFA Sydney branch saw the Holstein Express episode in terms of anti-
scabbing and national-unity rhetoric rather than one centred on Chile solidarity 
193 Robertson Interview, 2009.
194 ‘Chile: No Trade with Junta’.
195 ‘No Non-Union Wharf Labour!’, Maritime Worker, 18 April 1978, 1.
196 ‘Eden Compensation’, Maritime Worker, 13 February 1979, 5.
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or an internationalist identity.197 This was a clear case of a union using the Chile 
issue as a tool for their own more pressing political and industrial objectives. The 
relaxation of the overall ban pointed to a resource rationalisation by the union. 
The boycotts became a risk inordinately larger than the benefit of maintaining 
the blacking activities.
The SUA, on the other hand, whose communist identity and rhetoric were 
consistently advocated in relation to the Chile boycott, had no trouble maintaining 
their stance. In fact, they used the boycott to express their exceptionalist 
political identity: ‘principle before earning’, Elliott had said. Because of a small 
membership, however, and those members’ lack of contact with Chilean trade, 
the Seamen’s boycott, for all its political zeal, was anticlimactic. 
The WWFA was in the right industrial position and had the right leadership 
to give a base to the boycott; however, over time, the international socialist 
rhetoric that had formed the base of the black ban faded and industrial 
conditions required more imperative, strategic and political attention. As the 
boycott took a low and sinking profile in the union and the ACTU, so the grip 
on trade to Chile loosened. When Hugo Miranda noted ‘Australian watersiders 
prefer action’,198 he did not know how true those words were: they undeniably 
preferred their jobs.
197 Waterside Workers’ Federation, Branch News, 2 January 1979.




I am thinking of Diane, of Angie, Mike, Jerry, Bill, Adrian, Jeannie, 
Mavis, Peggy … People that you surely do not know. I think that we 
have never adequately thanked them.1
On 3 June 2009, at the Moneda Palace in Santiago, Joan Jara rose to give a 
speech of thanks. She looked at Michelle Bachelet, the then President of the 
Republic of Chile. They had both been victims of the military dictatorship. The 
president had just signed the papers that would grant Jara Chilean citizenship. 
Jara finally—officially—joined a people she had talked about as her own for 
almost her entire adult life. 
Jara told of the responsibility she felt when she left Chile after the coup and 
the death of her husband: solidarity work had given her something to live for. 
She spoke of the tours she made with Inti Illimani and Quilapayun. She said a 
generation of students heard of the coup in Chile and it ‘changed their vision of 
the world, and also changed the rhythm of their lives’. She spoke of the friends 
she made in exile, of many of them who gave years of their lives in support of 
the fight for Chilean democracy.
Among that list appeared two of the most prominent members of the solidarity 
movements in Britain and Australia: Mike Gatehouse and Mavis Robertson. 
Both have featured extensively in this book. These two activists, among many 
others, gave time, gave up income and also devoted ideological and emotional 
support to the Chile cause. 
While I have argued that union action for Chile was constrained by the availability 
of resources, opportunities and primary union aims, these individuals acted 
very distinctly. They participated in the movement far beyond the time it 
was personally, politically, economically and emotionally useful for them to 
do so. They were motivated by ideology and/or a deep unrest over the abuses 
of the Pinochet regime (though the order of those reasons varied). The Chile 
campaigns in both Australia and Britain owed their success in part to these sorts 
1 ‘Pienso ahora en todas aquellos amigos del exilio. Muchos de ellos dieron años de sus vidas en apoyo a 
la larga lucha por la restauración de la democracia en Chile. Para una generación de jóvenes universitarios 
en muchos países el golpe militar en Chile cambió su visión del mundo, cambió también el rumbo de sus 
vidas. Pienso en Diane, en Angie, Mike, Jerry, Bill, Adrian, Jeannie, Mavis. Peggy … y tantos, tantos otros 
de diferentes culturas, idiomas. Personas que seguramente Uds. no conocen. Pienso que nunca les hemos 
agradecido adecuadamente.’ Joan Jara, ‘Joan Jara recibe nacionalidad chilena por gracia en Palacio de la 
Moneda, jueves, 04 de junio de 2009’, Fundación Víctor Jara, accessed 19 August 2009, <http://www.
fundacionvictorjara.cl/nacionalidad.html>. 
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of organisers, including Mavis Robertson, Steve Cooper and Mike Gatehouse, 
who ‘attached an exalted significance’ to their cause.2 I used Hamer’s term 
‘faddists’ to describe them in this book, but not in any pejorative sense: their 
importance to the movement was crucial. It was their duty to work for Chile and 
it was the right thing to do. Parkin has suggested that a ‘status inconsistency’ 
(the gap between skill level and actual income that is filled with a sense of duty 
or honour) was in fact a motivator for radical activists, and the cases contained 
within these pages would support that notion.3 The great positive force and 
energy that the hyper-committed ‘communicators’, as Waterman would call 
them, brought to their chosen cause gave the impetus needed to organise and 
ultimately harness the power of the labour movement.4 
While many comparisons draw conclusions on a theoretical level, which I shall 
do too, the parallel study of these two campaigns also elucidated some much 
more personal similarities. In fact, there were uncanny similarities within the 
personnel of the Chile movements in Australia and Britain through all the levels 
of organisation. Mike Gatehouse and Steve Cooper were both quiet, highly 
educated and hardworking. They were not necessarily very well connected 
themselves, but had the ear of people who were. They came to the campaigns 
after spending time in Chile during the Allende administration. Steve Hart 
and Andrew Ferguson were both passionately involved in politics. They were 
both from leading labour families with relatives in representative positions in 
government. Mavis Robertson and Alex Kitson were both strategically connected 
to the upper hierarchy of the labour movement, although Kitson’s connections 
were more institutionalised than Robertson’s. Furthermore, Robertson used her 
network for Chile on a much more regular, albeit less formal, basis. Judith Hart 
MP and Senator Anthony Mulvihill were used in both countries to furnish the 
campaigns with legitimacy in the public eye. Allan Angel was similar to Barry 
Carr: they were scholars of Latin America in universities with similar politics. 
Both spoke Spanish and acted as key communicators between sections of the 
Chilean exile community and their host countries. George Anthony and Brian 
Nicholson in Britain and Henry McCarthy and James Baird (and to a lesser 
extent, Tas Bull) in Australia played comparable roles: their politics and career 
courses were very different, but they were used to give the campaigns the seal 
of rank-and-file trade union approval. There is really only one who has no 
exact counterpart in the movements. It was the moral authority of Jack Jones 
2 Also mentioned were Diane Dixon and Angela Thew, both of whom were interviewed for this thesis. 
Hamer, The Politics of Electoral Pressure, 1.
3 Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism, 53, 184, 189.
4 Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 247.
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that placed him in an important position in the hierarchies of the movement. 
If Bob Hawke had showed interest in the Chilean situation, he may have held a 
similarly privileged position.5
Their ideology differed, sometimes significantly, but they all shared a sense 
of moral purpose: a common belief in the justice of actions against the regime 
in Chile. They were also bound by the momentum of the cycles of protest 
established during the early 1970s. This primarily followed an annual calendar 
with a focus around key labour movement and historical Chilean dates. As is 
ascertained in Chapters Two and Six, the 11 September demonstrations were 
the main point around which activities clustered each year. Years of higher 
than normal activity appeared on significant anniversaries or around events 
such as the Chilean plebiscite of 1980. The campaigns’ focus and rhythm were 
also shaped by a long cycle of activist succession. There were few, if any, 
activists who remained imbedded in the social movement’s structure for the 
duration of the dictatorship, and very interestingly, the first major change of 
personnel occurred at roughly the same time in Australia and Britain at the end 
of the 1970s. 
The cycles were comparable and the roles fulfilled strikingly similar, but one of 
the most obvious differences between the two campaigns was the integration 
of exiles into the committees. In both cases, the integration of migrants into 
the structure of the campaign was problematic, but the CSC in Britain was 
more successful in sustaining its broad front. This was achieved by effectively 
denying voting rights to exiles. Mike Gatehouse remembered:
The Chilean People were in Chile, they were not here. The Chilean 
political parties were in Chile, they have external representation. But, 
if you involve them, then it ceases to be a solidarity campaign and 
becomes an exile movement. And we were absolutely clear that that 
would be wrong.6 
He went on to say that those campaigns that integrated Chileans floundered 
very quickly, and his observations are supported by the Australian example. In 
Australia, the attempted broad front collapsed under the disparate pressures of the 
two sets of political factions; however, to place the blame for this completely at the 
feet of the exiles would be hasty and incorrect, as politics on local, State, national 
and global levels also impacted on the Australian Chile campaign. Furthermore, 
due to the size of the population, there was more pressure to integrate Chileans in 
Australia, if only to have more hands on deck to help with organising. 
5 Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia, 82.
6 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
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The size of the movement also influenced the depth of bureaucratic structure. 
In Australia, where the left was much smaller and split among distant cities, a 
national organisational framework was attempted but never achieved. Instead, 
the Australian campaign relied more heavily on the networking abilities of 
individuals. While the need for a formal structure for the campaign was less 
necessary in Australia, it did expose the movement to the dangers of instability 
and potential collapse if a strategic individual ceased participation. The British 
Chile Solidarity Campaign created a more complex organisational framework, 
at both local and national levels, and was much more stable because of it. 
By creating a self-perpetuating network of affiliates, the British campaign 
successfully exploited the bureaucratic and organisational (industrial national) 
based nature of the trade unions and enabled the systematic capture of a critical 
mass of supporters. 
Thus the main difference in trade union involvement in Chile solidarity 
campaigns between Britain and Australia was the more ad-hoc nature of 
Australian unions’ and unionists’ involvement, compared with the more 
structured and hierarchical nature of the British trade union integration. Despite 
the British campaign’s ability to capture more mass support, the individuals 
with strategic knowledge of, and connections with, the labour movement were 
the most important acquisitions of the campaigns in both countries. 
This book has provided a road map through the concurrent complex structures 
of the labour movement in Britain and Australia tracking the idiosyncratic 
paths between them taken by privileged actors—privileged, that is, by their 
knowledge of the organisational topography of the labour movement. These 
strategic individuals could bridge labour movement hierarchies and carry the 
Chile cause further than it otherwise might have achieved. The campaigns used 
these individuals to boost their positions within the hierarchy of aims of the 
labour movement. Inversely, some individuals used the movement to promote 
themselves. In Britain, George Anthony is a case in point: he reached an 
organising position above his usual level within the labour movement hierarchy, 
and also extended his own network and influence. 
The exchange between individuals and the campaigns did not end there. Moral 
capital—that incalculable yet imperative resource as defined by Kane—was 
reciprocally granted between the campaigns and participants. While the moral 
capital of one person, such as Jack Jones, could be captured and used in order to 
legitimise the campaign, the reverse was also true. Though, the cause itself did 
not bestow moral authority on its participants per se, their involvement—that 
is, their stated aims and fulfilment of those aims—added to that individual’s 
store of moral capital. In the case of many individuals in the campaign, this 




While elucidating similarities between individual trajectories, this comparative 
study has also established a repertoire of activities on the historical record. This 
book has moved towards developing a typology of actions used by trade unions 
for external political causes in the 1970s.7 The majority of actions within that 
repertoire were indirect, and the majority of indirect actions were organised 
outside trade unions by either local or international solidarity organisations. 
These actions, described in Chapters Two and Six, included demonstrations, 
local and international conferences, cultural activities, tours and donations. The 
two movements’ repertoires were strikingly similar, though not identical, and 
often where they did differ it was due to scale.
Externally organised indirect actions took advantage of the opportunistic nature 
of union internationalism. Essentially, when a progressive union was petitioned 
for aid in the form of conference attendance, or support for a demonstration, 
they had no trouble fulfilling that request. These types of indirect actions 
against Chile, along with letter writing, telegram sending and resolution passing, 
represented the majority of solidarity actions in both Britain and Australia 
and most importantly had a minor impact on union resources. Indirect actions 
like this allowed unions to express their internationalist ideologies with little 
organisational expenditure and without risk to their members, and fittingly, 
the solidarity movement sought to routinise these actions into union business 
wherever they could. 
Other so-called indirect actions attempting to create change in Chile through 
public pressure included delegations and they were organised from within 
unions with little interference from social movements. Of all the Chile actions 
undertaken by unions, these were the least opportunistic because the union 
had to create their own opportunity to travel. Delegations were a substantial 
and high-risk undertaking: it could never be known what the outcome would 
be and there was physical danger to the delegates and the people they met. 
Delegations such as those sent from Australia in 1974 and by the NUM in 1977 
were extremely high-profile forms of solidarity that served the unions, Chileans 
and the solidarity movement very well, despite the fact they generated factional 
infighting in the union movement.
There were difficulties of sustaining or even starting a direct action for an external 
political goal. The only direct industrial protests that took place in solidarity 
with Chile were boycotts and scattered stop-work meetings, as described in 
Chapters Four and Eight. Essentially, the availability of union resources and 
the degree of threat to unions’ primary aims had an inverse relationship to the 
likelihood of action occurring. That is, the more activities were seen to require 
union resources (in organising time or money) or impinged upon the union’s 
7 Though not in its entirety.
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main aims, the less likely it was that unions would take that action.8 Solidarity 
with Chile was a just cause, but notwithstanding its role in fulfilling a sense of 
moral obligation and an ideological imperative to internationalism, it was still 
remote from the unions’ raison d’être. 
As such, action for Chile needed almost no impediment for it to occur. Unions 
were risk averse. For this reason, the Chile campaigns in both Britain and 
Australia comprised mainly routine events. These were endorsable and easily 
undertaken by the labour movement without draining resources or imperilling 
jobs, wages or conditions. An exception to this was the grassroots boycott in 
East Kilbride, which was, significantly, pulled into line by the union hierarchy. 
Similarly, the unilateral action of the wharfies in Australia soon drew the ire of 
the peak union organisation. This suggests that with few exceptions, those most 
keen on preserving union business were to be found in its upper hierarchy. 
It can be concluded, after examining the case studies and how they fit into 
the existing categories of political action, that international activity in unions 
is contingent on the sum of the incentives, capacities and impediments to 
the action.9 The CSC and CSCP were extremely successful mobilisers as they 
undertook activities that had little or no organisational cost for the unions and 
thereby made the expression of union internationalism easy. The Burgmanns 
have noted that militancy thrives in a favourable industrial climate, and the 
research contained within these pages provides highly detailed case studies that 
support this view.10 As long as industrial stability was not threatened, radical 
unions reacted favourably to the possibility of action for Chile.
It is evident throughout this history that actions undertaken by trade unions 
in solidarity with Chile were largely opportunistic, whether that opportunity 
was provided by an external source (such as participating in an organised 
international conference) or by the union’s industrial location (such as the 
Waterside Workers boycott). But also, below the opportunity, an ideological or 
moral sense of obligation to the cause was needed. The campaigns worked hard 
to sustain the sense of obligation and build a pool of goodwill towards the Chile 
cause. Left-wing unions were more likely to pursue an internationalist agenda 
and did not see a limit to their legitimate concerns.11 Their ideological concerns 
for the worldwide proletariat or socialism, peace or nonviolence predisposed 
them to actions for Chile.12 
8 Deery, ‘Union Aims and Methods’, 61. Though it has been noted in other places how hard it is to actually 
quantify union aims: Peter Gahan, ‘(What) Do Unions Maximise? Evidence from Survey Data’, Cambridge 
Political Economy Society 26 (2002), 279–98.
9 Schmutte, ‘International Union Activity’, 65.
10 Burgmann and Burgmann, Green Bans, Red Union, 14.
11 Anner, ‘Industrial Structure, the State, and Ideology’, 627.
12 Plowman, ‘The Victorian Trades Hall Split’, 306.
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Ideology, however, also caused the impure motives for some individuals’ and 
organisations’ involvement in the movement. ‘Chile’ was used to gain local 
political capital or as a weapon for internecine disputes. This was tantamount to 
a commodification of the Chile issue for political capital. It did not, in general, 
stop events from occurring or unions from taking internationalist actions but, as 
we have seen, it sometimes tempered action. It reduced solidarity effectiveness 
by self-censoring, limiting aims and ultimately resulting in the degradation of 
the broad front.
It’s hard to place rogue behaviour into the theoretical models of trade union 
action retrospectively applied by social scientists: to them, union actions 
with internationalist aims manifested as direct or indirect and union or social 
movement organised actions. The case studies published here demonstrate 
that industrial national unionism and social movement unionism existed 
concurrently within organisations. The case studies highlight the inability of 
static theoretical models to explain actions over time.
The role of pragmatism should not be underestimated, when it comes to union 
interaction, and more specifically union internationalism. And pragmatism is 
hard to work into a structural political model. 
Unions or unionists who desire to reach a political goal used the methods that 
were appropriate and available to them, regardless of that method’s abstract 
place in a theoretical model of union organisation. Each union and every union 
action was idiosyncratic, influenced by a huge range of factors. The forces at 
work on the decision for international political action or inaction by unions 
are too complex to be attributed to an ‘ideal type’ of union decision-making 
and it should not be assumed that there was a unity of purpose behind them.13 
The union activity that did take place for Chile could not be divided exactly 
into categories of direct and indirect political activity, social movement and 
industrial national unionism. The four categories overlapped. 
In sum, I have put forward three overarching findings in this history and 
reiterated them in this conclusion. The first covers the factors that must be present 
for internationalist action to occur within a union: opportunity, ideology/moral 
convictions and little or no risk to union core aims and resources. The second 
finding concerns the manner in which individuals and the campaigns attracted 
legitimacy and moral capital in a self-perpetuating and mutually beneficial 
manner. Finally, this work suggests that existing theoretical models of union 
action require revision in order to be useful in understanding the relationship 
between solidarity campaigns and trade unions. 
13 Deery, ‘Union Aims and Methods’, 60.
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But quite aside from the arguments, this book has restored trade union 
international action to its rightful place in the history of the labour movement. 
High-profile strategic individuals and committed faddists were a minority in the 
movement. The majority of those who expressed solidarity were trade unionists. 
The fact that they acted at all was a condemnation of the junta, and the very 
existence of a social movement denounced the crimes of the junta and increased 
pressure on the regime. If they did not succeed in restoring democracy, they 
certainly won a number of small victories, and one of those small victories was 
to do with trucks.
The slogan ‘no truck with the Chilean junta’ embodies the importance of unions 
to the Chile solidarity campaigns. The slogan itself stemmed from the first half 
of 1977 when rank-and-file Northampton lorry drivers declared they would 
not touch Chilean goods. On several occasions, they had refused to touch cargo 
at the Liverpool docks, and soon they produced stickers for their cabs that 
pronounced: ‘NO TRUCK WITH CHILE!’ 
News of their boycott and slogan spread to London, and the CSC office recognised 
an opportunity. Stickers were circulated through the campaign’s affiliates bearing 
the slogan (see Figure 1), and as a result, by 1979 the stickers were slapped on 
cabs and cars all around Britain. The stickers of the Northampton lorry drivers, 
though humble in conception, had a national and in turn international impact.14 
Take a sticker, or take any one of the activities for Chile in isolation, and they 
can seem futile, or simply symbolic. But as Jack Jones said in 1975: ‘The routine 
and often modest activities of the campaign of solidarity with the people of 
Chile against the Junta when “totalled across the world” have made a very 
important contribution to easing the repression of the regime.’15
The stickers were one small victory of many in the Chile solidarity movement.
14 CSC Annual report, 1977; Annual General Meeting 1979: Draft Programme of Activities for 1979, CSC, 
CSC/1/14, LHASC: Manchester; Stick by Chile in the Cab, the Highway, May 1979, CSC, CSC/7/14, LHASC, 
Manchester.
15 ‘How Solidarity has Helped Chile Fight’, Record [TGWU], February 1975, 5.
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Figure 2 A float hastily constructed for a workers’ parade in Glasgow by 
Chilean refugees.





Allende, Hortensia Widow of Salvador Allende
Allende, Salvador President of Chile, killed on the day of the military 
takeover
Angell, Alan Academic, Academics for Chile; Chilean expert
Anthony, George CSC Joint Chair with Brian Nicholson; CPGB; AUEW
Atkins, George AMWU organiser
Bachelet, Michelle A young woman at time of coup, her father was 
tortured to death. She and her mother fled to Australia. 
She went on to become President of Chile.
Baird, James (Jim) AMWU, peace activist, travelled to Chile in 1974; gave 
evidence to ILO; internationalist
Barbour Might, Dick Friend of the CSC
Beausire, William Disappeared dual British–Chilean citizen
Binns, Peter IS leader
Bolger, Bob WWFA Sydney Branch
Bower, Celia Association for British Chilean Friendship
Boyd, John AUEW
Browne, Anne CCHR, JWG; accompanied NUM delegation
Bull, Carmen Tas Bull’s widow; Argentinean by birth; used by CSCP 
for translation
Bull, Tas WWFA organiser; ALP; long-term social activist
Bunster, Alvaro Ambassador to Britain during the Allende 
administration; during the dictatorship was a popular 
speaker around Britain
Bustos, Manuel CUT, Textile Workers of Chile; emerged after the coup 
as a union leader
Carr, Barry Academic, Latin Americanist; communist sympathies; 
key individual in Melbourne solidarity movement
Carstairs, Susan CCHR
Cassidy, Sheila Detained in Chile; British subject, went on to become 
symbol of the irrationality of the Chilean regime
Clancy, Pat BWIU
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Collins, Jack NUM representative to the CSC; CPGB member
Cooper, Steve Key organiser for the CSCP in the early 1970s; lifelong 
unionist; AMWU in the 1970s; BLP left
Cornejo, Pedro CUT representative to Britain; originally adopted by 
NUPE Hammersmith
Corvalan, Luis Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Chile; 
imprisoned after coup
Creighton, Colin Sociologist; Hull Chile Solidarity
Dixon, Diane Key activist for Chile in Scotland and England; CPGB
Elgueta, Humberto CUT leader; teacher
Ferguson, Andrew ALP; radical left; organiser for the CSCP in the latter 
half of the dictatorship
Figueroa, Luis President of CUT
Fitzpatrick, Barry NATSOPA journalist; involved in the CSC as a union 
representative over many years; travelled to Chile in 
the 1980s as part of the Labour Movement Delegation
Garrett, John SPA member on the CSCP
Gatehouse, Mike Key organiser for the CSC; CPGB
Georges, George ALP; sympathetic to Chile cause; leader of 
demonstrations
Gillies, Dougal East Kilbride Works Committee member
Gonzalez, Mike Academic, Glasgow; Latin Americanist
Hargreaves, John TUC International Department
Hart, Judith BLP MP; active in Chile and Latin American causes
Hart, Steve Employed as organiser for Liberation; son of Judith
Hawke, Bob ACTU and ALP president
Healy, John WWFA Sydney Branch leader; son of Jim Healy, 
legendary WWFA leader
Heffer, Eric BLP MP Liverpool constituency; sympathetic to 
Chilean cause
Henderson, Don FDU unionist with deep interest in Chile activities
Henfrey, Colin CSCP organiser, Liverpool; academic
Hulme, Ken Trade union organiser for the CSC; activist; CPGB 
member at time of involvement
Hutchinson, Gordon Local committees and refugee portfolios within the 
CSC; JWG
Jagers, Pat WWFA Sydney Branch, SPA aligned
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Jara, Joan (Turner) Widow of Victor Jara; dancer; activist; owned Chile 
Records, a company that promoted Chilean new song
Jones, Jack TGWU; Spanish Civil War
Keenan, John Shop steward at East Kilbride Rolls Royce factory; 
BLP; AUEW; STUC
Kitson, Alex Scottish, executive officer of the TGWU; treasurer, 
CSC; involved in TUC and BLP
Levy, James Oxford academic with speciality in Chilean labour; 
organiser for Academics for Chile
Lewis, Jeannie Australian folk musician
Little, Jenny BLP international department
McCarthy, Henry AMWU and peace activist
McGahey, Mick Scottish miners’ leader
MacIntosh, Duncan CSC distribution organiser
MacIntyre, Jim TGWU; STUC
McKay, Jane Scottish communist leader; imperative to Glasgow Free 
Chile Committee and STUC
McKay, Ted NUM delegation member, 1977
McKie, Joe NUM delegation member, 1977
Martin, Billy AMWU national organiser; involved with the Chile 
movement from about 1978 onwards; Martin was given 
(according to Steve Cooper) a Golden Sombrero by the 
Latin American Community in Australia for service to 
the community
Medina, Tony Chilean refugee to Australia; a key communicator
Mitchell, Adrian Poet, playwright from Britain; activist in peace and 
disarmament causes
Moorhead, Glenn AFULE member, SPA aligned
Mulvihill, Tony ALP MP, sympathetic to the Chilean cause
Murray, Len General secretary, TUC
Nicholson, Brian TGWU member; joint secretary of the CSC; CPGB
Nolan, Jim STUC
Parry, Steve National Union of Students UK; CPGB 
Plant, Cyril TUC; ILO
Robertson, Mavis CSCP organiser; CPA member; long-term peace and 
women’s liberation activist
Sol, Raul Charismatic Chilean journalist in Britain
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Somerville, Bob Rolls Royce East Kilbride Works Committee
Thew, Angela Academic, Merseyside Chile Solidarity Committee
Toon, Ken NUM delegation member, 1977
Tyndale, Wendy Human rights activist; CCHR employee; afterwards 
employed by British Christian Aid
Wheelwright, Ted Professor at University of New South Wales; Latin 
Americanist; popular for media interviews
Woddis, Jack CPGB cadre
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